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In countries emerging from periods of armed conflict or authoritarian rule, 
efforts to address the legacies of massive human rights abuses — that is, transi-
tional justice — have taken a number of different forms. The most well-known, 
researched, and studied of these measures has been criminal prosecutions, 
particularly those carried out at the international level, such as the Nurem-
berg Tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.1 Outside the realm of 
criminal justice, truth-telling efforts, in particular truth commissions (most 
famously in South Africa and Latin America), have garnered a great deal 
of attention and study.2 Recent studies of massive reparations efforts of an 
administrative nature aimed at the victims of human rights abuses within 
countries have added to the literature on reparations, which had previously 
focused on reparations between states, particularly following World War II.3
 Vetting is another major category of transitional justice measures that 
countries in transitions to peace and/or democracy frequently employ, but 
that has been less studied than prosecutions, truth telling, and reparations. 
The term “vetting” is used in this volume to refer to processes for assessing 
an individual’s integrity as a means of determining his or her suitability for 
public employment. “Integrity” is used here to refer to “a person’s adherence 
to relevant standards of human rights and professional conduct, including 
her or his financial propriety.”4 Thus, vetting processes are aimed at screening 
public employees or candidates for public employment to determine if their 
prior conduct (including, most importantly from a transitional justice per-
spective, their respect for human rights standards) warrants their exclusion 
from public institutions. “Exclusion” here includes both terminating employ-
ment and restricting access to employment — firing and hiring. Vetting may be 
thought of primarily as a form of “administrative justice” because it involves 
the application of administrative law, which regulates the operation of admin-
istrative agencies and their relations with other branches of governments and 
the public. According to Ruti Teitel, administrative justice “illuminates law’s 
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distinctive potential for restructuring the relation of the individual to the 
political community in the transition.”5 Vetting is also inherently an element 
of institutional reform, in that even the most minor of vetting efforts will lead 
to changes in the makeup of the personnel of a public institution.6 
 There is a lack of agreement in the literature on the definition of basic 
terms, such as “vetting,” “lustration,” “screening,” “administrative justice,” and 
“purging,” which are often used interchangeably. Jon Elster, for example, refers 
to “administrative justice, that is, purges in the public administration,”7 while 
Martha Minow notes that “the removal of categories of people from public 
office or benefits” is “sometimes called a purge, and sometimes ‘lustration.’”8 
Kieran Williams, Brigid Fowler, and Aleks Szczerbiak define lustration as “the 
systematic vetting of public officials for links to the communist-era security 
services.”9 Jens Meierhenrich takes lustration to refer to “the purification of 
state institutions from within or without. The practice of lustration ordinarily 
revolves around, first, the screening of candidates for public office; second, 
the barring of candidates from public office; and third, the removal of holders 
from public office.”10 As the terms are used in this volume, purges differ from 
vetting in that purges target people for their membership in or affiliation with 
a group rather than their individual responsibility for the violation of human 
rights. Purges are most commonly associated with denazification in Germany 
and the actions taken against collaborators in France following World War II,11 
and, more recently, the de-Baathification process in Iraq. “Lustration” is used 
in this volume to refer specifically to the laws and processes that were named 
as such in the former communist countries of Eastern and Central Europe12 
(although some argue that lustration, depending on the country, straddled or 
crossed the line between vetting and purging13).
 The term “vetting” itself has been used to describe screening processes 
of public employees for criteria that do not include human rights consider-
ations, but focus instead on issues related to the security of the state, such as 
in South Africa and Northern Ireland.14 Nevertheless, there is an emerging 
concept of vetting among international actors that corresponds to the defini-
tion used here, which comes from “Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict 
Settings: Operational Guidelines,” a document produced by the ICTJ in col-
laboration with, and with the financial support of, the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme (UNDP).15 (Similar versions of these guidelines have been 
published by the UNDP16 and by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.17) Similarly, the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 report, The Rule 
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, defines vetting 
the public service as “usually entail[ing] a formal process for the identifica-
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tion and removal of individuals responsible for abuses, especially from police, 
prisons services, the army and the judiciary.” The report points out that the 
UN has been involved in such processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, 
Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Haiti.18 
 The frequency with which post-conflict and post-authoritarian coun-
tries engage in vetting processes and the growing attention they are receiving 
from international actors reflect an awareness of the relevance of vetting in 
transitions. In the words of Meierhenrich, “Although lustration is just one of 
many institutions of jus post bellum, it is arguably one of the most important. 
The pursuit of administrative justice affects the reconstitution of the pub-
lic sphere — literally and figuratively — in more fundamental ways, and thus 
more far-reaching ways, than most other institutions of transitional justice.”19 
Given the significance of vetting, it is surprising that no comprehensive, com-
parative, and thematic study exists on the subject. 
 This volume, which is one of the end products of a multiyear research proj-
ect undertaken by the International Center for Transitional Justice, aims to fill 
this research gap. It contains nine country-specific case studies: Argentina, El 
Salvador, Greece, South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Poland, Hungary, the 
Czech Republic, and East Germany. Four of the cases come from former com-
munist countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and focus on the lustration 
and vetting laws and procedures developed there; they provide a revealing 
comparison of how vetting processes can differ in similar contexts. The cases 
of El Salvador and Bosnia and Herzegovina provide us with two examples of 
how vetting may play out in post-conflict societies (Bosnia and Herzegovina 
also representing a post-communist situation), in which international actors 
tend to have a more important role. Argentina, Greece, and South Africa are 
cases of non-communist, post-authoritarian transitions (South Africa and 
Argentina representing both post-authoritarian and post-conflict situations), 
although their differences make them difficult to group together. What is 
apparent from these three cases, however, is the significant role that transi-
tional politics play in shaping and limiting the extent of vetting processes. 
 The project’s case studies constituted a first phase of research, which 
revealed that vetting is much more than a mere technical exercise in per-
sonnel reform. A second phase of the research project, therefore, aimed to 
address the broader, key practical, political, legal, and moral issues in order 
to clarify a number of fundamental conceptual questions related to vetting 
as a measure of transitional justice. This second phase included four thematic 
studies focusing on issues that cut across the case studies and frequently arise 
in the design and implementation of vetting programs: information gathering 
dUThIE
20
and management; due process; vetting and its relationship with other institu-
tional reforms; and vetting and transitional justice. 
 In practice, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to vetting; in each case, 
the designers of a vetting process must make a number of basic decisions con-
cerning what they want to achieve and how they want to achieve it. In the fol-
lowing sections, I briefly discuss nine basic decisions, as well as how they have 
in fact been made in the cases in this volume. These are:
• Targets: What are the institutions and positions to be vetted?
• Criteria: What misconduct is being screened for?
• Sanctions: What happens to positively vetted individuals? 
• Design: What are the type, structure, and procedures of the vetting 
process?
• Scope: How many people are screened? How many people are 
sanctioned?
• Timing and Duration: When does vetting occur and how long does it 
last?
• Rationale: How is vetting justified? What are the reasons for vetting?
• Coherence: How does the vetting relate to other measures of institutional 
reform? How does it relate to other transitional justice measures?
All of these decisions will be affected by the transitional context in which vet-
ting occurs; I therefore conclude with some comments about such contexts. 
An examination of how these decisions have been approached reveals that, 
strictly speaking, the processes described in this volume do not always fol-
low the same definition of vetting. Sanctions, for example, may not necessar-
ily involve exclusion, but rather public disclosure or transfers within the pub-
lic sector. The conduct being screened for may tend toward affiliation rather 
than abuses. Nonetheless, in every case included in this volume, the effort to 
reform institutions in the transition out of war or authoritarianism involved 
certain processes that we can describe as vetting or that function similarly to 
vetting. This is the case even in South Africa and Argentina, where politics 
blocked formal vetting as a potential avenue for the pursuit of justice. 
targets: what are the institutions and positions  
to be vetted?
Vetting refers to processes applied to the public sector within a given country. 
There is no case of vetting in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian transition, 
however, in which vetting has been applied to the entire public sector. Vetting 
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processes are applied only to certain institutions. Furthermore, as the “Vetting 
Guidelines” in this volume explain, vetting can target an entire institution, or 
it can target only certain positions within an institution or certain categories 
across institutions. The decision may depend on available resources, politi-
cal considerations, or the human rights records of certain units. Whatever the 
case, a “clear definition of the positions subject to vetting is a prerequisite for 
any vetting process.”20
 From a human rights perspective, the most important institutions to be 
vetted would be those most responsible for having committed human rights 
violations, or for allowing them to occur, under the previous regime or dur-
ing the conflict. In post-conflict situations, therefore, vetting tends to focus 
on those institutions implicated in serious, violent human rights abuses, pri-
marily in the security sector and judicial sector institutions. In El Salvador, for 
example, following the twelve-year-long civil war, vetting processes occurred 
in the early 1990s in the armed forces and as part of the creation of a new civil-
ian police force, and were accompanied by limited mechanisms to improve 
judicial accountability. In post-Dayton Agreement Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
where, according to Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, in this volume, “the police did 
not enforce the law impartially and the courts did not fairly render justice,” 
and consequently, “public confidence in the rule of law remained low,” vetting 
processes focused on the police and the judiciary.
 In some post-authoritarian cases, where less violent misconduct such as 
collaboration may have implicated members of a wider range of institutions, 
vetting can also take on a broader range of targets, including electoral posts, 
universities, and the media. In the Czech Republic, for example, the lustration 
procedure reached a “wide range of public offices,” according to Jiri Priban in 
this volume, including the judiciary and prosecution office, the civil service, 
constitutional bodies, the army and police, intelligence services, the national 
bank, the state media, press agencies, state corporations, universities, and the 
Academy of Sciences. In Hungary, those affected have included members of 
parliament; ombudsmen, members of the Constitutional Court, the president 
and vice president of the Supreme Court, and the chief prosecutor; the pub-
lic administration at the highest level, including the president and members 
of the cabinet; the police; and the media. Screening of the media in Hungary 
eventually included, according to Act No. XCIII (2000), “those who have the 
effect to influence the political public opinion either directly or indirectly.”21 
In Poland, the lustration statute stated that persons holding public offices had 
to make lustration declarations, including the president, members of par-
liament, and senators; the head of the civil service; directors in ministries, 
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central offices, and state regional administrations; judges, procurators, and 
advocates; and certain members of the media.22 
 Vetting in post-authoritarian countries, however, is not always applied so 
broadly across public institutions. In Greece, for example, explains Dimitri 
Sotiropoulos in this volume, “vetting has led to different outcomes in vari-
ous political and administrative institutions.” There, vetting was applied to 
universities, the justice system, the military, and the police and gendarmerie; 
although the government passed specific legislation regarding only the vet-
ting of academics and judges, the processes themselves ended up being most 
extensive in the universities and military. In unified Germany, explains Chris-
tiane Wilke in her chapter, vetting had a profound impact within the public 
sector, including universities, but it was applied unevenly at different levels 
of the system.23 In post-Apartheid South Africa, which straddled the line 
between a post-authoritarian and post-conflict case, and in Argentina, broad 
decisions were made against vetting the public sector at all.24
criteria: what misconduct is being screened for?
The criteria of a vetting effort are the specific types of misconduct that vetting 
authorities look for in an individual’s past. Each vetting process operates on 
the basis of certain criteria. These also vary across institutions, transitional 
contexts, and time. In post-communist Eastern Europe, for example, authori-
ties often vetted for evidence of nonviolent actions that constituted violations 
of “public trust,” such as past collaboration with secret service institutions, 
while in post-conflict countries members of security institutions have been 
screened for violent abuses, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
crimes of genocide. 
 There should be certain minimum standards of integrity, however. Accord-
ing to the “Vetting Guidelines”: 
As a general rule, involvement in gross violations of human rights or 
serious crimes under international law should always disqualify a per-
son from public employment. These include in particular genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, extrajudicial execution, torture 
and similar cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, enforced disap-
pearance, and slavery. These are serious crimes which indicate a lack 
of integrity at a level that fundamentally affects a person’s credibility to 
hold public service.
23
INTROdUCTION
Decisions concerning minimum criteria can be informed by international 
laws and norms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, the police certifica-
tion program excluded officers who had committed “acts and/or omissions, 
and/or functions from the period of April 1992 to December 1995, which 
demonstrate the inability or unwillingness to uphold internationally recog-
nized human rights standards.”25 Similarly, in Argentina, where challenges 
to candidates for elected posts have revolved around the definition and reach 
of the term “suitability,” which is a requirement under the National Consti-
tution, links have been made to international human rights instruments and 
international human rights law.26
 The determination of criteria, however, is often politically contested and 
controversial; understandably so, because these criteria reflect one way for 
a society to judge what was morally (if not necessarily criminally) unaccept-
able behavior in the past, as well as what the minimum standards of integrity 
in public institutions will be in the future. As Sotiropoulos comments in his 
chapter on Greece: 
Where should the vetting process stop in regard to persons who worked 
for the authoritarian regime?. . . Even though one should differentiate, 
for example, between a military general and a conscript (hierarchical 
differentiation), as well as between a policeman who escorts a member 
of the democratic resistance to the torture chamber and a janitor of an 
armaments factory (sectoral differentiation), it is not easy to arrive at a 
consensus about where to draw the line.
Furthermore, the determination of vetting criteria will depend upon what can 
be feasibly implemented. As the “Vetting Guidelines” point out, “An integrity 
standard that is difficult to verify is unlikely to be useable in practice.” Serge 
Rumin demonstrates in his chapter on information management that vetting 
relies on the availability, reliability, and measurability of information and 
evidence. 
 In Greece, for example, institutions were screened only for people who 
had actively supported or identified with the junta, notes Sotiropoulos, in part 
because it would have been impossible to measure the actual support for the 
regime of the much larger number of officials who simply continued work-
ing for the state apparatus “as they would have done for any kind of rule.” In 
Germany, formal vetting criteria were established, but in practice “evidentiary 
problems” limited which criteria could actually be applied. As Wilke explains, 
the Ministry of State Security (Stasi or MfS) files, which were the most 
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accessible files, provided “the single most used and reliable source for the vet-
ting process.” As a result, broader “public discussions about culpability, col-
laboration, and suitability for public office narrowed down” to one category of 
misconduct, namely, working for or collaborating with the Stasi. In the Czech 
Republic, the feasibility of verifying criteria actually led to a change in the 
law. Initially, the lustration law disqualified from holding public office those 
who had held positions in a political body or the repressive secret police, state 
security, and intelligence forces, as well as those who had collaborated with 
these entities. It turned out, however, that it was often technically impossible 
to distinguish between someone who had collaborated and someone who had 
in fact been a victim of the secret police, due to the unreliability of the secret 
police files; as a result, the criterion of collaboration became so controversial 
that it was annulled.27
sanctions: what happens to positively vetted individuals? 
Vetting efforts also vary in an important, yet often underemphasized way — the 
sanction applied to individuals whose vetting results are positive. Positive vet-
ting results lead not only to the exclusion or the removal of the public official 
from his or her post, but to a range of other sanctions as well. The nature of 
the sanction is important directly and symbolically for both individuals and 
the process as a whole. If the vetting has a punitive rationale (see below), then 
it matters whether a person is fired, suspended, offered a retirement package, 
transferred, given less responsibility, or simply has his or her past exposed. If 
the vetting is aimed at transforming institutions in order to prevent the recur-
rence of abuses, then it matters whether those who committed past abuses 
are actually removed from those institutions or not. 
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, police officers who did not receive certifica-
tion were no longer authorized to exercise police powers; they were termi-
nated from employment and were not allowed to work with any law enforce-
ment agency in the country. All judges and prosecutors had to reapply for 
their own positions as part of an open competition, and while some were not 
reappointed on the basis of “incriminating conflict-related information,” this 
was not made explicit and did not prohibit them from future appointments. 
As Mayer-Rieckh notes, some have called these exclusions “nonprosecutorial 
sanctions.” In El Salvador, the Ad Hoc Commission recommended that 103 
officers be “transferred or dismissed”; some were sent abroad to diplomatic 
posts, some were retired from active duty, and some initially took leave with 
pay and retired later.28 In Greece, as Sotiropoulos explains, “removal or dis-
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qualification” covered a range of sanctions, including “placement in inactive 
rosters, forced retirement, transfer to insignificant posts, annulment of pro-
motion, or temporary suspension of duty.” In Argentina, successful impug-
naciones have led to military promotions being rejected, with no further con-
sequences necessarily stemming from this rejection (although it is assumed 
that, given the reasons for the failure to gain the promotion, military careers 
will come to an end).29
 In the former communist countries in Eastern Europe, as well, vetting and 
lustration sanctions spanned the full spectrum. In the Czech Republic, what 
some refer to as “radical” lustration involved disqualification from holding 
office.30 In Germany, employees who were to be dismissed were often offered 
the option of consensually terminating their contract rather than being fired, 
a move that would avoid the stigma of being fired but would also forfeit their 
ability to challenge the decision in court. In some places, many people who 
thought they would be exposed by the vetting procedure preemptively quit 
and took jobs elsewhere; these numbers would not show up in official vet-
ting figures but can still be considered representative of people indirectly 
sanctioned.31 In Poland, what Adam Czarnota in his chapter in this volume 
calls “soft” lustration did not punish previous actions at all, only a “lustration 
lie”; those who made truthful declarations of collaboration with the secret 
services suffered no immediate consequences, since the system was designed 
to let the electorate decide whether someone with that past deserved to be 
voted into office. It was only those whose lustration declarations were deter-
mined to be false who lost their jobs as well as the “moral qualification to hold 
public office and a ban on holding one for ten years.”32 Hungary, finally, actu-
ally implemented a process referred to as “sanctionless lustration,” whereby 
individuals who were determined to have performed the activity in question 
were given the option of resigning or having the decision of the commission 
made public; “those who leave their office voluntarily are exempted from the 
explicit sanction of the law,” write Elizabeth Barrett, Péter Hack, and Ágnes 
Munkácsi.
design: what are the different types of vetting processes, 
their structures, and procedures?
Vetting measures also differ greatly in terms of their design. At a broad level, 
the most common type of vetting process is an administrative review of the 
past activities of the employees of a public institution. Such reviews occurred 
in various forms in East Germany, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
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Poland, and El Salvador. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, a review pro-
cess for the police was designed and implemented alongside a reappointment 
process for the judiciary and courts, in which all judges and prosecutors were 
removed from their positions and had to reapply in an open competition.33 In 
Argentina, where a comprehensive review or reappointment process has not 
been politically possible, human rights groups have managed to use existing 
institutional mechanisms to challenge, through a process of impugnación, the 
promotion of military officers against whom there is evidence of past human 
rights abuses, as well as the credentials of candidates for elected office who 
are ethically unsuitable for similar reasons.34
 Within these broad types, however, there will also be different structures 
and procedures. As the “Vetting Guidelines” point out, it may be possible 
in certain instances to use existing procedures and bodies to screen public 
employees. In most cases, however, a new set of procedures is developed and 
at least one vetting body is created to perform or oversee the process; such 
bodies must have their members selected, staffs hired, financial and material 
resources apportioned, and security provided. In Germany, explains Wilke, 
two basic models of vetting commissions were employed “in response to dif-
ferent institutional demands and structures”: an administrative one, com-
posed of unelected members of the institution; and a pluralistic one, com-
posed of a mixture of elected and appointed members of the institution to be 
vetted and outsiders with professional expertise. Furthermore, vetting bodies 
can be centralized in one commission handling vetting for all public institu-
tions, or they can be more decentralized and deal with vetting in one sector 
or one institution only. In the formerly communist countries of the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Hungary, for example, the review processes were cen-
tralized; in Germany and Greece, in contrast, the case study authors describe 
the vetting as “decentralized” and “fragmented.”35 
 Crucial to how vetting is designed and implemented, from a transitional 
justice perspective, are the procedural standards that the process maintains. 
As both Federico Andreu-Guzmán and the “Vetting Guidelines” point out in 
this volume, it is procedural guarantees that distinguish vetting from purges by 
ensuring that they conform to international human rights standards. Accord-
ing to Andreu-Guzmán, a fair and equitable vetting process will be one that 
is legitimate, safeguards human rights, is objective, is governed by the rule 
of law, is based on the principle of individual responsibility, and is relatively 
autonomous from criminal and regular disciplinary procedures. The specific 
minimal procedural guarantees necessary to achieve this in a vetting process 
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that involves removal or dismissal of employees, he argues, include the right 
to appeal an adverse decision to a court. Procedural guarantees should also be 
considered in relation to vetting sanctions: the more severe the sanction, the 
more rigorous should be the due process standards.
scope: how many people are actually vetted?
Scope refers to the size, extent, or reach of a vetting process, in terms of the 
number of individuals actually vetted. The measurable size of a vetting pro-
cess includes both the number of people who are screened and the number of 
people who are positively identified as having engaged in the activity in ques-
tion and who may then subsequently receive sanction. The scope of vetting 
processes varies widely across the cases; it is a function of decisions about the 
institutions and positions to be screened and the chosen criteria. And, as with 
many other elements of vetting, the actual number of people affected by vet-
ting will also depend on other factors, such as the availability and reliability of 
information.36 
 In post-apartheid South Africa, Jonathan Klaaren argues in this volume, 
where there was a choice made against vetting, and where public institutions 
transformed themselves primarily through processes of affirmative action 
and “rationalization” (integrating the apartheid-era public services), there 
were still some personnel selection procedures that, in certain instances, con-
cerned themselves with human rights issues. The closest thing to vetting in 
the South Africa case was the Goldstone Commission, a judicial commission 
of inquiry, the work of which led to the dismissal of twenty-three senior com-
manders of the military intelligence.37 In El Salvador, the Ad Hoc Commission 
requested information on the army officer corps of more than 2,000 individ-
uals, but carried out interviews of only some of them; 103 of those were either 
dismissed or transferred for committing human rights violations.38
 More extensively, in Poland, where vetting is still ongoing, close to 24,000 
individuals had completed lustration declarations by the time of writing; by 
2004, 278 of these declarations had been positive and the Lustration Court 
had ruled on 103 cases of negative declarations, finding 53 of them untrue.39 
In East Germany, Wilke provides the figures for two city administrations. In 
Greifswald, out of 1,553 screened employees, 58 people were identified as hav-
ing worked for the Stasi, and 18 of them were dismissed (5 of whom success-
fully sued for continued employment). In Dresden, about 520 out of 18,000 
employees in 1990 lost their jobs because of vetting. In the East German 
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institutions examined by Wilke, however, “the numbers of dismissals were 
small in comparison to the job losses caused by shrinking public budgets.” 
 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, vetting was more comprehensive in the sectors 
in which it was applied. Between 1999 and 2002, the United Nations Mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina screened all 23,751 employees of the ministries of 
interior who presented themselves for the certification process; certification 
was denied to 481 officers. In the judiciary, between 2002 and 2004 the High 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils had to review the applications of approxi-
mately two thousand persons for appointment and reappointment to judi-
cial and prosecutorial positions; 30% of incumbents were not reappointed, 
although only at times was this because of war-related misconduct.40 In the 
Czech Republic, finally, at the larger end of the spectrum, rates of disqualifi-
cation ranging between only 3% and 5% still mean that tens of thousands of 
people from a number of different government institutions have been barred 
from holding public office, as the total number vetted has reached over four 
hundred thousand.41
 If a vetting process restricts its criteria for exclusion to individual behavior, 
then the percentages of each institution’s personnel that are dismissed tend to 
be quite small. Nevertheless, vetting may, in certain cases, lead to the dismissal 
of an “unacceptably large number of employees,”42 doing harm to the capac-
ity of institutions — capacity that less-developed countries may not be able 
to do without.43 Such “human capital costs” may be particularly high when 
institutions are purged rather than vetted.44 In Iraq, for example, despite the 
concerns of Iraqis and outside observers about the effects that a wide-scale de-
Baathification policy would have on the country’s ability to rebuild itself, the 
Coalition Provisional Authority ordered such a policy, which led to the firing 
of approximately thirty thousand former members of the Baath Party, includ-
ing six thousand to twelve thousand educators. Concerns over the negative 
impact of the process later led to the return to their jobs of thousands of those 
dismissed.45 At the same time, however, if most individuals in a particular 
institution do fit the individual criteria for exclusion, a vetting program would 
have to weigh the human capital costs of firing them all against the damage 
that would be done to the institution’s legitimacy if they all remained.
timing and duration: when does vetting occur  
and how long does it last?
The case studies demonstrate that vetting processes differ widely in their tim-
ing and duration. Timing refers to when, during a transition, vetting begins; 
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duration refers to how long the process lasts. The timing and duration of vet-
ting will usually reflect the political landscape of the transition period; they 
will also be determined in part by other characteristics of the process, such as 
the numbers of institutions, positions, and people to be vetted.
 In Greece, vetting of the academic community began swiftly, with leg-
islation being passed within weeks of the collapse of the military regime 
in 1974, and lasted ten months. In the military, vetting proceeded gradually 
and in piecemeal fashion until the aftermath of an aborted coup in Febru-
ary 1975. Similarly, in El Salvador, the Ad Hoc Commission, which vetted the 
military, began working in May 1992, just four months after the final peace 
accord was signed; it was initially to last only three months and was then 
extended for another month, delivering its final report in September of the 
same year.46
 In Poland, on the other hand, the lustration law did not become valid 
until 1997 and was not enforced until 1999, nine years after the issue was 
first raised. At the time of writing, it had been in operation for six years, 
and there are discussions of broadening the process, sixteen years after the 
beginning of the transition. In Hungary, demand for lustration began in 
1990, but the first law was not passed until 1994; lustration remains a high-
profile issue sixteen years after the fall of communism, as new cases con-
tinue to arise. In Argentina, politicians and human rights organizations have 
been challenging military promotions for individuals accused of commit-
ting human rights violations since 1984, one year after the fall of the military 
dictatorship.47
 Timing can be important because of its potential impact on institutions. 
Individuals who are excluded from institutions early on in a transition will 
generally have less influence in the design and building up of those institu-
tions than individuals who are excluded later. In Poland, for example, the fact 
that vetting was delayed for almost a decade meant the continued influence of 
members of the communist regime in the post-communist government struc-
tures. As Czarnota argues, in his chapter on Poland, “One of the critical fac-
tors in determining the effectiveness of lustration, particularly when the aim 
is to eliminate dangers to the new regime, is timing.” Duration, for its part, is 
worth considering because of how it may affect the general perception and 
understanding of vetting’s rationale. In the Czech Republic, writes Priban, the 
continued prolongation of the lustration law was “widely criticized as con-
tradicting its original purpose and spirit. One of the main justifications of the 
law at the time of its drafting, which emphasized only a temporary effect of its 
discriminatory measures, thus turned out to be false.”
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rationale: what are the reasons for vetting?
The primary outcomes of a vetting process exist at the individual and institu-
tional levels: individuals will be screened and sanctioned, which will generally 
have at least some impact on the institution. But what is the rationale for engag-
ing in vetting? As mentioned above, the reasons for vetting public institutions 
can be numerous and contested. They can be both broad and long term, as 
well as narrow and short term, and they can change over time. One can, none-
theless, draw conclusions about the rationale behind vetting programs from 
the demands made by the public, justifications made by the politicians and 
designers, the mandates and legislation, and the nature of the process itself. 
At a broad level, the case studies in this volume suggest at least two important 
reasons for vetting: to punish the perpetrators, and to transform institutions 
in order both to safeguard the democratic transition and to prevent the recur-
rence of human rights abuses. These rationales are not mutually exclusive, 
and they are not necessarily considered with equal weight. 
 Some see a clear, nonpunitive, primary rationale behind vetting. In Greece, 
writes Sotiropoulos, vetting “does not have a punitive rationale. . . . The ratio-
nale for vetting is linked to the legitimacy of the new democratic regime.” 
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mayer-Rieckh argues that the main 
purpose of vetting was to build fair and effective institutions that would pre-
vent future recurrences of human rights abuse, rather than punishment. In 
the Czech Republic, explains Priban, the lustration law was initially motivated 
as a response to the less fair and unregulated practice of “wild lustration,” 
political instability, and public concern with the potential damage that the 
presence of secret police agents could have within the new democratic insti-
tutions and processes. According to a judgment of the Czech Constitutional 
Court in 2001, the lustration law still had a “legitimate aim, which is the active 
protection of a democratic state from the dangers which could be brought to 
it by insufficiently loyal and little trustworthy public services.”48 According to 
Pablo de Greiff, in his chapter in this volume, the most defensible of the vari-
ous justifications for engaging in vetting is that it may prevent the recurrence 
of human rights violations, not by deterring individual behavior, but by help-
ing to dismantle networks of criminal activity.
 The reasons for vetting are not always agreed to by all, however, and they 
can change over time. In Poland, for example, says Czarnota, while “the aim of 
the lustration law was the security of the state and the elimination of poten-
tial political blackmail,” “in Polish public opinion there is another aim that 
is not explicitly stated in the statute, namely the realization of some sort of 
transitional justice.” Similarly, in East Germany, a gap existed between those 
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who conceptualized vetting as quasi-retributive and those who saw it as a 
way to measure loyalty to the state. In this case, the degree to which these 
different understandings of the rationale of vetting affected its implementa-
tion changed as the transition progressed. As time passed, the initial social 
understanding of vetting, which was “self-consciously retributive,” gave way 
to a more legal understanding of vetting, through which it was, according to 
Wilke, “codified and implemented with a utilitarian and prospective concern 
about the establishment of a loyal and credible service.” This was partly due 
to political changes but also partly due to the idea that the passage of time 
allowed an individual to demonstrate that he or she could act according to the 
new society’s laws and norms. In Hungary, write the case study authors, the 
lustration debate began with a concern over blackmail and only later with a 
“general moral cleansing.”49
coherence: how does vetting relate to other measures  
of institutional reform? how does it relate to other  
transitional justice measures?
The coherence of a vetting program refers to its relationship with broader pro-
grams of institutional reform and transitional justice. As mentioned above, 
vetting has an institutional impact and is therefore an element of institutional 
reform. Mayer-Rieckh explains, however, that vetting can be implemented as 
a stand-alone measure or as part of a broader program of institutional reform 
that seeks to change an organization’s structure and mandate. This degree 
of coherence has implications regarding a vetting program’s rationale. In his 
chapter on this topic, Mayer-Rieckh argues, “as a stand-alone measure, vet-
ting is generally insufficient to ensure that abuses are not repeated. A coher-
ent and holistic approach to transitional reform is necessary — albeit not 
sufficient — to effectively prevent abuses from recurring.” Other reform mea-
sures that reinforce vetting in the aftermath of massive abuse, he explains, are 
those seeking to improve accountability, independence, representation, and 
responsiveness. 
 In the cases in this volume, vetting has been implemented in varying 
degrees alongside or as part of a broader program of institutional reform. 
In South Africa, institutional reform was only in small part concerned with 
human rights violations and cleansing the public sector of people with certain 
backgrounds.50 In Germany, according to Wilke, where vetting did focus on 
people’s past wrongdoing, vetting in the public sector was still only “the first 
step in a large-scale process of restructuring and personnel reduction.” Just 
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how much a vetting process is part of a larger program of institutional reform 
will depend on a number of factors, such as the particular model employed. A 
reappointment process, such as that used in the judiciary of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, explains Mayer-Rieckh, in general provides a “better opportunity” 
than a review process to implement other reforms such as those addressing 
gender and ethnic imbalances. 
 Vetting is a measure of institutional reform, and institutional reform, in 
turn, can be an element of a comprehensive transitional justice policy. De 
Greiff discusses this type of coherence in his chapter in this volume. At the 
pragmatic level, according to him, vetting can “facilitate the application” of 
other measures of transitional justice, in particular criminal prosecutions, 
truth-telling efforts, and reparations to victims, and in this sense act as an 
“enabling condition.” Conceptually as well, argues de Greiff, vetting relates to 
other transitional justice measures through its trust-inducing potential. 
 Support for such a holistic approach to transitional justice, which suggests 
that the different measures reinforce each other and are insufficient on their 
own, can be found in the case studies. In El Salvador, for example, the report 
of the truth commission, which named names and provided a systematic cri-
tique of the armed forces, gave impetus to the wholesale vetting of the mili-
tary leadership.51
 It seems that incoherence with other transitional justice measures, how-
ever, is more often the case. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
there has been so far little else in the way of transitional justice. In Greece, 
prosecutions did accompany vetting, but only for a small circle at the lead-
ership level.52 In Germany, Wilke argues that the failure to prosecute those 
who were politically responsible while dismissing low-level informers from 
their jobs was seen to undermine the legitimacy of the vetting process. In 
Argentina, the lack of established criminal responsibility actually hindered 
vetting efforts that could have relied on the evidence generated by trials. As 
Barbuto explains, it may be precisely because a “process of impunity” has 
lasted for more than twenty years that efforts to hold people accountable 
within the political sphere have also lasted so long and been the subject of so 
much debate. 
transitional context
Finally, it must be remembered that decisions about vetting processes take 
place within a broader context of the political transition that the country is 
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undergoing. This context can affect the design, implementation, and outcome 
of the vetting process in a number of ways. First, at a broad level, transitions 
from war to peace provide a sometimes very different context than transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy.53 This can influence vetting processes in 
a number of ways, such as criteria and scope. In post-authoritarian societies, 
for example, as mentioned above, vetting is more likely to involve screening 
members of public institutions for evidence of nonviolent forms of collabora-
tion with the former regime, while post-conflict societies tend toward screen-
ing for violent, gross human rights violations. At the same time, however, 
post-authoritarian vetting, while searching for more “moderate” crimes, will 
often cast a much larger net because many more citizens are implicated.
 Furthermore, the type of transition can shape the challenges and debates 
that vetting efforts will confront. As Rumin explains in his chapter on gath-
ering and managing information, the nature of a vetting process will always 
be at least partially a function of the information that is available, which, 
in turn, will be partially a function of the nature of the former regime. The 
post-authoritarian governments in the former communist countries in East-
ern Europe had at their disposal overwhelming amounts of secret police files 
on their citizens, files which are of uncertain reliability but are often the sub-
ject of much political debate and controversy. Post-conflict governments, on 
the other hand, are often faced with an almost complete absence of records. 
Instead of deciding how to handle mountains of evidence, they must design 
vetting processes with an eye to gathering whatever information they can, 
through the use of such tools as questionnaires. Of course, this will not nec-
essarily be the case. In Argentina, for example, the clandestine character of 
state terror meant that hardly any official information at all was available, 
which meant that human rights groups had to rely on the information they 
themselves had gathered in order to challenge the integrity of members of the 
military.54
 Second, the specific political context in which the transition occurs can 
affect the nature of a vetting process. For example, in El Salvador and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, where international actors played important roles in the 
respective peace processes, vetting processes were initiated in large part due 
to strong international pressure (and in the latter, were largely controlled by 
international actors55). In Greece and Argentina, political considerations lim-
ited the transitional governments’ desire and/or ability to apply more exten-
sive vetting efforts; in Greece, political stability in the face of tense relations 
with Turkey and preparation for integration into the European Economic 
Community was the top priority; in Argentina, in the immediate aftermath 
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of the transition, the power retained by the military and particularly its threat 
of uprising constrained the government’s ability to pursue formal vetting.56 
In post-communist Eastern Europe, some commentators have argued that 
variation in the timing and form of lustration can best be explained by privi-
leging “the dynamics of post-communist politics” over more historical fac-
tors such as the “mode of exit” from communism.57 In South Africa, finally, 
Jonathan Klaaren argues that a choice was made against vetting as part of the 
larger political compromise that ended years of conflict, authoritarianism, 
and apartheid. 
35
INTROdUCTION
notes
1  For a study of war crimes tribunals since World War I, see Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of 
Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2001). For analyses of recent criminal prosecutions in the aftermath of conflict, see the 
first three studies on Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone in the ICTJ’s Prosecutions 
Case Studies Series (New York: ICTJ, March 2006). 
2  For a study of truth commissions, see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the 
Challenge of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
3  For the most comprehensive study of massive reparations programs, see Pablo de 
Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), which 
resulted from a multiyear research project conducted by the ICTJ. See also K. De Feyter, 
S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens, eds., Out of the Ashes: Reparation for Victims 
of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2005). 
4  ICTJ, “Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines,” in 
this volume, hereinafter “Vetting Guidelines.”
5  Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 8. Lustrations 
in the Czech Republic are described as an “administrative law measure,” in that each 
one is “an administrative decision that states facts important for legal qualification for 
certain jobs in state administration and state-owned companies”; see chapter by Priban 
in this volume. Vetting is also related to criminal justice in a number of different ways 
and, to be done fairly, requires procedural justice; see chapter by Andreu-Guzmán in 
this volume. Vetting can also be conceived of as other forms of justice, such as retribu-
tive justice, in that it punishes perpetrators, or distributional justice, in that it can lead 
to the redistribution of resources. 
6  See chapter by Mayer-Rieckh on Bosnia and Herzegovina in this volume. 
7  Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 92. 
8  Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 136. 
9  Kieran Williams, Brigid Fowler, and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Explaining Lustration in Cen-
tral Europe: A ‘Post-communist Politics’ Approach,” Democratization 12, no. 1 (2005): 
22–43, at 23.
10  Jens Meierhenrich, “The Ethics of Lustration,” Ethics and International Affairs 20, no. 1 
(Spring 2006): 99–120, at 99.
11  See David Cohen, “Transitional Justice in Divided Germany after 1945,” and Henry 
Rousso, “The Purge in France: An Incomplete Story,” in Retribution and Reparation in 
the Transition to Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
dUThIE
36
12  See the chapters on the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in this volume; Williams, 
Fowler, and Szczerbiak, “Explaining Lustration in Central Europe”; and Tina Rosen-
berg, The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts after Communism (New York: Vintage, 
1996). 
13  See chapter by Andreu-Guzmán in this volume. 
14  For South Africa, see chapter by Klaaren in this volume; for Northern Ireland, see 
Kieran McEvoy and Ciaran White, “Security Vetting in Northern Ireland: Loyalty, 
Redress and Citizenship,” The Modern Law Review 61, no. 3 (1998): 341–61. 
15  Hereafter, “Vetting Guidelines.” Although these refer directly to vetting in post-conflict 
situations only, their development benefited substantively from all the country case 
studies in this volume. They represent an effort both to establish more firmly the con-
cept of vetting and to make this concept operational.
16  Available at http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/trans_justice/Vetting_Public_
Employees_in_Post-Conflict_Settings.pdf.
17  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Con-
flict States — Vetting: An Operational Framework (New York and Geneva: OHCHR, 2006). 
18  United Nations Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-conflict Societies, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2004/616, August 23, 
2004, 17–18.
19  Meierhenrich, “The Ethics of Lustration,” 103.
20  “Vetting Guidelines” in this volume.
21  See the chapter by Barrett, Hack, and Munkácsi in this volume.
22  See the chapter by Czarnota in this volume. It is only in Hungary and Poland that 
elected offices were subject to vetting; it is in these countries, however, that a positive 
result itself carried no direct punishment (see the section on sanctions below).
23  Wilke points out one implication of uneven application of vetting: the federal unem-
ployment offices, which were not vetted before the mid-1990s at all, provided an ave-
nue of employment, or a “safe haven,” for individuals dismissed elsewhere in the public 
sector.
24  The South African government did end up dismissing twenty-three officers from 
military intelligence, but this was in response to public pressure and not an example 
of systematic vetting; see chapter by Klaaren in this volume. In Argentina, efforts 
have been made to challenge military promotions and candidates for elected office, 
but again these are not formal vetting processes; see chapter by Barbuto in this 
volume.
25  International Police Task Force Policy P10/2002, para. 2(h); see chapter by Mayer-Rieckh 
in this volume.
26  See chapter by Barbuto in this volume.
27  See chapter by Priban in this volume.
37
INTROdUCTION
28  See chapter by Zamora with David Holiday in this volume.
29  See chapter by Barbuto in this volume.
30  See chapter by Priban in this volume.
31  See chapter by Wilke in this volume.
32  Some individual institutions on their own decided to fire or otherwise sanction employ-
ees who had made positive declarations — a “side effect” or “extension of the lustration 
statute”; see chapter by Czarnota in this volume.
33  See chapter by Mayer-Rieckh on Bosnia and Herzegovina in this volume. For a com-
parison of review and reappointment process, see Mayer-Rieckh’s chapter on vetting 
and other transitional reforms in this volume.
34  See chapter by Barbuto in this volume.
35  Germany also provides several examples of what might be called an “unofficial reap-
pointment” process. There, a number of university departments were completely dis-
solved purportedly because they were superfluous — as part of the “unraveling,” or 
Abwicklung — but were soon thereafter reopened, says Wilke, which “raised the ques-
tion whether wholesale Abwicklung was used to circumvent the requirement of indi-
vidual review before dismissing employees;” see her chapter in this volume. 
36  In Hungary, for example, proof of “lustratable” activity included signed declarations 
or reports of activity, but, suggest the case study authors, given the “great numbers of 
documents destroyed, it is perhaps not surprising that such extensive proof of involve-
ment was found only rarely.” See chapter by Barrett, Hack, and Munkácsi in this vol-
ume; see also chapter by Rumin in this volume. 
37  See chapter by Klaaren in this volume. 
38  See chapter by Zamora with Holiday in this volume. 
39  See chapter by Czarnota in this volume.
40  See chapter by Mayer-Rieckh on Bosnia and Herzegovina in this volume. 
41  See chapter by Priban in this volume.
42  “Vetting Guidelines” in this volume. 
43  South Africa, for example, according to Maryam Kamali, chose not to implement a for-
mal vetting process in part for such practical reasons: it “could not afford to dismiss 
large numbers of its professionals until a new generation of qualified professionals 
became available.” Germany, on the other hand, could afford vetting because it “had 
cadres of willing and qualified unemployed professionals in the western part of the 
country ready to take over.” Maryam Kamali, “Accountability for Human Rights Viola-
tions: A Comparison of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa,” Colum-
bia Journal of Transnational Law 40 (2001): 89–141, at 136.
44  As Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne explain, “Human capital resided in individuals 
who had to work within the system. . . . Eradicating those tied to the system indiscrimi-
nately will result in a loss of human capital that will be counter-productive to future 
reform.” Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne, “The Political Economy of Forgiveness: 
The Necessity of Post-Atrocity Reconciliation,” Society 44, no. 2 (2007 forthcoming).
45  Eric Stover, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti, “Bremer’s ‘Gordian Knot’: Transitional 
Justice and the U.S. Occupation of Iraq,” Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (August 2005): 
830–57.
46  See chapters by Sotiropoulos and Zamora with Holiday in this volume. 
47  See chapters by Czarnota; Barrett, Hack, and Munkácsi; and Barbuto in this volume. 
48  Quoted in the chapter by Priban in this volume. 
49  See chapter by Barrett, Hack, and Munkácsi in this volume. 
50  See chapter by Klaaren in this volume. 
51  See chapter by Zamora with Holiday in this volume.
52  See chapters by Mayer-Rieckh on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sotiropoulos in this vol-
ume.
53  Foreign or international occupation provides a third type of context that is not exam-
ined in this volume, but which also affects the nature of vetting. For a discussion of 
“lustration” under the U.S. occupation of Iraq, see Meierhenrich, “The Ethics of Lustra-
tion.” Claus Offe suggests that Germany offers a unique case because the German Dem-
ocratic Republic ceased to exist and became part of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
which “came to play the role of the functional equivalent of the occupation regimes 
after the Second World War.” Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition: The Eastern European and 
East German Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 86.
54  See chapters by Rumin and Barbuto in this volume. 
55  See chapters by Mayer-Rieckh on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Zamora with Holiday 
in this volume. In Liberia, the vetting of recruits for the newly established armed forces 
is being performed by DynCorp, a U.S.based private security company, contracted for 
the task by the U.S. government. See Human Rights Watch, “Liberia at a Crossroads: 
Human Rights Challenges for the New Government,” Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper, September 30, 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/liberia0905/; accessed 
June 1, 2006.
56  See chapters by Sotiropoulos and Barbuto in this volume. 
57  Williams, Fowler, and Szczerbiak, “Explaining Lustration in Central Europe,” 23; also 
discussed in the chapter by Barrett, Hack, and Munkácsi in this volume. 
dUThIE
38
part i
Case Studies
chapter 1
Strengthening democracy:  
Impugnación Procedures in Argentina
Valeria Barbuto1
41
In contrast to countries that established vetting or lustration procedures after 
their transitions, Argentina did not. There is no formal vetting mechanism to 
speak of, in the traditional sense, in Argentina; there is no institutionalized 
procedure for examining the records of present or prospective employees in 
any area of the state apparatus and to screen them on that basis. Given the 
massive participation of members of the various branches of the military and 
security forces in state terrorism during the dictatorship, this represents a 
significant lack in Argentina’s transitional “tool kit.” However, human rights 
NGOs have made use of alternative avenues to achieve a sort of stepwise and 
perhaps indirect “cleansing, largely by taking advantage of procedures that 
under Argentine law allow challenges to promotion or staffing proposals. 
Some of these procedures — generally called impugnación — have come about 
as a consequence of broad reforms of institutional practices (for instance, 
reforms intended to increase the transparency of government or civil soci-
ety participation in decisionmaking), rather than as explicitly designed pro-
cedures for screening personnel. This chapter will provide an overview of 
how procedures to impugn promotions in the military and police forces, to 
impugn those who aspire to hold electoral office in either the legislature or the 
executive branches, and to impugn members of the judiciary have been put to 
use in defense of a human rights and accountability agenda in Argentina.
state terrorism, documentation of crimes,  
and establishing responsibility
The possibility of impugning those responsible for serious human rights vio-
lations depends as much on the existence of institutional mechanisms that 
make such procedures possible as on the quality and type of information 
available. The military dictatorship, established on March 24, 1976, distin-
guished itself by operating in a clandestine manner:
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The main characteristic of the adopted system, which distinguishes 
it from other similar ones in Latin America, is the almost absolute 
clandestine quality of its procedures. For this reason, the detention of 
persons and their subsequent disappearance, as well as denying the 
acknowledgment of the responsibilities of the bodies that intervened in 
thousands of cases over a long period of time, are the key instruments 
of the method conceived and employed by the military government in 
order to act against suspects and active dissidents.2
As Emilio Mignone and Augusto Conte explain,3 the dictatorship operated on 
two normative levels. On the one hand, repression was carried out based on 
legislation limiting constitutional rights [legislación de excepción] that granted 
the government junta absolute power over the National Constitution. On 
the other hand, there was a set of rules for clandestine organizations and 
actions — a secret and parallel normativeness.
 This ad hoc operational structure for repression was created and inserted 
into the ordinary organizational structure of the armed forces. Both struc-
tures were dependent on the same commander in chief. The clandestine struc-
ture was formed by cellular groups that were more or less stable, but involved 
the rotating participation of officials who were under the ordinary structure. 
These clandestine repression groups were in charge of kidnappings, disap-
pearances, confiscating assets, stealing babies, and other crimes. The clan-
destine doctrine was approved by all members of the military high command 
(even brigadiers, generals, and admirals) and involved all active members of 
the military, who took turns in the execution of such activities, thereby ensur-
ing their concealment.4 
 The military government systematically denied the existence of disap-
peared persons, assassinations, and clandestine detention centers, even giving 
false information to the press5 and to the families of the victims.6 
 In addition to making the acquisition of documentation and evidence 
extremely difficult, this clandestine system of repression spread suspicion of 
responsibility for these crimes to every member of the armed forces. After the 
rule of law was reinstated, it became impossible to build military institutions 
in accordance with democratic principles without making personnel changes 
[depuración interna] or without the judicial system determining the individuals 
who had to be removed from their posts.
 During the dictatorship, documentation of state crimes was produced by 
human rights organizations. Based on accusations made by the victims, these 
organizations documented and explained the structure of repression and its 
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clandestine nature, publicized the situation in the national and international 
arenas, and filed accusations before the courts.
 By 1979, for example, the Permanent Assembly for Human Rights [Asam-
blea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos] (APDH) had 5,8187 documented cases 
of forced disappearances.8 In 1984, human rights organizations delivered a list 
of 896 persons responsible for these crimes to the National Congress.9 These 
numbers are not exhaustive and do not present the whole picture, which was 
much worse. But it is important to stress that they were produced in a context 
in which archives or official data were unavailable, and were based on the tes-
timony of those who dared to speak up in the midst of terror-induced social 
paralysis.10 For many years, these testimonies and the NGO archives were 
the only available information about the state’s crimes. Without a doubt, the 
information gathered by human rights organizations formed the basis for 
later accounts of state terrorism, the rejection of the dictatorship, and, with 
time, the people’s trust in democracy.
 The transition process initiated in 1983 posed the fundamental challenge 
of building and consolidating democratic institutions. However, over time, 
President Raúl Alfonsín’s (1983–89) main objective became to prevent new 
coups d’état, even if this hindered the strengthening of public institutions. 
Crucial for the attainment of this goal of stability and of constructing civil-
military relationships in the new political framework was the way serious 
human rights violations committed during the military dictatorship would be 
addressed by the new democratic regime. 
 The reinstitutionalization of the armed forces required taking political 
measures to dismantle them as political actors and subordinate them to civil-
ian power. A series of legislative measures was therefore passed in order to 
“privilege national defense as the exclusive arena of organization and opera-
tion of the armed forces, to reformulate its mission and institutional func-
tions, and to strike down the set of legal and institutional prerogatives that 
they held on matters of internal security.”11 This normative framework was 
established with the laws on national defense,12 internal security,13 and, later, 
national intelligence.14
 At the same time, in any transition the way in which human rights viola-
tions committed by previous regimes are confronted is crucial in determin-
ing how the institutional, social, and cultural reconstruction of society will 
take shape. In the Argentinean case, the emerging democracy was character-
ized by a far-reaching and deeply embedded societal consensus that linked 
the legitimacy of the new state to the rule of law and the cause of human 
rights. In fact, Raúl Alfonsín’s campaign for election was marked by its 
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promises to investigate and prosecute those responsible for the previous 
regime’s crimes.
 On December 12, 1983 (two days after the president was sworn in), Decree 
158/8315 called for the prosecution of the first three military juntas before the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces [Consejo Supremo de las Fuerzas Arma-
das] (CONSUFA) for the crimes of homicide, illegal deprivation of freedom, 
and torture. With these trials, the government hoped that the armed forces 
would carry out their own process of internal “cleansing.” On December 14 
another decree16 created an investigating commission, the National Commis-
sion on the Disappearance of Persons [Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición 
de Personas] (CONADEP). CONADEP’s task was to respond to civil society’s 
demands for truth regarding these crimes. It received accusations filed by the 
families of disappeared persons and gathered other accusations that were 
already in the archives of human rights organizations. This made it pos-
sible for many families to denounce these crimes publicly for the first time. 
Exiles also provided their testimonies from abroad, through embassies and 
consulates.
 Although CONADEP provided fundamental evidence for the acknowl-
edgement of these crimes and their methods, however, it lacked the capacity 
to carry out investigations. It was only authorized to receive voluntary tes-
timonies, document them, and send the files that it deemed appropriate to 
the courts.17 
 For an analysis of Argentina’s impugnación policies and procedures it is 
important to remember that CONADEP concluded its activities with the pub-
lication of a final report, Nunca Más, which did not include the list of those 
responsible for these crimes. That list, however, was published without offi-
cial authorization in the magazine El Periodista de Buenos Aires in November 
1984. Based on the testimonies of survivors, the families of victims, and a few 
former members of the armed and security forces, the number on this list 
reached 1,351 persons presumably responsible for the crimes covered in the 
report.
 Given the slow pace with which CONSUFA undertook the trial of the mili-
tary juntas, in April 1985 the Federal Chamber on Criminal and Correctional 
Matters of the Federal Capital [Cámara Federal en lo Criminal y Correccional de la 
Capital Federal] took charge of the case, and on December 9 of that year pro-
nounced its sentence.18 It condemned five commanders of the military juntas 
for homicide, illegal deprivation of liberty, and torture, among other crimes.19 
The court determined the existence of a deliberate and systematic plan for 
executing a secret policy of repression and that this policy became the main 
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weapon used by the dictatorship in its campaign of “eliminating subversion.” 
According to Juan Méndez, “the report by CONADEP and previous declara-
tions made by human rights organizations were now validated by the author-
ity of a court that reached its conclusion by confronting the evidence.”20
 By the time the trial of the juntas concluded, it is estimated that 2,000 
accusations had been filed before the courts, and that 650 members of the 
various forces (armed, security, police, and penitentiary) had been accused 
(though no investigations were carried out against them). Two-thirds of them 
continued in active service when these accusations were filed.21 As a result of 
strong pressure from the military, however, the Final Stop Law22 was sanc-
tioned in December 1986, which declared that the statute of limitations for 
further criminal prosecutions was 60 days. After this period, no one who 
had not already been questioned and processed [indagadas y procesadas] could 
be questioned and processed in the future. The argument made was that, for 
“reasons of state,” democratic stability had to be privileged. 
 Paradoxically, however, within 30 days of the promulgation of the law, 
thanks to the work undertaken by human rights organizations and the fami-
lies of victims, and the commitment of some judges, countless accusations 
were filed before the courts and hundreds of prosecutions were carried out. 
The law ended up working against the government’s strategy, worsening its 
relations with the military, and causing it to lose political prestige. It is in 
this context that the military insurrection during Holy Week in April 1987, in 
which the men in uniform demanded amnesty for the crimes of the dictator-
ship and reinstatement of the members of the military high command who 
had been removed, must be understood.
 The Law of Due Obedience23 was the consequence of this military crisis. 
This law obliged judges to presume that chief officials, subordinate officials, 
subofficials, and personnel of the armed, security, police, and penitentiary 
forces who acted with the alleged aim of suppressing terrorism during the 
dictatorship did so while obeying orders under coercion by superior author-
ities. This presumption had to be applied even if there existed proof to the 
contrary. Thus, all those members of the security services were exempt from 
criminal accountability. These measures created a public perception that there 
was a conflict between the development of judicial processes and democracy. 
Indeed, the ability of the judicial branch to conduct investigations and pro-
duce the necessary evidence in order to remove from their posts those mem-
bers of the armed forces responsible for these crimes was being limited.
 Finally, President Carlos Menem (1989–99) granted a series of pardons to 
those commanders who had been sentenced in 1985 and to other persons who 
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were under investigation as part of the judicial process.24 The justification, in 
this case, was to have closure on the judgment of the crimes of the dictator-
ship and “look ahead” to the future. This argument is still used each time the 
promotion of a member of the armed force is impugned due to his participa-
tion in the dictatorship.
 The sanctioning of the impunity laws25 and pardon decrees benefited 
about 1,20026 members of the military and security forces. As a result of these 
measures, the courts could not establish individual responsibility, which in 
turn hindered the institutional “cleansing” of the armed forces. The closure of 
the criminal cases meant that the evidence they would have produced could 
not be used as the basis for complementary measures — including remov-
ing members from their posts. Nevertheless, judicial processes continued for 
crimes that were not covered by these impunity laws: the kidnapping of chil-
dren and the confiscation of the assets of victims.
 After the possibility of prosecuting those responsible for forced disap-
pearances and torture was closed, some alternative paths of justice were 
opened. In order to fully understand the process that followed, it is necessary 
to take into account some of the changes introduced by the reforms made to 
the National Constitution [Constitución Nacional] (CN) in 1994. Among other 
changes, this reform incorporated within the CN the principle of a close tie 
between human rights and the democratic system.
 Two changes have particular implications for analyzing Argentina’s impug-
nación processes. First, article 36 establishes that:
This Constitution will maintain its rule even when its observance is 
interrupted due to acts of force against the institutional order and the 
democratic system. These acts will be irrevocably null and void. 
 Their authors will be subject to the sanction provided in article 29, 
perpetually barred from occupying public posts and excluded from par-
dons and commutation of sentence benefits. 
 Those who, as a consequence of these acts, usurp the functions pro-
vided to the authorities of this Constitution or to the regional govern-
ments will have the same sanctions and will have to respond civilly and 
criminally for their actions. 
 All citizens have the right to resist against those who commit the 
acts of force stated in this article. 
 In this manner, it is considered an attempt against the democratic 
system to commit a serious dolus crime against the State that entails 
enrichment, and that person will be barred from occupying public posts 
or employment for as long as the laws determine. 
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 The Congress will sanction a law on ethical public behavior for per-
forming public functions.
The incorporation of this article constituted a central argument in the impug-
nacións of new appointees to public posts.
 Second, the reforms granted constitutional status to those international 
human rights instruments that had already been ratified by Argentina.27 This 
enabled domestic use of international legal arguments on human rights, 
which was essential, for example, in order to demonstrate the unconstitu-
tional character of the Due Obedience and Final Stop laws, and in order to 
demand compliance with the right to truth and mourning. 
 Since 1985, human rights organizations had demanded recognition of 
the right of both the families of the victims and of society to know the truth 
about what had occurred. NGOs first sought to realize this right through judi-
cial cases. In the face of limitations on prosecuting those responsible for these 
crimes, however, they sought to find an answer to the final whereabouts of 
each one of the disappeared persons through “truth trials.” 
 For humanitarian organizations, the point of these trials was not only to 
comply with a right that was recognized nationally and internationally, but 
also the possibility of continuing to work within the judiciary so as to try to 
ensure that at least one branch of the state dealt with the subject. After one 
lawsuit reached the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
in 1999, Argentina signed a “friendly solution agreement” in which it commit-
ted itself to carrying out such trials. Today, many trials for the right to truth 
are held in Argentinean jurisdictions. A lack of regulations regarding these 
suits, however, means that each court proceeds differently, according to its 
own interpretation of the norms for proceedings. However, all cases involve 
intense activity in which many testimonies are gathered, providing a great 
amount of information about the state’s crimes and methods.
 In 2000, the Center for Legal and Social Studies [Centro de Estudios Lega-
les y Sociales] (CELS) brought a suit disputing the constitutionality of the Due 
Obedience and Final Stop laws, and on this basis, demanded that criminal 
prosecutions be reopened for the crimes of forced disappearance of persons, 
torture, and homicide. Between 2001 and 2003, approximately a dozen reso-
lutions by the judiciary confirmed the unconstitutional character of these 
laws and allowed the resumption of trials against the main parties responsible 
for these crimes. 
 In mid-2003, in a more favorable political environment, the resolutions 
by the courts regarding the unconstitutional character of the impunity laws, 
as well as the detention with the aim of extradition of 45 members of the 
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military and a civilian ordered by Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzón, restarted 
the debate on the possible annulment by Parliament of the Due Obedience and 
Final Stop laws. That same month, the Federal Chamber ordered lower courts 
to reopen those cases from the 1980s, the so-called megacases [megacausas].28 
 In June 2005, in a historical decision, the Supreme Court declared the Due 
Obedience and Final Stop laws to be unconstitutional. This opened the way 
for justice. Since then, 547 persons have been indicted, of whom 200 are in 
detention, charged with abducting children, robbery, illegitimate deprivation 
of liberty, torture, murder, and involuntary servitude.29
 This overview of some of the historical events shows how the crimes of 
the dictatorship and the responsible parties have been documented. It also 
shows how justice has not yet been achieved through these criminal cases. 
As Jonathan Miller indicates, “if republican institutions had enjoyed full func-
tionality,”30 the very court sentences would have resulted in dismissals and 
exclusions from any public post. Given the absence of such sentences, the 
task of removing from their posts persons who committed violations had to 
be achieved through other institutional mechanisms.
impugning military promotions
PROCEdURES fOR ImPUgNINg mIlITARy PROmOTIONS
In Argentina, mechanisms for promoting members of the military to higher 
ranks form a complex system involving the armed forces, the executive 
branch, the legislative branch, and civil society. Approving or rejecting mili-
tary promotions is fundamentally a political decision about the appointment 
of public officials. The absence of both a “cleansing” process of the armed 
forces and of criminal trials led human rights organizations and some legis-
lators to turn to impugnación as a method to achieve a slow cleansing of the 
armed forces.
 Article 99, clause 13 of the National Constitution grants the president of the 
nation the authority to provide “the military employments of the Nation: in 
agreement with the Senate, in the case of concession of employment or high 
official ranks of the armed forces; and on his own if on the battlefield.” By vir-
tue of this clause, the executive branch sends to Congress a series of proposals 
for promotions in the higher ranks of the military. This list of promotions is 
elaborated according to the provisions of Law 19.101 (Law of Military Person-
nel). A qualifying commission [Junta de Calificaciones] is in charge of evaluating 
whether the proposed individuals comply with the requirements. The Senate 
49
ARgENTINA
sends the list of members of the military provided by the executive branch 
to its Treaties Commission [Comisión de Acuerdos]. This commission has the 
authority to rule over all agreements petitioned by the executive branch 
regarding the posts of public officials.31 Its decisions have to be submitted for 
consideration and voting to the plenum of the Senate. 
 Amendments made to Senate regulations in 2002 broadened the require-
ments for publicizing the lists of proposals for agreement and the opportuni-
ties for civil society to present commentary. The lists of proposals sent by the 
executive branch were to be debated during public sessions and distributed by 
the pressroom of the Senate for possible observations:
Citizens may exercise this right within seven working days following the 
moment the petition for agreement is read in the chamber, thus having 
parliamentary status. The commission will also receive observations 
regarding the proposals, while the lists are under its consideration.32 
The reforms of 2002 and 2003 produced a deep change in the criteria regard-
ing the nature of congressional activity: the publicity of institutional acts is 
now a general norm, secrecy is an exceptional norm that must be explicitly 
justified, and the participation of citizens is an important condition.
 The Congress recognizes various forms of access and participation of citi-
zens. These include both public sessions of Congress, in which citizens can 
witness debates and have access to transcripts, and, since 2002, public hear-
ings.33 Senate regulations recognize the following as a public hearing:
An instance of participation for citizens during the process of making 
a legislative decision that opens a window so that all persons or non-
governmental organizations that can be affected by this decision or that 
have a particular interest in it may express their opinion. This instance 
helps the commission in charge of studying an affair or project to have 
access to the various opinions on the issue through direct contact with 
the interested parties, in a simultaneous manner and on equal terms.34 
An interesting aspect of the public hearing procedure is that the Senate’s 
commission must explain how its decisions take into account the opinions 
expressed by citizens. This establishes an instance of publicity for public acts 
and of expression by civil society, as well as a mechanism for starting a dia-
logue between citizens and public institutions.
 Since 1993,35 the Treaties Commission has requested information about 
individuals on the lists of proposed military promotions from the archives 
of the former CONADEP, the Secretariat of Human Rights, the CELS, and 
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the APDH. It has requested, in particular, that these organizations submit all 
information available in their archives concerning the performance of these 
members of the military. In this capacity, these organizations have partici-
pated in public sessions and public hearings on some occasions. They have 
also proposed that the commission summon witnesses to testify and that it 
produce its own evidence. The impugnación procedure for military promo-
tions has thus become more complex since the reforms to the Regulations of 
the Senate, regarding openness and public participation, and as human rights 
organizations have become involved in the process. 
ImPUgNINg mIlITARy PROmOTIONS: PRACTICE ANd ChAllENgES
Human rights organizations have impugned military promotions since 1984. 
However, during this period, the development of the impugnación procedures 
has varied according to a number of political and social factors, including 
the influence of civil society and the military, and the policies of the various 
governments. 
 The Radical Civic Union [Unión Cívica Radical] (UCR) stated on many occa-
sions during its term, from 1983 to 1989, that the courts should deal with the 
issue of cleansing the military of those who participated in state terror. On the 
other hand, it also promised to carry out a reform of the armed and security 
forces that would guarantee their democratic functioning. In the end, how-
ever, neither intervention by the courts nor any mechanism of “cleansing” the 
forces has taken place. In general terms, the 1980s displayed a lack of a policy 
to remove from military institutions officials involved in practices of state ter-
rorism. That decade saw a government that, overwhelmed by repeated mili-
tary uprisings, in the end had to make a pact to forego the pursuit of justice 
for the crimes of the dictatorship. It is in this context that one must place the 
rejection of the impugnacións presented by the NGOs and the subsequent pro-
motions endorsed by Congress that followed.
 Until the Senate reform of 2002, Parliament operated under a “culture of 
secrecy,” which affected the impugnación processes, especially regarding how 
sessions of the commissions were held and their decisions made. The Treaties 
Commission worked behind closed doors, and civil society only had access 
to press releases from the government following long bureaucratic proceed-
ings. Alfonsín’s government, in addition, did not display any great interest in 
including human rights organizations as interlocutors in the process of ana-
lyzing the records of the men in uniform: 
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One of the first measures adopted by Alfonsín’s government dealt with 
the lists of proposals for promotion of well-known repressors. Human 
rights organizations impugned these proposals as a group. Even though 
these proposed members were promoted, nonetheless, organizations 
acquired practice in impugning promotions. Neither the government 
nor Congress consulted us then, however. Only some congressional 
advisors requested information from us, informally. Alfonsín accepted 
the lists sent by the qualifying commission without any objections.36
The press published partial or complete lists of officials whose promotions 
were subject to review. Armed with this information, human rights organi-
zations would send a letter to Congress with their queries. The letter would 
include general documentary material, including excerpts from or complete 
testimonies by survivors, newspaper articles, and copies of relevant judicial 
documents. During those early years, human rights organizations presented 
the queries concerning members of the military together as a group.37
 In March 1984, the executive branch sent to Congress a list of 213 members 
of the military to be promoted. Some senators from different parties ques-
tioned the promotion of those who were accused of having participated in the 
repression. In August of the same year, human rights organizations sent to 
Congress a list of 896 members accused of being responsible for human rights 
violations. According to El Clarín, 40% of the names on this list were still on 
active duty.38 Among the 213 officers proposed for promotions, twenty five 
were on the list presented by the organizations. Even more meaningful was 
that it included seven of the thirteen candidates for generals and chiefs of the 
high command of the navy and the air force.
 Senators of the Justicialist Party [Partido Justicialista] (PJ) pointed out that 
15 proposed promotions had to be impugned by virtue of the information 
in CONADEP’s report. During a crisis in July of that year, when at least two 
chiefs of military regiments refused to cooperate with CONADEP, President 
Alfonsín had pressured the Treaties Commission to sign the promotions. 
With the vote of the UCR senators, regional parties, and one representative 
of the Movement for Integration and Development [Movimiento de Integración y 
Desarrollo] (MID), and after a very contested voting process, Congress ratified 
the lists on August 31.39 
 Those who supported the promotions of the members of the military 
under question, including the senators who voted in favor, argued that the cri-
terion for rejection should consist only of charges that had been proved in the 
courts. This not only contravened the principle of political decision operating 
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in these promotion mechanisms, but satisfying this requirement was also vir-
tually impossible in 1985, only two years after the first constitutional govern-
ment was sworn in, since no judicial cases had yet produced sentences. 
 The careers that many impugned members of the military would go on to 
have reveals the close relationship they maintained with the different consti-
tutional governments. The weakness of civilian control over the military and 
the dearth of political will on the part of the government to demand military 
self-criticism and to carry out institutional reforms were essential character-
istics of the 1980s. As an illustration, in December 1985, despite the fact that 
his promotion was impugned, Captain Roberto Luis Pertussio was neverthe-
less promoted. Shortly thereafter, at a graduation ceremony of high-ranking 
officials, with the minister of defense in the audience, Pertussio defended what 
occurred during the dictatorship, notwithstanding the fact that his speech 
challenged the government’s position regarding the importance of punishing 
crimes of state. Most of those whose promotions were impugned continued 
their careers until they participated in the military uprising of 1990, or until 
they made public their antidemocratic stances.40
 In the 1990s, promotion processes became more complex. One of the rea-
sons for this was the experience that civil society organizations had gained in 
using institutional mechanisms. Another important factor was that the high-
est position in the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces [Estado Mayor Conjunto] 
was now occupied by General Martín Balza, who distanced himself from the 
military sectors that supported and vindicated the dictatorship. 
 The process became more complex also by virtue of greater sophistica-
tion on the part of senators, who by then were more experienced in their leg-
islative practice. This could be seen in the nature of the debates in Congress 
over the agreements. Thus, for instance, a major change became visible in 
1993, when the list of promotions included marines Juan Carlos Rolón and 
Antonio Pernías, two well-known repressors at the Navy Mechanics School 
[Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada] (ESMA).41 As soon as the list was released, 
human rights organizations sent their objections to the Treaties Commis-
sion. Together with a brief summary of the records of these two marines, they 
included copies of testimonies by survivors and actions taken by the courts. 
The controversy was further fueled by the publicity surrounding the open-
ing of the “Archives of Terror” [Archivos del Terror] in Paraguay. These archives 
revealed, among other things, the active role that the Argentinean navy had 
played in coordinating repressive actions with other dictatorships in South 
America. On December 28, 1993, journalist Horacio Verbitsky published in 
Página/12 information provided by the victims and their families about the 
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past actions of the accused. The following day the government denied having 
sent promotions lists with the names of the two marines, but admitted to it 
three days later. The controversy resulted in the resignation of the vice-minis-
ter of defense and three undersecretaries.
 Carlos Menem’s government, however, backed the marines strongly, pro-
voking an intense public debate for two reasons: first, both marines were well-
known for their participation in state terrorism under the dictatorship; and, 
second, they had publicly acknowledged the methods of torture, disappear-
ing persons, and murder employed by the navy during a session of the Senate 
called by the Treaties Commission on October 19, 1994, when they had been 
summoned to provide a response to their charges. President Menem even 
declared publicly that he had the “moral authority” to support these promo-
tions because he had been detained and tortured himself during the dictator-
ship. He was not, however, in Argentina when the marines appeared before 
Congress, nor was the commander of the navy.42 Given the situation, the Trea-
ties Commission signed a writ against these promotions. However, this docu-
ment was never debated in a plenary of the Senate, and the pro-government 
faction managed to send it back to the commission to be reevaluated.
 In 1995, a former torturer, marine Adolfo Scilingo, acknowledged that it 
had been a systematic practice by the navy under the dictatorship to throw 
live prisoners into the Plata River. He said that one of his motivations for mak-
ing such a statement was the “unfair” reaction to the proposed promotions 
of Rolón and Pernías. According to him, the navy’s clandestine groups were 
formed in such a way that their membership rotated among all members of 
the force and, furthermore, the navy had made the decision and given the cor-
responding orders to eliminate persons by such methods. Hence, if these two 
marines were questioned, all high ranks of the navy had to be questioned as 
well. Either one questioned everyone or no one, argued Scilingo. On April 
25, 1995, General Martín Balza, commander of the Joints Chiefs of the Armed 
Forces, publicly criticized the armed forces for its role in the crimes of the dic-
tatorship. On May 4, Enrique Molina Pico, commander of the Joint Chiefs of 
the Navy, did the same. Although the two statements differed in content and 
the boldness with which they acknowledged human rights violations, Molina 
Pico at least recognized that the armed forces had used the wrong methods, 
which had led to “horrors that were unacceptable.” Both statements went 
much further than what President Menem himself was willing to admit. 
 Debate about these promotions, which continued into 1995, pro -
duced an important political crisis. In August of that year, the two marines 
asked to be retired.43 The case, almost ten years after the installation of the 
BARBUTO
54
constitutional regime, demonstrated at least two important facts. First, it was 
possible to stop the careers of repressors without damaging the military insti-
tutions and without provoking a military uprising. Second, there was another 
influential sector to which the government had to pay special attention: civil 
society. Pressure to make the process more open and public forced some pub-
lic officials to begin to act according to the law and common sense.
 In this new context, Congress started to send official requests for informa-
tion about members of the military to be promoted to the APDH and CELS. 
Similar requests were made to the Office of the Undersecretary for Human 
Rights of the Nation [Subsecretaría de Derechos Humanos de la Nación] — today 
with the rank of Secretariat of State — keeper of the CONADEP archives and 
other, later files of accusations. These official requests not only demonstrated 
that the queries and documentation being provided had become part of the 
procedure; they also opened the possibility of holding hearings with the Trea-
ties Commission in which civil society could participate.
 There are a number of other important ways in which the mechanisms 
for impugning military promotions have changed. In the first place, it is now 
possible for the military to reply to the queries presented in the impugnacións. 
Second, the Ministry of Defense now sends to the commission the military 
file of the individual being proposed for promotion. This information has 
been of great importance, considering the lack of other official documenta-
tion. Human rights organizations, in turn, have become better at answering 
the requests for information from the Treaties Commission. In most cases, 
the documentary evidence of participation in the crimes of the dictatorship 
has been conclusive, and therefore of the kind to raise serious questions about 
the proposed promotions. Third, in other cases these organizations have 
suggested that the Treaties Commission conduct its own investigations and 
produce its own evidence. These were cases that involved members of the 
armed forces about whom there was some suspicion, but no certainty, of past 
crimes. In 2001, for instance, CELS responded to a request for information by 
the Treaties Commission stating that:
regarding Commander Vicente Engelman: in our presentation of 
November 12, we delivered the information on him in our possession to 
the Commission so that it could be evaluated. We understand that this 
information might not be enough to affect his suitability for promo-
tion, but it must be considered by the Commission together with other 
elements of his record and evidence that may be gathered following 
the authority of this body. Also, this would establish clearly its stance 
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regarding State terrorism and would corroborate its commitment to the 
democratic system and respect for human rights.44 
Since the start of the democratic transition, the military has repeatedly dem-
onstrated its unease with and applied pressure on political decisions related to 
efforts to disclose the truth and achieve justice. Until 1990, this included failed 
assassination attempts and military uprisings. Later, church pulpits and mili-
tary events were used as the occasions for speeches to express opposition. On 
March 2, 2001, the military’s resistance to the practice of impugnación, among 
other justice measures, manifested itself in the form of 663 petitions for habeas 
data45 before CELS, the APDH, and the Office of the Undersecretary for Human 
Rights.46 In their petitions, the members of the military demanded access to 
their personal information contained in the archives of these organizations. 
CELS only possessed information on nine officials suspected of being involved 
in serious human rights violations, representing less than 1.5% of the members 
of the military who had presented petitions. However, the commander of the 
army was included among them. The APDH refused to provide the information 
in its possession. CELS argued that Law 25.326 (Protection of Personal Data, 
commonly known as “Habeas Data Law”) was not applicable to the institution 
since CELS is not a database meant to “provide information,” but, nevertheless, 
expressed its willingness to comply. Since the petitions were missing some 
information that was necessary for CELS to complete its search, it asked peti-
tioners to fill in some of the basic information they lacked. After 45 days, CELS 
did not receive a response from the members of the military, so it decided to 
deliver the information in its possession, clarifying that it considered it partial 
and incomplete owing, in part, to the lack of response to its own request for 
the missing data. In context, it is difficult not to see the military’s habeas data 
requests as part of a pattern of opposition to the impugnación of promotions. 
 Since 2002, impugnación processes have been related to issues of institu-
tional public disclosure, control of institutions, and debates on public poli-
cies. Specifically, they have accelerated evidence production mechanisms 
by the Congress and disclosure of information through public sessions and 
hearings. At the start of 2002, for example, the Treaties Commission initiated 
an investigation into the records of marine Julio César Binotti and Lieutenant 
Colonel Mariano Braga. In both cases, after CELS called for openness in the 
process, a public session was held in which the testimonies of survivors and 
families of victims were recorded.
 The promotion process for Roberto Bendini, commander of the Joint 
Chiefs of the Army, in October 2003, provided an opportunity for Congress 
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to get involved in the case of a public accusation and to test the executive 
branch’s commitment to public disclosure and transparency. Some months 
before, the media had reported that Bendini had made statements that vindi-
cated the crimes of the dictatorship as well as some anti-Semitic statements.47 
The Ministry of Defense created an ad hoc commission to investigate the inci-
dent and concluded that the accusations were false, but never made its report 
public.48 CELS then requested that the Treaties Commission attempt to access 
the report, make it public, and conduct its own investigation. 
 The Treaties Commission suspended consideration of the list of proposed 
promotions, requested from the executive branch a copy of the record issued 
by the Ministry of Defense, and summoned the president of the ad hoc com-
mission to testify. In the end, the army commander was promoted, and CELS 
stated that Congress’s actions had not dispelled the doubts concerning his 
suitability. Nevertheless, the process represented an important exercise in 
public disclosure and accountability, participation by civil society, and con-
trol by the legislative branch.
 Although it would be very useful to have the exact number of impugned 
promotions from 1983 to date — as well as their results — it is impossible to 
know, at least in part because no data about this were kept in the 1980s. This 
brief summary of some of the procedures cannot substitute for this informa-
tion, but may, nevertheless, illustrate some of the changes that impugnación 
procedures have suffered over time, in the state’s policies towards justice 
for the crimes of the dictatorship, and in various institutions including the 
armed forces. 
impugning appointments and removing personnel  
in the police and security forces
In the case of Argentina’s police forces (federal and regional) and security 
forces (National Gendarmerie, Argentinean Navy Prefecture, and National 
Aeronautical Police Force), there have also been no formal impugnación pro-
cedures for serious human rights violations committed under the military 
dictatorship. During this period of state terrorism, police and security forces 
were under the operational command of the armed forces. This meant that 
when the first actions for truth and the first lawsuits (the trial of the juntas, 
etc.) took place, the responsibility of the police forces was not investigated. As 
with the armed forces, however, since 1983 human rights organizations have 
demanded the removal from the police and security forces of those who were 
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involved in clandestine activities. These demands were sent to the ministry 
that controlled the forces at the time of the case (the Ministry of Interior or 
the Ministry of Justice, according to successive reforms).
 One example of these demands followed the appointment of Ricardo Scifo 
Módica as Chief Inspector for the Guidance for Victims [Orientación a la Víc-
tima] of the Federal Police. On May 27, 1996, when the newspaper La Nación49 
published a story explaining the tasks of this new section, some survivors of 
clandestine detention centers — Club Atlético, El Banco, and El Olimpo — identi-
fied Scifo Módica as a member of one of the groups that had operated these 
centers, using the nickname alacrán (scorpion).50 Human rights organizations 
and some legislators51 publicly objected to this appointment. CELS sent Min-
ister of Interior Carlos Corach a letter expressing its concern, which was based 
on the need to remove this official from the post in line with the institutional 
movement towards a democratic regime:
[CELS] considers that this appointment should be revoked since it 
would offend the ethical conscience not only of the nation, but also of 
humanity, and would doubtlessly give rise to harmful reactions against 
the Constitutional Government and the Federal Police itself. The Argen-
tinean people aspire to a life of peace founded on truth and justice. It is 
by virtue of this that it becomes necessary to avoid this type of unjusti-
fied vindication that conspires against this aim. The Argentinean State, 
on the other hand, has subscribed, ratified, and incorporated into the 
National Constitution international agreements that would be violated 
with this measure.
These organizations continue to demand that those responsible for such 
crimes be dismissed from the police and security forces, which would involve 
the loss of privileges and rights to which the members of the police are enti-
tled, explicitly forbidding applications for readmittance into the force.52 NGOs 
continue to make such requests notwithstanding the frequent refusal of the 
authorities to stop the appointments or promotions, refusals that include 
the case of Scifo Módica, whose appointment in the Federal Police moved 
forward. 
 In the case of the police and the security forces, however, unlike the armed 
forces, there is no institutional mechanism of promotions to higher ranks 
that involves other state bodies or allows for the participation of citizens. The 
system of transfers and promotions is based on seniority and the informa-
tion contained in the police files (for instance, regarding the past application 
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of internal sanctions). CELS and Human Rights Watch have stated that these 
systems are
structured on the basis of two rigid rosters — higher and subordinated 
personnel — and mobility within each one of them is random. Mecha-
nisms with a very low level of public scrutiny such as the ones used for 
these decisions generate a system without objective criteria, depending 
on the arbitrariness of hierarchically superior members.53
These organizations have proposed creating an “ethical commission” includ-
ing members of other branches of the state and civil society to be in charge of 
appointing officials, so as to exercise a measure of public control of police and 
security institutions. 
 Some specialists contend that the lack of public controls in this sector is 
related to long-standing institutional practices. First, to an operational depen-
dency on the executive branch, which, in the end, is responsible for these 
institutions:
until 1946 the chief of police [federal] was always a member of the upper 
class — congressman, general of the nation, former governor, sena-
tor — not someone from the force itself, a career policeman. After 1955, 
this again became the case and during the dictatorship (and the previous 
military governments), they were also career members of the military, 
and this continued to be so until 1983.54 
Second, the police, owing to its characteristic functions, have maintained 
important prerogatives. In this sense, a set of customary practices has granted 
the police far-reaching powers that protect it from possible controls by other 
branches of the state. Parallel to this problem is the close dependency of the 
judicial branch on the police, which hinders its actions:
the judiciary has had (and still has) a very strong and coactive depen-
dency on the police force. To give a simple example, until not long 
ago (before the dictatorship) judges did not prosecute members of the 
police for torture or homicide, even if all the evidence was on the table, 
because they felt that if they did, if they “tainted” a member of the force, 
they would never be able to order them to detain someone or to perform 
an inspection. This has changed since 1983 and is still changing; I mean, 
we are doing better, but the links between the two are still very strong. 
The police “knows” more than judges do, it “coerces” the judiciary and 
the legislative branch, and these branches think that they use the police, 
59
ARgENTINA
but they fear it at the same time. This has created institutions (histori-
cally) with great autonomy and, for this reason, impervious to external 
controls.55
During the 1990s, the problem of police violence became a central issue on 
the public agenda.56 In response, civil society organizations (human rights 
organizations and those dedicated to issues of institutional violence) have 
contributed to improving the methods of controlling the members of these 
forces. However, there has not been substantial improvement regarding their 
responsibilities for state terrorism during the dictatorship. 
impugning electoral posts
ThE lEgISlATIVE BRANCh
Legislators can be impugned at two stages in Argentina. The first is when the 
lists of candidates are made official. The second stage is when the elected can-
didates are announced or the certificates [diplomas] are presented.57 Impugn-
acións can be formulated by a member of the House of Representatives or a 
senator (designated or elected), the main governing body of a political party, 
an institution, or a person. Article 64 of the Constitution establishes that: 
“Each House of Congress is the judge of the election, the rights, and titles of its 
members in regards to their validity.”
 When an impugnación is received, either the Commission of Petitions, 
Powers, and Regulations [Comisión de Peticiones, Poderes y Reglamentos] of the 
Chamber of Deputies or the Treaties Commission of the Senate is designated 
as the judging commission. The maximum period for dealing with these 
impugnacións is 90 days. The judging commissions must act within this period 
and their decisions must be presented before the plenum of the correspond-
ing house. 
 There are “formal” causes for impugnacións that do not entail any type of 
controversy for the cases being dealt with here; for example, lack of compli-
ance with any of the requirements imposed by each chamber (age, citizen-
ship, and an address in the corresponding district), anomalies in the electoral 
process, or the existence of a nonappealable judgment for illegal activities. 
However, the authority of the chambers to reject the appointment of a mem-
ber to that body of government, owing to a lack of suitability [falta de ido-
neidad] or to moral incompetence [inhabilidad moral], has been the subject of 
intense debate. The first issue under discussion is whether the authority of the 
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chambers to remove members displaying moral incompetence58 can be 
extended to deny them access in the first place. The second issue — on which 
I will concentrate the bulk of my attention — concerns the definitions of suit-
ability and moral incompetence. 
 A central debate concerning impugnación processes in Argentina has been 
the definition and reach of “suitability” requirements, apart from the specific 
competencies or abilities necessary for performing a given post. These discus-
sions take as their starting point article 16 of the CN, which establishes that all 
of the inhabitants of the country are eligible for public posts or employment 
on no other condition than suitability. The Supreme Court has, however, 
stated that “the declaration that all inhabitants are eligible for employment 
without other condition than suitability does not exclude the imposition of 
ethical requirements.”59 According to one constitutional expert, “the consti-
tution does not establish specific contents regarding suitability, and for this 
reason, this must be judged according to current ethical standards. Without a 
doubt, among these standards, democracy must take primacy as a system for 
making effective and for protecting human rights. The constituting essence of 
democracy lies in the recognition, respect, tutelage, and promotion of human 
rights.”60 
 It is in this sense that a relationship has been established between the 
application of the concept of suitability, according to article 36 of the CN, and 
the international human rights instruments incorporated into the constitu-
tion in 1994. After the 1994 constitutional reform, it has been argued that the 
Argentinean state has a constitutional obligation to take the necessary mea-
sures in order to remove from public posts those who have been responsible 
for human rights violations. Furthermore, meeting this obligation is a neces-
sary condition for complying with the right to democratic institutions.61 
 Similarly, international human rights law considers the removal of officials 
involved in serious human rights violations to be an affirmative obligation of 
states and a guarantee of nonrepetition of the crimes of the past. In 1995, the 
Human Rights Committee of the United Nations recommended that, to be 
in compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Argentinean state should “establish adequate procedures in order to make 
sure that those members of the armed and security forces against whom there 
was sufficient evidence of participation in previous serious human rights 
violations are removed.”62 In 1999, the committee insisted to the Argentin-
ean state that “measures should be taken in order to be assured that persons 
who participated in serious human rights violations do not continue to be 
employed by the armed forces or the public administration.”63 Furthermore, 
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the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities has pointed out that one of the measures that must 
be adopted regarding the impunity of serious human rights violations is the 
“removal from their posts of high officials involved in the serious violations 
that have been committed.”64 
 Access to electoral office has been impugned in the case of only two per-
sons (one of them twice). Interpreting the National Constitution in light of the 
principles of international human rights law was the central argument used 
for impugning, on two occasions, former General Antonio Domingo Bussi, 
a high-ranking officer during the military dictatorship.65 The first occasion 
regarded his certification as an elected representative, and the second as the 
candidate elected as governor of the province of Tucumán. On December 1, 
1999, the APDH and a group of representatives objected to Bussi’s certificate 
as representative, pointing out his proven responsibility for serious human 
rights violations.66 These objections were accepted by the Treaties Commis-
sion, which initiated the process of debating his certification as an elected rep-
resentative, and formed the basis for his rejection.67
 Bussi’s defense disputed the legality of the impugnación process.68 In its 
interpretation of article 64 of the CN and article 3 of the Regulations of the 
House of Representatives, the defense argued that there was no reason to 
proceed with the case, for the aforementioned article refers to the “elections, 
titles, and rights of the elected representative.” It stressed that there were no 
irregularities during the elections and that Bussi’s electoral certificate had 
been duly validated by the electoral courts of the province. It also argued that 
the formal requirements contained in article 48 of the CN, the nonappealable 
judgments by the competent judge, were the only possible criteria for annul-
ment. Likewise, the defense appealed to article 23 of the Pact of San José, Costa 
Rica, which establishes the right of every citizen to vote and be elected.
 Among other activities, the commission held a hearing on March 28, 2000, 
with human rights organizations and a citizen who had been a direct victim 
and who demanded to be heard.69 In supporting the case against Bussi, these 
organizations stressed that the requirement of suitability had to be interpreted 
according to the spirit of the constitutional reform of 1994. Specifically, they 
appealed to article 36 of the CN,70 which establishes the permanent disqualifi-
cation for occupying public posts of those who had acted against the institu-
tional order and the democratic system, and which links the health of the sys-
tem with ethical conduct in public functions. In addition, they insisted on the 
superior constitutional hierarchy of pacts and international agreements. The 
APDH and CELS, in particular, contended that popular sovereignty is limited 
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by constitutional norms in force and fundamental rights. In its final report, 
the commission included the application of international norms with consti-
tutional status, in particular the American Convention on Human Rights and 
the UN Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.
 Bussi’s case aroused much debate in the public domain. Some jurists 
agreed with an ethical interpretation of the concept of suitability, although 
only for “exceptional cases.”71 Others stated that in no case could the houses 
expel their members for ethical violations committed before their election. 
Jonathan Miller, in a restrictive analysis, states that there is a distortion in 
interpreting article 64 in order to judge the suitability of an elected represen-
tative. According to him, the Constitution only refers to the “validity” of the 
titles. Citing the case of Powell vs. McCormack,72 quoted in the report, however, 
he states that a fair interpretation of this verdict underscores the impossibility 
of removing a representative due to questions not related to formal or legal 
requirements. Miller’s main argument is that there is “extensive legal analysis 
on the history of the norm used for article 64 that leaves no room for using 
article 64 for judging the suitability of an elected representative, be it for a ‘sec-
ular’ judgment of his morals, or for any other judgment of his suitability.”73
 There are also varying opinions regarding the application of international 
law. Méndez and Chillier have stated the importance of international law in 
the context of a lack of an explicit vetting or lustration norm in Argentina. “In 
the case of Guatemala,” they argue, “there was an explicit constitutional norm 
of lustration that was applied by the agencies of the State in order to avoid that 
a member of the military who had participated in the coup d’état could access 
power through democratic means. In the case of Argentina, this norm is not 
a part of our body of law, and the adopted measure was elaborated based on 
principles of international law. . . . This void is a direct consequence of the pol-
icy of impunity exercised by the first two democratic governments.”74
 However, there exists a broader discussion on the reach of obligations 
stemming from the decisions of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) in nonjudicial processes. There is agreement that the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights and the decisions by the IACHR establish 
the obligations of the state to investigate, judge, and repair human rights 
violations. Miller’s stance, however, is that “the international system has not 
sought to use a political process for fighting against human rights violations, 
but a legal process.”75 Other authors find that the international legal system 
clearly establishes the obligation of states to remove from their structures 
those responsible for serious human rights violations. Compliance with this 
obligation is a condition of respecting society’s right to have democratic insti-
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tutions in force. In this context, the decision by the IACHR regarding the Ríos 
Montt case constituted a positive precedent for measures of removal from 
public posts.76
 Bussi’s certificate was rejected by the House of Representatives because 
his participation in crimes against humanity demonstrated that he did not 
satisfy the requirements of political morality necessary to hold a high post 
in one of the main institutions of the republic.77 General Bussi then appealed 
to the judicial system. In this instance, the attorney general ( procurador gen-
eral), making use of a broad interpretation of the relevant constitutional prin-
ciples, asserted Congress’ power to decide on the quality of those who aspire 
to occupy one of its seats. This power, he claimed, is crucial to safeguard the 
independence of Congress, avoiding the interference of the other powers in 
the decisions of the legitimate representatives of the nation.78 Bussi’s judicial 
appeal, however, became moot once the period in which he would have been 
a deputy lapsed. 
 December 2005 saw the second case of this type of impugnación, when the 
Chamber of Deputies opened an evaluation of the suitability of former com-
missar Luis Abelardo Patti to be a member of the legislative. On October 23, 
2005, Patti was elected deputy by the province of Buenos Aires. On Decem-
ber 6, 2005, as a result of a claim raised by three members of the Chamber 
of Deputies, that body did not allow Patti to be sworn in. The claim alleged 
that Patti had participated in the murder of two members of the armed group 
Montoneros, on May 14, 1983, and in the murder of José Gastón Goncalvez, 
whose incinerated remains had been found on April 2, 1976. 
 In March 2006, a commission was formed to analyze Patti’s situation. 
After three months, during which the commission received testimony and 
collected evidence, it issued a majority decision against allowing Patti to 
become a member of Congress. Those who voted against the decision, and in 
favor of allowing Patti to take his seat, argued that no firm judicial sentences 
against Patti had been issued. On May 23, 2006, the Chamber of Deputies, in a 
plenary session, declared him unsuitable to occupy a congressional seat.
ThE ExECUTIVE BRANCh
In the case of posts in the executive branch decided by election, the impug-
nación mechanism is different, although the discussions regarding moral or 
ethical suitability are the same. Electoral processes for the executive are regu-
lated by the terms established in the national and regional constitutions; the 
National Electoral Code [Código Electoral Nacional] (CEN) and the regional 
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electoral codes [códigos electorales provinciales] (CEPs); regional electoral laws; 
and the Organic Law for Political Parties.
 Although there are many differences in the provisions of each one of the 
regional sets of norms, in general it could be said that the first instance of con-
trolling compliance with requirements for candidates are the political parties 
themselves. Carlos Fayt has stated that political parties have to comply with 
the principle of suitability, since this is something that can be required by the 
electorate.79 Parties must present their list of candidates to a state authority 
that evaluates it and makes it official. In all cases, there is an administrative 
authority for the election (for example, a regional electoral commission), and 
there is always a competent judicial body to which decisions can be appealed.
 In the case of elections for national posts, after each party prepares a list 
of candidates, it must present it before a national electoral judge. Article 60 
of the National Electoral Code establishes that “parties will have to register 
the list of publicly-announced candidates before the electoral judge. These 
candidates must comply with the requirements for the post to which they 
are applying and will have to be clear of any legal cause for disqualification.” 
And article 61 establishes that “the judge will pronounce his resolution 
regarding the condition of the candidates, stating in a concrete and precise 
manner the grounds for his resolution.”
 The official lists have to be made known to the National Electoral Com-
mission [Junta Nacional Electoral], which has the authority to certify the win-
ners of the vote count. The CEN establishes that the electoral judge of the first 
instance is the competent judicial instance, and the National Electoral Cham-
ber [Cámara Nacional Electoral] is the body for appeals.
impugnacións  and removals in the judiciary
The National Constitution establishes that magistrates of the judicial branch 
are appointed by the president of the nation in agreement with the Senate. 
For this purpose, the president sends a file with each candidate’s record to the 
Treaties Commission of the Senate. Since the reform of the National Constitu-
tion in 1994, the judges of the lower federal courts are appointed “based on a 
proposal of three candidates presented by the Council of the Magistracy [Con-
sejo de la Magistratura], in agreement with the Senate, during public session, in 
which the suitability of the candidates is considered.”
 In compliance with article 114 of the CN, Law 24.93780 was passed in 1997, 
establishing the Council of the Magistracy, which is authorized to select the 
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magistrates and administrative members of the judicial branch. The council 
is a permanent body of the judicial branch, comprising the president of the 
Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation [Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación] 
(CSJN), four judges of the judicial branch of the nation, eight legislators, four 
attorneys with federal license (elected by similarly licensed professionals), a 
representative of the executive branch, and a professor of law at one of the law 
schools at the national universities (also elected by vote).
 In 2003, a presidential decree and the reform of the Regulations of the 
Senate introduced new and important amendments regarding procedures 
for appointing judges of the CSJN and other judicial officials. With Decree 
222/03,81 the executive branch established guidelines for the nomination of 
these judges and ordered a new procedure.82 According to these, the president 
must make public a list of up to three candidates for each post and an inquiry 
must be held in order to consult citizens on the technical and moral capac-
ity of the candidates, as well as their commitment to democracy and human 
rights. After this inquiry is completed, the proposal for candidates, together 
with the observations provided by civil society, must be sent to the Senate to 
be debated in a public hearing.
 This decree was based on a proposal made by five nongovernmental orga-
nizations, published in the text “Una Corte para la Democracia” (A court for 
democracy).83 All of these organizations have been systematically working 
on issues regarding accountability and public disclosure as well as judicial 
reforms. This document contains “proposals for changes in the appointment 
and removal processes of judges of the Supreme Court, the reduction of the 
jurisdiction of this court, and other ideas aimed at recovering credibility, 
legitimacy, and the trust of the people in this institution, which must be the 
guarantor of individual freedoms and the proper functioning of the demo-
cratic system.”84
 At the same time, the reform of the Regulations of the Senate in 2003 
established in great detail the system of publicizing the agreed-upon lists of 
candidates for judges, and broadening the opportunities for civil society to 
make observations about them. But it also stipulated the right of reply by the 
candidate to observations that may have been posed. It also allowed the Trea-
ties Commission to produce evidence. A fundamental part of this reform was 
the incorporation of public hearings into the process. After December 2002, 
an intense debate took place on the reform of these regulations, which, in a 
first resolution, failed to include public hearings for agreements on the can-
didates for magistrates. Finally, however, public hearings were incorporated 
into the amendments of 2003 and were established in article 123.
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 The process of removing judges was also changed with the reform of the 
CN in 1994. Prior to this reform, the established mechanism was a political 
trial in which the House of Representatives made an accusation and the Senate 
reached a resolution.85 Since this reform, and regarding the removal of judges 
of lower courts, any citizen can file a suit before the Council of the Magistracy. 
The ruling produced by the council is nonappealable and has no other effect 
but the removal of that judge. The removed judge, however, is subsequently 
subject to the law before the ordinary courts. This procedure incorporates 
in a positive manner the principle of participation by various actors in rela-
tion to justice. Regrettably, however, the process has become very bureau-
cratic and, as a result, the control of these actors is not entirely effective. Sus-
tainable and effective judicial reform depends on the proper functioning of 
this process.
impugnación: political or legal?
An ongoing debate in Argentina, since the transition to democracy began in 
1983, concerns whether the agreements for military promotions are politi-
cal or juridical in nature. The legislators who seek to approve the agreements 
argue that there are no judicial proofs that validate the questionings, and that, 
therefore, the promotions should go through unhindered. According to this 
line of thinking, the courts would have to provide objective, legal proof; in 
the case that there is none, the impugnacións would violate the principle of pre-
sumption of innocence. The following dialogue provides an example of such 
a discussion in Congress:
Mr. Usandizaga: Mister President, as I have stated on more than one occa-
sion in previous cases not related to these agreements — and with no 
intention of provoking controversy with anyone — I am very respectful 
of the constitutional principle that establishes that in order for someone 
to be guilty of a crime, he or she has to have been sentenced by a previous 
judgment ruling over the issue at hand. Constitutionally, our country is 
ruled by what is known as the principle of presumption of innocence. 
This means that there can be accusations or accusers, but if there is no 
sentence in the end, no one can be punished. This is why I vote in favor 
in these cases. My intention is not to argue with anyone, but to observe 
a principle that I have always respected in all votes of this nature. That is, 
the principle of presumption of innocence rules our country by consti-
tutional mandate. It is in this sense that I am voting. 
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Mr. Del Piero: Mister President, the intervention by the Senator for Santa 
Fé urges me to make the following clarification. I am not making any 
value judgment or condemning anyone. I am merely offering my agree-
ment or not with the National Executive branch regarding the confirma-
tion of the higher ranks of the Armed Forces. In order to make my vote, 
I have taken into consideration the record of suitability of the candidates 
being proposed. My vote against this specific case on the agreements 
we are considering is based, above all, on my personal evaluation of the 
moral competence displayed in the records of the proposed officials, 
who participated in the “Dirty War” [Guerra Sucia] during the period 
between the years of 1976 and 1982. Henceforth, regarding the case of 
the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Alejandro Guillermo Duret — to 
my knowledge, he is the one being dealt with here — I place my vote 
against on the record.
Mr. Verna: Mister President, inasmuch as this case is included in the 
report by CONADEP with file number 7.594, I announce my vote against. 
Likewise, I wish to state the following: the agreement is, in addition, a 
political issue because it is resolved within a political body whose rep-
utation may be affected, positively or negatively, according to its deci-
sion. Due to this political nature, these cases must be analyzed neither 
with the juridical rigor of a magistrate, nor with the technical criteria of 
a qualifications commission, but with an understanding of the affirma-
tion of values that our society needs.86
According to regulations, it is clear that decisions by the Senate do not need 
previous court sentences. As stated above, the rejection of a promotion is a 
political decision that only halts a military career; it does not take away the 
acquired rights of whoever is not being promoted. More than being guided 
by legal-institutional matters, the course of these discussions was determined 
by the need of the branches of the state to provide a response to policies con-
cerned with dealing with problems regarding the military in general. In other 
words, these arguments mainly circled around the balance of forces in civic-
military relations and the limits of the political autonomy and the corporate 
features of military institutions.87
 Criticism of the political character of impugnacións has also surrounded 
their application to posts decided by election and the removal of magis-
trates, again as a result of the lack of legal decisions from the courts on seri-
ous human rights violations. CELS stated the following in the context of the 
Patti case:
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International human rights law imposes an inversion of the burden of 
proof [in cases such as this one] which involve serious human rights 
violations. Indeed, those persons accused of committing such crimes 
must prove their suitability, even more so in cases like the present one, 
in which the suspect intends to occupy a post of such importance. . . . A 
person who depends on the state apparatus itself [in order to commit 
crimes] cannot hide behind the lack of diligence in the clearing up of the 
facts by the State itself.88
CELS has argued in favor of departing from the requirement of having “a firm 
judicial sentence,” in order to assess the ethical or moral suitability of the 
members of Congress, for these extraordinary cases involving grave human 
rights violations such as forced disappearance, torture, and genocide. Its posi-
tion is that the rule for access to and permanence in public positions laid out 
by the Human Rights Commission in relation to the case of Argentina, a rule 
containing the criterion of a “reasonable suspicion judicially declared,” or of 
“sufficient proof of participation,” is the proper evaluation tool for assessing 
the suitability for occupying public positions. Its exceptional character is a 
function of the peculiar gravity of the situations to which it is meant to apply, 
the material and legal impossibility of competent tribunals carrying out 
timely investigations. In other words, the impunity suffered by the country 
in the last twenty years of democracy motivates the appeal to extraordinary 
criteria in order to enforce the principles of justice contained in international 
human rights law. 
 The Electoral Commission of the Province of Buenos Aires, acting on a dif-
ferent view, however, on October 19, 1999, resolved that:
The evaluation of the facts presented by the impugning party is subjec-
tive, so long as there is no court resolution that, in the face of lack of 
compliance with the law or commission of an act typified as a crime, 
gives ground to a challenge. All of the facts being denounced have not 
merited a court judgment that can validate the circumstances described 
in writ of Fs. 1/8, and have not merited a criminal sentence that implies 
moral or ethical condemnation.89
The impugnación of this candidate did not lead to his exclusion despite the 
ethical and suitability requirements that must be complied with in order to 
occupy posts that entail great public responsibility.
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conclusion
The core of the Argentinean democratic transition has been defined by Stan-
ley Cohen as a process dealing with “legal and political limitations to imple-
menting the principle of accountability.” The problem is, however, that the 
very concept of “transition” takes on a specific meaning here, because the 
“Argentinean case is the history of a process of impunity that has developed 
gradually.”90 This process has been ongoing for more than twenty years, and 
it altered not only the institutional and political possibilities to confront the 
crimes of the dictatorship, but also the contents of the ethical debate, as well 
as the chances of transforming the armed forces into a democratic institution. 
The absence of a sustained public policy to fight impunity has contributed to 
undermining the conditions that make life in democracy possible.91 Arguably, 
for instance, the continued systematic practice of violence and torture by the 
security forces results from a lack of institutional mechanisms to democratize 
them. 
 The achievement of justice is crucial in order to have armed forces com-
mitted to democracy. In this sense, an important step in the direction of inves-
tigating and judging those responsible for the crimes of the dictatorship was 
taken by the Supreme Court when it decided, in the 2005 Poblete-Hlaczik case, 
that the Due Obedience and Final Stop laws were unconstitutional. Similarly, 
some measures taken since 2003, among them, retiring a significant num-
ber of the military upper echelons due to their antidemocratic postures, the 
repeated repudiation of the dictatorship on the part of the chiefs of the three 
branches of the armed forces, and the decision to remove the portraits of the 
dictators Jorge Videla and Reynaldo Bignone from the walls of the Military 
Academy, have had some impact. 
 The state has the obligation to provide just reparations and guarantees of 
nonrepetition. In order to do so, it may establish ad hoc mechanisms, and 
carry out institutional reforms leading to the separation from the armed and 
security forces of those linked with the grave violation of human rights. These 
ad hoc mechanisms could include administrative proceedings that would pro-
vide the possibility of producing evidence against and removing from their 
posts those individuals for whom there exists reasonable suspicion of respon-
sibility for human rights violations under the dictatorship. For example, the 
state could create an evaluating commission to investigate the past behavior 
of members of the military, police, and security forces. This would consider-
ably improve the quality of the membership of these institutions. This special 
administrative procedure — according to the rules of due process — will have 
to provide adequate judicial control over administrative decisions. 
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 Current laws would actually allow various forms of these ad hoc screening 
procedures without the need for carrying out legal reforms. However, there 
are imperative reforms needed to the norms that rule military careers so that 
they (1) integrate verification and screening procedures and separation from 
duties when there are suspicions of participation in these types of crimes, and 
(2) modify the executive’s discretion in presenting candidates for positions 
and promotions, requiring the executive to motivate and ground its requests. 
Some of the norms that currently govern the life of the armed and security 
forces were adopted during the dictatorship, and clearly, they call for thorough 
revision. The adoption of norms specifically barring holding an official posi-
tion for reasons of grave violations of human rights during the dictatorship 
could actually improve the debate about the moral or ethical requirements of 
suitability for office. This would cohere with the Law on the Ethics of Public 
Function [Ley de Ética en el Ejercicio de la Función Pública], which established that 
all state functionaries stand under the obligation to “strictly observe and see 
to it that the National Constitution, the laws, and rulings are observed, and to 
defend the republican and democratic system of government.”92 
 Discussions such as those concerning Antonio Bussi’s certificate and Luis 
Patti’s candidacy demonstrate that nonjudicial measures to remove public 
officials from their posts or to prevent their candidacy due to involvement 
in the crimes of the dictatorship generate much debate. Court decisions, pre-
sumably, would be less contentious, at least in part, by virtue of complying 
with certain guarantees. 
 Those working to reform and develop mechanisms in the administrative 
sphere will need to be mindful of the inevitable controversy they will awaken, 
and therefore must face two challenges: first, defining criteria for assigning 
responsibilities for past crimes and, second, ensuring that the reforms abide 
by democratic principles. These principles encompass far more than the spe-
cific issue of the crimes of the dictatorship; they include the participation of 
different institutions of public administration and civil society in decision-
making processes, and the disclosure and provision of public access to infor-
mation concerning the nature of those processes. These measures will make a 
contribution to the ongoing political debates about democracy. 
Translated by Christian Gerzso.
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The Struggle for lasting Reform: 
Vetting Processes in El Salvador
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introduction
To fully understand the social context of the vetting processes that took place 
in El Salvador in the early 1990s, following the conclusion of the twelve-year 
civil war, one must go back to the 1930s, for it was then that the system of 
authoritarian military domination was established, at the same time that the 
country’s economic structure was modernizing. The 1930s crisis in world 
capitalism hit Salvadoran shores with unprecedented force. The national 
economy’s dependence on coffee prices dragged the country down into one 
of its worst crises, calling into question the system of domination that had 
been ushered in by the liberal reform of the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. The response of those in power was to turn over the management of 
state affairs to the military, which established itself permanently in govern-
ment, first under the personal dictatorship of General Maximiliano Hernán-
dez Martínez, who ruled the country with an iron hand for thirteen years. His 
rule was followed by decades during which military control was institutional-
ized: the armed forces took over management of the state, setting up a politi-
cal regime that combined the periodic use of systematically fraudulent con-
trol mechanisms with repression directed against those who did not accept 
military domination, and which was accompanied by a constitutionalist, 
anticommunist, and developmentalist rhetoric that allowed the opposition 
only limited space. Thus, for more than fifty years the military not only held 
power, but also enjoyed a level of impunity that placed its members above the 
citizenry at large.
 In the early 1970s, this political arrangement faltered, as elections became 
less and less useful as an instrument for legitimating the system, and an armed 
insurgency arose and took the first steps to challenge the military government. 
The regime’s response was to accentuate its dependence on repression, which 
not only spurred on the guerrillas both politically and numerically, but also 
worsened its own crisis of legitimacy. The stage for an armed confrontation 
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was set, and for the next twelve years, from 1980 to 1992, Salvadoran society 
was embroiled in an internal war in which the guerrillas argued the need for 
democracy and social justice, while the government claimed to be defending 
itself from what it considered an international communist conspiracy whose 
objective was to take over the country and install a dictatorship. 
 During the second half of the 1980s, it became clear that there was no pros-
pect of a military settlement to the armed conflict, as conditions both domes-
tically and internationally brought about a persistent stalemate. At the same 
time, the population was showing ever more palpable signs of weariness in 
the face of the armed conflict. The alternative of a negotiated solution began 
to look increasingly attractive for both the guerrillas, who had been talking 
about such an option for several years, and the recently elected conservative 
government, which needed to end the war in order to ensure the viability of 
an economic restructuring project based on the dictates of the “Washington 
consensus.”
 Although its precise causes may be in dispute, the war’s climate of impu-
nity and judicial dysfunction certainly inhibited its early resolution. In 1983, at 
the peak of the conflict, Judge Harold Tyler made the following assessment in 
a report to the U.S. secretary of state:
Intimidation and corruption of prosecutors, judges and juries are wide-
spread, and a rigid legal system renders successful prosecutions all the 
more difficult. The military exerts a pervasive influence over the nation 
and. . . has sought to shield from justice even those who commit the 
most atrocious crimes.2
Eight years later, this analysis was viewed as still relevant by a RAND study 
prepared for the Pentagon and published on the eve of the final peace accord 
in 1992.3 
 In April 1990, both parties agreed to sit down at the negotiating table, 
with the intermediation of the secretary-general of the United Nations. Two 
years later, in January 1992, the parties signed the peace agreement that not 
only ended the armed conflict, but also contained a broad array of political 
reforms, which the UN secretary-general called a “negotiated revolution.” 
This set of accords constituted a political program for the most thorough-
going democratization that Salvadoran society had undertaken since its inde-
pendence. Although the document clearly pointed to the dual causality of 
the conflict, that is, both socioeconomic exclusion and lack of democracy, in 
practice, and as a clear expression of the limits of the negotiated solution, the 
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main focus was on political reform. The assumption was that socioeconomic 
changes would be addressed via the mechanisms of a democratic society. 
 Overcoming militarism, in respect to both military control of the gov-
ernment and subsequent human rights violations, was the key issue in the 
negotiations, as reflected in the proportion of the peace accords given over to 
these matters, and the meticulous detail of the commitments made therein. 
The result has been that, both institutionally and organizationally, the instru-
ments of legitimate violence have been profoundly changed: the constitu-
tional reform redefined the role of the armed forces (article 212), limiting it 
to the external defense of the country; and, accordingly, the police function, 
which was traditionally entrusted to the armed forces, was separated out, the 
police agencies were dismantled, and a new police force, the National Civil-
ian Police [Policía Nacional Civil] (PNC), was formed. The national security 
doctrine in place up until that time was replaced by a new organic law of the 
armed forces, which deprived the military of its support network in the popu-
lation by disbanding paramilitary organizations. 
 All these changes raised questions about the status and fate of armed 
forces personnel. How could it be ensured that the country would not return 
to a state of militarism? How could it be guaranteed that the armed forces per-
sonnel would be capable of implementing the peace accords and would oper-
ate within their new parameters? What was to be done to prevent impunity 
from again becoming a characteristic of military conduct? The peace accords 
addressed these questions by reducing the total number of forces, creat-
ing institutions to protect human rights, bolstering the independence of the 
judiciary and of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (entrusted 
with the prosecutorial function), establishing the Commission on the Truth in 
El Salvador (hereafter, Truth Commission) to analyze the most serious politi-
cal crimes committed during the war, and establishing the so-called Ad Hoc 
Commission (hereafter, AHC). The AHC’s sole function was to undertake the 
vetting of the officer corps of the armed forces, based on a three-pronged test: 
full respect for the rule of law, professional competence, and the capacity to 
operate in the new situation of peace.
 The first section of this chapter will provide some background on efforts to 
vet the armed forces prior to the peace accords. The second section contains a 
more detailed study of the work of the AHC, and the other mechanisms man-
dated by the peace accords to reorganize the police apparatus and improve 
judicial accountability. The third section will address vetting efforts under-
taken in recent years, which have responded mainly to domestic constituencies 
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and concerns, including groups seeking to promote the integration of El 
Salvador into the global economy as well as popular discontent with rising 
criminality. In El Salvador, attempts to produce mechanisms that will ensure 
democracy, respect for human rights, and accountability have moved from a 
primary focus on human rights abuses to being centered principally (though 
not exclusively) on weeding out corrupt and incompetent state functionar-
ies. In this sense, the vetting reforms initiated with the peace accords have 
become institutionalized into broader concerns about the kind of account-
ability that should be in place in a democracy. As a final matter, this paper will 
examine two issues that deserve further attention: first, the legal and politi-
cal issues surrounding the ten-year ban on political office recommended by 
the Truth Commission for the people mentioned in its report; and, second, a 
deeper analysis of the specific contextual reasons that might explain the par-
tial success of the AHC. 
vetting mechanisms and institutional reform processes
VETTINg PRIOR TO ThE PEACE ACCORdS
By late 1979, the crisis of the authoritarian military regime was already in evi-
dence. The government of General Humberto Romero, who had assumed 
the presidency in 1977, found itself trapped in a political dilemma: on the one 
hand, it faced a mounting grassroots antigovernment mobilization, backed 
and fostered by the guerrilla movement, to which its only response was a 
policy of stepped-up repression; and, on the other hand, it had to address the 
demands of Salvadoran society, of the international community, and in par-
ticular of the administrion of US President Jimmy Carter, that citizens’ human 
rights be respected. The issue was resolved by the military regime in a manner 
that had become traditional: a coup d’état. But this time the plotters called 
on the opposition to form a government, and pledged to withdraw to their 
barracks.
 One of the serious problems faced by the new Revolutionary Govern-
ment Junta [Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno] was that of addressing the human 
rights violations committed under previous administrations, and, more spe-
cifically, the illegal executions and disappearances of citizens, both men and 
women, which had become a regular practice of the security forces and armed 
forces units. The government took a number of unofficial, discrete, and ulti-
mately unsuccessful initiatives in this direction, such as offering money to ex-
members of the intelligence apparatus of the military regime in exchange for 
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information about the burial places of the disappeared. It also officially set up 
a Special Commission for Investigating Political Prisoners and Disappeared 
Persons [Comisión Especial de Investigación de los Presos Políticos y Desaparecidos],4 
made up of three civilians: the attorney general of the republic, the president 
of the National Commission for the Defense of Human Rights, and the former 
president of the same commission, a respected attorney. From the outset of 
its work, the special commission encountered hostility and a lack of coop-
eration on the part of high-level military officers; consequently, its members 
began to receive and document hundreds of complaints from citizens, and to 
visit places where clandestinely buried human remains had been found. 
 After several weeks of work, on November 28, 1979, the commission deliv-
ered its report to the government junta. The report, in summary, argued that 
the number of human rights violations committed by the armed forces, along 
with the high level of impunity enjoyed by the perpetrators, provided grounds 
for the conclusion that the illegal disappearances and extrajudicial killings 
were an official policy approved by the three previous administrations. The 
commission therefore recommended that criminal proceedings begin against 
the previous three presidents of the republic, their ministers and vice-minis-
ters of defense, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, and national directors 
of the three police agencies that existed at that time. This “vetting” effort was 
ultimately fruitless, as it was overtaken by other events. Although the junta, 
on December 5, agreed to publish the commission’s report and ordered the 
attorney general to open a criminal case against those named in it, by Christ-
mas a government crisis between the majority of civilian members of the 
junta and the cabinet and the high command of the armed forces was sparked 
by an increase in human rights violations. The crisis culminated in early Janu-
ary 1980 with the resignation of the cabinet and two of the five junta mem-
bers. The new ruling junta, made up of members of the military together with 
the Christian Democratic Party, shelved the commission’s recommendations. 
 The failure of this experience clearly points to the limitations of a vetting 
instrument designed in an improvised fashion and used in conditions of polit-
ical instability, including, especially, the weakness of the powers that put it in 
place. The first government junta (October 1979 to January 1980) was charac-
terized by a lack of coherence, trying to defuse a highly polarized situation 
at the same time that it introduced a very radical program of socioeconomic 
reforms. It was clear that the measures being proposed by the commission 
were unprecedented, and required a degree of power that the junta never had. 
Moreover, the commission’s mandate was extremely vague with respect to its 
operations, powers, and available material resources. 
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 A second “vetting” effort came two years later, in December 1983, when 
the U.S. government, concerned about the unfavorable reactions in Congress 
to its military assistance program, which were provoked by the increase in 
death-squad activity, sent Vice-President George Bush to San Salvador with a 
list of active-duty officers who, in view of the U.S. government, were involved 
in organizing and directing death squads. The United States demanded that 
these officers be relieved of their command duties and exiled, offering in 
exchange a more-than-substantial increase in military equipment.5 The result 
was a limited effort to carry out an internal vetting process in subsequent 
months, in which most of those on the list were retired. Nonetheless, extra-
judicial executions continued to be the usual (albeit less-frequent) practice of 
the armed forces.
VETTINg ANd ThE PEACE ACCORdS
The 1992 peace accords can be read as a program for democratizing a society 
that for more than fifty years had experienced authoritarian military rule, not 
by replacing but by reforming the institutional framework put in place by the 
previous regime. At the same time, the peace accords reflected the balance of 
military force between the parties to the conflict, in which neither side (nor 
their allies) could claim victory over the other. Accordingly, the negotiated 
settlement implied certain restrictions on the democratization program, and, 
more concretely, on the necessary demilitarization of politics. The most basic 
of these restrictions concerned the main actors in the conflict: the armed 
forces would continue to exist, albeit in a modified form, and the Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front [Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación 
Nacional] (FMLN), though shed of its weapons and military structure, would 
become a legal political party. 
 From this perspective, the whole set of mechanisms proposed by the peace 
accords had a dual function: first, to introduce into Salvadoran society insti-
tutions and forms of democratic political coexistence; and, second, to prevent 
Salvadoran political life from falling back into the molds and forms of con-
duct that dominated it for so many years. Retribution was relegated to a sec-
ond tier, and tended to be easily overlooked, allegedly out of considerations 
of political stability. As the accords were implemented, this view became 
even more predominant, and as a result transitional justice measures focused 
not on retribution, but on prevention. “Punitive” action was limited to a few 
exemplary cases, which were not of a judiciary nature. This approach is illus-
trated by the vetting mechanism that will be the main focus of analysis of this 
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chapter, the Ad Hoc Commission. With its target limited to the armed forces, 
and only the senior commanding officers,6 the commission’s grounds for vet-
ting included not only human rights violations (subject to criminal liability), 
but also the “capacity to adapt to the new situation,” a typically nonjudicial 
consideration. 
 The peace accords contain three types of mechanisms that are relevant 
to the issue at hand: “total vetting,” “direct vetting,” and “indirect vetting.”7 
The first corresponds to measures that abolished an entire institution, or an 
entire part of one, its personnel being dismissed and sometimes forbidden 
from applying to the new, similar institution created by the accords, just for 
having been a member of the old institution.8 The second type, direct vetting, 
refers to the explicit mechanisms that evaluated the personnel of an institu-
tion to determine who should be separated from it. And, finally, indirect vet-
ting refers to institutional reform measures requiring that personnel must be 
subject to new selection procedures in the future. 
 Four cases of total vetting followed the peace accords. The first was that of 
the combatant force of the FMLN, which was dissolved as such, its members 
being given the choice of continuing to participate in the political life of the 
country through a political party (with the help of a series of economic mea-
sures to integrate them into civilian life), or (for a minority of them) joining 
the new PNC, within the 20% quota to which the FMLN would have a right 
in the transition period.9 The second case was that of two of the three police 
corps that existed prior to the accords, the National Guard [Guardia Nacional] 
and the Treasury Police [Policía de Hacienda].10 These were abolished as the 
peace process began, and their members incorporated into the armed forces. 
The National Police [Policía Nacional] (PN) was accorded different treatment, 
as will be seen below, and was gradually replaced by the new National Civilian 
Police. In the third case, important units of the armed forces known as Rapid 
Deployment Infantry Battalions, which constituted the elite forces of the army 
but which were accused of the worst human rights violations, were dissolved, 
as it was considered that they “will not be needed in the new situation of 
peace.”11 Finally, the two official paramilitary entities, one known as patrullas 
(patrols) and made up of army reservists, and the other the civil defense forces 
created during the war, were also abolished. In the case of the latter, this was 
accomplished by decree and with no compensation to members; in the case 
of the patrullas, which were part of the armed forces reserves and traditionally 
had played a major role in the repression and surveillance of the rural popula-
tion, it was done with an express prohibition on participating in “any function 
related to public security or monitoring of the population or the territory.”12
ZAmORA wITh hOlIdAy
88
 Direct vetting was reserved for all the officers of the armed forces, either 
serving there or in the PN,13 and all the policemen in the PN. For officers who 
had served in the old PN, a system was established by which they could apply 
to the new PNC by fulfilling the requirements that it might establish for all 
aspirants, and being subject to “an evaluation of their conduct.”14 Both cases 
will be addressed in the next sections of this chapter. 
 Finally, indirect vetting covered the armed forces, the police, and the 
judiciary. In the case of the armed forces, the peace accords included a set of 
reforms that ranged from the institution’s doctrine to a new organic law, a 
new system for professional training of officers, and a set of preventive and 
promotional measures.15 Similarly, for the PNC, the peace accords went into 
great detail about a set of reform measures to be adopted to guarantee that 
the institution avoided falling into the vices of the past. A separate issue is 
the judiciary. As noted in the introduction, it was absolutely necessary that 
the judiciary be vetted. Nonetheless, this institution shielded itself behind the 
separation of powers recognized by the constitution, evading any possibility 
of scrutiny. The Supreme Court of Justice headed up this struggle, going so 
far as to threaten to declare the accords unconstitutional if they were used to 
intervene in its work. The solution to the problem was a set of constitutional 
reforms that would open the space for a potential vetting of the judiciary. First, 
a new independent institution, the National Judicial Council, was established 
to train, nominate, and propose the promotion and dismissal of judges.16 
The idea was to improve the quality of judges and to place some limitations 
on appointments made by the Supreme Court, a practice considered prone 
to corruption. Second, although the National Assembly continues to be the 
body entrusted with electing the magistrates by a two-thirds majority, it has 
to choose from a list (of three for each opening) presented by the National 
Judicial Council.17
ARmEd fORCES
Two transitory commissions were agreed to in the peace negotiations that 
would have an impact on the vetting of military personnel. Most widely 
known and documented is the UN-sponsored and staffed Truth Commission, 
which functioned for a nine-month period between 1992 and 1993 under a 
mandate to investigate “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 
and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know 
the truth.”18 The Truth Commission was empowered to carry out investiga-
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tions and make “legal, political or administrative” recommendations — that 
the parties agreed would be binding — which could include “measures to 
prevent the repetition of such acts, and initiatives to promote national recon-
ciliation.”19 Although the Truth Commission would also comment on judi-
cial actors and other civilians, in the final peace accord document the parties 
referred to the commission the “need to clarify and put an end to any indica-
tion of impunity on the part of the armed forces, particularly in cases where 
respect for human rights is jeopardized.”20
 It is the lesser known and underexamined AHC, which vetted the mili-
tary officer corps shortly after the peace accords were signed, that has been 
cited by one recent study on transitional justice as “the most notable recent 
example of lustration/vetting processes in a post-conflict developing coun-
try.”21 Additionally, this commission represents the first (and only) example 
of a Latin American military submitting to an external civilian review panel 
with the power to fire or transfer officers.
 The agreement to vet [depurar22] the military was reached in September 
1991, late in the two-year-long peace negotiations that were finally completed 
in January 1992. The three members of the AHC were selected by the UN sec-
retary-general in consultation with the two parties: the Nationalist Repub-
lican Alliance [Alianza Republicana Nacionalista] (ARENA) — government, 
and the FMLN — rebels). Two Salvadoran military officers were appointed as 
observers by the president of El Salvador. Unlike the Truth Commission, which 
was entirely comprised of international members and staff, the AHC was com-
prised entirely of Salvadorans. Not very much was expected of its findings, as 
the task itself was deemed too ambitious and dangerous, and, being composed 
of Salvadorans, the commission was seen as being vulnerable to pressures and 
reprisals from the army. It must be kept in mind that for the previous sixty 
years the military had decided the future of civilians; it was unprecedented for 
civilians to decide the professional future of military officers.
 The initial agreement was broad and vague, and seemingly applied to the 
entire armed forces: “A process of purification of the armed forces is agreed 
upon, on the basis of a vetting of all personnel serving in them by an Ad Hoc 
Commission.”23 The duties and mandate of the commission were further 
elaborated, however, in the final peace agreement signed on January 15, 1992, 
which said that the commission’s work should be carried out “within the 
framework of the peace process and with a view to the supreme objective of 
national reconciliation.”24 Specifically, the commissioners were to take into 
account the past performance of each officer, including:
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(1)  his record of observance of the legal order, with particular empha-
sis on respect for human rights, both in his personal conduct and in 
the rigor with which he has ordered the redress and punishment of 
unlawful acts, excesses or human rights violations committed under 
his command, especially if there have been serious or systematic 
omissions in the latter respect;
(2)  his professional competence; and
(3)  his capacity to function in the new situation of peace, within the 
context of a democratic society, and to promote the democratiza-
tion of the country, guarantee unrestricted respect for human rights, 
and reunify Salvadoran society.25
“Serious deficiencies” in any one of these three areas would be sufficient cause 
for the commissioners to recommend the transfer or dismissal of personnel. 
The work of the commission was to begin shortly after the signing of the 
peace accords and to last three months, and its recommendations were to be 
implemented within sixty days of its report being issued. Although the word-
ing of the mandate is not precise, it is clear that the commission was to look 
not at all of the members of the armed forces, but rather only at the officer 
corps.26 Its recommendations were to be binding and non-negotiable.
 The AHC was likely the most difficult point for the military to concede 
during the two-year process of negotiations. The military issue was the “Gord-
ian knot” of the negotiations: the FMLN insisted that its troops and officers be 
incorporated into the armed forces, a demand the officer corps could not bear 
to accept because, it believed, to do so would amount to inviting the “enemy” 
into its house and would destroy the “professional character of the armed 
forces,” as well as the system of promotions [tandas] that was seen as the back-
bone of the institution’s stability. The impasse was overcome when both sides 
finally agreed to the separation of police functions from the military and the 
creation of a new, independent police force, and the FMLN dropped its origi-
nal demand and accepted a quota in the new National Civilian Police.
 The threat now posed to the military by the commission would be deter-
mined to a great extent by the people appointed to it, an issue so delicate 
that it was one of the very last details resolved in the negotiations. Accord-
ing to one of the key FMLN negotiators, Salvador Samayoa, so serious was 
the naming of these commissioners that it was only done at the eleventh 
hour, in the last few days of 1991, during final rounds of negotiations in New 
York City.27 Although UN negotiator Alvaro de Soto worked from lists pre-
pared by both the government and the FMLN, the government vetoed every 
91
El SAlVAdOR
name on a list of fourteen prepared by the FMLN, while the FMLN vetoed 
only one name on the government list. The military’s concerns were thus 
mollified by the fact that the government was effectively able to name the 
commissioners.
 Three commissioners, “Salvadorans of recognized independent judg-
ment and unblemished democratic records,”28 were finally chosen. Reynaldo 
Galindo Pohl was an attorney and university professor who had participated 
actively in the military movement that overthrew General Salvador Cas-
taneda Castro in 1948; he had been a member of the Revolutionary Govern-
ment Junta, had chaired the Constituent Assembly that gave the country its 
modern constitution in 1950, had been minister of education in the first half 
of the 1950s, had begun work for the United Nations in the 1960s, and was 
respected and consulted by the Salvadoran military. Abraham Rodríguez, 
also an attorney, was a founder of the Christian Democratic Party and its first 
candidate for president, who in the 1980s, during the José Napoléon Duarte 
administration, had been in charge of relations between the president and 
the armed forces, working intensely with the top echelon of the officer corps. 
Eduardo Molina Olivares was a former Christian Democrat, who during the 
1980s had been engaged in the defense of human rights and had worked for 
a negotiated solution to the conflict. The composition of the commission 
clearly reflected the supposed political alignment of its members: Rodríguez 
with the government, Molina Olivares with the opposition, and Galindo Pohl 
tied to the UN. In addition, the president appointed two high-ranking retired 
officers as observers, General Carlos E. Vides Casanova, former minister of 
defense, and General Rafael Humberto Larios, former chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. The United Nations Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) provided 
the equipment for the work of the commission, while the salaries of the staff 
and all other expenses were provided by several Scandinavian governments, 
given that the commissioners accepted neither remuneration nor any kind of 
financing from the Salvadoran government. 
 The peace accords set forth the evaluation criteria and guaranteed that 
officers would be interviewed, but did not lay down any procedural guide-
lines. The commission, therefore, designed its own procedure, which can be 
summarized as follows:29
(1) The first decision was to not interview all the officers; the commis-
sion would limit its work to the three highest echelons of the corps, 
i.e., generals, colonels, and lieutenants, and only include captains 
if they were implicated in the course of the evaluations of their  
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superiors. In the three months prescribed by the accords, it would 
have been practically impossible to evaluate the more than two 
thousand officers in the armed forces at that time.
(2) The second step was to meet with more than four hundred offi-
cers (from captain to general) to provide them with a clear expla-
nation of the commission’s mandate and the procedures it would 
follow. At the same time, the commissioners asked for the officers’ 
cooperation. 
(3) The commission asked the Ministry of Defense to provide the “ser-
vice sheets’ [hoja de servicios] for all officers;30 the ministry had sent 
photocopies, but the commission demanded the originals, and 
obtained them.
(4) The commission received all types of information with respect to 
the officers’ conduct, from private sources and nongovernmental 
organizations, as well as foreign governments. The commission did 
not conduct any criminal investigations, but, rather, sought to form 
an opinion based on the information received and the interview 
with the officer.
(5) The interview with the officer proceeded based on the information 
in the possession of the commission. The interview format was 
uniform and sought to look not only into the events in which the 
officer was involved, but also at any relevant information regarding 
his responsibility for his subordinates’ actions (chain-of-command 
responsibility), and above all the willingness he displayed to adapt to 
the new situation being ushered in by the peace accords. The inter-
views lasted from thirty minutes to one hour. 
(6) Once the interview was over, the commission discussed the case and 
reached a decision as to whether to include the officer’s name on the 
list of those who should be discharged or transferred. In every case 
the decision was adopted unanimously, even though only a majority 
was required.
(7) The two military advisers appointed by the president (a former 
defense minister and a former chairman of the chiefs of staff) 
attended all the interviews, but were not present when the commis-
sion deliberated on a decision. They were also not present when the 
commission made the final evaluation of the overall effort, nor at 
the ceremony delivering the report; in these two cases, the decision 
not to participate was made by the advisers themselves, even though 
their presence had been requested by the commission.
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NATIONAl CIVIlIAN POlICE
The creation of a new National Civilian Police (PNC) meant that a new con-
ception of the public security function had to be developed. As defined by the 
peace accords, the PNC was to be “a new body, with a new organization, new 
cadre, new mechanisms for education and training, and a new doctrine.”31 
Although recruitment remained open to former guerrillas and former mem-
bers of the PN, the initial vetting of both was required. In the new regulations, 
special emphasis was placed on the institutional mechanisms set up for select-
ing new personnel as well as for ongoing accountability. Designed both as a 
measure for the demilitarization of society and as a measure of guarantee-
ing FMLN safety for reincorporation into civilian life, the development of the 
PNC has generally been hailed as one of the most important achievements of 
the Salvadoran peace process.
 Under the peace accords, the National Public Security Academy [Academia 
Nacional de Seguridad Pública] was created as the only institution entrusted with 
the task of selecting personnel for the PNC, as well as training and carrying out 
annual evaluations of all PNC personnel. Additionally, an inspector general’s 
office within the PNC was created that would investigate disciplinary cases of 
police officers. During the transition period,32 personnel were recruited from 
the public at large, but without discriminating against former PN or FMLN; 
on the contrary, according to the peace agreement, in the first promotions the 
FMLN could propose 20% of candidates from its own ranks, the government 
could do the same, proposing names from the old PN, and the rest would be 
chosen from candidates with no prior association with either. Former PN offi-
cers would be eligible after an evaluation of their conduct, which would be 
verified by ONUSAL. Former FMLN combatants who fulfilled the appropriate 
admission criteria and procedures were also eligible,33 provided that ONUSAL 
could verify that they had “actually and irrevocably abandoned the armed 
struggle.”34 These processes were also monitored by a domestic commission, 
the National Commission for the Consolidation of the Peace [Comisión Nacio-
nal para la Consolidación de la Paz] (COPAZ), which included representatives 
from the government, the FMLN, and political parties.
JUdICIAl BRANCh
Despite significant flaws in the Salvadoran judicial system, the peace accords 
themselves said little about judicial reform, much less about vetting of person-
nel. A working document on judicial reform prepared during the negotiations 
by the UN had included the immediate replacement of the Supreme Court and 
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the attorney general, as well as an evaluation process of the judiciary, but the 
FMLN had to forego these issues in favor of greater military reforms.35 How-
ever, the periodic reports from ONUSAL, the UN special rapporteur on El 
Salvador, and the Truth Commission all suggested further reforms, many of 
which were never implemented.
 The peace accords did provide for reforming the National Judiciary Coun-
cil36 [Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura](CNJ) to improve judicial independence 
and the quality of justice.37 Among the new roles assigned to the CNJ were the 
periodic evaluation of the judges’ professional competence at all levels below 
the Supreme Court38 (albeit without the ability to act on these evaluations), 
as well as the ability to propose candidates for the Supreme Court, appellate 
and trial courts, and for justices of the peace. The CNJ has had a long-standing 
dispute with the Supreme Court over these issues,39 however, reflected in part 
by the fact that its composition and role have been changed three times by the 
Salvadoran legislature in the past fifteen years.
vetting and post-vetting situation
ARmEd fORCES
The AHC, created by presidential decree, began functioning on May 19, 1992, 
and was originally set to last three months, although it was later extended 
for an additional month. Prior to its official opening, however, the commis-
sioners prepared by renting office space, hiring staff (including a director, two 
lawyers, and support staff), and requesting initial information from the Salva-
doran armed forces about the more than two thousand active members of the 
officer corps. The final report was submitted to President Alfredo Cristiani 
and the UN secretary-general on September 23, 1992.40
 Especially important to the commission’s efforts was the work of El Res-
cate, an NGO founded by a group of North Americans and specializing in 
gathering information about the conflict in El Salvador. El Rescate created an 
index of accountability (beginning in early 1990) based on two sets of data: one 
that compiled all incidents of human rights violations reported by Tutela Legal 
(the human rights office of the San Salvador archdiocese, and the most reli-
able of local organizations), and a second one containing information on Sal-
vadoran military structure and personnel, which was prepared over the course 
of more than a year by a graduate of the Salvadoran military academy. The 
human rights database covered 1980 through 1991, and included 15,212 records 
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of violations, of which 71% had only one victim. By cross-indexing these two 
databases, El Rescate was able to generate reports on individual officers that 
included violations committed during the time when an officer served in a 
command position of a major unit, department, or military zone.41
 By mid-June, the commissioners had reviewed all the files and began a rig-
orous schedule of interviews, up to fourteen a day. The final report, delivered 
in late September 1992, was never made public,42 but soon the basic results 
were an open secret. The report recommended that 103 officers be transferred 
or dismissed, including nearly all of the members of the army high com-
mand, all the colonels who had command of troops during the war, as well 
as the minister and vice-minister of defense. In each case the commission 
only stated one or more of the three criteria — human rights record, profes-
sional competence, or ability to adapt to the new situation of peace — used 
to judge each officer. According to the peace accords, Salvadoran President 
Cristiani had agreed to implement these recommendations within sixty days. 
The U.S. and local press at the time, however, reported widespread discontent 
within the armed forces over the AHC recommendations, although declassi-
fied cables from the U.S. embassy now suggest that junior officers were not 
unhappy with the proposed changes.43
 The issuing of the AHC report also came at the most delicate of times in 
the implementation of the accords, with the final demobilization of FMLN 
and government forces scheduled for October 31. There were delays on both 
sides on a number of issues, the most crucial being that regarding land, and 
only with intensive diplomatic efforts by Marrack Goulding and Alvaro de 
Soto44 on behalf of the UN secretary-general was a new timetable devised that 
would formally bring the armed conflict to an end by mid-December 1992. In 
the process, the UN secretary-general stipulated for the first time the synchro-
nized nature of the accords, whereby “compliance with certain key points in 
the calendar by one side is contingent upon compliance with specific under-
takings by the other side.”45
 In this context, the deadline for compliance with the recommendations 
of the AHC — which President Cristiani tried to renegotiate under apparent 
pressure from the military — came into play as part of a final struggle between 
the FMLN rebels and the Salvadoran government over implementation of the 
peace accords. By the final deadline at the end of December 1992, it became 
clear to the UN that the government had discharged or transferred all but 
fifteen of the officers on the list, including seven officers who had been sent 
abroad to diplomatic posts.46 This led to a public rebuke from the secretary-
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general on January 7, 1993, followed by an expression of concern by the Secu-
rity Council on February 9, which also mentioned the failure of the FMLN 
to destroy its remaining arms. In fact, President Cristiani engaged in private 
negotiations with the FMLN during this period (to which the UN was not a 
party), resulting in two agreements — on December 22 and February 4 — in 
which a series of issues were negotiated based in large part on the two remain-
ing cards held by each side: the missiles still in the possession of the FMLN, on 
the one side, against a series of anomalies regarding land, the new police force, 
and reinsertion programs for the FMLN, on the government side.47 The FMLN 
publicly and privately, however, had essentially agreed to allow Cristiani the 
latitude to discharge the final fifteen officers over the remaining months of his 
presidency, perhaps until as late as May 1994.48
 The publication of the March 15, 1993, report of the Truth Commission 
is generally credited with ensuring that the AHC recommendations would 
finally be completed. Whereas the AHC report was secret, and aimed at a 
relatively few top officers, the Truth Commission report provided a more 
systemic critique of the armed forces as a whole. Although far fewer military 
officers were actually named in the report (about fifty), the effect nonetheless 
was to give greater credence to the recommendations of the AHC. Many of 
those named had also been identified by the AHC report, most notably Min-
ister of Defense Rene Emilio Ponce — key among the fifteen holdouts — for his 
role in the 1989 murder of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and her daugh-
ter. Shortly after the release of the report, President Cristiani told the UN that 
the last fifteen officers from the AHC report, along with others named by the 
Truth Commission, would be retired from active duty by June 30 (some would 
leave with pay, to be retired at the end of 1993). By early July, the UN secretary-
general said that the government was in “broad compliance” with the AHC 
recommendations. At least eight other officers who were not on the AHC list 
but were named in the Truth Commission report, however, managed to stay 
on in the armed forces for at least another year.49 Of the AHC names that are 
known, only one former military officer named in the report currently holds 
public office, former Colonel José Almendáriz, a legislator from the cen-
ter-right National Conciliation Party. In the 2003 elections, former Colonel 
Rolando Herrarte also ran for a deputy post with the Christian Democratic 
Party, but failed to win office. According to several officers consulted, most 
are retired or in private business, and not explicitly involved in politics.50
 The depuración of senior military officers in El Salvador was seen as an 
important component of the peace process, even though none of these offi-
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cers expressed any repentance for past behavior or was ever brought before 
tribunals. In fact, it can be argued that, without the sweeping (and controver-
sial) amnesty that was approved following the release of the Truth Commis-
sion report, many of the remaining fifteen officers might not have even left 
when they did. 
 More than ten years following the events described above, most analysts 
agree that the Salvadoran military is subordinate to civilian authority — 
even though a civilian is yet to be named as defense minister, the military 
is still largely autonomous in governing its internal affairs, and the military 
continues to play a minor role in internal security (largely due to the post-
war crime wave) as well as intelligence gathering.51 During the presidency of 
Dr. Armando Calderón Sol (1994–99), a conflict erupted over the decision of 
the president to promote some colonels to the rank of general, disregarding 
the procedures established by the law; nevertheless, the military accepted the 
president’s authority. More significant regarding the role of the military has 
been the separation of police functions from its charter, which has resulted in 
an extremely low number of human rights cases brought against it in recent 
years. Consistent with this reduced role is the armed forces’ reduction in size, 
from some sixty thousand strong during the war to about fifteen thousand 
personnel at present. According to the human rights ombudsman, for exam-
ple, in 2001 and 2002 only twelve complaints were made against the Ministry 
of Defense, three in 2002 and 2003, and eighteen in 2003 and 2004 — out of 
about two thousand complaints lodged annually for all institutions.52 Given 
these statistics, it is not surprising that the armed forces rank highly in recent 
years among Salvadoran institutions as evaluated by public opinion polls.53 
Thus, while the depuración was an important symbolic component of the 
peace process, the redefinition of the military’s role in society has been of 
arguably more long-term importance.
 But the significance of the vetting of the high officers of the Salvadoran 
army can be seen when looked at from the perspective of the officer corps’ 
long history of impunity. As stated before, this impunity, which stretched back 
to the beginning of the 1930s, was broken in a very discrete but dramatic way 
for officers who had seen their role as saving the country from the communist 
menace. Furthermore, it was done by a group of three civilians — one of whom 
was practically chosen by the military itself — and in a way that left the officers 
no chance to have their cases reviewed. For future generations of officers, the 
precedent was set; from that moment on, they would have to consider the pos-
sibility of being held accountable for their actions as military men.
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NATIONAl CIVIlIAN POlICE
The creation of a new civilian police service has been widely hailed as one of 
the greatest legacies of the peace process. In 2000, for example, the UN sec-
retary-general recalled “the public security model ensconced in the accords, 
that of a rights-respecting, civilian-run force” that embodies “the country’s 
commitment to reconciliation, professionalization and the rule of law.” How-
ever, the secretary-general went on to note that, given the widespread crimi-
nality within the National Civilian Police (PNC) and its inability to root out 
these elements, “there are now serious indications of a departure from that 
public security model.”54 Although still viewed favorably among police forces 
in Central America, and even increasingly within El Salvador, the continued 
problems faced by the PNC are traceable to flaws in the initial vetting pro-
cesses as well as the more permanent mechanisms of selection, recruitment, 
and internal accountability.
 In order to build a more professional police force, PNC candidates are 
required to meet psychological, physical, general knowledge, and educational 
requirements. During the transition period, the PNC was to be composed 
of up to 20% ex-FMLN, 20% ex-PN, with the remaining 60% civilians with-
out previous involvement with either side. But as Charles Call notes, “both 
the government and the FMLN consistently showed a propensity to cheat on 
entrance requirements in order to ensure that their members would gain entry 
into the PNC.”55 In the first months, for example, the government tried to pass 
an entire special forces battalion, one thousand Treasury Police, and eleven 
National Guardsmen (the latter two groups from security forces that were to 
be dissolved) into the PN so that they could then enter the PNC. In addition, 
there was no practical way of submitting applicants to a background check, 
because the old police records were completely unreliable, and, in the case 
of the ex-guerrillas, there was no documentation at all of their past behavior, 
aside from the difficult-to-obtain opinions of their immediate commanders. 
The FMLN was able to get some of its members in as civilians, and even mem-
bers of youth gangs successfully entered the academy in the early years.56 
ONUSAL, however, was able to reverse most of these egregious violations of 
the peace accords. 
 A second serious failure in vetting occurred as a result of the December 
1992 and February 1993 secret agreements made between the FMLN and the 
government, unmediated by the UN, which allowed for the full-scale trans-
fer of the entirety of the Special Investigative Unit [Comisión de Investigación de 
Hechos Delictivos] (SIU) and Anti-Narcotics Unit [Unidad Ejecutiva Antinarcóticos] 
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(UEA) of the PN into the PNC. After minimal screening and no retraining, a 
number of ex-UEA officers took over command positions outside their area 
of specialization, over and above better qualified PNC officers who had gone 
through the academy, “becoming a corrosive, militarizing influence within 
the new force.”57 In late 1993, members of the SIU were implicated in various 
criminal activities, including the assassination of a high-level FMLN leader. 
Only following this crisis was ONUSAL able to intervene to insist that ex-UEA 
and ex-SIU personnel would be required to meet standard admission require-
ments and attend the academy; but when the government agreed to these 
measures, the majority of both groups went on strike and ended up resigning 
en masse — a fortuitous, but unplanned, result of this new development.
 These defective screening procedures for entering the PNC were comple-
mented by weak internal disciplinary systems. The PNC’s internal system 
originally included a disciplinary investigative unit, a disciplinary tribunal, 
and a control unit, all supervised by an external inspector general’s office 
that operated under the vice-minister of security. The system was character-
ized by overlapping functions and an inefficient handling of an overwhelm-
ing number of cases. By early 1996, for example, almost half of the current 
police subcommissioners had been charged with disciplinary infractions, 
but two years later none of them had been dismissed.58 In addition, the head 
of the disciplinary investigative unit reported in 1996 that the disciplinary 
tribunal rarely acted on his recommendations, and often suggested lighter 
punishments.59
 When PNC officers were implicated in high-profile kidnappings and rob-
beries in 2000, Salvadoran President Francisco Flores took action and named 
a special commission (which included external actors) to review police per-
sonnel. This commission’s work resulted in the dismissal of some 329 offi-
cers by late 2000, but a second, more massive purge was authorized under 
Decree 101, issued in August 2000. Mid-level police personnel were asked to 
provide lists of depurables (those who should be dismissed); if they were unable 
to come up with any names, they risked being fired themselves.60 Under this 
decree, 817 officers were dismissed, although the human rights ombudsman 
and other observers noted that these dismissals were carried out without 
respect for due process guarantees.61 Rachel Neild of the Washington Office 
on Latin America noted that:
Decisions were made at the discretion of the Director General [of the 
PNC], while the Inspector General was responsible for investigations. 
This placed the Inspector General under the Director General’s control, 
ZAmORA wITh hOlIdAy
100
thus voiding the Inspector’s ability to act as an external control on the 
system.62 
 The Organic Law of the PNC was then modified in late 2001, formally 
resulting in a loss of autonomy for the inspector general, placing that post 
under the PNC director, and institutionalizing the lack of due process for 
police accused of disciplinary violations. It remains to be seen whether these 
changes will result in greater internal controls for PNC officers. In 2003, for 
example, the inspector general reportedly processed some 5,039 PNC officers 
for disciplinary measures, of which 20% were for serious violations.63 If accu-
rate, this means that nearly a third of the entire police force was subject to 
some kind of complaint during the year.
 Although the impartiality and fairness of these moves towards greater 
accountability may be of questionable seriousness, they have clearly had an 
impact on public opinion. In fact, former police chief Rodrigo Avila64 has 
said that the disciplinary process was constructed to impact public opinion 
more than anything else, since it clearly violated the rights of the police them-
selves.65 Indeed, while almost half of all human rights complaints lodged with 
the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman are consistently against the 
PNC, its standing vis-à-vis public opinion has nevertheless increased. In 1996, 
56% of those polled had “little” or “no” confidence in the PNC, while in 2001 
this had decreased to 45% (although by November 2004 it had gone back up 
to 49%).66 
 Most dismissed police have likely found employment in El Salvador’s bur-
geoning private security sector, estimated at almost twenty thousand strong 
(and larger than the PNC itself). Although it is difficult to determine the fate 
of dismissed police officers, it is worth noting that a 1999 survey of prison 
inmates found that 22% had been members of the armed forces (which could 
include army as well as previous public security forces), while 6% were ex-
FMLN guerrillas. However, of prisoners between the ages of twenty-six and 
forty, 44% were ex-combatants from one side or another.67
 The arbitrariness and externally-driven nature of the disciplinary proce-
dures discussed here clearly illustrate the lack of real institutional develop-
ment in the new police force. Internal and permanent procedures for main-
taining a more or less clean police force did not function properly; they were 
understaffed, subject to pressures from outside and within, without a clear 
and consistent policy, and under weak leadership. As such, they opened the 
door to the development of noninstitutional procedures implemented more 
to satisfy public opinion than to build up a model police force.
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JUdICIARy
Although efforts at vetting in the military and police have at least been 
attempted (with varying degrees of success), the judicial system has been a 
much more reluctant partner in reform. This urgent task is all the more com-
plex because, unlike the police or military, which are subject to executive 
branch authority, the principle of judicial independence must be balanced 
against the need for evaluation and review of judges. Nevertheless, El Salvador 
has fallen far short of the mark, as the UN secretary-general noted in his five-
year report on the peace process:
[T]he greatest failing in [the administration of justice] is the lack of 
efficacy in the process of vetting judges and officials who are dishon-
est, incompetent or whose motivation has failed them. The Supreme 
Court of Justice and the National Council on the Judiciary have evalu-
ated judges in a manner and at a pace which have not proved adequate to 
the gravity of the situation. The inability to make more substantial and 
bold progress in this endeavour represents a failure to comply with an 
indispensable condition for the structuring of a system which, together 
with an efficient police, would be capable of eradicating impunity and 
guaranteeing justice.68
Reforming the judiciary in the Salvadoran context also means depoliticizing 
it. As Linn Hammergren has noted, “Supreme Court justices, along with the 
justices of the peace, were the two most critical judicial actors in the mecha-
nisms for party competition — at the upper level they assured friendly judg-
ments, and at the lower level they mobilized voters.”69
 The Truth Commission attempted to jumpstart this much-needed reform 
process by calling for the resignation of the entire Supreme Court and seek-
ing to give the National Judiciary Council (CNJ) greater responsibilities for 
evaluation and oversight of judges.70 Although the Supreme Court resisted 
this request — in an interview to a local newspaper, its president noted that 
“only God” could remove him from office71 — the attention given to judicial 
dysfunction in the Truth Commission’s report nevertheless created a greater 
public sense of the need for reform. A new court was elected under a new pro-
cedure in 1994 — giving the CNJ the ability to nominate half of the magistrates 
and the bar associations the other half — and not a single magistrate from 
the previous court was reelected. But while the 1994 court was widely seen 
as more professional, political party allegiances and loyalties appear to have 
played a factor in top judicial appointments in 1997, 2000, and 2003.72 The 
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peace accords also called for new justices of the peace to be selected through-
out the country, which, after much delay, finally took place by 1994.
 Although the peace accords attempted to introduce a measure of democ-
racy into the nomination process of Supreme Court judges, and to ensure 
broad support across political party lines by requiring election by a two-
thirds majority of deputies, the end result has been that the main political 
parties simply distribute among themselves the five vacancies to be elected by 
each legislature. Each party chooses its own candidate based on party loyalty, 
regardless of qualifications. The Supreme Court of Justice has become more 
and more partisan and is losing its independence. If in the past the court was 
criticized for its dependence on the wishes of the president of the republic, 
nowadays, increasingly, its dependency is on the political parties. 
 In the first ten years after the peace accords were signed, the CNJ gained 
prestige as it sought to improve the training and evaluation of judges. But as 
its reputation improved, so too has its rivalry with the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice. Disputes between the two bodies have been over which one has the right 
to name judges at the level of justice of the peace, over how binding the CNJ’s 
evaluation of judges should be, and over whether the CNJ should also recom-
mend promotions and transfers of judges.73 The current CNJ law, for example, 
requires that it present a list of three candidates for each justice of the peace 
position, and currently these individuals are required to pass through a rig-
orous training program. However, the CNJ has discovered that the Supreme 
Court has been filling vacancies in alternate justice of the peace positions74 as 
a way of getting its candidates into the system through the back door. Accord-
ing to data compiled by the CNJ, of 317 appointments made to different judi-
cial posts over a four-year period from February 1999 to May 2003 not from 
lists provided by the CNJ, the vast majority, or 274, were for alternate justice of 
the peace posts.75
 The CNJ performs mostly administrative and procedural reviews of indi-
vidual judges, including the processing of case loads in a timely fashion, and 
other minor issues. It does not have the ability to look into qualitative han-
dling of cases. Even then, the CNJ’s disciplinary recommendations are not 
binding on the Supreme Court.76 Since 1995, the court has had a judicial inves-
tigative division to look into complaints about judges, and it is this body that 
is also to review the CNJ’s evaluations. According to former CNJ president 
Lizette Kury, the Supreme Court has taken at least a year to comment upon 
CNJ’s most recent annual evaluation of judges,77 which meant the recommen-
dations of the council became useless because the law gives a specific period 
to the court to act upon the recommendations of the council. When queried, 
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the court’s investigative unit could only provide a statistical summary of com-
plaints it received against different judicial functionaries, but no information 
is available about the results of its investigations.78 The figures for the period 
since the peace accords are hardly promising. For example, during the term of 
the first postwar Supreme Court (1994–97), which is widely seen as one of the 
best courts in decades, only one judge was removed for official corruption.79 
Likewise, the court only disciplined nineteen judges in 1999, fifteen in 2000, 
and forty-eight in 2001 — out of a total 230 that the CNJ had said should be 
sanctioned.80 The court has also carried out numerous transfers, promotions, 
and demotions without consulting the CNJ — 110 during 2002, according to 
the latest CNJ statistics. The situation has deteriorated even more in the last 
few years. According to sources in the CNJ, from 2003 to 2005 the Supreme 
Court only sanctioned four judges accused of corruption; one was suspended 
and the others were transferred to a different court.81
 None of this has made for improved relations between the council and the 
Supreme Court. The scant attention that the court has given the evaluations 
of judges performed by the CNJ, as well as the court’s efforts to make appoint-
ments of judges whose names were not submitted by the CNJ, underlie the 
lack of cooperation between two institutions that hold central places in the 
administration of justice. In light of the relationship between these institu-
tions, then, it is unlikely that any sort of legitimate vetting process will be 
implemented in the near future. 
further issues
Two issues stand out as worthy of further discussion. First, the Truth Com-
mission’s recommendation that those named in its report be banned from 
holding public office is important, given that this issue has often been mis-
takenly praised, when in fact it was never implemented. Second, given that 
the Ad Hoc Commission’s vetting of military officers represents a distinctive 
effort in Latin America, and a prominent case in postwar transitional situa-
tions, a discussion of the uniquely favorable circumstances that facilitated this 
effort is merited.
BAN ON hOldINg PUBlIC OffICE
One of the most widely held misconceptions about the results of the UN- 
sponsored Truth Commission was that it barred those named in the report 
from holding public office for a period of not less than ten years. Indeed, 
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the report did make this recommendation, along with one to permanently 
proscribe those named from any future activity related to public security 
or national defense. Although the latter has been upheld in practice, and by 
default, the recommended ban against holding political office was immedi-
ately seen as problematic on several counts, a fact that was duly noted in a 
subsequent ONUSAL review of implementation of the Truth Commission’s 
recommendations.82 The problems with this recommendation clearly express 
the difficulties of trying to punish people for committing human rights abuses 
during an internal conflict in which there is no victorious side. When the par-
ties to the military confrontation (and the main actors committing human 
rights abuses) negotiate and define the parameters for peace, instruments 
such as truth commissions can become a substitute for the judicial process.
 The recommendation of a ban on public office was one of those that was 
“inferred directly from the results of the investigation” and as such required 
“urgent” attention. It suggested that COPAZ prepare legislation to implement 
this measure. In its report, ONUSAL found that, in fact, no legislative action 
was possible, noting that any legislative bill “would affect essential provi-
sions of the Constitution relating to political rights,” and, moreover, was in 
direct conflict with other Truth Commission recommendations calling for 
the approval of international human rights instruments that safeguard the 
political rights of citizens. The legal problem with the recommendation was 
a serious one. The constitution explicitly establishes, in articles 74 and 75, the 
causes for the suspension and loss of citizen rights, and, in articles 126 and 127, 
the requisites and prohibitions to become a candidate for Congress; to intro-
duce a new prohibition on the grounds of past violations of human rights 
would amount to reforming the constitution. In addition, the government 
and its majority in the National Assembly had passed a total amnesty for all 
violations of human rights committed during the war. 
 The recommendation was formally evenhanded, in that it was to be applied 
to both sides in the conflict. But in practice it amounted to asymmetric treat-
ment. The negotiated peace was based on the idea that the FMLN would aban-
don its military practices in exchange for full participation in the political 
process, as a political party. However, to start this “participation” by barring 
from office the guerrilla leadership was clearly political nonsense, and would 
have put the new party at a serious disadvantage. Not only would the FMLN be 
entering the arena of politics for the first time, but it would have to do without 
its most recognized leaders as potential candidates for public office. At the 
same time, the armed forces, whose active members were by constitutional 
mandate forbidden to present themselves as candidates unless they ended 
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their military careers, would continue as an institution. This would have con-
stituted a disproportionate punishment for the leadership of the FMLN, even 
more so considering that the great majority of human rights violations com-
mitted during the war had been committed by the armed forces. 
 A related problem was the limited, and discriminatory, mandate given 
to the Truth Commission by the peace accords. The Truth Commission was 
not supposed to investigate all human rights violations during the war, but 
only those “serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose 
impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth.”83 
Practices implemented by the guerrillas during the first phase of the war, such 
as executing prisoners and assassinating informers (they called it ajusticia-
mientos), which were clearly human rights violations, never impacted the pub-
lic enough to merit an investigation by the Truth Commission.  
 This explains the curious situation in which most of the criticism of the 
commission’s work came from conservative sectors within the country and 
human rights proponents abroad. The main objection of both was that the 
commission employed a double standard for the two sides in the conflict, 
being more severe with the army. It was faulted for its weak handling of cases 
of abuse by the FMLN, for which it tended to rely on FMLN factions’ own prior 
admissions, and occasionally failed to accord the same kind of command 
responsibility as it did with the armed forces.84 Given that one guerrilla fac-
tion in particular had publicly claimed credit for a series of assassinations of 
local mayors, it would have been disproportionately punished by a ban on 
holding public office vis-à-vis other factions that were less forthcoming about 
their previous history. 
Ad hOC COmmISSION, VETTINg,  
ANd fORTUITOUS CIRCUmSTANCES
Although vetting and related processes of institutional reform were key to the 
resolution of the Salvadoran conflict, it should also be recognized that they 
took place under the most fortuitous of circumstances, namely:
• The Salvadoran case was one of the first efforts by the UN to help 
resolve an internal conflict in the post-Cold War period, before it was 
pulled into numerous conflicts around the world. The timing of this 
effort enabled greater international donor generosity.
• Domestic conditions were ripe — the implementation of the demobili-
zation of military and guerrilla forces went forward with UN supervi-
sion, surviving any irregularities and violations.
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• The U.S. government, which had played such a dominant role in sup-
port of the government and military throughout the conflict, also 
threw its considerable political and economic weight behind the suc-
cessful negotiated end to the conflict and implementation of the peace 
accord provisions.85 
More specifically, there are at least nine reasons why the Ad Hoc Commis-
sion was relatively successful in carrying out a large-scale purification of the 
Salvadoran military.
The role of The UnITed naTIons
As part of the UN-verified peace accords, compliance with the Ad Hoc Com-
mission report recommendations did not only depend on the good will of the 
parties; the government would also be held accountable by the UN secretary-
general, who had the power to publicly chide either side, providing a definitive 
statement as to who was or was not in compliance. In the case of the AHC, 
the UN resorted to public expressions of concern several times throughout 
the process.
U.s. governmenT pressUre
Especially in early 1993, when it became clear that President Cristiani and the 
armed forces were not in compliance with the depuración, the U.S. Congress 
held up some $11 million in fiscal year 1993 military aid. While not an entirely 
significant sum for the military (it did not affect funds in the pipeline), this 
measure had a dissuasive effect on the military.86 As noted by a March 9, 1993, 
cable from the U.S. embassy, the Salvadoran military may have even exagger-
ated the role of the United States in this matter:
The widely-held view within the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] offi-
cer corps (at least the 15 holdouts) is that the USG [United States Gov-
ernment] has been behind their forced separation by providing names 
of officers and information to the Ad Hoc Commission and Truth Com-
mission members. (This was reiterated to Chargé again March 9 by Ad 
Hoc Commission member Abraham Rodríguez.) They continue to view 
this Embassy and the USG as the principal force behind their forced 
resignations — a perception that President Cristiani himself may also be 
sharing with them — particularly in light of the recent letter from the 
secretary.
In fact, the United States had not shared that much information with the AHC.
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 Although the AHC findings eventually resulted in the dismissal of virtu-
ally the entire leadership of the Salvadoran military by mid-1993, including 
the Tandona (the influential class of 1966 from the Salvadoran military acad-
emy), it is worth noting that the U.S. government itself had come quite close 
to recommending this two years earlier, even before the signing of the peace 
accords, in response to military stonewalling in the Jesuit case. In 1991, accord-
ing to the U.S. MilGroup (Military Group) Commander at the time, then U.S. 
Ambassador William Walker had discussed “asking State to direct him to tell 
Christiani (sic) that all funds should be cut off if the entire Tandona did not 
resign within 30 days.”87 According to a cable by Walker himself, on February 
19, 1991:
USG [United States Government] pleas, threats, turning on and off 
the military assistance spigot, and appeals to institutional honor 
have all had the same results — zilch. . . [leaving] only two choices —  
admit defeat and attempt to move on to other matters, or pull the plug, 
i.e., demand a new leadership with a clear understanding of what they, 
and we face. I opt for the second option.88
ImpacT of The TrUTh commIssIon
As previously noted, the AHC report was strengthened greatly by the subse-
quent release of the Truth Commission report, especially as it named several 
of the fifteen military officers who were holding out on the depuración.
coUrage of commIssIon members
Not to be underestimated is the courage it took the commissioners of the AHC 
to propose the depuración that they did. One of the commissioners received a 
death threat, while others spent several months outside of the country follow-
ing the release of this report.
fmln leverage (mIssIles, demobIlIzaTIon)
Another factor contributing ultimately to the implementation of the AHC 
recommendations was the timing with respect to the peace process, and the 
decision by the FMLN to use whatever leverage remained to force final com-
pletion of the depuración. As noted, some factions of the FMLN held on to their 
supply of surface-to-air missiles until the AHC recommendations were com-
plete, and, among other issues, AHC delays led the FMLN to hold up demo-
bilization of several contingents of their troops. Had the AHC report come 
much later, the FMLN would have had virtually no leverage in this matter.89 
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At the same time, the FMLN was generally flexible on the overall timing of the 
depuración.
pressUre from below
The remaining fifteen senior officers were also under pressure from junior 
officers, who had long been dissatisfied with their leadership. As former 
Ambassador William Walker noted two years earlier in a May 30, 1991, cable:
For years, junior officers have expressed dissatisfaction with the incum-
bent ESAF leadership and have been eager for them to retire and open 
up more senior positions. This sentiment is fueled by the personal ambi-
tion of junior officers, as well as the belief that the ineffectiveness and 
corruption of some colonels is a detriment to the institution.
This situation remained the same in 1993, by which time there was little sym-
pathy in the ranks for the fate of the final fifteen officers.90
prIor amnesTy
The U.S. embassy argued at the time that without an amnesty, full compliance 
with the AHC recommendations would have been difficult:
This report — and particularly the unresolved issue of a general amnes-
ty — may complicate President Cristiani’s ongoing effort to effect the 
removal of the final 15 active duty ESAF officers who were cited by the 
AHC. These officers are unlikely to step down until the amnesty issue 
is settled, since there is greater legal and physical protection for them 
within the military.91
moneTary IncenTIves
Outgoing military officers were widely rumored at the time to have received 
significant payments as incentives for complying with the depuración. Declas-
sified U.S. State Department documents tend to confirm that suspicion. For 
example, one report from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research (INR) refers to the “generous retirement packages and a face-saving 
departure calendar” that were used to persuade Minister of Defense Ponce 
and fourteen others to leave active service by June 30.92
secrecy of The process of dEPURACIóN
Many believe that only because the results were secret was Cristiani able to 
carry out the depuración. Dismissals and transfers could be disguised in rou-
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tine orders; the U.S. embassy even suspected that secret orders were issued to 
implement the recommendations.93 For better or worse, the military clearly 
preferred secrecy as a face-saving measure, and Minister Ponce even told the 
United States that “the consequences would be disastrous” should the names 
be made public.94
 These conditions were thus not only incredibly favorable for a successful 
peace negotiation and implementation, but some of them are also unlikely to 
be repeated elsewhere.
conclusions and final considerations
A review of the functions of vetting, as part of the negotiated political solution 
to the Salvadoran internal armed conflict, tends to support two conclusions. 
First, it demonstrates the usefulness of such an instrument in circumstances 
in which stronger responses to the underlying causes of conflict are unlikely. 
In the Salvadoran case, there was a broad consensus that one of these causes 
was the role played by the armed forces for many decades, as has often been 
the case elsewhere. But the fact that the guerrillas were unable to defeat the 
army during the twelve-year conflict made it impossible to implement the 
more radical solutions tried in other countries, such as: the creation of a new 
armed forces in Nicaragua and Cuba; the dissolution of the armed forces in 
Costa Rica in 1948 and in Panama after the U.S. invasion; or the integration 
of opposing military forces in Zimbabwe. In El Salvador, both the balance of 
military forces and the international context allowed only for a more “mod-
est” solution, the vetting of the officer corps, but it was one that was instru-
mental in moving the peace process forward. 
 A second conclusion of this review is the inherent limitation of vetting 
processes: insofar as they deal with personnel and not entire institutions, their 
effects can be short-lived. The comparison between the impacts of vetting in 
the army and the judiciary in El Salvador illustrates the point. In the army, 
vetting was accompanied by a deep and comprehensive institutional reform 
(constitutional reform, restating the role of the institution and reduction of its 
size, separation of army and police, new organic legal framework), the combi-
nation of which has been one of the reasons behind the successful demilitar-
ization of politics in El Salvador. On the contrary, in the case of the judiciary 
there was no direct vetting, and the institutional reform that did occur was 
not comprehensive and was restricted to the two leading institutions of the 
system, the Supreme Court of Justice and the Council of the Judiciary. The 
impact of these measures on democratization and the rule of law has been 
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weak; corruption continues to be a central problem in the judiciary and, in 
recent years, the composition of both the court and the council has tended 
to look more like the situation during the conflict than the expected democ-
ratization. In other words, the absence of comprehensive vetting and accom-
panying institutional reform seems to be a recipe for failure and frustrated 
expectations. The Truth Commission’s indictment of the role of judiciary in 
the past, made thirteen years ago, seems as relevant today, if we drop the ref-
erence to the military:
The judiciary was weakened as it fell victim to intimidation and the 
foundations were laid for its corruption. . . its ineffectiveness steadily 
increased until it became, through its inaction or its appalling submis-
siveness, a factor which contributed to the tragedy suffered by the coun-
try. The various, frequently opportunistic, alliances which political lead-
ers (legislators as well as members of the executive branch) forged with 
the military establishment and with members of the judiciary had the 
effect of further weakening civilian control over the military, police and 
security forces, all of which formed part of the military establishment.95
 A related consideration is the question of the relationship between vetting 
and power. As an instrument of politics, vetting depends on the institutional 
capacity and willingness of those in power to implement it. This is precisely 
the dilemma faced by the Truth Commission on the question of punishment, 
as the commissioners stated in their report:
The question is not whether the guilty should be punished, but whether 
justice can be done. . . . El Salvador has no system for the administration 
of justice which meets the minimum requirements of objectivity and 
impartiality so that justice can be rendered reliably.96
Our review of the different fortunes of vetting in El Salvador demonstrates 
this clearly. The first Revolutionary Government Junta, in October 1989, 
attempted the most radical response to past human rights violations: not just 
vetting, but criminal prosecution, although it did so while trying to exercise 
power in a highly critical situation and with very limited resources. To try to 
prosecute the top officers of the previous governments was to put in danger 
the careers of most of the officers still serving in the armed forces, including 
at least one member of the junta and the minister of defense. It is no wonder 
that the effort failed and became one of the reasons behind the government’s 
downfall. The second attempt at vetting, conducted by the U.S. govern-
ment in 1983, was prima facie successful, both because Vice President Bush 
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commanded enough power to bend the will of the military hierarchy, insofar 
as the armed forces depended on U.S. military aid to conduct the war against 
the guerrillas, and because it was done as a private initiative. But from the 
point of view of the stated objectives of the U.S. government (to curb human 
rights abuses by the Salvadoran military), it was a complete failure. The situ-
ation did not improve — and, it could be argued, became worse in the follow-
ing years — and the institutional structures of the armed forces, as well as its 
political role, continued unchallenged.
 Finally, the Ad Hoc Commission’s depuración — one of the most extensive 
examples we know about of vetting of high officers (all the generals and more 
than half the colonels who conducted the war were dismissed) as part of a 
political settlement — was successful not only because of the favorable condi-
tions in which it was implemented, but also because it was clearly separated 
from any form of judicial punishment and its procedures were kept secret.97 
But, despite these limitations, the central endeavor of the Ad Hoc Commis-
sion, namely, to avoid the country’s relapse into military domination, has 
been achieved so far. Its effects have lasted because they were accompanied by 
broader institutional reform of the armed forces.
Portions of this chapter translated by Charles H. Roberts.
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chapter 3
Swift gradualism and Variable Outcomes:
Vetting in Post-Authoritarian greece
Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos
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introduction
For a number of years after the collapse of the Greek authoritarian regime 
(1967–74), a former member of the left-wing resistance, who had been impris-
oned for four and a half out of the seven years of military rule, would pass by 
a coffee shop in the center of Athens every morning. As he headed towards 
his office, he would see the judge who had convicted him in a military court 
relaxing in the shop, quietly sipping his coffee.1 In another instance, a former 
leader of the student movement against the regime found out, several years 
after the trial in which the policeman who had tortured him was acquitted, 
that the torturer had risen to the rank of chief of police of a major Greek 
city.2 Judging from these two not uncommon examples, it seems that in post-
authoritarian Greece vetting did not go far enough. 
 In this chapter, I first differentiate between vetting and punitive policies and 
briefly discuss the categories of people to which the vetting could be applied. I 
pinpoint some misconceptions about transitional justice and vetting in post-
authoritarian Greece and then sketch the historical and political context in 
which the democratic transition and consolidation (1974–81) took place. The 
implementation of vetting has led to differential outcomes in various political 
and administrative institutions, which I review with an emphasis on vetting 
in the academic community and the judiciary. In the last section I recap my 
main point about the swiftness and gradualism of vetting in Greece.
VETTINg ANd PUNITIVE POlICIES
During a transition to democracy institutions are required to shed the prin-
ciples or standards on the basis of which they used to work under authori-
tarian rule. The transformation of standards, so that they become compatible 
with democracy, goes hand in hand with the vetting of personnel. Vetting 
may be applied in parallel with other transitional justice measures, such as 
prosecutions against the staff of a deposed authoritarian regime. In my view, 
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however, vetting does not have a punitive rationale. Punitive policies, such 
as criminal prosecution, are applied in cases of violations of law, for instance 
torture or other violations of human rights. The rationale for vetting is linked 
to the legitimacy of the new democratic regime. The new regime aims to 
replace the prior one, which has been discredited, and the process of replace-
ment includes the removal of the personnel which operated the repressive 
state apparatus.3 Vetting, which effectively means the screening of individu-
als, may also include the disqualification of persons who have been associated 
with the previous regime. The removal or disqualification of such persons 
means placement in inactive rosters, forced retirement, transfer to insignifi-
cant posts, annulment of promotion, or temporary suspension of duty. 
 The open question of course is what degree of association with abusive 
behavior would make someone subject to vetting. A minimum version of vet-
ting applies only to those responsible for abuses under the deposed authori-
tarian regime. A maximum version could amount to the replacement of all 
personnel in some state institutions and the complete dismantling of other 
institutions. In some cases this may be necessary. Take, for instance, the Mov-
imiento Nacional (National Movement) in Spain. The Movimiento Nacional 
was the political party created by Franco and used as an instrument to control 
Spanish administrative institutions during his authoritarian rule (1939–75); it 
was dismantled after the transition. Another example is the military police in 
Greece, which was completely revamped after the transition to democracy in 
1974. 
 However, sometimes a much less radical transformation may take place. 
Except for some institutions that are considered bastions of authoritarianism, 
democratic transition may not mean a start de novo for large sections of the 
state apparatus. This more or less limited vetting comes as a result of the com-
bination of, first, applying standards of responsibility and fairness that a new 
democracy aspires to, in order to distinguish itself ethically from authoritari-
anism, to acquire legitimacy, and to create a new democratic political culture; 
and, second, the political agenda and the constraining conditions of the tran-
sition, which often restrain any impetus to build a regime anew.
fAIRNESS, RESPONSIBIlITy, ANd ThE CONSTRAININg CONdITIONS  
Of VETTINg
One aspect of applying fairness and responsibility in vetting is the following 
dilemma: fairness may require expanding the circle of people subjected to 
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vetting in order to include anyone who worked for the authoritarian regime, 
whereas, by contrast, responsibility requires restricting the same circle so 
as not to jeopardize the functioning of the state and the stability of the legal 
environment within which social interaction takes place. An obvious issue 
is how large the circle of persons subject to vetting proceedings should be. 
Where should the vetting process stop in regard to persons who worked for 
the authoritarian regime? The implementation of vetting presupposes a grasp 
of who should be included and who should be excluded from the process. 
For instance today, more than thirty years after the fall of the Greek military 
junta — the so-called Greek Colonels — it is still difficult to get a full picture of 
how many people conscientiously worked for them. One may count among 
the junta’s collaborators all persons who were appointed to top ranks of the 
state apparatus after the 1967 coup and until the junta’s fall in 1974. Imme-
diately after the coup, the Greek Colonels proceeded with sweeping purges 
and appointed a new cabinet. Gradually, they swept through the highest 
ranks of the judicial system, the universities, and the local governments. 
They appointed new mayors, replaced all prefects (who were government-
appointed heads of the country’s regions), and placed new general managers 
and boards of directors on top of the state-run companies and public bodies. 
They changed the leadership of the confederations of workers and civil ser-
vants, the Greek Orthodox Church (the state’s official religion), and the bar 
associations of Athens and Salonika.
 It is very difficult to find data for most of the people who collaborated with 
the military junta, for at least two reasons: first, between 1974 and today, archi-
val research about the seven-year long authoritarian rule has been sparse. 
Although research abounds on how the Greek Colonels came to power, there 
are only a few sources on the regime itself.4 Second, there is an unspecified but 
probably large number of officials (officers, civil servants, etc.) who did not 
resist the junta and continued working in and for the state apparatus, effec-
tively contributing to the stability of authoritarian rule, as they would have 
done under any kind of rule. After April 1967, thousands of Greeks continued 
discharging their duties in the armed forces, the police, public administration, 
local government, and state-run companies, obeying orders “from above,” as 
if a regular government turnover had taken place. It would be impossible to 
measure the degree to which such people actually supported the junta. Even 
though one should differentiate, for example, between a military general and 
a conscript (hierarchical differentiation), as well as between a policeman who 
escorts a member of the democratic resistance to the torture chamber and 
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a janitor of an armaments factory (sectoral differentiation), it is not easy to 
arrive at a consensus about where to draw the line; nor is it easy for any post-
authoritarian society to bear the cost of vetting a large share of the population 
who worked in one way or another for a deposed authoritarian regime. 
 As I will argue later, the Greek answer to the problem of fairness and 
responsibility in vetting was to differentiate by institutional sphere. What 
weighed heavily in the problem of where to draw the line on vetting was the 
precarious conjuncture of tensions in Greece’s external relations during 1974–
76 and the traditional strong role of various institutions, such as the judiciary 
and the police and security, in the Greek postwar political system. In other 
words, political considerations prompted the transitional government and 
the courts to reduce the circle of individuals who were vetted and/or indicted 
for crimes committed between 1967 and 1974. 
 Such considerations restricted the scope of prosecutions against military, 
police, and security personnel. Table 1 shows the number of different cat-
egories of officials who were prosecuted and the corresponding percentages 
among them who were finally tried and convicted. As there is no official com-
prehensive account of all these trials, my information is based on an elabora-
tion of a list of prosecuted officials (see the source for Table 1). Except for this 
circle of individuals, the rest of the officials who worked for the junta in vari-
ous capacities (e.g., police informants, top-ranking civil servants, the leader-
ship of police and security forces, etc.) were not prosecuted. 
TABlE 1 
Number of urban police, gendarmerie, and military officials prosecuted, tried, and 
convicted in the “junta trials” after the 1974 transition to democracy in greece
 POlICE gENdARmERIE ARmy TOTAl
Prosecuted 58 34 99  191
Subsequently tried 56 (97%) 33 (97%) 95 (96%)  184
Eventually convicted  32 (57%) 24 (73%) 57 (60%)  113
SOURCE: My own classification of 191 individual cases of officials prosecuted for unlawful 
acts committed between 1967 and 1974. For the list, see Giorgis Th. Kremmydas, Oi Anthro-
poi tes Juntas Meta te Dictatoria [Junta’s men after the fall of the junta] (Athens: Exantas, 1984), 
229–85. The gendarmerie was primarily responsible for rural areas, the police for urban 
areas. Members of state security, who were policemen not required to wear uniforms, are 
counted under “police.”
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 The case of Greece also offers an example of the importance of the politi-
cal agenda and constraining conditions for the scope of vetting in post-
authoritarian periods. With the exception of the military and the university 
system, “dejuntification,” which was a term used as equivalent to vetting, was 
restrained.5 The Greek transitional government, which ascended to power in 
July 1974, was not particularly preoccupied with punitive measures against 
members of the deposed authoritarian regime6 and even less with vetting. The 
government’s priorities lay elsewhere. With the benefit of hindsight, I would 
like to argue that Konstantinos Karamanlis, who was the first post-authoritar-
ian prime minister and led a conservative majority, single-party government 
during 1974–80, wanted, first, to preserve political stability in a period of 
tense relations with Turkey, and, second, to close all issues related to the coun-
try’s authoritarian past in order to prepare for Greece’s integration into the 
European Economic Community (achieved in January 1981, that is, only six 
and a half years after the junta fell). Political stability and the containment of 
popular demands were permanent concerns for all post-1945 Greek regimes. 
However, in 1974, Karamanlis masterminded the transition to a democratic 
regime, which was different from and more open than the very “disciplined” 
democracy that he himself had helped craft in the postwar era.
paradoxes and misconceptions about the transition  
to democracy and vetting in post-authoritarian greece
ThE POlITICAl ANd hISTORICAl CONTExT
The postwar Greek crown democracy (1946–67) was shaped by the experi-
ence of the civil war between the royalist government and the communist 
Left (1946–49) as well as by the polarization between the right wing and the 
king, on the one hand, and the political forces of the center and the left, on the 
other. The postwar regime was a “disciplined” democracy characterized by 
limited freedoms and restricted political participation.7 Professing a national-
ist and anticommunist ideology, the Greek Colonels, led by Colonel George 
Papadopoulos, staged a successful coup d’état on April 21, 1967. Through-
out its seven-year rule, the regime was unable to institutionalize itself, as it 
was caught in major dilemmas and contradictions.8 Typical of the latter was 
Papadopoulos’s project to retain power in his hands, while allowing for some 
degree of limited political pluralism. In November 1973 the junta crushed the 
students’ movement in the Polytechnic School of Athens. This was a blow 
to the legitimacy of the junta’s project of the alleged liberalization of the 
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authoritarian regime. In the same month, a week after the repressed revolt, 
Brigadier General Dimitris Ioannides staged a coup within the coup and 
imposed an even stricter authoritarian rule. 
 The second and final blow came in the summer of 1974. Ioannides’s junta 
staged a coup d’état in Cyprus on July 15, 1974. On July 23, Turkey, which felt 
provoked, reacted by invading Cyprus. The Greek military proved unable to 
resist the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. 
The next day ( July 24), the generals resorted to Karamanlis and the pre-dicta-
torship conservative political elite to save the situation. Karamanlis formed a 
transitional government of “National Unity,” as it was then called. 
TwO PARAdOxES
After the military leaders handed over power to Karamanlis’s transitional 
government in July 1974, they could not control the pace with which he would 
proceed to vet institutions nor the scope of the process. The first paradox was 
that the military, which had ruled unchallenged until the summer of 1974, was 
unable to resist the will of the incoming politicians even though they did not 
have control over the means of violence. A first key to solve this paradox is 
that there was no time to negotiate the transfer of power, as Greece was on the 
brink of war with Turkey. A second key is that because the military had failed 
in the one sphere in which it was supposed to excel, namely, mobilization for 
war, it was immediately discredited in the political sphere as well. For this rea-
son, it submitted to the incoming democratic government. 
 A second paradox is that even though the military was completely discred-
ited, for the reasons noted above, vetting in the military was rather slow and 
limited. The key to the gradualism and restraint on Karamanlis’s part is that 
the immediate post-authoritarian period was an inauspicious time to attempt 
a thorough vetting: as long as tensions between Greece and Turkey remained 
high, vetting could weaken the Greek military as an institution and endanger 
the country’s defense. While considerations of national defense constrained 
vetting in the military, considerations of political stability prevailed in vetting 
the rest of the state apparatus. Karamanlis aimed at building a strong execu-
tive at the expense of the other two branches, which would enable the gov-
ernment to work effectively. He also aimed at attaining social demobilization, 
which would allow the elites to rule without pressure from the masses.9 All 
these considerations were reflected in vetting. 
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mISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TRANSITIONAl JUSTICE  
ANd VETTINg IN gREECE
There are some misconceptions about the democratic transition in Greece 
in the mid-1970s. One scholar states that within six months after the regime 
change of July 24, 1974, some 108,000 officials and civil servants were “dis-
missed, transferred or otherwise disciplined.”10 Another observer claims that 
“there was also a drastic purge of officers and officials in the public service. 
The purge went deep into local government and the judiciary as well as the 
Ministries.”11 According to another source, “about 100,000 civil servants 
were purged.”12 
 None of the sources mentions any relevant field research or interviews or 
research on statistical data of civil service personnel. They probably also offer 
inflated numbers, which may be attributed to the lack of concrete empirical 
research on this topic in the first years after the fall of the junta. The num-
bers mentioned above cannot be true for the following reasons: the total 
number of civil service personnel at the time was not that large. In May 1968 
there were only 96,922 public employees in Greece. Of these, about 50,000 
were civil servants and the rest were other public employees, such as police 
officers, nurses, and teachers.13 Five years after the fall of the dictatorship, in 
December 1979, there were 65,237 civil servants.14 Hence, in the decade of the 
1970s, the number of public employees should have been somewhere between 
65,000 and 96,000. Although there are no precise figures for the second half 
of 1974, when the transition to democracy occurred, the total number of pub-
lic employees in all categories should have been less than 100,000. Obviously, 
then, we cannot speak of 100,000 purged civil servants, as do two of the 
above-mentioned sources. A second misconception concerns the number of 
trials of torturers. One source stated that a “few hundred trials took place.”15 
Another claims that over the next two years, 1975 and 1976, “between one 
hundred and four hundred torture trials were conducted in Greece.”16 Neither 
of the above claims stands to scrutiny. The few available Greek sources on the 
topic give the smaller numbers shown in Table 1, above. 
vetting of the government, justice,  
and university systems
After the fall of the junta, the Court of Cassation decided that the crime of 
high treason was started and completed on April 21, 1967; that is, it was not 
committed continuously. (The events of April 21, 1967, did not constitute a 
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“revolution,” as the Greek Colonels had labeled their actions, but a “momen-
tary” coup.) As a consequence, the political officials who had collaborated 
with the junta were not guilty, as they held ministerial posts during 1967–74, 
after the crime was already completed.17
 Initially, the Karamanlis government did not draft new legislation either to 
prosecute or to vet the principals of the junta and their subordinates. Between 
July and October 1974, the transitional government, fearful of provoking the 
army at a time of crisis in the country’s external relations, did not take action 
against any of the junta’s leaders or those associated with the junta. The ratio-
nale was that an elected government, rather than a temporary government in 
charge of democratic transition, should decide on these issues. Karamanlis 
pursued punitive policies and, less so, vetting only after he won the first post-
authoritarian elections with 54% of the vote in November 1974.
 For this reason, before the elections the transitional government limited 
itself to removing some generals, isolating other officers, and monitoring the 
moves of the junta’s leaders. In August 1974, in order to vet army officers, the 
government resorted to the Supreme National Defense Council, a government 
organ that had existed for a long time and had the jurisdiction to promote or 
retire officers. Eleven generals were forced to retire. In September, this council 
put an unverified number of middle- and lower-ranking officers on tempo-
rary suspension.18 It seems that the criteria used in this process were whether 
the officers occupied top-ranking posts on the eve of the fall of the junta (in 
the case of generals) or had taken active part in the coups of April 1967 or 
November 1973 (in the case of the rest of the officers). In August–September 
1974 the government reassigned three police and security officers to insignifi-
cant posts and relieved another seventeen of their duties for a period of four 
to twelve months.19 The reassigned or relieved officers were notorious for 
having tortured members of the democratic resistance. Such measures were 
not the result of a systematic vetting of the security apparatus, only the conse-
quence of the pressure of public opinion felt by the government.
 Indeed, while the government showed restraint in dealing with the army 
generals and police and security officers, measures against the junta’s lead-
ers were precipitated by developments beyond its control: the suit of a private 
citizen against the junta leaders on September 6, 1974, started the process of 
trials involving top-ranking military officers.20 The legal base for the suit was 
a criminal act, high treason, included in the Greek Criminal Code of 1950.21 
The government was prompted to act. It chose punitive practices rather than 
vetting. The legislation of the anticommunist postwar Greek state provided 
for the deportation of political dissidents to isolated places, usually small 
129
gREECE
islands in the Aegean.22 In October 1974, Karamanlis used such old legislation 
to deport the five most prominent junta leaders to one such island. 23 
 In the meantime, about one thousand lawsuits were filed by private citi-
zens in the fall and winter of 1974. Unsure of the evolution of the transition 
to democracy, some victims of the junta did not show up to either prosecute 
or testify.24 As shown in Table 1 above, some 191 military, security, and police 
officials were prosecuted. At the time, there was no law for the specific crime 
of torture. The charges, which in some cases were multiple, were homicide 
in the first degree, attempted homicide, abuse of power, bodily harm (light 
or heavy), and moral responsibility for the above.25 When the trials ended, 
approximately two years later, 57% of the prosecuted police officers, 73% of 
the gendarmerie, and 60% of the military were convicted (Table 1).
VETTINg Of OffICIAlS IN ThE CENTRAl ANd lOCAl gOVERNmENT  
ANd ThE wIdER PUBlIC SECTOR
Three months into the transition, the government introduced two pieces 
of legislation. The first was the Constitutional Act of October 3, 1974, which 
assigned the responsibility for investigating the case of “those primarily 
responsible” for the authoritarian rule (meaning the junta’s leaders) to a higher 
court, the Athens Court of Appeals. A second relevant piece of legislation was 
one of the first Parliamentary Resolutions of the first post-authoritarian Par-
liament, which was elected on November 17, 1974 (Resolution D of January 15, 
1975). The act and the resolution limited their focus to the act of conspiracy on 
the part of military officers who led the coup of April 21, 1967; and the arrest 
and detention of about sixty-five hundred civilians on the day of the coup, 
including the then prime minister Kanellopoulos and former ministers. 
 With the exception of the perpetrators of the 1967 coup, none of the per-
sons who had served in the last or previous cabinets between 1967 and 1974 
was brought to trial. Twenty-four protagonists were tried for high treason by 
the Athens Court of Appeals in 1975 and received long sentences. The three 
leaders of the 1967 coup (Georgios Papadopoulos, Nikolaos Makarezos, and 
Stylianos Pattakos) received death sentences, which were commuted to life 
imprisonment by Karamanlis himself. Nine other persons (among the twenty-
four indicted) received life imprisonment. Most of the convicted stayed in 
prison for a long time before being released on the grounds of irreparable 
health damage. 
 All general secretaries of ministries and all prefects (nomarches) and 
province governors (eparchoi) were also replaced in the first weeks after the 
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transfer of power.26 All presidents and general directors of public bodies, 
state-run companies, and state-owned banks were replaced by new personnel 
loyal to the emerging democratic regime. All mayors and members of town 
councils who had been appointed by the junta were fired. Owing to the lack 
of historical research and the difficulty of accessing archives, it is difficult to 
confirm the exact number of people who were “purged.” In regard to regional 
and local government, among those “purged” one may include the 199 pre-
fects and province governors and mayors of the 6,061 municipalities that 
existed in Greece in 1974 (according to the Population Census of 1971).27 The 
records of these officials were not checked individually. All were replaced out-
right simply by virtue of the fact of having worked for the previous regime. 
The transitional government appointed new officials to all the above posts, 
with the exception of local government, where it reinstated the mayors and 
town councils that had been elected in 1964, the last time municipal elections 
had been held before the breakdown of the democracy. 
VETTINg Of hIghER JUdgES: ISSUES Of lEgITImACy, PROCESS,  
ANd CRITERIA fOR ThE SElECTION Of ImPlICATEd INdIVIdUAlS28
The association of prominent members of the judiciary with the Greek Colo-
nels’ regime was not negligible. It suffices to say that the first, short-lived gov-
ernment imposed by the junta in the spring of 1967 was headed by a high-
ranking judge and that the judiciary was a professional category that was 
disproportionately represented in the junta’s cabinets: 9% of all ministers dur-
ing 1967–74 were former judges or public prosecutors.29 Thus, in the summer 
of 1974 it seemed pertinent to vet the judiciary.
 The legislation for vetting the judiciary was first issued on August 7, 1974, 
that is, almost immediately after the collapse of the junta on July 23, 1974. This 
piece of legislation, which was a constitutional act, provided for the function-
ing of a body, the Highest Disciplinary Council.30 This was a council already 
provided for by the pre-dictatorial Constitution of 1952 (article 111). The tran-
sitional government did not specify the organization and functioning of this 
council until late September 1974. 
 On September 5, 1974, the transitional government issued another consti-
tutional act. Its purpose was to restore legality to the justice system and to 
restitute those judges who had been dismissed during 1967–74. This act called 
back into service those judges who had been purged by the junta. During 
the Greek Colonels’ regime, a total of approximately forty judges had been 
forced to resign or had resigned in protest for the intrusions of the junta in the 
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administration of justice. At the same time, other judges had been promoted 
to the posts made available by the junta’s purges.31 After the 1974 transition, 
the rank and postings of restituted judges would be determined individually 
by the appropriate councils of the justice system (the service councils, which 
were in charge of promotions and retirements). In parallel, the act referred 
those judges who had been promoted by the junta to the Highest Disciplin-
ary Council. However, the act provided only for the cases of promotions to 
the posts of president and vice president of the country’s three highest courts, 
namely the Court of Cassation, the Council of the State (the highest admin-
istrative court, somewhat similar to the French Conseil d’ Etat), and the Audit 
Office (Elegktiko Synedrio, the equivalent of the French Cour des Comptes, 
which in Greece had the jurisdiction of controlling the state’s finances but also 
acted as a court and passed judgments in cases of financial disputes among 
public bodies, matters of state pensions, etc.) and to the post of the general 
prosecutor. In other words, the cutoff point was placed very high, exempting 
from vetting the vast majority of middle- and high-ranking judges and prose-
cutors who were promoted in the hierarchy of the justice system during 1967–
74, but never reached the very top. In a development parallel to that in the vet-
ting of universities, those judges who had benefited from the purges of their 
colleagues by the junta, as they moved on in their careers and occupied 
the posts of their purged colleagues, were not touched by restituting 
legislation.32 
 The act provided for the criteria to be applied and the penalties to be 
imposed by the Highest Disciplinary Council in vetting the former occupants 
of the highest echelons of the justice system during 1967–74. The criteria were 
of three kinds: first, the conditions of promotion to the post of president, 
vice president, or general prosecutor; second, the professional conduct of 
the person vetted; and, third, his conduct outside the confines of the justice 
system, which implied his involvement with the junta. The criteria to evalu-
ate such conduct were not determined in either a stable or a systematic fash-
ion.33 Examples of projunta conduct included official declarations in support 
of the junta or collaboration with the junta in order to monitor and/or sanc-
tion members of the resistance against the junta. The penalties to be imposed 
were forced retirement, annulment of promotion, or temporary suspension 
of duty. 
 The act exempted from this referral those judges who had collaborated 
with the junta but were already retired at the time of the collapse of the author-
itarian regime.34 The act also gave the minister of justice a deadline of three 
months to sue any other judges who had committed any other disciplinary 
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fault during 1967–74 or had served at a political post (minister, deputy min-
ister, general secretary of ministry) in the same period. The act did not cover 
the cases of judges who had contributed to the formulation of the junta’s poli-
cies by participating in committees to prepare drafts of law or drafts of the 
two authoritarian constitutions of 1968 and 1973. This is another instance in 
which the transitional government chose not to widen the circle of implicated 
persons. Vetting in the judiciary was to be restrained and gradual. 
 Another piece of legislation, the constitutional act of September 24, 
1974, brought about a modification in the above procedure. The restitution 
of judges who had been purged by the junta was taken out of the hands of 
the usual competent organ, namely the service councils of the judiciary, and 
passed to the cabinet. This was a move towards an outright politicization of 
the restitution process, which opened possibilities for discriminating for or 
against judges who had been purged by the junta. 
 The rest of the organizational aspects of the Highest Disciplinary Council 
were determined by a legislative decree issued on September 30, 1974.35 The 
decree provided that the council would consist of seven members. Its head 
would be the president of the Council of the State. The other six members 
would be drawn by lot as follows: two law school professors, two high judges 
from the Council of the State, two high judges from the Court of Cassation, 
and two high judges from the Audit Office. However, two of the six judges 
would be exempted if the person to be vetted served in their court. So, for 
example, if the case of a judge of the Court of Cassation were to be discussed 
by the council, only the judges from the other two courts, the Council of the 
State and the Audit Office, plus the two professors would participate in the 
council.36 
 Two provisions of the legislative decree of September 30, 1974, are note-
worthy in the context of my claim about the gradualism and swiftness of the 
vetting process. First, the pool of high judges in the three courts out of which 
the members of the council were to be drawn by lot included judges who, 
without openly collaborating with the junta, had benefited from the dismiss-
als of many of their colleagues by the junta. Such judges had climbed up the 
ladder of hierarchy quite quickly due to the openings created by the junta’s 
purges. Second, the Highest Disciplinary Council was to decide on all cases in 
the first and last instance; there was no right to appeal. 
 The results of implementing all the aforementioned provisions for vetting 
were meager. Shortly after the demise of the junta, the leading judges of all 
three high courts were replaced:37 the president and two vice presidents of the 
Council of the State, the president of the Court of Cassation and the general 
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prosecutor, as well as the president and two vice presidents of the Audit Office. 
The replacement of the top judges was decided by the prime minister and the 
competent ministers. The criterion for replacing them was the sheer fact that 
they had been hand picked by the junta and, consequently, they could not be 
trusted in the transition process. Only twenty-three judges were charged with 
disciplinary offenses by the Highest Disciplinary Council. Five of them were 
absolved. The vetting process for another six was cancelled for various proce-
dural reasons (death of the person subjected to vetting, delay in the filing of 
the case beyond the deadline set by the government). The remaining twelve 
received sanctions (eight received annulment of their promotion, three were 
forced to retire, and one received temporary suspension). 
 To conclude, only those judges who had been appointed to the highest 
posts in the judicial hierarchy before the collapse of the junta and were still 
in place after July 1974 were to be vetted. The rest, namely middle- and lower-
ranking judges, were not included in the circle of persons to be vetted. There 
was no pressure from the post-authoritarian governments of Karamanlis to 
vet projunta members of the judiciary. The reluctance of the Karamanlis gov-
ernment to pursue vetting in the judiciary is related to the traditional role of 
judges in the Greek postwar political system. In the 1950s and the 1960s, as 
was the case with the police and security forces, the judiciary had played a 
prominent role in building an anticommunist semidemocratic regime, instead 
of a fully fledged parliamentary democracy, in the period between the end of 
the Second World War and the breakdown of democracy (1944–67). 
 To sum up, the only vetting of the judiciary that took place were the 
twenty-three cases dealt with by the Highest Disciplinary Council. Overall, 
the only removals from the judiciary were the twelve judges sanctioned by 
that body, including the presidents and vice presidents of the top courts who 
were “purged” by the prime minister immediately after the transition. 
VETTINg Of ACAdEmICS: ISSUES Of lEgITImACy, PROCESS,  
ANd CRITERIA fOR ThE SElECTION Of ImPlICATEd INdIVIdUAlS 
In the university system, the transitional government had two concerns: first, 
to restitute the jobs to those academics who had been dismissed by the junta 
for political reasons; and, second, to evaluate the cases of the academics who 
had obtained their teaching posts during 1967–74 as well as to sanction the 
academics who had openly collaborated with the junta. In the postwar period 
(and until 1982) the hierarchy of Greek academics included full professors, 
each of whom held a “chair,” and associate professors ( yfighites, the equivalent 
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of the German Dozenten), who were the higher-level academic personnel; and 
lower-level academic personnel who were either PhD holders with teaching 
duties (epimelites) or teaching assistants (voithoi). This differentiation as well 
as the two concerns noted above were reflected in the constitutional act of 
September 3, 1974, which was drafted to deal specifically with the vetting of 
universities. 
 First, the act provided for the automatic rehiring of professors who had 
been dismissed or forced to resign for political reasons by the junta; and, 
second, it set criteria for vetting the academic community, differentiating 
between two categories of academics that had been favored by the junta. The 
first category consisted of those who had been appointed by the junta to any 
post in the government, the public administration, or the wider public sector 
for any length of time between April 21, 1967, and July 23, 1974 (i.e., the begin-
ning and the end of the authoritarian regime). To deal with this first category, 
the act provided for the establishment of a new body, the Special Disciplin-
ary Council, in charge of judging the cases of higher-level professors who 
had been appointed to the aforementioned posts and also the cases of other 
professors who, without pursuing a political career, had actively sided with 
the junta inside the university system (e.g., had collaborated with the security 
forces to suppress the student movement). 
 The second category of implicated individuals consisted of those academ-
ics who had been elected by the individual departments and schools to the 
old chairs previously occupied by academics purged for political reasons 
between April 1967 and July 1974.38 The act did not provide for the cases of full 
or associate professors who had been elected to new chairs, first created by 
the junta, during 1967–74, or for the cases of those professors who occupied 
chairs made available in the same period for reasons other than the dismissal 
of their holders (death, retirement, etc.). The procedure provided by the act 
was the following: the restitution of the professors purged by the junta would 
take place before the reevaluation of those appointed by the junta. After the 
restitution of the former, the most senior professors were assigned to reevalu-
ate those appointed by the junta. The criteria for such evaluation referred to 
behavior in support of the junta, such as denouncing left-wing students to the 
authorities, or participating in administrative organs staffed by the junta, for 
example, the administrative organs of the universities.
 The act was less lenient with regard to lower-level academic personnel. 
Any academics below the level of associate professor who had been hired 
after April 21, 1967, were subject to reevaluation, regardless of the reason or 
the conditions of their hiring. All lower-level academic had to obtain a major-
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ity of two-thirds of the votes of professors in their department in order to 
keep their posts. In other words, potentially, the circle of implicated lower-
level academics was wider than the circle of implicated full or associate pro-
fessors, even though the latter had more power and authority during 1967–74 
and, as will be noted below, had collaborated with the junta in large numbers. 
Although there is no precise information, it seems that in practice few, if any, 
lower-ranking academics were vetted.
 A few more pieces of legislation specified the criteria and the procedure 
by which the junta’s collaborators among the academics would be vetted 
but also narrowed down the circle of higher-level academics to be reevalu-
ated. The first piece of legislation was a presidential decree by which the nine 
members of the Special Disciplinary Council were selected and appointed.39 
The second was a legislative decree40 that narrowed even further the circle 
of higher-level academics to undergo vetting. Reversing the aforementioned 
constitutional act of September 3, 1974, this decree also proceeded to exempt 
from vetting those full or associate professors who were elected to old chairs, 
made available during 1967–74 only because their previous holders had been 
purged by the junta. The result was that academics were to be vetted only in 
cases in which they were proven to have been active supporters of the junta. 
The way in which they had obtained their academic posts was not a criterion 
for vetting. 
 All the above pieces of legislation were passed by the transitional govern-
ment before the first post-authoritarian parliamentary elections of November 
1974. After the elections, which were won by Karamanlis’s conservative party, 
a resolution (passed by the new Parliament in January 1975) extended by ten 
months the time period given to the Special Disciplinary Council to complete 
its task.41 The nine members of the council were selected by the transitional 
government. The chairperson was the president of the Council of the State. 
The other eight members were four judges from the Council of the State and 
four full professors. The Special Disciplinary Council was organized along 
the lines of a typical court and followed the usual procedures (hearings took 
place, the implicated academics were called to defend their case in front of 
the council, etc.).42 However, there was no provision for a court or a coun-
cil of second instance. The council’s decisions would be final. This provision 
reflected the transitional government’s determination to proceed with vetting 
in a swift manner.
 Several points are worth noting. First, the care taken by the government to 
vet the academic community reflected the symbolic importance of the univer-
sity system as an institution that should cultivate ideas of freedom and human 
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dignity and independence of thought in a democratic society. Second, the 
extent and detailed nature of the relevant legislation as well as the speed with 
which vetting began (the relevant act was passed in early September 1974, just 
a few weeks after the fall of the junta) reflected the legitimacy and the power 
of the student movement, which had been the only collective actor to engage 
in massive resistance against the junta. The involvement of the students in the 
process of vetting was probably the only case of participation “from below” in 
the vetting which took place in Greece during 1974–75. The legitimacy of the 
extraordinary and short-lived body called the Special Disciplinary Council 
derived exactly from the wide consensus in favor of “dejuntification” among 
the student body. Finally, there was a contrast between tertiary (i.e., higher 
education) and the other, lower levels of education. The cases of projunta 
teachers and officials of the Ministry of Education (such as school inspectors) 
were not touched at all.43 The differentiation between higher education and 
the other levels of the educational system, and the narrowing down of the 
circle of professors to undergo vetting point up the aspect of gradualism in 
the Greek case of vetting. The swiftness of the vetting process is shown in the 
speed with which the relevant legislation was passed and with which the spe-
cial body in charge of vetting was constituted. 
 The Special Disciplinary Council examined ninety-two cases of academ-
ics. Only seventy-eight of them suffered some disciplinary measure, such as 
temporary suspension. Thirty-nine out of the seventy-eight professors were 
fired.44 At the time, Greek universities were dominated by large-scale student 
movements that, for more than a year, had pressed for the suspension or fir-
ing of large numbers of professors whom the students suspected as junta col-
laborators. Despite such pressure, an unverified number of collaborators did 
not suffer any consequences. There are several reasons for this. Some collabo-
rators among the academics had quickly changed sides and had approached 
the democratic factions within the universities. Others claimed that their low 
rank obliged them to follow the orders of higher-ranking academics who had 
collaborated with the authoritarian regime. In other cases it proved impos-
sible to show that particular professors had denounced members of the 
resistance to the police.45 Even when and where vetting did not result in the 
expulsion of projunta academics from the universities, the general climate 
in these institutions was hostile to any professors who had not resisted the 
junta. Some academics who had collaborated with the authoritarian regime, 
but were not disciplined by the Special Disciplinary Council, would carry a 
stigma for a long time after the transition to democracy. Compared to vetting 
in the police and the judiciary, vetting in the university system was extensive.
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vetting of the military, police, and security forces
ThE mIlITARy 
In the military, vetting, which resulted in temporary suspension of duty, reas-
signment to insignificant posts, or forced retirement,46 was gradual. In the 
beginning of the transition, the military officers who were junta leaders or 
its most brutal collaborators remained free. Major Anastasios Spanos, the 
chief of the most notorious military police torture center in Athens, was not 
arrested. In August 1974, he was transferred to a post at the northern Greek 
border. Papadopoulos, the leader of the 1967 coup, was free until the end of 
September 1974, when he was placed under house arrest. Ioannides was free 
until he was finally arrested in mid-January 1975.47 
 Generally, the process of vetting the military would have proceeded in this 
gradual and stepwise fashion, were it not for the abortive coup d’état staged by 
middle- and low-ranking officers in February 1975. The coup, which was insti-
gated by officers loyal to Ioannides, was quickly stifled by Minster of Defense 
Averoff and by military generals loyal to Karamanlis. The latter then recog-
nized the pitfalls of proceeding too cautiously with “purging” the army. It is 
reported that in the aftermath of the coup, five hundred military officers were 
forced into early retirement and another six to eight hundred were transferred 
to various posts.48 Among the cashiered officers were fourteen generals and 
twelve brigadiers.49 
 Between the spring and the winter of that year, the military officers who 
had been prosecuted for their role in the coup of 1967 or in the suppression 
of the revolt at the Polytechnic School or in torturing members of the resis-
tance were indicted and tried (for data on the number of persons indicted, 
see Table 1). Some, like Ioannides, received multiple sentences, as they were 
tried on several counts. Military officers who had been notorious torturers 
(such as Spanos, Theodoros Theofylogiannakos, and Nikolaos Hadjizissis) 
received prison sentences ranging between seventeen and twenty-three years. 
Lesser known torturers, such as six naval officers who had engaged in torture 
aboard a cruiser in 1968, were also tried in 1975 and received sentences rang-
ing from six months to eight years.50 Today, neither the details of the vetting 
process nor the exact number of officers who were subjected to vetting are 
part of public information. One source claims that in the mid-1970s the Greek 
army had approximately fifteen thousand officers; that the numbers of people 
subjected to vetting in the military ranged between five hundred and fifteen 
hundred officers; and that in 1974–75 “purification touched a relatively small 
percentage of officers.”51 
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ThE POlICE ANd SECURITy fORCES
Vetting in police and security forces resulted in the replacement, reassign-
ment to positions of minor importance, or pensioning off of officials who 
occupied high-ranking posts under the junta or had become notorious for 
violating human rights. The decisions about which individuals to replace or 
remove were taken by the prime minister and the competent ministers of the 
transition government. 
 In midsummer 1974, the transitional government replaced the chiefs of 
the urban police and gendarmerie, the Greek intelligence service, and the 
National Security Service (a branch of the police focusing on monitoring the 
Left, including student and labor movements). These officials were quickly 
discharged of their duties because they had identified with the deposed 
authoritarian regime and could not be trusted in a period of democratic tran-
sition. As for the rest of police and security personnel, Psomiades is correct to 
point out that “only a handful. . . namely some but not all who had acquired 
notorious reputations for brutal conduct under the dictatorship were placed 
on inactive rosters.”52 In the aftermath of the attempted coup of February 
1975, vetting was accompanied by starting prosecutions against officers of 
the urban police (astynomia) and the gendarmerie (chorofylake). An unspecified 
number of police officers were forced to retire, while twenty-five officers of 
the gendarmerie and nineteen of the police were prosecuted. 
 Prosecutions were not as limited as vetting. Private citizens took the ini-
tiative to press charges against top police officers, who had overseen round-
ups of students and other members of the resistance, and against torturers, 
who were middle- or low-ranking policemen. Trials took place in Athens, 
Salonika, Chania, Chalkida, and other smaller towns in 1975. The fact that 
trials were dispersed and that there is no primary or secondary source avail-
able containing systematic information on all the defendants makes access to 
the data very difficult. However, as shown in Table 1 above, the approximate 
number of prosecuted police officers was fifty-eight and the corresponding 
number of gendarmerie officers was thirty-four. The trials were held before 
ordinary (i.e., not military) courts of first instance. Although the crimes were 
acts of torture, again the prosecution was couched in terms of light and heavy 
bodily damage, as in the case of military torturers. The number of indicted 
policemen was “highly circumscribed.”53 In addition, most sentences were 
suspended or converted to monetary fines. The notorious torturer Evangelos 
Mallios was brought to trial in November 1975 and received a ten-month sen-
tence, convertible into a fine. He was assassinated a year later by the left-wing 
terrorist organization “17th of November.” Another notorious torturer, Petros 
139
gREECE
Babales, who also had received a light sentence in the same trial, was assas-
sinated four years later, in 1979. 
 Prosecutions and removals of junta collaborators in the police picked up 
after February 1975 (i.e., eight months into the transition), but did not go very far. 
The limited extent of such punitive policies may be accounted for by the tradi-
tional role of the police in the Greek state apparatus. Even before the 1967 coup, 
police and security forces played a primary role in monitoring political forces 
of the Center and the Left. According to a private citizen, who in 1974 pressed 
charges against police officers who had tortured him, it was the judiciary (itself 
not adequately vetted) that shielded the police from harsh sanctions.54
 In sum, while it was more extensive in the military, whatever little vetting 
took place in the police and security forces after the transition to democracy 
concerned only the highest-ranking officers. By contrast, punitive policies 
other than vetting, such as removals and prosecutions, were applied to lower-
ranking officers as well. All in all, ninety-two police and security officers were 
“purged” through removals and prosecutions. 
conclusion 
My major conclusion is that vetting in various institutions in post-junta 
Greece was swift and gradual. This conclusion is a general pattern of the 
Greek case but is not equally valid for all institutions; nor was vetting equally 
extensive in all institutions (see Table 2).
TABlE 2 
The extent of vetting in various institutions of post-authoritarian greece
 APPROxImATE NUmBER Of PERSONS VETTEd
Universities 92 professors and associate professors
Justice system 23 high-ranking judges
Military 1,300 – 1,500 officers
Police and gendarmerie 92 officers
Total 1,500 – 1,700 persons
SOURCES: Pikramenos, He Dikastike Anexartisia, 306, 333–35; Alivizatos and Diamandouros, 
“Politics and the Judiciary,” 47; Psomiades, “Greece,” 263; Danopoulos, Warriors and Politi-
cians, 135. The table does not include the number of individuals who held political posts in 
July 1974, such as cabinet ministers, who were immediately replaced, rather than vetted, by 
the incoming transition government.
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 A difference between vetting the university and justice systems, on the one 
hand, and the military, police, and security institutions, on the other, was that 
the transitional government passed specific legislation to facilitate the vetting 
of projunta academics and judges. The reasons for this special care taken by 
the government to vet the justice and university systems are not the same for 
both institutions. In regard to the justice system, the obvious concern was 
to complement the democratic transformation of the executive and the leg-
islative “branches of government” with the corresponding transformation of 
the judicial branch. An antidemocratic judiciary, loyal to the authoritarian 
regime, could have delayed or even halted the process of democratization as 
a whole. In regard to the university system, the primary reason for passing 
specific legislation to vet academics lay in the pressure exerted by the students 
on the transitional government and in the evident importance of academia as 
a source of freedom and critical thought. An antidemocratic academia would 
be a contradiction in terms. 
 The entire process was also fragmentary in Greece. There was neither a 
general procedure suitable to vet all political and administrative institutions 
nor any central institution entrusted with the process of vetting. There was no 
uniform process to cover the armed forces, the police and security forces, and 
the ministries and public agencies. As in most instances of legitimate vetting, 
the criteria used for vetting in post-authoritarian Greece were related to spe-
cific instances of behavior of the vetted individuals. For example, in the scarce 
vetting of the military that took place in the summer and fall of 1974, active 
participation in the coup d’état of April 21, 1967, or in the coup of Novem-
ber 1973, or in the coup against Archbishop Makarios in July 1974 in Cyprus 
was taken into account. Later, in 1975, such criteria were somewhat relaxed. 
Known association with prominent members of the junta or with informal 
circles of the junta’s supporters probably mattered somewhat in the case of 
vetting the military after the aborted coup d’état of February 1975 (participa-
tion in that coup obviously mattered, too). In the case of vetting the body of 
university professors and the higher-ranking judiciary, active support of the 
plans of the junta in the educational and judicial systems mattered a lot. In the 
case of middle- and low-ranking judiciary, such association with or open sup-
port of the junta did not seem to matter, as vetting was very circumscribed or 
did not take place at all. 
 Indeed, vetting in post-authoritarian Greece had variable effects, depend-
ing on the institution in question. Vetting was effected to a larger extent in 
the military and the universities, but for completely different reasons. In the 
first case, it was the aborted coup of February 1975 that precipitated vetting 
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that until then had been gradual and restrained. In the universities, by con-
trast, pressure for “dejuntification” of academic personnel mounted early on 
in the transition. In other institutions, such as the judiciary and the police, 
vetting was measured (to put it mildly). In the central and local government 
and the wider public sector vetting was limited to the uppermost echelons of 
the hierarchy. Finally, it is doubtful whether vetting touched the ranks of the 
civil service at all. It was only with the mobilization of socialist and commu-
nist trade unions towards the end of the 1970s and the advent of the socialist 
party in power in 1981 that important state sectors, such as the security appa-
ratus and the central public administration, were eventually cleansed of most 
projunta elements. 
SOTIROPOUlOS
142
appendix: list of personal interviews  
conducted in the context of this case study
1 Interview with lawyer and former member of the resistance, Salonika, December 30, 
2003.
2 Interview with law school professor, University of Salonika, January 5, 2004.
3 Interview with former member of the resistance, Salonika, January 5, 2004.
4 Interview with former member of the resistance, Athens, January 28, 2004.
5 Interview with law school professor, University of Athens, February 11, 2004.
6 Interview with lawyer and former member of the resistance, Salonika, March 6, 2004.
7 Interview with medical doctor, who was former member of the resistance, Athens, 
March 10, 2004.
8 Interview with the general secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Athens, May 4, 2004.
9 Interview with journalist who was former member of the resistance, Athens, May 30, 
2004.
10 Interview with former member of the resistance, Athens, June 16, 2004.
11 Interview with judge of the Council of the State, Athens, July 5, 2004.
12 Interview with professor of classics who was former member of the resistance, Athens, 
July 6, 2004.
13 Interview with medical doctor who was former member of the resistance, Athens, July 
6, 2004.
The interviews took place in the offices or houses of the interviewees. The interviews 
were open ended and revolved around the cases of the junta’s collaborators against 
whom the interviewees pressed charges in 1974–75 and around the extent, the proce-
dures, and the different outcomes of vetting in the various institutions with which the 
interviewees were familiar.
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introduction 
This chapter analyzes the South African (in)experience with vetting practices 
during the transition from apartheid to constitutional democracy over the 
years from 1990 to 1996. It argues that there was no institutional practice of 
vetting in the South African transition — although there were certain events 
akin to vetting, such as the operation of the Goldstone Commission — and, 
furthermore, that different sectors of South Africa’s administrative and power 
structures transformed themselves through other means. The political choice 
made against vetting was reinforced by some legal doctrines and their consti-
tutional entrenchment, in particular the competence of existing public service 
institutions and strong labor and administrative justice rights. 
 Different institutions and sectors in South Africa were transformed differ-
ently in the transition. The public service sector was transformed during this 
time by processes of rationalization and demographic change. Political par-
ties did not undergo any vetting of their membership either, but were rather 
influenced directly by the changed political currents. Significant institutional 
practices of personnel turnover were implemented in the judiciary and also 
in the security services. The key position of the judiciary and the new eleven-
member Constitutional Court within the politics of transition demanded that 
certain rules and processes be negotiated regarding the composition of the 
courts and the selection of its members. The Judicial Service Commission 
(JSC) was established to play this role. Within the security services, initial dis-
missals were reactions to media revelations or ad hoc investigations, while 
government and liberation intelligence services were formally amalgamated 
at a later stage and a statutory basis for vetting on grounds of loyalty to the 
state was instituted. Concluding that the content of concepts such as adminis-
trative justice is variable and contested, particularly in times of transition, this 
chapter aims to highlight the institutional influences on our understanding of 
such concepts. 
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 Situated within the field of transitional justice, the core analytic definition 
of “vetting” used here will follow that of the ICTJ research project. Thus, the 
definition used is that of processes of public power that involve the examina-
tion of employment and other records of individuals for the purposes of hir-
ing or firing on grounds of past human rights behavior. Personnel selection 
procedures involve similar examination for such purposes, but the criteria 
on the basis of which such screening takes place, what I shall call “grounds 
of transition,” encompass but are broader than the category of past human 
rights behavior. Grounds of transition refer, then, to human rights records (as 
did the Goldstone Commission), but, more often, to status as an apartheid or 
homelands government employee or as a member of a liberation movement, 
or to record of activity undertaken for the government or the liberation move-
ment.1 Thus, personnel selection procedures were not in themselves vetting 
procedures, but, in the instances where they involved a (minimal) concern 
for individuals’ human rights records, did include processes akin to vetting. 
Finally, “grounds of transition” do not include those grounds (such as formal 
educational qualifications) that are unrelated (or at most distantly related) to 
the political transition from apartheid to democratic nonracial government 
in South Africa. As is addressed further below, the influence of affirmative 
action policies complicated the issues examined here. I have not considered 
race on its own as a ground of transition. 
background
A brief sketch of the dates and significant events of the South African transi-
tion from apartheid to constitutional democracy can provide some context 
for this analysis. The transition had two aspects of particular interest for a 
study of the practice of vetting: the broad series of political events leading to 
the adoption of the 1996 constitution2 and the more narrow series of develop-
ments related to the establishment and operation of the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission (TRC) in 1995 (which continued beyond 1996). 
 Without sketching the rise and fall of apartheid in South Africa, one can 
see the transition as initiated by two events at the beginning of February 1990.3 
The South African State President F. W. de Klerk, himself recently in power, 
released from prison the world’s most famous political prisoner, Nelson Man-
dela. Following prior negotiations with Mandela, this release was uncondi-
tional. Furthermore, de Klerk lifted the ban not only on Mandela’s political 
party, the African National Congress (ANC), but also a number of other orga-
nizations including some direct political rivals of the ANC. The releases and 
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the unbanning of organizations were followed by the launch of the Conven-
tion for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991. CODESA, 
however, collapsed in mid-1992 after the parties failed to reach agreement on 
a negotiated settlement and constitution. Following what one observer has 
described as “social upheaval, mass action, and escalating violence,” the par-
ties agreed to restart negotiations in March 1993 and by the end of that year 
negotiated an interim constitution that essentially took effect during the first 
nonracial elections held on April 27, 1994.4 Over the next two years, the dem-
ocratically elected parliament negotiated a final constitution, adhering in the 
process to a set of agreed-to constitutional principles providing for a bill of 
rights, the separation of powers, and so on. On its second try, the 1996 con-
stitution was certified by the Constitutional Court and took effect in February 
1997, signifying (at least for the purposes of this chapter) the end to the South 
African transition.
 Although the South African transition itself was politically dramatic, one 
of its central institutional forms was even more so — the operation of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.5 The events directly leading to the establish-
ment of the TRC have attracted much analysis and reflection.6 One important 
source of the movement towards establishing the TRC relates to the develop-
ments concerning legal guarantees of indemnity and begins in 1990. 
 The initial talks between the liberation movement and the F. W. de Klerk-
led apartheid government resulted in a series of minutes and statements. Some 
regard the Pretoria Minute of August 1990 as the place where the compromise 
political deal truly began, with the ANC suspending its armed struggle and 
both parties committing themselves to inclusive negotiations.7 In these initial 
negotiations with the government, the ANC was concerned about providing 
protection from legal prosecution for its returning exiles. The apartheid gov-
ernment matched this interest with concern for persons within its own con-
stituency who had engaged in rights abuses. The result was the Indemnity Act 
35 of 1990, modeled on an international definition of political offences. In terms 
of this law, de Klerk as the state president could grant indemnity to any person 
or category of persons upon publishing certain facts in the official government 
gazette. After a series of later controversies, in which members of the govern-
ment and its constituencies appeared vulnerable to criminal charges without 
benefiting from the protection of this definition in terms of the indemnity act, 
the apartheid government pushed through the Further Indemnity Act of 1992, 
which gave the president power to grant indemnity by discretion.8 
 This statutory framework of indemnity was thus in place during the 
negotiations over the interim constitution. At the end of these talks, the 
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ANC and the National Party mandated the writing of a clause (sometimes 
termed the “postamble”) to the constitution taking effect in April 1994. This 
clause ensured that a mechanism for amnesty would be set up. Pursuant to 
this clause, the TRC was established by the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. The TRC was mandated to grant amnesty from 
prosecution if alleged perpetrators made full disclosure of their human rights 
violations and if those violations were proportional to the achievement of 
political objectives. It was also mandated to institute a process for granting 
reparations and reporting on human rights violations and making recom-
mendations for truth and reconciliation more generally.9
the place of vetting in the south african transition
With the above account of the political transition and the establishment and 
operation of the TRC as background, it is worthwhile to locate the practice of 
vetting within the South African transition. Perhaps the evidence of the South 
African choice on the practice of vetting can be most clearly seen in the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report. Published in October 1998, 
volume 5 of the Report made the following recommendation in its three para-
graphs dealing with the lustration10 policy:
17 The Commission gave careful consideration to the possibility of lus-
tration as a mechanism for dealing with people responsible for vio-
lations of human rights. As used in several Eastern European coun-
tries, lustration (from the Latin meaning to illuminate or to purify 
by sacrificing or purging) involves the disqualification of such per-
sons from certain categories of public office, or their removal from 
office. Other international and South African commissions have 
commented on this matter. For example, the report of the Skweyiya 
Commission recommends that “no person who is guilty of commit-
ting atrocities should ever again be allowed to assume a position of 
power.”11
18 The current opinion in International Law is that lustration should be 
limited to positions in which there is good reason to believe that the 
subject would pose a significant danger to human rights, and that it 
should not apply to positions in private organizations.
19 The Commission decided not to recommend lustration because 
it was felt that it would be inappropriate in the South African 
context.12
151
SOUTh AfRICA
 Despite perceiving international law as permitting lustration in limited 
circumstances in the public service,13 the TRC did not recommend the use of 
lustration in those circumstances. The TRC’s choice against lustration went 
quite far. Even after explicitly raising and considering the matter, the TRC 
chose not to recommend the disqualification from public service of person-
ally responsible human rights violators who would be a danger to human 
rights. 
 From the South African point of view, the TRC’s decision demonstrates 
the ongoing power of the compromise negotiated between the liberation 
movements and the apartheid government over employment stability. The 
source of this political compromise lay in the balance of power between the 
two sides. There was no clear winning side; “the only way out of an untenable 
stalemate was to negotiate.”14 The enactment of this political compromise 
took the form of both political agreements and doctrines of law. As noted 
above, its clearest written form is the interim constitution and its postamble. 
As discussed below in relation to the public sector, the political and constitu-
tional choice made against vetting at the start of the South African transition 
was reinforced by the continuing influence of legal doctrines of competence 
and rights during the period from 1990 to 1996. 
 The political reasons behind the choice against vetting also meant that at 
least some public institutions delayed initiating institutional transformation 
until after this period, as for instance happened in the case of the criminal 
justice system. The establishment of a high-profile multidisciplinary investi-
gating unit located within the Department of Justice, the Directorate of Spe-
cial Investigations (the Scorpions), and the National Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions (NDPP) in 1998 was motivated by the need to have certain struc-
tures within the criminal justice system completely free of any organizational 
attachment to those of the apartheid order.15 In this sense, the establishment 
of the Scorpions and the NDPP is similar to the establishment of the Constitu-
tional Court (discussed more fully below), but, unlike the establishment of the 
Judicial Service Commission (also discussed more fully below), the creation 
of these separate prosecution and investigatory agencies occurred after the 
immediate phase of transition from 1990 to 1996.
the public service
There was no vetting legislation in the South African transition generally 
applicable to the public service. Nor was there any formal practice of vetting 
generally applied within the public service sector. No generally applicable 
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vetting law was enacted within the national sphere nor were there vetting laws 
adopted in the homelands (before 1994) or in the nine newly established prov-
inces (after 1994). This is a crucial feature that must be appreciated to under-
stand the place of vetting in the South African transition.
 The public service did not engage generally in vetting during the transition.16 
As the acting director general of the Department of Public Service and Admin-
istration (DPSA) is on record as having stated: “In so far as the human resource 
management area in the Public Service is concerned, staff was not subjected 
to security vetting as part of the transitional phase in the country. As such, 
processes of the nature alluded to in the [ICTJ] project extract. . . have thus not 
taken place.”17 This point was confirmed by a number of line departments.18
 This does not mean that the public service was not undergoing a radical 
transformation during this transition. It was. However, this transformation 
did not occur through a process of vetting of public servants. Instead, the 
public service was subjected to different processes of transformation during 
this period.19 Two processes were of particular importance: rationalization 
and affirmative action. 
 The dominant process during the period of transition was one of “ratio-
nalization.” Rationalization was primarily aimed at amalgamating the various 
existing but fragmented apartheid-era public services. These were the public 
services of the homelands as well as the public service of apartheid South 
Africa. As the Public Service Commission put it: “The legacy of the apartheid 
past was a fragmented collection of public services serving the former Repub-
lic of South Africa, the TBVC States [that is, the “independent” homelands of 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei] and the self-governing territo-
ries. There were eleven public services in all, each with its legislation, struc-
tures, systems, personnel composition and organizational cultures. Out of 
this inefficient and ineffective fragmentation of public personnel corps, a new 
unified Public Service has to be built.”20 This process of rationalization was 
carried out within the constitutional constraints of section 237 of the interim 
constitution.21 
 Although it was perhaps not headlined, the process of rationalization 
had another organizational dimension beyond consolidation: rightsizing or 
downsizing the number of employees.22 While the numbers of existing pub-
lic servants were very uncertain and contested, the total number of civil ser-
vants decreased during the period of transition as part of these organizational 
consolidations. Furthermore, beyond its organizational aspects, the process 
of public service transformation during this period of transition included ini-
tiatives directed at racial and gender representativeness (see below) as well as 
153
SOUTh AfRICA
initiatives meant to promote management skills and political capacity within 
the civil service.23
 This process of rationalization began in earnest in 1995, the year after the 
adoption of the interim constitution. In that year, twenty-three national depart-
ments submitted proposals for rationalization of their “full organizational 
structures,” while three national departments and all provincial administra-
tions had submitted proposals for rationalization “at management level only.”24 
The executive functions of the Public Service Commission were transferred to 
the minister for the Public Service and Administration only on April 12, 1996.25
 These organizational aspects of rationalization were more significant in 
public service transformation than terminations of public servants on indi-
vidual grounds. The public service legislation as amended in 1994 allowed 
for the early or premature termination of public servants within the manage-
ment echelon with full benefits. This was termed “taking the early retirement 
package.” The legislation allowed for a number of grounds (some quite vague) 
for this termination: retirement to the advantage of the state, rationalization, 
continued ill health, the interest of the public service, and discharge by the 
president. This policy was in effect from January 1995 to February 1996. The 
implementation of this policy during this period of transition, however, saw 
relatively small numbers of persons discharged.26 Although there may have 
been elements of constructive discharge in some instances, this process of 
early retirement was essentially a voluntary one and was under the executive 
direction of the renamed structure (the Public Service Commission) that had 
been in control of the national public service during the apartheid era.27
 A second important process in the transformation of the public service 
in this period was one of affirmative action. During the period of transition, 
the public service was changed from one that was markedly white (at least in 
its more senior ranks) to one that began to reflect the demographics of the 
South African nation. The management echelon of the public service was 94% 
white and 6% black in 1994. This composition contrasted with the population 
demographics that were nearly opposed: 87% black and 13% white in mid-
1995.28 By October 31, 1997, those percentages had changed to 66% and 34%.29 
This process was, however, underway before the transition, as greater and 
greater numbers of the black majority in South Africa found positions within 
the civil service. As with rationalization, the process of changing personnel 
composition had a great impact on the transformation of the public service. 
Indeed, rationalization sped up the process of changing personnel composi-
tion since representation of black persons within the homeland administra-
tion was greater than that within the pre-1994 South African public service.
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political parties
What was true for the public service and the formal structures of the 
state — that there was no general rule or practice of vetting — was also true for 
the more informal structures, that is to say, the political parties. By and large, 
the principal South African political parties did not engage in vetting of their 
own membership during the transition.30 Political parties do not self-report 
having undergone vetting, nor does evidence emerge from other sources.31 
For instance, the Democratic Alliance (reporting on behalf of its predeces-
sor party, the Democratic Party) states that it “did not have specific vetting 
requirements applicable to its staff, members or public representatives relat-
ing to the transition to democracy.”32 
 During the transition, persons alleged to have been involved in human 
rights abuses were routinely appointed to significant positions within the 
major political parties. For instance, in 1993, the ANC appointed Andrew 
Masondo as political commissar of its armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe (also 
known by the acronym MK), despite allegations made by former ANC detain-
ees that he was involved in incidents of torture in the ANC detention camps 
in exile, and despite his earlier removal from the ANC’s national executive in 
1985 after an internal investigation.33 ANC internal investigations into allega-
tions of abuse made findings of indirect involvement of senior party figures 
who later rose to occupy high government positions, including Joe Modise, 
who became the defense minister after 1994, and Jacob Zuma, who became 
the deputy president in 1999.
 Even with respect to its own internal investigations into alleged abuses, 
such as the Skweyiya Commission and the Motsuenyane Commission, the 
ANC position was that the organization itself would not take action and 
that, instead, the findings of these investigations would be referred to and 
dealt with by the TRC.34 Amnesty International noted specifically that these 
reports stopped short of recommending that no one implicated in human 
rights abuses should be allowed to hold a senior post in the ANC or in any 
future government of South Africa or in its security forces.35 
why did the choice against vetting stick?
The political choice against vetting made in 1990 as identified above was 
reinforced by an intertwined set of organizational factors and legal doctrines 
during the subsequent six years. These factors included (1) constitutional pro-
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visions, including some that gave, at best, uncertain legal authority for enact-
ment of vetting legislation and protection for existing powerful public service 
institutions, and (2) strong legal protections for the labor rights of public ser-
vice employees and for the due process concerns of administrative justice.
 The first factor reinforcing the initial political decision against vetting was 
a lack of constitutional competence to enact such laws at the national level 
(i.e., a lack of legal authority). This was coupled with the considerable orga-
nizational power of the public service oversight institutions.36 From 1990, 
the white-dominated apartheid parliament certainly would have been com-
petent to enact such legislation under the pre-1994 constitution. In principle, 
that parliament was supreme and (notoriously) competent to enact nearly any 
piece of legislation it wished to. However, perhaps for readily apparent rea-
sons of self-interest, no vetting legislation was either considered or enacted by 
this white-dominated parliament during the transition.37 And the subsequent 
power of the first post-apartheid parliament after 1994 and the strength of its 
political will must be considered alongside two legal texts: the postscript (the 
final [and unnumbered] section of the interim constitution) as well as section 
236, one of the transitional clauses of the interim constitution.
 Entitled National Unity and Reconciliation, the postscript is worth quoting 
at length. It provided in part: “In order to advance. . . reconciliation and recon-
struction, amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences 
associated with political objectives and committed in the course of the con-
flicts of the past. To this end, parliament under this constitution shall adopt a 
law determining a firm cut-off date. . . and providing for the mechanisms, cri-
teria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty 
shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed.” As with any text, 
this clause remained open to interpretation, both in courts and in policy pro-
cesses. An amnesty may be limited to the granting of immunity from criminal 
and/or civil liability and thus need not constitute a bar to vetting procedures. 
There is no judicial decision specifically interpreting this clause in the context 
of vetting procedures. In government policy during the transition, however, 
the scope of the amnesty appeared to be understood such that this clause not 
only shielded beneficiaries from criminal and civil liability, but that it further 
shielded officials from measures such as vetting.
 Judge John Didcott (one of if not the foremost judicial critic of apartheid 
serving within that system and later a judge on the Constitutional Court) wrote 
of the postscript in the following terms: “Once the truth about the iniquities 
of the past has been established and made known, the book should be closed 
on them so that the catharsis thus engendered may divert the energies of the 
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nation from a preoccupation with anguish and rancour to a future directed 
towards the goal which both the postscript to the [interim] constitution and 
the preamble to the [TRC] statute have set by declaring in turn that. . . the pur-
suit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace 
require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruc-
tion of society.”38
 In the case that Didcott was considering, AZAPO & Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa, the Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the TRC legislation.39 Although all members of the court 
accepted that the TRC act infringed upon the right of the victims to access 
their judicial remedies (rights that were protected for the first time in South 
Africa in the interim constitution), the court held that these rights could be 
limited in the interests of reconciliation. The decision of the court depended 
heavily on the postscript.40 
 Although it is inherently a matter of speculation, significant constitutional 
arguments based on the postscript could well have been raised as obstacles 
to any law of vetting that parliament wished to consider. It is interesting to 
contemplate, however, whether a practice of vetting designed to achieve pre-
ventive rather than punitive goals would have fallen under the apparent prohi-
bition of the postscript. Even staying within the understanding of the issues 
as expressed in AZAPO, much could have been said in favor of the constitu-
tionality of preventive vetting. Arguably, such a practice would have had the 
advantage of bolstering the transition by increasing the legitimacy of the pub-
lic institutions. Such a practice might have been judged constitutional since 
AZAPO expresses a preference against punitive goals and demonstrates an 
overriding concern to support the transition.
 A second legal text, section 236 of the interim constitution, entrenched a 
set of provisions governing transitional arrangements for the public adminis-
tration. Prominent within this constitutional section was the rule contained in 
section 236(2): “A person who immediately before the commencement of this 
constitution was employed by an institution referred to in subsection (1) shall 
continue in such employment subject to and in accordance with this constitu-
tion and other applicable laws regulating such employment.” This legal text 
gave power to those officials arguing against vetting. According to the acting 
director general of DPSA, the reason that there were no vetting processes dur-
ing the transition was “in the main. . . because of an approach that the position 
of staff in the Public Service be protected during the transitional phase. (This 
approach was enshrined in section 236 of the interim constitution, 1993.)”41
 Effectively, parliament shared competence in this area with the existing 
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set of entrenched public service commissions. The strong legal position of 
the public service before 1994 did not quickly change. Instead, the interim 
constitution provided specific institutional protections for the public ser-
vice. As part of its creation of new public agencies, the interim constitution 
established one national Public Service Commission as well as nine Provin-
cial Service Commissions.42 To a great extent old wine in new bottles at their 
inception, these public service commissions essentially were continuations of 
pre-interim constitution structures intended to manage more than oversee 
the operation of the public service and operated in terms of pre-interim con-
stitution laws governing the public service.43 They had operated in the past in 
a manner that zealously safeguarded the employment rights of (largely white) 
civil servants and they largely continued to do so during the years of the tran-
sition from 1990 to 1996.44 These institutional protections were supplemented 
by a body of legal rules and norms since the interim constitution made exten-
sive and explicit provision for the general continuation of laws applicable 
from the pre-interim constitution period. In particular, this meant that the 
Public Service Act — governing the terms and conditions of public employ-
ees — survived the transition.
 In any case, even assuming that the parliament possessed at least some 
degree of constitutional competence to enact a generally applicable vetting 
law, other legal provisions would have strongly operated against such a move. 
Any such law would have faced certain challenge based on provisions of the 
Bill of Rights, introduced in early 1994. Moreover, these provisions of the Bill 
of Rights were, of course, also applicable to the particular vetting laws and 
processes that were enacted. Thus, they form part of the legal background 
against which vetting was considered. 
 From the point of view of public employees, the Bill of Rights provided 
specific rights protection that could have been invoked by opponents of vet-
ting and would have complicated the operation of any potential vetting legis-
lation. This protection was in the form of labor rights and, perhaps even more 
powerfully, in the form of the interim constitution’s legal guarantee of admin-
istrative justice contained in section 24. This right is approximately equiva-
lent to the due process rights of other constitutions. This section provided all 
persons with a right in particular to “procedurally fair administrative action 
where any of his or her rights or legitimate expectations is affected or threat-
ened.” Although vetting processes would not necessarily violate such provi-
sions, the implementation of vetting likely would have been complicated by 
the right to administrative justice. Indeed, from the point of view of the TRC, 
the administrative justice right became an obstacle to its efficient and quick 
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functioning. Much of the “legal firepower” of the TRC itself was spent on 
complying with legal guarantees of administrative justice.45 Indeed, in a TRC 
setting closely analogous to that of vetting, administrative law came to the 
aid of an alleged apartheid perpetrator in the transition-era case of Du Preez v 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.46 This constraining experience of the TRC 
with rights of administrative justice demonstrates the power of these provi-
sions in the South African legal tradition. Although this experience did not 
make a process of vetting impossible, it indicates that any vetting initiatives 
would have faced powerful (albeit not insurmountable) constraints stemming 
from the obligation of procedural fairness.
 It is, of course, deeply ironic that a great part of the legal protection enjoyed 
by public employees against the enactment of vetting legislation derived from 
the more celebrated legal victories of the anti-apartheid effort. This was espe-
cially the case in the context of an individual public service employee faced 
with retrenchment (i.e., firing). Cases such as Administrator, Transvaal v Traub47 
and Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile48 upheld the rights of black or progres-
sively minded and outspoken employees in the face of actions by apartheid 
bureaucrats. These cases were regarded at the time as victories against apart-
heid. However, they also entrenched legal norms of procedural and substan-
tive protection in South African law that would in the 1990s be significant 
potential obstacles to instituting a vetting process.
personnel selection procedures in the transition  
in south africa
As the last section pointed out, there was no law of vetting in the South Afri-
can transition from 1990 to 1996. No vetting took place within nonsecurity 
components of the public service or within political parties. This is not to 
say that no personnel selection or security clearance procedures took place. 
Some did. In particular, personnel selection practices took place within the 
judiciary and within the security services. 
BEgINNINg TO TRANSfORm ThE JUdICIARy
An episode of the transition that relates specifically to the personnel of the 
judicial branch was the impetus for a Constitutional Court made up of a new 
slate of judges. This aspect of the transition derives from sharply contrast-
ing attitudes of the apartheid government and the liberation movement. For 
a number of decades, the African National Congress had consistently held 
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a skeptical attitude towards the personnel of the judiciary under apartheid. 
The ANC’s view was that the majority of judges were stooges of the apartheid 
regime, apart from a few honorable exceptions such as Judge John Didcott. 
When constitutional issues began to be seriously debated within the ANC in 
the late 1980s, one of the most hotly contested within the liberation movement 
was the composition of the judiciary as well as the power of judicial review. 
For instance, in response to one internal proposal that apparently would have 
allowed at least some apartheid judges to continue to hold their seats, Pallo 
Jordan and others in the ANC suggested before 1990 that all members of the 
judiciary should resign and then be rehired by a new democratic regime.49 In 
contrast, the apartheid government had belatedly and self-interestedly woken 
up to the value of an independent judiciary and of a bill of rights as structural 
guarantees for the rights of minorities in a constitutional democracy with 
a clear black majority. Both it and international opinion were thus strongly 
committed to maintaining rather than modifying the existing institutional 
independence of the South African judiciary.50 This debate took place against 
the background of an existing judiciary that was nearly 100% white and male. 
The permanent appointment of the first judge who was not white did not take 
place until 1991.51 
 In the end, the interim constitution essentially kept intact the existing judi-
ciary with two significant innovations. First, constitutional review power (the 
power to strike down parliamentary legislation on constitutional grounds) 
was given to first-instance judges (but not to the judges of the old-order apex 
court, the Appellate Division, now renamed the Supreme Court of Appeal). 
Second, while the vetting of sitting judges was a political nonstarter, the dif-
ferent starting points of the liberation movement and the government none-
theless set the stage for the establishment of the Constitutional Court.52 The 
establishment of the Constitutional Court thus owed much to a concern with 
the existing personnel of the judiciary. The creation of a new court with con-
stitutional jurisdiction, but crucially also with newly appointed judges, can be 
seen as motivated in large part to make a decisive break with the past. 
 The Constitutional Court would embody that decisive break not only in 
terms of doctrine but also in terms of personnel.53 Nonetheless, although 
the members of the new court were to be selected and appointed anew, the 
court was not a complete break with the personnel of the existing judiciary. 
Constitutionally, four of the eleven judges were required to be appointed 
from among the judges of the existing Supreme Court. Thus, a substantial 
portion of the personnel of the new Constitutional Court was mandated to 
have direct continuity with the existing judiciary. Furthermore, although it 
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was not a legal requirement, two of the remaining seven appointments to the 
Constitutional Court were in fact also judges of the existing Supreme Court. 
One of these nonmandated appointments was that of Judge Didcott. More-
over, there was significant participation by the judiciary and by the legal pro-
fession in the actual process of nominating the judges for the court. Six of the 
eleven appointments required the consultation of a constitutionally mandated 
body, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).54 In order to form its opinion, the 
JSC chose to interview a number of candidates. After a short but fierce period 
of controversy, it was resolved by the JSC that the process of interviewing and 
recommending candidates for these appointments would be open. The JSC 
thus conducted a transparent process for these six appointments, essentially 
along the lines by which the media is usually permitted to view public and 
open processes of the courts. In this interviewing process, the members of 
the JSC asked candidates questions based on their résumés as well as ques-
tions regarding their views on the legal system.55 
 As the above demonstrates, the JSC was designed to and did play an 
important role in the selection of the Constitutional Court judges. It also 
was designed for and has played a role in the selection and appointment of 
lower-rank judges. In this sense, one can point to the JSC as a personnel-selec-
tion institution. While retaining approximately the same size, the judiciary 
itself had changed from having one black male judge and two white female 
judges in May 1994 to a state where the justice minister could point to “14 
white females, 42 indigenous African males, 8 indigenous African females, 
8 coloured males, 1 coloured female, 11 Asiatic males and 2 Asiatic females” 
out of 214 judges.56 By 2003, 60% of the judges were post-apartheid appoint-
ments. During the time of transition, the debates and discussions within the 
JSC covered in part grounds of transition, although they mostly focused on 
more institutional matters of judicial competence.57 For instance, the mem-
bership of judges in the Afrikaner Broederbond (a secret brotherhood that 
was closely linked to the National Party) was a matter critically taken into 
account by the JSC in relation to the promotion of certain old-order judges, 
although the JSC has also recommended the appointment of some persons 
with that background.58
PERSONNEl SElECTION ANd SECURITy ClEARANCES  
IN ThE SECURITy SERVICES
The security services sector did undergo at least one formal and statutory 
personnel selection process during the transition. This sector saw the clearest 
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separation of the old and the new regimes at the start of the transition, at least 
with respect to formal military and intelligence structures. Thus, even though 
there were numerous organizations involved, the transition witnessed the 
merger of two broad sets of military/intelligence organizations, one from the 
side of the liberation movements and one from the side of the government.59 
These different organizational structures were put together during the years 
from 1994 to 1996, although on the military side the processes extended 
beyond 1996. 
InTellIgence 
The period from 1990 to 1994 can be characterized as one in which Presi-
dent F. W. de Klerk was attempting to regain civilian political control over the 
intelligence services but was unable to wield much power in this effort. For 
instance, de Klerk repeatedly stated that no witch hunts were to be conducted, 
apparently needing to make this commitment in order to attain control over 
these services. The few high-profile sackings of senior intelligence officials 
that occurred during this period were all conducted in response to exposure 
by journalists or by a judicial commission of inquiry without any powers of 
enforcement or prosecution, the Goldstone Commission.60 In December 1992, 
de Klerk dismissed twenty-three senior commanders of the military intel-
ligence in response to evidence uncovered by the Goldstone Commission. 
However, the primary reason cited for the dismissal of these senior officials 
(including two generals and four brigadiers) was their apparent involvement 
in destabilizing the ongoing negotiations process.61 Although the Goldstone 
Commission had some formality to its investigation, these actions of dis-
missal were immediate responses to its reports and did not form part of any 
sustained program of vetting.
 During this period (as well as prior to it), there were continued contacts 
between the National Intelligence Service (NIS), as the primary intelligence 
service on the side of the government, and the MK Department of Intelligence 
and Security (MK-DIS), as the primary intelligence structure for the ANC on 
the side of the liberation movements. The NIS had been selected by de Klerk 
as his primary intelligence instrument for the transition from apartheid. Thus, 
the NIS was put in the position of performing the functions of a powerful yet 
reformist state agency in the midst of the transition. This position of power 
and the ability of the two intelligence agencies to shape their own relation-
ship both with each other and with their respective principals contributed to 
the relatively warm relations between the NIS and MK-DIS. In 1992, the head 
of the MK-DIS indicated the degree of consensus that existed in stating: “In 
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discussing the future of intelligence in our country, we cannot negate the fact 
that we, as intelligence actors, constitute a tragic legacy; a legacy of opposi-
tion to one another — some of us struggling against apartheid, others defend-
ing it — actions that were dictated by the very nature of our highly politicized 
roles respectively. Today, a new mission must be determined for the South 
African intelligence community — a mission which is in line with the desired 
goal of a non-racial democratic order.”62 Along these lines, there were argu-
ments made within the ANC for retention of the NIS as it was. Beyond its 
contribution in the negotiations (as described above), the NIS was regarded 
by the ANC as possessing “assets and capabilities that the ANC would not 
want to lose, including sources, information on both the white right wing and 
extremists in black parties such as Inkatha, technological capabilities, and 
greater professional training than in the ANC.”63
 It is within the above context that we can outline and assess the person-
nel selection done in the security sector. Consider the experience of the South 
African Secret Service (SASS). SASS is one of the two South African intelli-
gence services created in 1994 out of the NIS and the amalgamation of lib-
eration-movement intelligence services. It is a partner service to the National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA). NIA has primary responsibility for domestic intel-
ligence and SASS has primary responsibility for foreign intelligence. SASS 
has indicated that “no vetting [i.e., security clearances such as background 
checks on issues of affiliation or screening for human rights abuses]64 was 
done as a prerequisite to join the new intelligence structures established by 
the Constitution and the Intelligence Services Act.” Instead, the service noted 
the existence of an “amalgamation process to incorporate all the intelligence 
structures.”65 SASS has reported that “[d]ue to the diversity of backgrounds 
and various other practical reasons, [it was] decided that security screening 
before amalgamation would not be a prerequisite, but to do a vetting there-
after. [SASS] conducted its own vetting and was one of the first departments 
to complete the vetting process. It needs also to be mentioned that during the 
early 1990s (pre-1994), severance packages were offered to members in the 
statutory Intelligence Services in an attempt to sever structures from mem-
bers who could jeopardize the amalgamation process.”66 
 As the experience of SASS demonstrates, there were a number of overlap-
ping practices in the transition of the intelligence services sector. The creation 
of the new intelligence services out of elements of government and liberation 
intelligence services during this period included pre-amalgamation volun-
tary retirement incentives as well as post-amalgamation security screening67 
and post-amalgamation certification.68 Of the approximately four thousand 
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members of the new civilian intelligence services, about one-half came from 
the previous governmental intelligence services, one-quarter from the ANC 
intelligence services, and the rest from homelands and other services.69 
 This 1994 restructuring of the intelligence services (the amalgamation) 
was, at most, only in very small part a move to cleanse the services of indi-
viduals with backgrounds involving human rights violations or indeed of 
particular individuals at all. As demonstrated by the relatively warm relations 
between the intelligence services, there were other factors that loomed larger 
than changing the personnel. As one commentator put it: “The reason behind 
the changes in the intelligence and security structures was partly a result of 
the general government restructuring following independence, but also to 
allow for the integration of the MK-DIS, along with all other intelligence ser-
vices in the country, into the new national intelligence structure.”70 
 As indicated above, it was after the formal amalgamation that persons in 
the new intelligence services were subjected to a check for security clearance. 
The exemption from a pre-employment security clearance was a departure 
from prior governmental practice and was understood within the intelli-
gences services to be a concession to those members not previously employed 
in government. In order to understand the practice of security clearance that 
developed at this time, one can make a distinction between two different types 
of security clearances. One type is a state information security clearance and 
is an intelligence-oriented understanding that extends to loyalty to the state.71 
Another type of security clearance is more corporate-oriented and refers to 
procedures, such as checking on fraudulent curriculum vitae or qualifications 
as well as criminal records, and so on, and does not necessarily include assess-
ing loyalty to the state.72 It was the first rather than the second type of secu-
rity clearance that was implemented during this period. To the extent, then, 
that human rights criteria were not the critical ones in the security clearances 
that were actually carried out, this practice was not one of vetting. Moreover, 
in this type of security clearance, the criteria adopted for the security clear-
ance and the application of those criteria may have varied significantly in this 
period of transition.73
 Beyond (but also linked to) the security clearance, the other primary post-
amalgamation process in the new intelligence services affecting personnel 
through examination of records was that of certification. The central legis-
lation for the amalgamation within the intelligence services was the Intelli-
gence Services Act 38 of 1994. Section 3 of this act regulated the process and 
essentially established the new National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and the 
South African Secret Service (SASS) out of members of the statutory Bureau 
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for State Security, the ANC Department of Intelligence and Security, the 
Bophuthatswana Internal Intelligence Service, the Transkei Intelligence Ser-
vice, and the Venda National Intelligence Service. Members of other services 
of other political parties and self-governing territories (e.g., KwaZulu) could 
be included if they applied to the director-general within a set period.74 It was 
necessary that each member be a South African citizen and that he or she fea-
ture on a personnel list submitted by the head of each organizational compo-
nent. NIA and SASS were thus formally established on January 1, 1995.75
 Section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act regulated the post-amalgamation 
personnel selection by providing for a security screening investigation by the 
newly created intelligence structure itself in section 8(1)(a) and then provid-
ing for evaluation of the collected information by the deputy president or the 
cabinet minister charged with intelligence. For the relevant period, the cabi-
net member charged with intelligence was Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, 
the current president of South Africa. According to section 8(1)(b) of the 
Intelligence Services Act, the condition of appointment of a member of the 
intelligence services was that the deputy president would be “reasonably of 
the opinion that such person may be appointed as a member without the pos-
sibility that such person might be a security risk or that he or she might act 
in any way prejudicial to security interests of the Republic.” Obviously, this 
was a standard that was open to interpretation by the deputy president. There 
appears not to have been any policy made in order to guide his interpretation. 
Section 8(2) of the act then provided for certification by the deputy president 
of such “appointability” of a member. However, the certification of appoint-
ability was not the end of the matter; there was the further possibility of the 
deputy president withdrawing that certificate of appointability upon gaining 
new or different information regarding that member’s appointability. Thus, 
the members of the intelligence services were placed under the control of a 
civilian politician, in particular that of Thabo Mbeki occupying the post of 
deputy president.
 This post-amalgamation personnel selection process (i.e., the security 
clearance and the certification of appointability) of sections 8(1) and 8(2) of 
the Intelligence Services Act only applied to persons appointed anew after 
the 1994 establishment of the agency and the service. For the bulk of the 
members who were amalgamated directly from the prior existing services, 
the equivalent provision was contained in section 8(3) of the act. In terms of 
section 8(3), if the deputy president “obtains information regarding [such] a 
member. . . which causes him to be reasonably of the opinion that the per-
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son could be a security risk or could possibly act in any manner prejudicial 
to security interests of the Republic, such member shall be deemed unfit for 
further membership of the Agency or Service.” Although this standard also 
was open to interpretation by the deputy president, it contained more protec-
tion against dismissal for these existing members than for the new members 
governed by section 8(2). 
 There are several points worth noting regarding this intelligence services 
amalgamation legislation. First, the deputy president effectively had the final 
say. The model of personnel selection adopted is thus one of an agency newly 
established via amalgamation of existing units, in a process operated by a very 
senior political head, and with one key part of the process — that of security 
clearance — conducted by the newly established agency itself. Second, the 
members of the new service taken in from preexisting units would only be 
evaluated in terms of information obtained after amalgamation (rather than 
in terms of information then available to the preexisting unit). Thus, full 
information sharing was not established before amalgamation. Third, it bears 
emphasizing that the legal standard for the deputy president’s discretion in 
section 8(3) with respect to members of the new service who were members 
of preexisting units is more objectively phrased than for the ongoing selection 
process of sections 8(1)–(2). For preexisting members, the standard for non-
appointability was thus higher. It was more difficult for the deputy president 
to be of the opinion of the existence of security risk. On the face of the law at 
least, as demonstrated in these last two points, there were greater protections 
thus provided for existing members than for new members. 
 As for the impact and effect of this law, a detailed study of the opera-
tion of this personnel selection in practice remains to be done. However, 
some features — beyond the generally held observation that this process 
of integration of the intelligence services was successful — are clear. First, it 
does not appear that grounds of transition figured prominently in this pro-
cess — there is no indication that an individual’s record as a human rights 
violator or status as a government/liberation forces member was taken into 
account to any significant extent. Indeed, at least two of these statuses — 
participation in government or liberation forces — were made legally equiva-
lent. Second, there remained significant noncooperation from the part of the 
intelligence sector with the new democratic regime, at least initially. In par-
ticular, the leaders of the intelligence agencies refused to tell newly elected 
President Nelson Mandela in 1994 the names of the informers used against the 
liberation movements.76 This indicates that the personnel selection processes 
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likely remained contested and variable. The secrecy and lack of informa-
tion sharing during this period was, however, not a break with bureaucratic 
tradition within the intelligence sector. From 1989 to 1994, the intelligence 
community had also withheld information from State President F. W. 
de Klerk.77 
The armed forces
Occurring more slowly than the process within the intelligence service, the 
armed forces of the liberation movements were absorbed into the South 
African military in an integration process that was planned by commanders 
from both sides themselves.78 After a series of off-the-record meetings in 1992 
between South African Defence Force (SADF) and Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) 
commanders, as well as more official and inclusive meetings in 1993–94, the 
Joint Military Coordinating Committee (JMCC) made a formal plan for the 
integration process including the establishment of certified personnel regis-
ters. In this process, the approximately 28,000 MK members, 6,000 members 
of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), and 11,000 members of the 
Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana militaries were scheduled for 
integration with the 90,000 members of the South African Defence Force.79 
In the integration process, individuals were assessed in terms of a rank struc-
ture, a process that caused difficulties for the liberation movement armed 
forces that had not operated on the basis of rank.80 In the end, fewer MK 
and APLA military personnel participated in the integration than had been 
expected. Thus, in 1998, about 16% of the South African National Defence 
Force (SANDF, which replaced the SADF in 1994) uniformed component (of 
73,500) were from MK and less than 7% from APLA.81 Nonetheless, a process 
of rationalization was also begun with respect to the armed forces.82
 The JMCC oversaw the process of integration and understood its man-
date to include oversight over the process of security clearances (which was 
an institution [established in 1980] separate from that of the police and that 
of the intelligence organizations). There was a “natural” fear on the part of 
the “comers-in” that the process of security clearances could be used to keep 
out new members of the armed forces.83 However, those implementing the 
clearance process in the SANDF made some allowances that were guided by 
the governmental policy of reconciliation and that had the effect of facilitat-
ing integration. These included a delay before a full-scale process of security 
clearance evaluation would be conducted as well as an explicit appreciation 
for cultural differences.84
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The polIce
The integration of the police forces differed from that of the armed forces 
in part because the liberation movements had few if any personnel with rel-
evant policing experience or indeed desire to be integrated into police struc-
tures.85 Instead, the police forces of the various homelands and independent 
territories needed to be amalgamated and rationalized in an organizational 
restructuring akin to the process that occurred with the public service gener-
ally. The newly appointed ANC minister with political responsibility for the 
police reassured the existing members of the police service that no radical 
changes would be forthcoming and that jobs were secure.86 In this process, 
the integration of the former homelands police forces improved the demo-
graphic representation of the national police. As Cawthra notes, “[b]y the 
end of 1999, about 70 per cent of the approximately 125,000-strong force was 
black, although less than 30 per cent were female. However, half of the middle 
managers in the service were white and white men constituted 70 per cent 
of senior management.”87 As with the intelligence and the army, a few high- 
profile personnel changes did occur as the result of judicial and other pres-
sures. At least to some extent, these pressures derived from human-rights 
related grounds. In August 1992, the retirement of about a third of the existing 
white generals in the South African Police (SAP) was announced. Still, “none 
of the most senior ranking officers in the SAP who have been implicated in 
unlawful activities were among those scheduled to retire.”88 In March 1994, 
de Klerk ordered immediate leave from duties for ten South African Police 
senior officers in response to an interim report issued by the Goldstone 
Commission.89
conclusion
One point raised by the South African inexperience with vetting in transi-
tion is that the relationship between the practice of vetting and the concept of 
administrative justice is not a relationship that can be prefigured. One cannot 
determine — without regard to the particular context of a society in transition 
and the implementation of particular programs — whether the fundamental 
rights of administrative justice (including procedural justice) are competitive 
with or complementary to the pursuit of transitional justice through practices 
such as vetting (which is also a form of administrative justice). In South Africa, 
this can be seen, for instance, in the operation of the TRC and its relationship 
to due process. Some will take the position that procedural obstacles (and 
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potential obstacles) presented by the right of administrative justice impeded 
the operation of the TRC and reinforced, without regard for transforma-
tion, the choice made in the transition against a general practice of vetting.90 
Others will take the position of the Constitutional Court that procedural 
justice and substantive justice are inextricably intermingled.91 In the end, the 
relationship will be a contested one. 
 It is hardly surprising that there are significant contests over the mean-
ing and operation of concepts such as administrative justice within a time of 
transition. But the point does push us to move beyond it and to recognize at 
least one significant aspect (among others) of this contest. In an important 
sense — and a sense that is perhaps not recognized enough by those domestic 
and international advocates engaged in transitional politics — the contest over 
due process and administrative justice rights has a particularly institutional 
dimension. The contest — whether it occurs in the decisions of judicial bodies 
or the drafting of memoranda of understanding — cannot be separated from 
issues of the effective functioning of the public service or, for instance, the 
proper relationship between the judiciary and the executive.92 As other chap-
ters in this collection demonstrate, attention to the institutional dimension is 
often overlooked but is significant.
 Several institutional dimensions of vetting are demonstrated by the 
examination of the South African experience. First, what emerges as signif-
icant from the South African experience is the relationship of vetting with 
the content of the legal system. The law (even in the relatively narrow sense 
of the preexisting and dominant doctrine of the legal system) is a significant 
institution that must be taken into account when designing and operating a 
system of vetting. If the relationship of vetting with the legal system is not 
taken into account, then the stated goals of the vetting process are likely to 
be deflected and less likely to be achieved. Second, at least in the case of a 
transition relatively uninfluenced by international actors — such as South 
Africa’s transition — public service institutions and structures must also be 
taken into account in designing or implementing a process of vetting. These 
institutions were powerful reinforcing factors with respect to the choice 
made in South Africa against vetting. A third point — perhaps relevant again 
mostly to domestic-driven transitions such as South Africa’s — builds upon 
this observation. As detailed above, the significant political actors — includ-
ing the liberation movements — at the outset of the South African period of 
transition made a choice against vetting. Their understanding of this choice 
was that individuals in existing organizations such as the public service or 
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the judiciary would not be dismissed. This understanding existed simultane-
ously with an understanding regarding the need to change the structure of the 
bureaucracies that made up, for example, the public service.93 Although the 
precise nature of those structural changes was not specified nor agreed upon, 
it was common cause that these structures would change. What perhaps was 
not taken into account or appreciated sufficiently by all the actors were the 
institutional consequences of the choice against vetting. The choice against 
vetting meant that agreed-upon structural reforms of organizations such as 
the public service were that much more difficult to effect.
 As a last word, one cannot avoid reflecting upon the relationship between 
race and the transformation of the state in the South African context. The 
South African experience provides one example of the degree to which the 
process of vetting in a time of transition may compete with (or mask or over-
lap) other themes of transformation such as racial justice.94 Given the promi-
nent role of the public service in the political economy of South Africa95 and 
the demographic distribution of South Africa,96 it was perhaps not surprising 
that advocates of racial transformation would focus on the public service in 
the period of transition. The push for change of the personnel of the public 
service on the grounds of race (and to a lesser extent gender) has thus com-
peted with the efforts of advocates of vetting, at least those who based their 
argument for vetting narrowly on human rights considerations. 
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introduction
The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement not only ended a brutal three-and-a-half-
year war but also designed a complex program to build the peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The former warring factions (the country’s Bosniaks,1 
Serbs, and Croats) signed the agreement only under tremendous international 
pressure. Although these factions carried primary responsibility to fulfill the 
agreement, they consistently — albeit to different degrees — resisted its imple-
mentation in the post-Dayton period. In response, international actors on the 
ground abandoned their initially cautious approach in view of continuous 
obstruction by the parties and increasingly intervened directly to move for-
ward the implementation of the peace process.
 This contentious environment affected efforts to reform the rule of law 
sector including the vetting of its personnel (by vetting I mean assessing 
integrity to determine suitability for public employment). In the early post-
Dayton period, the police did not enforce the law impartially and the courts 
did not fairly render justice. Public confidence in the rule of law remained low. 
Domestic authorities, however, failed to reform the police, the courts, and the 
prosecutors’ offices, and did not remove police officers, judges, or prosecutors 
who were unfit for service. As a result, international actors gradually adopted 
a more proactive approach to reforming and building the rule of law sector. 
Between 1999 and 2002, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herze-
govina (UNMIBH) screened close to twenty-four thousand law enforcement 
personnel.2 The High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils (HJPC), bodies with 
mixed international and national staff, reappointed judges and prosecutors 
for close to one thousand — almost all — judicial and prosecutorial positions 
between 2002 and 2004.
 The UNMIBH certification process and the HJPC reappointment process 
represent two distinct approaches to vetting. The certification process was 
a review process. Serving law enforcement personnel were screened and 
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removed only if they did not meet the criteria for certification. In the reap-
pointment process, on the other hand, the courts and prosecutors’ offices 
were reconstituted and there was a general competition for all posts. Serving 
judges and prosecutors also had to reapply for their own positions. Although 
the goal of the certification process was to remove those individuals who 
were found unfit for service, the aim of the reappointment process was to 
select for office the most qualified candidates. This chapter describes some of 
the opportunities and risks associated with these two distinct approaches to 
vetting. 
 Both the UNMIBH certification process and the HJPC reappointment pro-
cess reveal an institutional dimension of vetting. The principal rationale for 
both processes was comprehensive personnel reform to build fair and effec-
tive institutions rather than establishing individual accountability for past 
abuses. This study also shows that efforts to build public institutions that 
prevent the recurrence of abuses should generally not be limited to excluding 
abusers, but require a comprehensive reform of the institution, including a 
full review of its personnel. Effective personnel reform will identify the vari-
ous shortcomings of the institution’s employees and ensure the selection of 
competent and representative personnel of integrity.
 The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section provides a short 
account of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and an overview of the Day-
ton Peace Agreement. The second describes UN efforts to screen and certify 
the police, and the third examines the reappointment of judges and prosecu-
tors, which was carried out by the HJPC. The fourth section places these vet-
ting processes in the context of other transitional justice measures. The last 
section discusses four salient issues relevant to a better understanding of the 
concept and praxis of vetting in general: the relationship between vetting and 
institutional reform; review and reappointment as two distinct approaches to 
vetting; the role of international organizations in vetting processes; and the 
issue of resources.
background and context
ThE POlICE ANd COURTS IN yUgOSlAVIA ANd ThE CONflICT
In communist Yugoslavia, each of the six republics had its own law enforce-
ment and judicial systems. The police force formed an integral part of a repub-
lic’s Ministry of Interior. The ministry was headed by a minister who was a 
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member of the communist nomenklatura and managed all operational and per-
sonnel aspects of the police. Each republic had a three-tier court system and 
its own constitutional court. Judges were appointed by the republic’s parlia-
ment on the recommendation of the communist minister of justice. Member-
ship in the Communist Party was a condition for professional advancement 
of judges, prosecutors, and police officers. De facto, communist Yugoslavia 
did not have a genuine separation of powers. The government was dominated 
by the communist state apparatus, and the judiciary was under the control of 
the executive branch of government. When nationalist parties came to power 
in Yugoslavia following the breakdown of communism and the 1990 elec-
tions, they took control of the state apparatus, including the police and the 
judiciary. 
 Following Bosnia and Herzegovina’s declaration of independence from 
Yugoslavia in February 1992, conflict quickly erupted among the country’s 
Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, and the country plunged into all-out war.3 Both 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats were actively supported by regular Serbian 
and Croatian forces, that is, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and the Croa-
tian Defense Force (HVO), and sought to split off large parts of the territory 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian government (Bosniak) forces fought to 
preserve a unitary state that would maintain the borders of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former Yugoslavia. Assault on civilian popula-
tions, in particular the forced migration of populations on the basis of their 
ethnicity (what became infamously known as “ethnic cleansing”), was not 
only an instrument of warfare but above all a central aspect of the political 
project the war was intended to accomplish. In particular Bosnian Serb and 
Bosnian Croat forces dispossessed, displaced, interned, ill-treated, raped, and 
killed populations to enlarge the territory they controlled. During the atro-
cious three-and-a-half-year armed conflict, an estimated one quarter of a mil-
lion people were killed and 2.2 million people (more than half the population) 
were displaced.4
 After the outbreak of the conflict, Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat lead-
ers seized the public institutions in their “autonomous areas,” including the 
police and the judiciary.5 The police now served nationalist enclaves and 
turned into an instrument of war, executing the policy of “ethnic cleansing.” 
The transition from law enforcement to war fighting was all the easier because 
the police in communist Yugoslavia had a paramilitary role in the national 
defense system, in addition to its regular law enforcement and state security 
role. In times of war, the police were to support the territorial defense in the 
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interior of the country. During the conflict, the military and police conducted 
joint operations, and soldiers and members of paramilitary groups without 
formal police training joined the police.
 International, in particular European, efforts to resolve the conflict in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina were intense, though indecisive, haphazard, and ineffec-
tive. As a result, self-declared nationalist leaders and warlords in the country 
dictated events and exacerbated the conflict. This only changed decisively in 
1995 due to more active involvement by the United States, international pub-
lic outrage following the fall of the UN-designated safe areas of Srebrenica 
and Zepa in July 1995, and the international community’s new resolve to use 
force.6 Following the agreement of the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks to ally 
themselves in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Washington 
Agreement),7 Croat and Bosniak forces launched successful offenses against 
the Serbian forces, which at last set the necessary conditions for a settlement.
ThE dAyTON PEACE AgREEmENT
The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
so-called Dayton Peace Agreement, was negotiated in November 1995 under 
strong U.S. pressure in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on December 14, 
1995.8 The agreement had essentially two objectives: to end the fighting and 
to build a viable, democratic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the 
parties carried primary responsibility to implement the agreement, it des-
ignated a broad array of international organizations to assist the process. 
The Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), a multinational 
force led by NATO, was to oversee the compliance with the military provi-
sions. The peace agreement designated a high representative to oversee and 
coordinate the implementation of its civilian aspects. The high representa-
tive was nominated by and received political guidance from the Peace Imple-
mentation Council, which was established to mobilize international support 
for the peace process.9 The specific tasks related to civilian implementation 
were divided up between different international organizations, in particu-
lar the Office of the High Representative (OHR) itself, the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).
 The Dayton Peace Agreement was a “coerced compromise” rather than 
a sincere agreement, and yet it relied primarily on those responsible for the 
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war to implement the peace.10 Nationalist Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats 
fiercely resisted the implementation of the agreement, as its objectives were 
contrary to the very reasons why they began the war, and implementing the 
agreement would have reversed the war’s outcomes. Significantly, they were 
not committed to the two fundamental provisions of the peace agreement: 
the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its pre-conflict borders 
and the right to return of all displaced persons. Although Dayton ended the 
fighting, the conflict continued by other means. This left a heavy responsibil-
ity on the international implementers, who were ill equipped to fulfill it.
 The Constitution of the Dayton Peace Agreement provided for weak state 
structures.11 Bosnia and Herzegovina would consist of two coequal “entities,” 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Federation) and the Repub-
lika Srpska (RS), and all governmental functions except the few expressly 
assigned to the state would fall under the responsibilities of the entities. In 
the Federation, authority was further devolved to the ten cantons in order to 
create a delicate balance of power between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats.12 
Regular law enforcement, judicial, and prosecutorial functions fell under the 
mandate of the two entities.13 In the Federation, the ten cantons had primary 
responsibility for police and the judiciary.14 As a result, the post-Dayton law 
enforcement, judicial, and prosecutorial systems were highly fragmented 
and remained vulnerable to interference by local leaders with nationalist 
agendas.15
 In terms of police reform, the parties committed themselves in the Dayton 
Peace Agreement to “provide a safe and secure environment for all persons in 
their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law enforcement agen-
cies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and 
with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,”16 and to ensure the “prosecution, dismissal or transfer, as appro-
priate” of police officers responsible for serious abuses of the basic rights of 
minorities.17
 The Dayton Peace Agreement designated an International Police Task 
Force (IPTF) to assist in the reform of the police and entrusted the United 
Nations to run it.18 The Security Council established UNMIBH, which 
included the IPTF under the responsibility of a UN civilian office.19 Initially, 
the IPTF included 1,721 international police officers, a number later increased 
to 2,027.20 UNMIBH did not have an executive mandate and had no enforce-
ment powers vis-à-vis the parties. It was to monitor, advise, and train local 
police officers, and to assist and facilitate the reform process.21 Reforming the 
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police, including vetting its personnel, would require the consent and support 
of the domestic authorities.
 Judicial reform did not feature prominently in the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment. The new Constitution obliged the parties to “ensure the highest level 
of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms,” 
including “the right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters, and other 
rights relating to criminal proceedings.”22 The peace agreement did not 
specify, however, what reforms were necessary to ensure the respect of these 
rights, and there was no specific reference to the need to reform the courts, 
the offices of the prosecutor, or the penitentiary system. Moreover, although 
several international organizations had a human rights mandate,23 no inter-
national organization was specifically tasked with assisting and coordinating 
judicial reform.
BOSNIA ANd hERZEgOVINA AfTER dAyTON
1 Una Sana (Bosniak)
2 Posavine (Croat)
3 Tuzla Pdrinje (Bosniak)
4 Zenica doboj (Bosniak)
5 Bosna Pdrinje (Bosniak)
6 Central Bosnia (mixed)
7 herzegovina Neretva (mixed)
8 west herzegovina (Croat)
9 Sarajevo (Bosniak)
10 herceg Bosna (Croat) federation
Republic Srpska
SOURCE: Office of the High Representative, Maps. See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps.
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vetting the police
ThE PRE-VETTINg SITUATION
By the end of the conflict, the number of active police officers in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina had reportedly swelled to an estimated 44,750, a threefold 
increase of their prewar size. Of these, 32,750 were in the Federation, includ-
ing 3,000 deployed in Bosnian Croat-controlled areas. The RS reportedly had 
12,000 police officers.24 These figures exceeded by far generally accepted prac-
tice in Western European democracies.
 Rather than upholding the rule of law and human rights, the post-Dayton 
police continued to support nationalist separatist agendas and to function in 
separate ethnically-based forces, each operating under the direct control of 
the respective ethnically-based political party. There was no police coopera-
tion between the two entities, and the Bosnian Croat police operated autono-
mously within the Federation. Particularly in Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb 
areas, minority returnees were not protected during home visits, and minority- 
related incidents were not investigated. The police forces themselves had war 
criminals among their ranks and continued to discriminate against, harass, 
and intimidate minority populations. The absence of functional law enforce-
ment created a climate of impunity, subverting a fundamental clause of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement: the promise that all refugees and displaced persons 
could voluntarily and safely return.
ThE UNmIBh CERTIfICATION PROCESS
conTexT and legal basIs
During the first years after Dayton, the parties undermined most serious 
efforts to reform the police. Although obstruction by those who carried prin-
cipal responsibility for the conflict and its outcomes, in particular nationalist 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat groups, could be expected, the international 
community initially maintained the fiction that it should be there only to 
assist rather than ensure implementation.
 In response to the domestic groups’ obstruction, the overall approach of 
the international community changed over time and UNMIBH’s mandate 
evolved gradually. Security Council Resolution 1088 of December 1996 gave 
UNMIBH the power to conduct independent investigations into abuses by the 
local police.25 In 1997, the high representative was authorized to make binding 
decisions.26 On several occasions, the high representative used these powers to 
remove police officers who had committed serious violations of duty. On the 
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basis of the April 1996 police restructuring agreement for the Federation (the 
Bosniak-Bosnian Croat entity) and of UN Security Council Resolution 1088, 
UNMIBH developed the power to decertify police officers who were found 
responsible for human rights abuses or other serious violations of duty.27
 Eventually, in December 1998, a police restructuring agreement was also 
signed for the other entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the RS.28 The agree-
ment authorized UNMIBH to vet the police.29 On the basis of the Federation 
and RS restructuring agreements, UNMIBH issued five policies that deter-
mined the maximum strength and ethnic composition of the police services 
and established a three-step personnel reform process: registration, provi-
sional authorization, and certification.30
The UnmIbh local polIce regIsTry secTIon
UNMIBH entrusted its Human Rights Office with implementing the certifi-
cation process. The Human Rights Office established the Local Police Regis-
try Section, which was comprised of a staff of two international civilian staff 
members (a project manager and an international lawyer), twenty-eight inter-
national police officers, and twenty national staff members (lawyers, trans-
lators, electronic data managers, and administrators). The section was sup-
ported by two liaison officers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia in The Hague and by several lawyers and police investiga-
tors in other sections of the Human Rights Office. The three-step personnel 
reform process began in November 1999, and close to twenty-four thousand 
law enforcement personnel had to be vetted over the next three years.
regIsTraTIon, provIsIonal aUThorIzaTIon,  
and cerTIfIcaTIon
Registration. From November 1999 to December 2000, UNMIBH registered all 
Ministry of Interior personnel who presented themselves during the registra-
tion process. In total, 23,751 persons were registered. The registration form 
included comprehensive information on qualifications, current assignment, 
professional history, and background. The information was recorded in the 
UNMIBH local police registry.31 The registration process defined the pool of 
persons to be vetted and closed the doors to arbitrary manipulations of the 
police personnel lists by the ministries or the political leadership. A person 
who had not been registered would not be included in the personnel reform 
process. Once the registration process was completed, access to the police was 
limited to the regular recruitment procedures: a person wanting to become a 
police officer had to apply at the police academy.
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Provisional authorization. Registered persons underwent an initial screening 
process to quickly remove those who clearly did not meet minimum crite-
ria for service. These criteria included minimum age, citizenship, minimal 
training requirements, and a position requiring the exercise of police pow-
ers. Circumstances that precluded provisional authorization were, inter alia, 
a criminal record or indictment or previous removal by UNMIBH.32 Officers 
who met the criteria were provisionally authorized by UNMIBH to exercise 
police powers and were issued a UNMIBH identification card. Beyond these 
minimum criteria, provisional authorization did not indicate a comprehen-
sive assessment of the suitability of the police officer. 
Certification. Persons who were provisionally authorized were subject to more 
extensive background checks and performance monitoring by UNMIBH.33 
Those who passed the comprehensive checks received full certification from 
UNMIBH. The final decision rested with the UNMIBH police commissioner. 
Circumstances that excluded a police officer from certification included, in 
particular, independent evidence obtained by UNMIBH of a serious breach 
of law or duty; a material misrepresentation to UNMIBH that fundamentally 
affected consideration of suitability;34 a violation of property legislation; and 
“acts and/or omissions, and/or functions from the period of April 1992 to 
December 1995, which demonstrate the inability or unwillingness to uphold 
internationally recognized human rights standards.”35 The latter two catego-
ries merit closer attention in the context of this study on vetting.
 During the conflict, minority populations were generally forced to give up 
their housing and property, which were subsequently occupied by members 
of the ethnic majority, in particular members of the armed forces, police, and 
the nationalist leadership. During the certification process, UNMIBH checked 
the property status of more than 8,300 police officers whose pre-conflict 
addresses were different from their current addresses. Illegal occupants had to 
regularize their housing situation or they would not be certified. Of the 7,998 
illegal occupant police officers, around 80% vacated the property they occu-
pied. The remaining 20% entered into rental agreements with the rightful 
owners. Three police officers were not certified because they failed to vacate 
the property they illegally occupied or to reach such an agreement with the 
rightful owner.
 The formula “acts and/or omissions, and/or functions from the period 
of April 1992 to December 1995, which demonstrate the inability or unwill-
ingness to uphold internationally recognized human rights standards” pro-
vided the basis for vetting the wartime background of police officers.36 This 
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information was drawn from four principal sources: databases of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, statements of victims and 
witnesses, information from nongovernmental organizations, and data in the 
registration forms completed by the police officers themselves.
 UNMIBH reviewed the information and conducted independent follow-
up investigations as required. Police officers were not given an opportunity 
to be heard or to defend themselves. On the basis of the case files prepared 
and the recommendations made by the UNMIBH Human Rights Office, the 
UNMIBH police commissioner decided whether to certify a police officer or 
not. An officer was not certified if there were grounds for suspicion that he or 
she had committed a war crime or crime against humanity listed in relevant 
domestic provisions and associated international standards. The “grounds for 
suspicion” standard of proof corresponded to an obligation of the domestic 
police to start a criminal investigation (or a prosecutor to initiate an inquiry) 
into the potential commission of a crime. A higher standard of proof did not 
appear to be feasible: “The standard UNMIBH applied was a balance between 
the urgent need to vet human rights violators from the Bosnian police and 
the need to implement a procedure that respected the rights of those under 
scrutiny.”37
 The types of cases reviewed included, inter alia, police officers who were 
guards or interrogators in concentration camps and took part in ill-treatment 
of prisoners; commanders of military police units that operated detention 
facilities where atrocities occurred; and officers who were directly involved 
in war crimes or crimes against humanity including murder, rape, torture, 
and ill-treatment during the conflict. The cases fell into three categories of 
responsibility: complicity, command responsibility, and direct commission.
 A police officer who was not certified was no longer authorized to exer-
cise police powers. He or she had to hand in his or her UNMIBH identification 
card and police-issued side arm, and the chief of police had to initiate mea-
sures to terminate the officer’s employment. If the individual continued to 
exercise police powers, he or she was considered to be illegally impersonating 
a police officer and was subject to arrest and disarmament by SFOR.38 Non-
certification precluded employment in any position within any law enforce-
ment agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.39
 A person who had been denied certification could request in writing 
a review of her or his case. The relevant policy stated that UNMIBH “will 
respond to requests in accordance with internal guidelines” but did not spec-
ify the steps of the review process.40 In early 2002, an internal UNMIBH panel 
was established, the members of which were independent of the UNMIBH 
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police commissioner. The panel reviewed submissions and, if warranted, 
referred cases back to the commissioner for reconsideration of his decision.41 
The final decision rested again with the UNMIBH commissioner.
OUTCOmES, PERCEPTIONS, ANd ChAllENgES
oUTcomes
UNMIBH’s mandate came to a close in December 2002. In the course of the 
certification process, UNMIBH registered and screened all 23,751 Ministry of 
Interior personnel who presented themselves to the registration teams. Of 
these, 16,803 were granted provisional authorization to exercise police pow-
ers. The overwhelming majority of those not provisionally authorized were 
administrative support personnel who, a priori, did not qualify for authoriza-
tion to exercise police powers. Of those provisionally authorized, 15,786 were 
granted full certification. Certification was denied to 481 officers, while 228 
cases were pending in December 2002.42
TABlE 1  
Overall breakdown of certification figures
  PROVISIONAlly   NOT
 REgISTEREd AUThORIZEd CERTIfIEd CERTIfIEd PENdINg
Federation of BiH n/a n/a 8,311 254 104
Republika Srpska n/a n/a 5,692 184 104
Brcˇko District n/a n/a 263 1 2
State Border Service n/a n/a 1,351 41 16
Fed. Court Police n/a n/a 169 1 2
Total 23,751 16,803 15,786 481 228
SOURCE: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2002/1314 (December 2, 2002): 3
 The UNMIBH certification process not only led to a verification of the 
suitability of individual police officers, but also to a reduction in the overall 
number of officers, an improved ethnic composition of the services, and an 
increase in female officers. Although the post-conflict police forces through-
out Bosnia and Herzegovina were essentially mono-ethnic and without 
female officers, there was an average of around 10% minority officers and 
around 3% female officers in December 2002. The police forces in Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina had moved closer to meeting European policing standards, a 
requirement to negotiate a stabilization and association agreement with the 
European Union.
 At the time of writing, it was not clear whether the UNMIBH certification 
process actually led to an overall improvement in the performance of the 
police. No comprehensive assessment of the impact of the UNMIBH reform 
and certification process had been carried out and there was no ongoing eval-
uation of the police performance in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the 
reform of the police appeared to have positively affected the performance of 
the police in certain minority return areas and possibly the return process 
itself. For example, the number of attacks and other violent incidents target-
ing minority returnees decreased significantly in Stolac near Mostar follow-
ing the removal of police officers with bad human rights track records and the 
inclusion of minority officers in the Stolac police administration in 1999.43
 The situation of noncertified police officers had not been comprehensively 
assessed either. Senior Ministry of Interior officials and union representatives 
interviewed for this study mostly felt that those not certified had generally 
not been treated fairly in the course of the UNMIBH certification process. A 
handful of noncertified police officers were also interviewed during research 
for this study. They generally experienced a sense of powerlessness in the face 
of the UNMIBH certification process. They felt they were treated unfairly. In 
particular, they expressed extreme frustration at the fact that they had not 
been given an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves. As they had 
been police officers their entire life and had been excluded from any work in 
a Ministry of Interior in the future, it was almost impossible for them to find 
alternative employment.44
pUblIc percepTIons
According to a public opinion survey commissioned by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), overall public confidence in the police rose 
slightly during the period the police officers were vetted and the police ser-
vices were restructured with the assistance of UNMIBH.45 Minority return-
ees generally expressed greater trust in the police following the integration of 
minority officers and the removal of human rights abusers.46 The percentage 
of those believing that there is a significant level of corruption in the police 
remained, however, roughly the same.47 A serious impact assessment would 
be necessary to ascertain the accuracy of such partial evidence and determine 
the effects of the vetting and restructuring processes.
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challenges and lImITaTIons
Political resistance. UNMIBH encountered fierce resistance from domestic 
actors who not only failed to meet their obligations to vet the police but also 
strongly objected to the UNMIBH certification process and obstructed it wher-
ever possible. Ministers and other government officials generally denied any 
wartime wrongdoing of police. A number of police officers who were denied 
certification continued to work, moved to other Ministries of Interior, were 
appointed as civilian advisors to ministers, or just remained on the ministry’s 
payroll. The ministries also failed to initiate disciplinary or criminal proceed-
ings against those police officers who were denied certification. The UNMIBH 
certification process reveals the tremendous complexity of a personnel reform 
process in a transitional situation without clear regime change.
Legal challenges. Procedurally, UNMIBH applied a questionable minimalist 
approach, which it justified by operational constraints. The UNMIBH certi-
fication process did not provide for the possibility of review by an indepen-
dent and impartial “tribunal”48 or a fair and oral hearing, which are generally 
required in administrative proceedings.49 The UNMIBH review mechanism 
was not public, submissions had to be made in writing, the review panel was 
not independent, and it only had powers to make recommendations. The final 
decision rested with the UNMIBH police commissioner, who had already 
taken the decision in the first instance. Also, a “balance of probabilities” stan-
dard, rather than the “grounds of suspicion” standard used by UNMIBH, is 
generally accepted as the appropriate standard of proof in administrative 
proceedings.50
 The UNMIBH certification process was regulated in internal UNMIBH pol-
icies issued by the UNMIBH police commissioner and communicated to the 
ministers of interior. The domestic authorities did not amend domestic laws 
to ensure their consistency with the UNMIBH guidelines, and UNMIBH and 
OHR failed to pursue their incorporation into domestic laws. The uncertain 
status of the UNMIBH policies led to considerable confusion when a number 
of former police officers challenged their noncertification in domestic courts 
following the departure of UNMIBH.51
Handover and legacy. Leading up to the closure of UNMIBH in December 2002, 
there was significant pressure to complete the certification process, in accor-
dance with the UNMIBH Mandate Implementation Plan.52 At the same time, 
the UN was already drawing down its personnel and resources. The European 
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Union Police Mission, which took over from UNMIBH on January 1, 2003, 
regarded its role as purely advisory and considered the certification process 
to be completed with the departure of UNMIBH.53 The local police registry 
set up by UNMIBH was disbanded, sealed, and shipped away for storage in the 
UN archives near New York City.
 Complaints by noncertified police officers and challenges before domestic 
courts and the Human Rights Chamber, an internationally-led human rights 
court in Sarajevo, continued and intensified after the departure of UNMIBH. 
Some noncertified officers alleged that they were never notified in person by 
UNMIBH about the decision denying them certification and, therefore, were 
denied any appeal against those decisions. Others stated that their appeal 
filed against the UNMIBH decision remained unanswered. Some submitted 
evidence that called into question the facts upon which the UNMIBH deci-
sions were based. As of March 2004, more than one hundred fifty noncerti-
fied police officers had asked domestic courts to review the legality of their 
dismissals. Some courts were of the opinion that they had no jurisdiction 
over UNMIBH decisions that provided the basis for ministry dismissals. Other 
courts issued judgments declaring such dismissals unlawful and reinstating 
police officers that were not certified by UNMIBH.54
 Whatever the merits of the allegations made by noncertified police officers, 
the abrupt termination of UNMIBH, the failure to incorporate the certifica-
tion regulations into domestic legislation, the removal of all files related to the 
certification process, and the failure to put in place a follow-up mechanism 
that could address challenges to the UNMIBH certification process under-
mined the credibility of the entire process and endangered its outcomes.55 
In a presidential statement of June 25, 2004, the UN Security Council called 
upon Bosnia and Herzegovina “to ensure, including through the adoption or 
amendment of domestic legislation, that all IPTF certification decisions are 
fully and effectively implemented and that the employment of persons who 
were denied certification by the IPTF be terminated, and that such persons 
will be precluded from employment, either now or in the future, in any posi-
tion within any law enforcement agency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”56 This 
statement did not put to rest the controversies over the UNMIBH certification 
process and demands continued that a mechanism be established to review 
contested certification decisions.57
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vetting judges and prosecutors
ThE PRE-VETTINg SITUATION
The challenges to building an effective and fair judicial system after Dayton 
were daunting. The country was divided into several territorial jurisdictions, 
which were frequently run as if they belonged to different sovereign states; the 
legal system comprised a multitude of overlapping and inconsistent laws; the 
judicial infrastructure had been severely damaged; and a number of unquali-
fied individuals had been appointed to judicial positions, while other quali-
fied legal professionals had left the country or compromised themselves as a 
result of their involvement in the conflict.
 The post-Dayton judicial system continued to serve conflict-era agendas.58 
Rendering justice in the courts all too often depended on an individual’s 
national identity — or that of the judge or prosecutor before whom she or he 
appeared. Property rights were not protected, attacks on returnees not inves-
tigated, corrupt politicians not effectively prosecuted, and war criminals not 
indicted. As with the police, nationalist politicians and organized criminals 
continued to exercise undue influence on judges and prosecutors. National-
ist parties ensured the appointment of their own judges and prosecutors, and 
nationalist politicians blatantly interfered in judicial proceedings by giving 
instructions to judges, bribing them, or threatening them.59
ThE hIgh JUdICIAl ANd PROSECUTORIAl COUNCIlS
conTexT and legal basIs
Although police reform was slow in coming during the first years after the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, judicial reform hardly took place at all. The parties 
to the agreement did not make any serious efforts to reform the courts and 
prosecutors’ offices, and the vagueness in the agreement on the role and func-
tion of international intervention in the judicial sector led to piecemeal and 
competing international reform efforts with pitiful results. The international 
community stood by as the “misrule of law” continued for several years.60
 From 1998 onwards, rule of law reform began to feature more promi-
nently on the international agenda.61 Initial efforts to comprehensively review 
serving judges and prosecutors and remove those unsuitable for service were, 
however, unsuccessful.62 In response, the Independent Judicial Commission 
(IJC), established in early 2001 as the lead international agency for judicial 
reform, developed a reinvigorated strategy for judicial reform, proposing to 
replace the ongoing review process with a reappointment of all judges and 
mAyER-RIECkh
196
prosecutors.63 The IJC recognized that the number of courts, judges, and 
prosecutors in Bosnia and Herzegovina was far higher than general practice 
in Western European democracies. As a result, the judicial system was costly 
and inefficient. Moreover, ethnic representation in the judiciary did not reflect 
the ethnic composition of the population it was called to serve. The IJC, there-
fore, proposed to establish a reappointment process not only to ensure the 
suitability of judges and prosecutors, but also as a tool to restructure the court 
system, reducing its size and ensuring proportionate ethnic representation.64 
The reappointment process would involve an open competition for all judi-
cial and prosecutorial posts and would be implemented by an independent 
high council to effectively obviate political interference.
 A number of experts, in particular from the Council of Europe, initially 
expressed strong reservations about a general reappointment process. The 
principal concern related to the proposed open competition for judicial posi-
tions and the possible removal from office, six years after the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement, of judges already enjoying life tenure, even though 
no individual misconduct had been established. Such measures would violate 
the independence of the judiciary, in particular the principle of irremovability, 
which is contained in the entity constitutions and in legislation imposed by 
the high representative himself, and would set a negative precedent of politi-
cal interference in the judicial sector.65
 In response, other analysts stated it was “precisely because the judiciary 
. . . [was] not independent that the professional review process was created in 
order to clear the ground for real independence to take root.”66 Moreover, the 
reappointment process was not only necessary but also the most equitable 
process to implement the required restructuring of the court system, in par-
ticular the reduction of courts and judicial personnel, as well to improve eth-
nic representation.67 The experts critical of the reappointment process later 
softened their opposition, in particular following the decision to create the 
Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor to investigate complaints against judges 
and prosecutors, which would ensure the application of minimum due pro-
cess standards for sitting judges and prosecutors.68
mandaTe and sTrUcTUre of The coUncIls
To alleviate some concerns of the decentralized local power structures, the 
high representative established three councils, one at the state level and two 
at the entity level: the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the State Council); the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council 
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of the Federation of BiH (the Federation Council); and the High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council of the Republika Srpska (the RS Council).69 The coun-
cils became operational on September 2, 2002.
 The councils were independent bodies regulating important affairs of 
the judiciary, in particular the selection, appointment, transfer, discipline, 
and removal of judges and prosecutors; the supervision of their professional 
training; and the preparation of budget proposals for all courts and prosecu-
tors’ offices.70 During a transitional period, which ended on May 31, 2004, 
the councils were given the additional tasks of restructuring the courts and 
prosecutors’ offices, including the reappointment of almost all judges and 
prosecutors.71 
 During this transitional period, the three councils together had a total of 
seventeen national members, including six from the Federation, six from the 
RS, and five from the state level, as well as eight international members, two of 
whom served as the president and the vice president. The national members 
of the councils were judges and prosecutors from all levels of the judicial and 
prosecutorial systems, as well as attorneys. During the transitional period, the 
high representative had the power to appoint all council members. Each entity 
council comprised the six members from its entity, two from the other entity, 
and the eight international members. The State Council included all members 
of the entity councils, together with the five state-level members.72 The IJC, 
which had some one hundred and twenty staff, served as the secretariat of the 
councils during the transitional period, while they restructured the judicial 
and prosecutorial systems and implemented the reappointment process.73 
The remainder of this section describes these two transitional processes.
The resTrUcTUrIng of The coUrTs  
and prosecUTors’ offIces
The restructuring of the courts was based on a comprehensive assessment, 
which applied three principal criteria: caseload of the judges, population 
served by the court, and distance from the next larger court.74 As a result, 
more than 30% of all first instance courts were closed.
 The number of judges and prosecutors needed was calculated on the basis 
of the inflow of cases. As a result, the councils reduced the number of judges 
by almost 30%. Once the number of courts and prosecutor’s offices, as well as 
the number of judges and prosecutors for each court and prosecutor’s office, 
was determined, the councils were in a position to initiate the reappointment 
process.
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TABlE 2 
Summary of changes to court system, first Instance Courts
ENTITy PREVIOUS PROPOSEd ChANgE
Republika Srpska 25 21 -16%
Federation of BiH 53 31 -42%
Total 78 52 -33%
SOURCE: Independent Judicial Commission, “Restructuring of the Court Systems: Report 
and Proposal,” October 21, 2002, Annex A.
TABlE 3 
Number of judge and prosecutor positions as determined by the hJPC
JUdgES PREVIOUS NEw ChANgE
RS District Court judges 56 61 +9%
RS Basic Court judges 227 144 -37%
Fed. Cantonal Court judges 158 120 -24%
Fed. Municipal Court judges 439 304 -31%
Total 880 629 -29%
PROSECUTORS PREVIOUS NEw ChANgE
RS District prosecutors 70 73 +4%
Fed. Cantonal prosecutors 177 172 -3%
Total 247 245 -1%
SOURCE: HJPC, “Periodic Report No. 2,” April 10, 2003, 7.
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The reappoInTmenT process
The reappointment process consisted in an announcement declaring judicial 
and prosecutorial posts as vacant and a procedure to fill these posts on the 
basis of merit. All qualified professionals were eligible to apply in an open 
competition, including external candidates.75 Sitting judges and prosecutors 
also had to (re-)apply for their own or another position. In order to pave the 
way for the reappointment process, the entity constitutions had to be modi-
fied by decision of the high representative removing the guarantee of life ten-
ure for judges (and prosecutors in the RS).76
 The reappointment process was carried out in several phases with a lim-
ited number of courts and prosecutors’ offices included in each phase. The 
councils issued public vacancy announcements for the relevant openings and 
applicants were required to complete a comprehensive application package 
and provide a writing sample and copies of relevant certificates and diplo-
mas.77 Some two thousand persons applied for a total of 953 posts. Most 
applicants applied for more than one post resulting in around five thousand 
applications.
 More than 4,800 complaints were received from the public against judges 
and prosecutors. Most complaints were filed by litigants who were dissatis-
fied with a court decision, but did not include any allegations of wrongdo-
ing. Such complaints were generally not investigated further. As of May 31, 
2004, the Office of the Disciplinary Prosecutor completed the review of 4,514 
complaints. Of these, the disciplinary prosecutor deemed 750 founded and 
included them in the application packages that were forwarded to the coun-
cils’ nomination panels.78
 As the secretariat of the councils, the IJC verified that the incoming appli-
cations complied with the fundamental requirements, including an examina-
tion of compliance with property laws, political affiliations, and of personal 
assets. Applicants were also required to submit information on service in a 
military or paramilitary organization, government positions held, and legal 
activities during the conflict years. The IJC distributed the names of applicants 
to various international organizations for comment, investigated complaints, 
and assessed the information available on each applicant. Conflict-related 
information was, however, of limited use during the reappointment process. 
The number of conflict-related complaints from the public against judges and 
prosecutors was small and most conflict-related information was sketchy. The 
huge amount of overall information that needed to be processed did not allow 
for extensive independent investigations of conflict-related information. As a 
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result, while the councils at times did not appoint a candidate on the basis 
of incriminating conflict-related information, there was no comprehensive 
background review of conflict-related activities for all applicants. Whether 
this led to the appointment of unsuitable judges or prosecutors was not pos-
sible to ascertain at the time of research.79
 The verification process performed by the IJC was a time-consuming exer-
cise. Each application averaged fifty-five pages of material without counting 
verification documentation and investigation reports.80 After completing the 
verification of an application, the IJC submitted a standard documentation 
package to one of the councils’ nomination panels, which decided whom to 
call for interviews.81
 The nomination panel interviewed the applicants for a vacant post to 
assess whether they met the required qualifications and ranked in order of 
preference all nominated candidates. Applicants had the right to review and 
comment upon their application dossiers. After receiving the recommenda-
tions of the nomination panel, the council decided on the appointment for 
a vacant post and publicly announced its decision.82 Although appointment 
decisions were based on individual merit, the councils strove to ensure pro-
portionate ethnic and gender representation, in accordance with relevant con-
stitutional and legal requirements.83 Ethnic representation was determined in 
accordance with the last pre-conflict census in 1991.
 Sitting judges and prosecutors who were not reappointed could file a 
written request for reconsideration within fifteen days of publication of the 
appointment decision. The grounds for reconsideration were, however, very 
limited under the law. A request for reconsideration could only be filed if 
material facts that were favorable to the applicant were not considered, pro-
vided the information had been submitted with the application; or if the 
applicant had exercised her or his right to review the application material and 
the council took an adverse decision on the basis of information not made 
available to the applicant.84 Sitting judges and prosecutors who were not reap-
pointed generally filed requests for reconsideration. All requests were, how-
ever, rejected by the councils because they did not meet the limited grounds 
for reconsideration.85
 The mandate of a sitting judge or prosecutor who was not reappointed 
for office was terminated. Nonreappointment did not, however, prohibit the 
individual from later appointment to a judicial or prosecutorial post. A not-
reappointed judge or prosecutor received her or his salary including benefits 
for a period of six months after termination of mandate.86
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OUTCOmES, PERCEPTIONS, ANd ChAllENgES
oUTcomes
Of the total of 953 judicial and prosecutorial posts, the councils were able to 
fill 878 by May 31, 2004. The remaining 75 posts (8%) were not filled during 
the transitional period due to a lack of qualified minority candidates and were 
readvertised.87 About 30% of the incumbents who applied for their positions 
were not reappointed (other incumbents did not apply, either because they 
retired or because they did not want to undergo the reappointment process). 
Approximately 18% of those appointed by the councils were applicants at 
large rather than incumbent judges and prosecutors.88 Although the coun-
cils were not always able to strictly apply the 1991 census breakdown for each 
court and prosecutor’s office, the ethnic composition of the system signifi-
cantly improved as a result of the reappointment process and is expected to 
generally reflect the census when the remaining positions are filled.
TABlE 4 
Ethnic composition before and after reappointment
REPUBlIkA SRPSkA BOSNIAkS SERBS CROATS OThERS
1991 census 28.3% 55.9% 8.9% 6.9%
Before reappointment 2.3% 91.2% 3.7% 2.8%
After reappointment 22.8% 65.6% 8.1% 3.5%
fEdERATION Of BIh BOSNIAkS SERBS CROATS OThERS
1991 census 52.2% 22.1% 17.5% 8.2%
Before reappointment 64.8% 9.6% 23.1% 2.5%
After reappointment 56.5% 19.1% 21.9% 2.5%
SOURCE: HJPC, “Final Report,” 11
 It is too early to assess if the reappointment process has actually led to 
an improvement in the administration of justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
However, whatever the concrete impact on the functioning of the judicial sys-
tem, the restructuring of the courts and the implementation of the reappoint-
ment process established conditions that are generally considered necessary 
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for an independent and professional judiciary and constitute “a key. . . require-
ment for BiH’s integration into Europe and Euroatlantic structures.”89
pUblIc percepTIons
Public opinion polls in Bosnia and Herzegovina before the implementation 
of the reappointment process showed that confidence in the judiciary was 
between 41% and 68.4%.90 Although confidence in the judiciary was higher 
than in other official bodies it was lower than in the police, and both domestic 
and international observers felt that necessary efforts to reform the judiciary 
either had not taken place or were insufficient or fundamentally flawed.91 
Restoring confidence in the judiciary and its ability to enforce the rule of law 
was, therefore, one of the principal reasons to put in place an effective reap-
pointment process.92 A majority of the public supported the reform of the 
judiciary and thought it would yield positive results.93 During the reform 
period, the level of confidence in the judiciary increased to between 60.2% 
and 74.0%.94 It was, however, too early to assess conclusively any changes in 
public perceptions as the reappointment process had just been completed at 
the time of research.
 Senior domestic judges interviewed for this study generally supported the 
reappointment process but criticized the “international domination” of the 
councils.95 Judges who were not reappointed alleged that suitable judges and 
prosecutors had been passed over, and that the reappointment process did 
not respect their constitutionally guaranteed national rights, in particular the 
independence of the judiciary.
challenges and lImITaTIons
Political interference. Once reappointments began to gain pace, nationalist 
political parties and lobbies began to vehemently oppose the process alleging 
that it violated their constitutionally guaranteed national interests and that the 
councils were biased in their decisions. Some even requested that the councils 
be abolished and that the political parties be given the right to appoint judges 
and prosecutors.96
 These attacks on the councils pointed to a broader pattern of resistance 
by nationalist parties and their constituencies against restoring a multiethnic 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, they revealed that vetting and broader 
personnel reform processes in the public sector not only affect those indi-
viduals selected for or excluded from office but also have general institutional 
implications, which have an impact on existing power relations and, there-
fore, often evoke political reactions. These reactions can involve attempts 
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to manipulate the personnel reform process itself. Decisions on the number 
and type of personnel of public institutions, as well as on the processes of 
appointing and excluding them, significantly affect the level of influence that 
the constituent groups of a society have on their political system.
Restructuring with a limited number of applicants. The scope of opportunities to 
replace public employees and to restructure the system through a reappoint-
ment process is limited by the pool of applicants. Unlike the reappointment 
process in the former East Germany, for example, where a large pool of West 
German jurists not affected by the exercise was available to replace the judges 
who were not reappointed, the pool of potential applicants for judicial and 
prosecutorial appointments in Bosnia and Herzegovina was small. The coun-
try suffered a serious brain drain during and after the conflict, and appeals 
to jurists to return were of limited success. As a result, no more than some 
two thousand applicants, including sitting judges and prosecutors, applied for 
around one thousand posts — about two applicants per post. Therefore, the 
restructuring of the judicial and prosecutorial systems was difficult to imple-
ment. Restoring the multiethnic balance destroyed by the conflict was one of 
the principal reasons to put in place the reappointment process. However, 
throughout the entire process, there was an insufficient number of qualified 
minority applicants due to the small pool of potential applicants and resis-
tance to return, which caused delays in the appointments, a high percentage 
of reappointments of incumbents, and seventy-five unfilled posts at the end 
of the transitional period.
vetting and transitional justice
At the time of writing, the main nationalist groups that were responsible for 
the conflict continued to hold political power in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
not only undermined efforts to strengthen the rule of law but also continued 
to resist attempts to face the past. Bosnia and Herzegovina remained trapped 
in the nationalist antagonisms of the conflict and the pursuit of transitional 
justice was largely driven by international actors. 
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The 
Hague was established in 1993, but nationalist groups in Bosnia and Herze-
govina remained adamantly opposed to the tribunal, and several important 
people who had been indicted remained at large ten years after the signing 
of the peace agreement. Domestic war crimes trials had generally not taken 
place. The Bosnian State Court was established in 2002 and a war crimes 
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chamber in the court began to function in 2005 in view of plans to close 
down the International Criminal Tribunal. Again, these efforts were initiated 
by international actors against the resistance of nationalist domestic leaders. 
 Efforts to establish truth-seeking mechanisms have generally failed, and 
a truth commission did not get off the ground during the ten-year period 
following the signing of the Dayton Agreement. In late 2003, however, the 
Republika Srpska national assembly, acting under great pressure from the 
high representative, established the Srebrenica Commission. The commission 
was formed following a decision by the Human Rights Chamber, an interna-
tionally-led human rights court in Sarajevo, in which it ordered the RS to dis-
close the full truth regarding the Srebrenica massacres. Initially, RS authorities 
obstructed the work of the commission, which led to the removal of several 
high-level RS officials by the high representative in April 2004. The coopera-
tion of RS officials improved over the following months. The final report of 
the commission of October 2004 represented the first public acknowledge-
ment by Republika Srpska authorities of the 1995 massacre of more than 
seven thousand Bosniaks at Srebrenica.
 A comprehensive reparations program had not been established by 2005. 
The Dayton Peace Agreement provided, however, for the right of all displaced 
persons to have their property restored to them or to be compensated, and 
established an internationally led commission to process property claims. A 
high rate of property was restituted to returnees as a result of persistent inter-
national pressure.
 In many respects, the two personnel reform processes constituted the 
most comprehensive transitional justice measures implemented so far. As we 
have seen, both the UNMIBH certification process and the HJPC reappoint-
ment process required the exclusion of war criminals from the police, the 
courts, and prosecutor’s offices. Some have suggested that those exclusions 
constituted “nonprosecutorial sanctions,” which were particularly impor-
tant in the post-Dayton context due to the limitations of international and 
domestic judicial processes.97 Both the certification and the reappointment 
processes were, however, primarily aimed at reforming institutions. The 
continued presence of war criminals in the police, the courts, and prosecu-
tors’ offices was perceived as a significant obstacle to implementing the peace 
agreement and building the rule of law.98 Through their positions in those 
institutions, war criminals continued to hold political and economic power 
and to pursue conflict-era objectives, in particular to prevent the return of 
minorities. The removal of war criminals was considered an important condi-
tion to reestablish trust in the police, the courts, and prosecutor’s offices, and 
205
BOSNIA ANd hERZEgOVINA
to disable informal criminal networks that existed in these institutions. These 
processes, therefore, constitute transitional justice measures primarily in the 
sense that they aim to prevent future abuses, rather than to establish account-
ability for past abuses.99 Indirectly, these personnel reform processes should 
also assist in establishing accountability, as reformed rule of law institutions 
might pave the way for domestic efforts to prosecute war criminals.
some systematic reflections
A comparison of the certification process implemented by the UN Mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the reappointment process carried out by 
the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils reveals a number of interesting 
similarities and differences. Four significant issues arise in comparing the two 
personnel reform processes and appear relevant to a better understanding of 
the concept and praxis of vetting in general: the relationship between vetting 
and institutional reform; review and reappointment, two distinct approaches 
to vetting; the role of international organizations; and the issue of resource 
requirements.
VETTINg ANd INSTITUTIONAl REfORm
The principal rationale for both the UNMIBH certification process and the 
HJPC reappointment process was comprehensive personnel reform in order 
to build fair and efficient institutions. Both processes aimed not only at ensur-
ing the required integrity of individual law enforcement agents, judges, and 
prosecutors, but also pursued broad personnel and institutional reform 
goals. By means of the certification process, UNMIBH reduced the number of 
police officers; set the maximum personnel strength of each law enforcement 
agency; terminated paralegal police activities; raised the number of minority 
officers in the police; and improved its gender composition. The HJPC reap-
pointment process was part of a comprehensive restructuring of the judicial 
and prosecutorial systems, in particular a reduction of the number of courts 
and prosecutors’ offices. By means of the reappointment process itself, the 
councils defined the number of judges and prosecutors and determined their 
ethnic and gender composition in each court and prosecutor’s office.
 Vetting processes set the integrity criteria for employment and assess suit-
ability for employment. Criteria for employment define access to and exclu-
sion from public positions. Defining and applying those criteria, then, not 
only affect the employment situation of individuals but also the future shape 
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and personnel structure of the public institution in question. An institutional 
dimension is inherent to any vetting process.
 The institutional dimension of a personnel reform program can vary 
greatly. On one end of the spectrum, a vetting exercise could be carried out as 
a stand-alone measure aiming at excluding abusers while leaving the mandate, 
size, and organizational structure unchanged. On the other end of the spec-
trum, a vetting process may be part of broad institutional reform measures 
involving changes to the mandate and organizational structure of the institu-
tion. Even the mere exclusion of abusers may, however, have significant insti-
tutional implications. For example, if a vetting process results in the removal 
of abusers who cannot be replaced by qualified individuals, the functioning of 
the institution may be affected negatively. In designing a vetting process, its 
likely institutional impact should, therefore, be taken into consideration from 
the outset. 
 More often than not, countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian 
rule need to engage in a comprehensive reform program including personnel 
reform in order to build fair and effective public institutions and prevent the 
recurrence of abuses.100 The multifaceted shortcomings of a public institu-
tion’s personnel often represent an important cause of past abuses. The per-
sonnel may, for example, lack qualifications and skills, include human rights 
abusers, fail to represent the population it is called to serve, or have an inad-
equate organizational structure. An effective personnel reform program in 
transitional contexts will identify the various shortcomings of public employ-
ees, define a suitable organizational structure, and ensure the selection of 
competent and representative personnel of integrity.
 A vetting process that takes place in the context of comprehensive per-
sonnel reform will involve a wide-ranging assessment of the suitability for 
employment. General criteria for employment in a public institution fall into 
several broad categories, in particular aptitude, competence, integrity, and 
representativeness. By aptitude, I refer to basic qualities such as minimum 
and maximum age, citizenship, and physical and mental fitness. Competence 
relates to an employee’s qualifications such as general education, profes-
sional training, and professional experience. Integrity refers to an employee’s 
adherence to international standards of human rights and professional con-
duct, including a person’s financial propriety. Representativeness relates to 
proportionate gender, ethnic, geographic, and religious composition of an 
institution’s personnel. Depending on the specific circumstances of a transi-
tional situation, the shortcomings of the personnel of a public institution will 
vary greatly and concentrate in different areas. In post-Dayton Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, for example, most police officers had relatively high levels of 
competence, whereas many officers had significant integrity deficits, female 
officers were underrepresented, and the police services were dominated by 
the respective ethnic majority. The personnel reform process, therefore, had 
to focus on removing those with an inadequate human rights record and 
improving the representation of women and minorities in the police, while at 
same time maintaining, and improving where necessary, the competence of 
police officers.
 The Bosnia and Herzegovina example also reveals that the different aims of 
a personnel reform exercise may compete with each other and that the design 
of such processes may imply difficult trade-offs and compromises between 
those aims. In general, however, the legitimacy of a personnel reform pro-
cess will depend on attaining certain minimum standards in each of the four 
categories. A public institution with competent but mono-ethnic personnel, 
for example, is unlikely to be trusted by other ethnic groups and might not 
understand the language and concerns of those groups. The personnel of 
another institution might have high levels of integrity but lack competence. 
Despite best intentions, these personnel will not be able to fulfill the man-
date of their institution. What those minimum standards are concretely will 
depend on the specific circumstances of the transition. In terms of integrity, 
there is, however, a broadly held view that individuals who committed serious 
human rights or humanitarian law crimes should always be removed from 
public office.101
 If public institutions undergo other reforms that imply changes to their 
personnel structures, those institutional reform measures will have an impact 
on the personnel reform process. Before a personnel reform process can be 
designed under such circumstances, the mandate, organizational structure, 
and composition of the institutions in question have to be determined. Some 
institutions might have to be merged, others reduced in size or abolished, 
and others again reshaped or reoriented. The reforms of the judicial and law 
enforcement sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina are cases in point. Person-
nel reform including vetting, then, presupposes decisions on the number and 
kind of posts, the gender and ethnic composition, and the ratio of senior staff 
to middle management to regular staff. Failing to make those decisions might, 
for example, result in vetting individuals for posts that are discontinued or for 
which they only partially qualify.
 In transitional contexts, personnel reform might also have to be accom-
panied by other institutional reform measures to effectively improve the per-
formance of a public institution. Representative personnel with high levels 
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of competence and integrity will not be able to function professionally and 
effectively if they are not supported by adequate institutional frameworks, 
procedures, and resources. Other institutional reform measures may include, 
for example, the creation of civilian oversight mechanisms and civil com-
plaint procedures; the reform or establishment of legal frameworks and inter-
nal procedures; the development or revision of a professional code of ethics; 
changing symbols that are associated with abusive practices; and the provi-
sion of adequate salaries, equipment, and infrastructure.
 The precise content and scope of those measures will depend on the cir-
cumstances of each particular transitional situation. Institutional reform of 
the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina included the creation of police com-
missioner posts in each police service to deter inappropriate political inter-
ference; the development of new and uniform arrest and police custody pro-
cedures that adhere to international standards; the removal of intelligence 
agencies from police premises; the introduction of new and inoffensive 
insignia, symbols, and uniforms; the establishment of a separate state bor-
der service; and the provision of vehicles, side arms, communication equip-
ment, and other resources. Institutional reform measures in the judicial sec-
tor of Bosnia and Herzegovina included the development of new procedural 
codes; the establishment of professional disciplinary bodies; the redesign of 
the budgetary process and increased funding; the renovation of premises; 
and the merger and restructuring of courts and prosecutors’ offices. Person-
nel reform processes often have to be accompanied by a broad range of other 
measures to ensure that transitional reform of public institutions is effective 
and sustainable.
REVIEw VERSUS REAPPOINTmENT
The UNMIBH certification process was a review process. Serving police offi-
cers were screened to determine their suitability for continued service. If 
UNMIBH determined, on the basis of defined criteria, that an officer was not 
fit for service, she or he would not be certified and had to be dismissed. Oth-
erwise, the police officer would be certified and remain employed with the 
respective agency.
 The HJPC reappointment process reversed the fundamental dynamics of 
a review mechanism. In the context of the reappointment process, the courts 
and prosecutors’ offices were reconstituted, and there was a general competi-
tion for all posts of judges and prosecutors that was open to external candi-
dates. A serving judge or prosecutor also had to apply if she or he wanted to 
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continue to work in the profession. If the serving judge or prosecutor was not 
appointed to a post, she or he would cease to hold office. Although the goal 
of the UNMIBH certification process was to remove those who were deemed 
unfit for service, the aim of the HJPC reappointment process was to select for 
office the most qualified candidates.
 In a review process, fundamental due process requirements apply. In par-
ticular, serving employees who are being reviewed should be granted a fair 
hearing. Applicants in a reappointment process, on the other hand, do not 
enjoy the same due process protections, as there is no right to be appointed 
to public office. Applicants have, however, a right to equal access to public 
service. A reappointment process should, therefore, be based on criteria of 
equality, and the selection process should ensure non-discriminatory proce-
dures. In a review process, the burden of proof falls on the reviewing body to 
establish that an official is unfit to hold office. A reappointment process shifts 
the burden of proof to the applicant, who has to establish that she or he is the 
most suitable for the vacant post. These procedural simplifications streamline 
the process significantly.
 Under ordinary circumstances, such procedural reversals would likely 
violate fundamental due process rights of the serving employees who are 
not reappointed. Moreover, the termination of judges with life tenure raises 
concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary. However, in a country 
emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, a reappointment process facili-
tates the selection of the most suitable employees, rather than just weeding 
out those who are clearly unacceptable to hold public office. A reappoint-
ment process also provides a better opportunity to undo structural injustices 
and implement necessary institutional reforms, such as modifying the ethnic 
or gender composition of a public institution, and facilitates the reduction or 
reassignment of personnel in the context of a consolidation or disbandment 
of public institutions.
 In states based on the rule of law, constitutional safeguards are in place, 
in particular the separation of governmental powers, to protect the rule of 
law and prevent political interference between public institutions, including 
arbitrary replacements and restructuring.102 The independence of the judi-
ciary provides special safeguards for judges, in particular the principle of irre-
movability. Legal provisions generally protect the operational independence 
of the police. A reappointment process could seriously undermine the rule of 
law and represents a serious risk of arbitrary interference in the workings of 
otherwise independently operating sectors. Therefore, the institution of reap-
pointment processes should be limited to exceptional circumstances when 
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the public institution in question is fundamentally dysfunctional and when 
an overall improvement of the rule of law is unlikely to be accomplished 
without it; it should be implemented by an independent body that follows 
clearly defined, transparent, and fair procedures; and it should be carried out 
as quickly and as early as possible in the transition to overcome protracted 
periods of legal uncertainty. The HJPC reappointment process was rightly 
criticized for the fact that it only started in 2002, seven years after the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement.
ThE ROlE Of INTERNATIONAl ORgANIZATIONS
In general, vetting processes under domestic leadership will be the prefer-
able option to internationalized processes because they prevent resentments 
against external imposition, provide a better basis for local buy-in and sus-
tainability of the process, and ensure the application of local know-how. Vet-
ting processes are, however, often contested in the fragile political environ-
ment of a country emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, as they affect 
access to and exclusion from governmental power structures. This is true in 
particular when representatives of a former abusive government continue to 
wield formal or informal authority during the transitional period and stand 
to lose power and influence through the vetting process. Considerable inter-
national pressure might be required to implement an effective and fair vetting 
process under such circumstances.
 Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is a case in point. The war ended at 
Dayton with a coerced compromise. The implementation of the peace could 
not be left to those who were responsible for the conflict and saw the post-
Dayton situation as an opportunity to continue the conflict through other 
means. Significant international leverage would be necessary for a prolonged 
period to create conditions for a self-sustaining peace. 
 The strategy of international intervention in post-Dayton Bosnia and Her-
zegovina is a controversial topic.103 Although there is general agreement that 
the early cautious and wavering style of international civilian involvement 
played into the hands of those extreme nationalists who opposed the sign-
ing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in the beginning, there is much debate 
over the productivity and sustainability of the later heavily interventionist 
approach. At the time of the UNMIBH certification and HJPC reappointment 
processes, international actors had firmly imposed themselves on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the international regime had turned into a quasi protector-
ate. Whatever the merits and shortcomings of the interventionist approach, it 
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provided the high representative and the United Nations with the powers to 
impose vetting processes on domestic institutions.
 International involvement in a vetting process requires an invitation from 
domestic authorities or, in the case of domestic opposition and resistance, an 
international mandate that provides international actors with the authority 
and means to intervene directly in domestic affairs and overrule domestic 
procedures if necessary. Depending on the circumstances and the mandate, 
international actors could advise domestic authorities in designing a vetting 
process; assist in its implementation through training, advising, monitoring, 
and the provision of resources; or take the lead role and establish an interna-
tionalized vetting process.
 When an internationalized process is established, every effort should be 
made to involve domestic actors as broadly as possible, to ensure its integra-
tion into domestic law, and to put in place provisions guaranteeing a seam-
less changeover from the extraordinary transitional vetting process to regular 
domestic selection and recruitment procedures. In this regard, the shortcom-
ings of the UNMIBH certification process were significant. The certification 
process relied exclusively on international resources and actors, who applied 
internal guidelines that were not integrated into domestic law. There was no 
domestic involvement in the UNMIBH certification process except when it 
came to executing decertification decisions: the relevant minister of interior 
was informed in writing that UNMIBH was decertifying a certain police offi-
cer and that the minister had to dismiss the officer.
 When UNMIBH came to an end in 2002, the certification process was con-
cluded with some haste and the follow-on European Union police mission 
shied away from any further involvement. The UNMIBH local police registry 
with personnel files of around twenty-four thousand currently or previously 
employed local police officers and other Ministry of Interior personnel was 
shipped off for storage in the UN archives near New York City, rather than 
being turned into a national police personnel registry. No mechanism was put 
in place either to review contested decisions following UNMIBH’s departure 
or to ensure that those who were not certified would not be rehired. The fail-
ure to build a sustainable domestic follow-on mechanism and to ensure trans-
fer of skill and knowledge to it resulted in legal uncertainty, real confusion 
over the status of noncertified officers, and serious challenges to the entire 
certification process.
 Although it was too early at the time of writing to assess the legacy of the 
HJPC, the reappointment process was better integrated into the domestic sys-
tem, ensuring a smooth transfer to a domestic follow-on mechanism. The 
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reappointment of judges and prosecutors was carried out by mixed domes-
tic-international councils on the basis of legal statutes that were published 
in the official gazette. Following the conclusion of the reappointment pro-
cess, the three councils were merged into one that was entirely nationalized 
and functioned as a permanent domestic judicial commission. International 
staff stayed on in advisory and support functions. The HJPC remained the 
final independent authority on personnel matters, and continued to oversee 
appointments and disciplinary cases of judges and prosecutors. This institu-
tional stability guaranteed the transfer of procedures, information systems, 
and databases, and ensured continuity of know-how and experience.
RESOURCE REqUIREmENTS Of VETTINg PROCESSES
Early efforts to vet the police and the judiciary collapsed, inter alia, due to a 
lack of qualified staff, inadequate resources, and insufficient time. Both the 
UNMIBH certification process and the HJPC reappointment process were 
hugely resource-intensive. UNMIBH had more than thirty international and 
more than twenty national staff members working for a period of three years 
to implement the registration, provisional authorization, and certification of 
around twenty-four thousand law enforcement personnel, and legal, project-
management, police, and local expertise fed into the exercise. Still, the com-
pletion of the process was rushed and marred with problems. The UNMIBH 
resources were, however, dwarfed by the resources available to the HJPC and 
the IJC, which had more than 140 staff members to restructure the judiciary 
and reappoint some one thousand judges and prosecutors. Its sixteen-month 
mandate had to be extended for another five months to complete the reap-
pointment process, which turned out to be much more complex and time 
consuming than anticipated, in particular the process of verifying applica-
tions by the IJC.104
 Both review and reappointment processes are immensely time- and 
resource-consuming exercises, in particular when they involve background 
investigations and the assessment of past conduct. The success or failure of 
such processes significantly depends on a thorough evaluation of operational 
requirements and the provision of adequate time and resources.
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chapter 6
The Politics of the lustration law in Poland,  
1989–2006
Adam Czarnota
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introduction
The Polish lustration law is a brief text, and is not particularly unusual in com-
parison to lustration legislation in other former communist states. It is, in fact, 
rather dull and boring. The law was the outcome of a legislative compromise. 
It is not radical in terms of penalties, but it is broad in terms of the groups 
required to undergo the lustration procedure. It penalizes specifically only the 
telling of a “lustration lie,” rather than membership in or collaboration with 
communist secret services. The most interesting, if not fascinating, part of the 
law is its political context or, in other words, the politics of the lustration law 
in Poland. A “black letter” analysis of the law alone cannot provide answers to 
questions about why the lustration law was adopted so late, why it is so “soft,” 
to what preliminary outcome its introduction has led, and what obstacles it 
has faced to its full implementation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to access 
all the data necessary to answer these questions because the process remains 
under way. Even describing what direction to look in order to find answers is 
not an easy task and requires the application of different methods — hence the 
hybrid structure and methodology of this chapter. Lustration is a very con-
tested issue; it is nearly impossible to adopt a neutral position toward it. 
 Importantly, in the context of a project such as this one, the discussion 
about “lustration” — which in other places goes by “vetting” — in Poland, as 
in other post-communist countries, focused narrowly on electoral and some 
other highly public offices (in the sense of those institutions’ role in public 
opinion formation) plus the judiciary and advocates, but not on processes 
of personnel renewal in, for example, security sector institutions. This is so 
despite the fact that, as I will show below, some of these institutions in fact 
established rather ambitious personnel screening procedures.1 Screening for 
human rights abuses and other forms of misconduct that took place, on a 
fairly large scale, within some areas of the security sector was not called “lus-
tration” sensu stricto. It was called “verification of personnel” [weryfikacja], 
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and I refer to it later as “vetting.” In public discourse, the term “lustration” was 
used in the restrictive sense explained here, and this will be the real focus of 
this chapter. 
 The Polish lustration law has been in operation for just six years. The lus-
tration law adopted by the Polish Parliament on April 11, 1997 (uniform text 
Dziennik Ustaw, 1999, Nr 42, poz. 428), formally became valid law on August 
3, 1997, but could not be enforced without the creation of a Lustration Court. 
After the amendments of June 18, 1998 (Dziennik Ustaw, Nr 131, poz. 860), 
which entered into effect on November 27, 1998, verification of lustration dec-
larations was made possible. Full enforcement became possible on December 
1, 1998, with the creation of the V Department (Lustration Court) in the War-
saw Appellate Court. A commissioner for the public interest was nominated 
by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Adam Strzembosz, on October 16, 
1998, and formally took office on January 1, 1999.
 In the next section, I describe the sometimes dramatic history of the lus-
tration debate and legislation in the Polish III Republic. I then provide an over-
view of the lustration law itself, and examine the functioning of the law over 
the past six years. In the following two sections, I evaluate the lustration law 
from both a public opinion perspective and in terms of its success in achiev-
ing its stated aims. In the final section I analyze the Polish lustration law from 
the point of view of a post-communist social theory. 
history of lustration in post-1989 poland
INTROdUCTION
The present lustration law is the result of many years of debate regarding lus-
tration, its form, and its substance. This debate was conducted both within 
and outside of Parliament. The question of dealing with the communist past 
in some form, formulated broadly as the “lustration issue,” crystallized during 
the debate around three points:
• lustration proper, which means screening and barring from public 
office former collaborators and members of secret services who com-
mitted “lustration lies”;
• access to secret services files; and
• decommunization, which refers to all political and legal strategies 
aimed at eradicating the legacies of communism in the social and 
political system. Lustration is part of decommunization but is ana-
lytically narrower in scope. In particular, decommunization includes 
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a legal ban of communist parties, the confiscation of the property of 
communist parties, the penalization of the use of communist propa-
ganda, the use of criminal law against former communist officials, and 
so on.2
 These issues, together with other legal strategies, such as restitution of 
property and retributive justice for former communist crimes, constitute the 
legal dimension of the crucial problem euphemistically called “dealing with 
the past.” In the case of the peaceful transition of power in Poland, these issues 
were and are hotly debated. Quite often it is very difficult to separate them, 
even analytically, especially lustration from decommunization. The aim of 
this chapter is to focus on the lustration law alone. It is puzzling that the first 
country to break with the monopoly of Communist Party rule was not the 
first to adopt a lustration law. There is no shortage of explanations, however, 
some of which are explored throughout this chapter. 
 Since 1989 it is possible to distinguish three different phases in Poland’s 
approach to the lustration issue, legislation, and legal implementation. The 
discussion about lustration can be seen as a process of growing awareness of 
the nature of lustration and of differentiating it from other transitional justice 
measures. The first phase, between 1989 and 1992, was characterized by broad 
and chaotic debates about dealing with the past, only part of which con-
cerned lustration. The second phase, between 1993 and 2001, was occupied by 
attempts to clarify the lustration issue and create the legal-institutional frame-
work to deal with it. The main result of this phase was the adoption of the 
lustration statute of April 11, 1997, as a result of compromise between political 
forces in the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish Parliament. The third phase, 
which began in 2001, is a by-product of the change in the configuration of 
political forces that followed the 2001 election, won by the post-communist 
Democratic Left Alliance [Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej] (SLD).3 This phase has 
been characterized primarily by legislative attempts to restrict the scope of 
lustration.
hISTORy Of ThE ISSUE4
The first suggestions that some sort of lustration was necessary came in 1990 
from the Citizen’s Parliamentary Club [Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny] (OKP), 
which included all members of the so-called contract parliament (meaning 
it was not fully freely elected) from the anti-communist opposition. Roman 
Bartoszcze, a Member of Parliament (MP) from OKP, and one of the leaders of 
the independent peasant’s movement, argued the necessity of screening secret 
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police files for reasons of state security and to critically deal with Poland’s 
communist past. Bartoszcze created a political storm within the opposition 
political forces by urging the investigation of the relationship between some 
members of the OKP and the communist secret police, the Security Service 
[Słuz˙ba Bezpieczen´stwa], well known by the abbreviation SB.5 The first post-
communist governments — the political base of which was in the OKP — such 
as Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s and then Krzysztof Bielecki’s, failed to take up Bar-
toszcze’s suggestion. 
 The Senate, the upper chamber of the Polish Parliament, prepared a draft 
verification procedure for candidates running for election to Parliament in 
1991. The draft, which suggested screening candidates for collaboration with 
the communist secret services, was voted down. Another attempt involved a 
secret list of parliamentary candidates who had collaborated with the secret 
police during the communist period, prepared in 1991 by Andrzej Mielcza-
nowski, the head of the State Security Office [Urza˛d Ochrony Pa´nstwa] (UOP). 
The justification for compiling this list was the security of the state; it was 
treated as part of the security screening mechanism presumed to exist in all 
democratic states. If we take into account the fragility of the political situa-
tion in 1991, the close connection between Mielczanowski and President Lech 
Wałe˛sa, and especially Mielczanowski’s role in the so-called Józef Oleksy 
scandal in 1995,6 it is highly probable that this list played an important politi-
cal role as part of the efforts of Wałe˛sa’s political camp to discredit its oppo-
nents and improve its own position.
 Right-wing-oriented political parties supported lustration and decommu-
nization. A new impetus for dealing with the issue of lustration came after 
the election in 1991, when Antoni Maciarewicz became the minister of inter-
nal affairs in the right-wing Olszewski government. Maciarewicz had been a 
member of the anti-communist opposition since 1976 and a member of the 
famous Workers’ Defense Committee [Komitet Obrony Robotników] (KOR), 
together with Jacek Kuron´ and Adam Michnik. From the very beginning, 
Maciarewicz represented nationalist and Catholic ideology in the opposition 
movement. He was also editor of the influential samizdat journal Glos. In his 
new position, Maciarewicz organized a department of studies in the cabinet 
of the minister of internal affairs that focused on the archival resources of the 
secret police of the Polish People’s Republic.7 The aim of the unit was to pre-
pare a report that would show the danger to state structures if lustration were 
to be abandoned. 
 The next dramatic act took place in May and June 1992. On May 28, the 
Sejm adopted a motion proposed by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, leader of the radi-
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cally liberal libertarian political party, which obliged the minister of internal 
affairs to present full information to the Sejm by June 6 about higher civil 
servants and members of both parliamentary chambers who were secret 
collaborators with the communist secret police between 1945 and 1990. The 
motion required Maciarewicz to provide full information about judges, pub-
lic prosecutors, and advocates within two months, and information about 
representatives of local territorial self-governing bodies at different adminis-
trative levels within six months. This motion, adopted by the Sejm, became 
the legal basis for the minister’s actions. On June 4, Maciarewicz presented to 
the MPs a document from the archival resources of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in relation to MPs, senators, and persons holding high-level offices in 
the state. The list of sixty-four names included: the new president of Poland, 
Lech Wałe˛sa; three ministers; eight deputy ministers; three officers from the 
president’s office; thirty-nine members of Parliament; and eleven senators. It 
is not surprising that making such a list public created a political storm. The 
minister stressed that the list was not one of collaborators with the commu-
nist secret police; rather it referred to individuals about whom information 
was available in the ministry’s archives. He suggested that a special commis-
sion be organized, with the chief justice of the Supreme Court as head, to ver-
ify these materials. The idea of lustration, however, was compromised by the 
ensuing political scandal.8
 Opponents of the idea argued that it was purely an act of political 
revenge. The transformed communist party opposed lustration and claimed 
that, for the sake of reconciliation, all lustration efforts should be abandoned. 
Another argument used by liberal-democratic forces, represented mainly 
by the Democratic Union [Unia Demokratyczna], stressed the legal continuity 
between the communist Polish People’s Republic and the post-communist 
Third Republic, which, they argued, precluded any act of political revenge. 
This position, expressed quite often by Adam Michnik and his newspaper 
Gazeta Wyborcza, stressed the transfer of power through round-table talks as 
a decisive moment. The former communists had recognized the opposition, 
and, as a result, the political agreements achieved at the round-table talks 
between the two sides (the communists and the opposition) were translated 
into constitutional and legal language. 
 The consequence that Michnik derived from this peaceful form of transfer 
of power was a sort of self-limitation of both the former communists and the 
opposition. The new post-communist period began not as a result of revolu-
tion but of cooperation between two political camps through legal reforms. 
One of the first amendments to the communist constitution was a provision 
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that Poland was a law-governed state [Rechtsstaat]. This had its own conse-
quences. This legal argument had a political dimension in the Polish sociopo-
litical landscape. Some of the leading political forces in the Democratic Union 
looked for a coalition between reformist elements in the former communist 
party and liberal-democratic forces as a necessary political precondition for 
the successful modernization and democratization of society and the state. 
For members or sympathizers of the right-oriented political parties, by con-
trast, the political compromise — which was a virtue for the liberal left — was 
the original sin of the Polish III Republic, a corrupt foundation upon which it 
was impossible to build a new democratic society and its political institutions. 
The right-oriented political forces looked to lustration as a partial remedy for 
this original mistake. 
 In order to understand the discussion about lustration and decommu-
nization, and the position of particular political forces in these debates, it is 
also necessary to take into account the economic dimension. The transfer of 
power in Poland was preceded by the accumulation of economic power by 
some people from the former political apparatus who were especially con-
nected with the secret services. By 1989 these people were able to translate 
their political position into being able to extract economic rent. The law- 
governed-state formula, that is, the rule of law, was then crucial in legally safe-
guarding the new private property acquired on quite dubious legal grounds. 
This economic background played a very important, but not always articu-
lated, role in the debate about lustration and decommunization. 
 Resistance to lustration also came from post-Solidarity9 political group-
ings, such as parts of the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic 
Congress [Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny], which used technical arguments 
to claim that, due to the nature of the documents on which lustration would 
inevitably be based, it would be impossible to create a just process. Support-
ers of lustration came from the same Solidarity circles, and looked at lustra-
tion as a sort of medicine for the pathologies and problems of transforma-
tion. An important part of their arguments focused on the continuation of 
informal communist structures concentrated around people from the former 
communist secret services.10 
 On June 19, 1992, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the minister of 
internal affairs’ action, based on the motion adopted by the Sejm, was uncon-
stitutional. The tribunal found that the Sejm’s resolution violated individual 
dignity and at the same time did not provide any means of protection for per-
sons screened. This led “to the violation of the good name of the persons to 
whom the information applies and creates a sui generis penalty of infamy.”11 
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According to the Constitutional Tribunal, this was inconsistent with the for-
mula of a law-governed state expressed in article 1 of the so-called Little Con-
stitution, the constitutional law in force at the time. 
 These events had an enduring effect on the public perception of the lus-
tration process in Poland. Generally the mass media presented lustration as 
one of the following: (1) part of a conspiracy aimed at a coup d’état by right-
wing political parties; (2) a conspiracy of political forces connected with the 
former communist regime and some elements of the post-Solidarity parties 
to eliminate Jan Olszewski’s12 government; or (3) a totally discredited idea in 
whatever form.13 The events of June 1992, as well as the work of a special par-
liamentary commission to investigate the execution of the Sejm’s lustration 
motion, which cleared Minister Maciarewicz of the accusation of using the 
motion for political purposes, created a situation that forced the legislature to 
address the lustration issue.
 In September 1992 the Sejm started debate on six different drafts of a lus-
tration law, prepared by various political parties (including the Solidarity 
trade union), one of which came from the Senate. Two drafts were, let us say, 
“soft,” proposing only verification and making public knowledge of instances 
of collaboration with secret services. Other drafts were more severe, propos-
ing lustration and decommunization together; these would ban collaborators 
and persons who held positions as executive officers at all levels of the Com-
munist Party from holding public positions in the new state. Parliamentary 
debate thus slid into discussion of decommunization rather than lustration 
per se. 
 Lustration as a topic of public debate continued during the parliamentary 
election campaign of 1993. After the election the majority in the new Parlia-
ment was held by a coalition of the post-communist Democratic Left Alli-
ance [Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej] (SLD) and Polish People’s Party [Polskie 
Stronictwo Ludowe] (PSL) — both opponents of lustration. In July 1994 there 
was debate in the Sejm on eight drafts of a lustration law. Some of these were 
old drafts prepared before the election and some were new. In this debate one 
could distinguish not two but three positions.14 One was held by a group of 
strong opponents of lustration based around the SLD party. The second was 
held by a group that consisted of strong advocates of radical lustration rep-
resented by the Confederation for an Independent Poland [Konfederacja Pol-
ski Niepodległej] (KPN); radical lustration, based on the Czechoslovak model, 
was actually close to decommunization. The third position, held by a centrist 
group, favored restricted lustration, which meant limiting the group of people 
to be screened to the top echelon of the former communist state. The radical 
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opponents succeeded in blocking lustration and for a long time the drafts dis-
appeared from public view. 
 In June 1996, following internal decisions in the Sejm, when the legislative 
process started four new drafts were discussed.15 The basis for the work of the 
special parliamentary commission for a lustration law was a draft prepared 
by the post-Solidarity Union of Freedom [Unia Wolno´sci], the Union of Labor 
[Unia Pracy], and part of the post-communist PSL. The resulting lustration 
law was adopted by the Sejm on April 11, 1997. The statute, containing thirty 
articles, established a mixed model of broad (in the sense that a broad range 
of people became the object of the law), but not radical, lustration. The radical 
model was based on a connection between lustration and decommunization. 
The final outcome was a compromise, and the law only punished the telling 
of a “lustration lie,” but not conscious collaboration. It did not punish peo-
ple who consciously collaborated with the secret services but had admitted 
this publicly. The majority in the Sejm refused to use lustration as a tool for 
decommunization; the radical Czech model of lustration was turned down. 
The next year, however, after a parliamentary election in which post-Solidar-
ity forces won, the lustration statute was amended. The amendment adopted 
on June 18, 1998, made the lustration law more radical and changed its institu-
tional design. Only eight articles remained unchanged. 
 After its adoption, the political opposition to lustration, mainly for-
mer communists and Adam Michnik’s Gazeta Wyborcza, mobilized forces to 
soften the law as much as possible. The first attempt was made by President 
Aleksander Kwas´niewski.16 Before signing the new law, Kwas´niewski sent it 
to the Constitutional Tribunal to determine its constitutionality. The Consti-
tutional Tribunal, in two rulings, confirmed the constitutionality of the law, 
questioning only two articles. The first was an article that made it possible to 
restart lustration procedures against persons who had already gone through 
the process. The tribunal said that, because there were no provisions regard-
ing time limitation on restarting the procedure, the article created a state of 
permanent insecurity and limitation of freedom. The second article related 
to the removal of a candidate for the presidency who made a false lustra-
tion declaration, which the tribunal said amounted to a limitation of voting 
rights.17 At the same time, however, an unexpected obstacle to the implemen-
tation of the law came from the judiciary. One of the law’s provisions created 
a Lustration Court, to which judges would be elected by the judges’ own self-
governing bodies. The required judges had not been elected by the deadline. 
Further amendments were necessary to address difficulties in creating the 
Lustration Court. 
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 In terms of the operation of the amended lustration law, the most impor-
tant trend occurred during the third phase of the history of lustration in 
Poland. After the post-communists won the next election, they initiated a 
series of amendments aimed at making lustration meaningless. The most 
important of these was an attempt to restrict the types of facts that could be 
used as evidence of “collaboration” or “service.” The first step in this direction 
was an amendment of February 15, 2002, which limited the scope of applica-
tion of the law by removing from it former collaborators with military intel-
ligence and counterintelligence. Additionally, the amendment introduced a 
very imprecise clause that exempted from the list of objectionable collabora-
tions actions that did not endanger personal and civil rights and freedoms. 
The majority of that amendment was struck down by the Constitutional Tri-
bunal’s verdict of June 19, 2002 (K11/02), on purely procedural grounds.18 
 Another attempt to limit the impact of lustration came in an amend-
ment of September 13, 2002, which limited the definition of “collaboration” 
in such a way that, in effect, most forms of what is commonly understood as 
collaboration were excluded. “Collaboration,” as defined in the amendment, 
did not include gathering and passing information for intelligence, counter-
intelligence activities, or activities conducted in defense of the state borders. 
It also protected those individuals who alleged that they only “pretended” to 
collaborate, despite their fulfillment of all formal requirements expected from 
the secret services. This second restriction was inspired by a Supreme Court 
judgment of October 2, 2002 (Syg. Akt II KKN 311/01), in the cassation19 case 
of Marian Jurczyk, one of the leaders of Solidarity in Szczecin, in which the 
court moved towards a material — meaning substantive — understanding of 
collaboration.20 In making an evaluation of the outcome of collaboration and 
not restricting itself to the establishment of the fact of collaboration, the court 
moved outside the formal application of the legal definition of “collaboration” 
as stated in the lustration law. The judgment was rightly criticized as unjusti-
fied judicial activism. 
the polish lustration law
OVERVIEw Of ThE lAw
The lustration statute is composed of forty articles in six chapters, plus an 
annex. There is no legal definition of “lustration” in the text of the statute. The 
term itself is confusing and has different definitions in different countries. The 
word lustration became well known after Czechoslovakia’s so-called velvet 
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revolution. In Czechoslovakia, and then the Czech Republic, lustrace meant a 
ban on the holding of a public position by functionaries of the Communist 
Party or political police. The application of the term was broad and radical. 
It included decommunization as such. It meant banning office holders in the 
communist regimes from public life in new democratic regimes for some time. 
This broad definition was not, however, adopted by other post-communist 
countries. They preserved the word “lustration” but, due to their political con-
texts, gave it a different meaning. This explains part of the confusion in analy-
ses of the lustration laws in post-communist countries. 
 In the Polish context, lustration means something different and is used 
in a narrow sense, as the public unveiling of individual connections with the 
secret services, and only with the secret services, by persons holding public 
office or candidates for public offices in the newly democratic state. The aim 
was to cleanse the public space of “wild lustration” — the periodic publication 
of lists of collaborators and accusations of collaboration with former commu-
nist secret services, accusations from which those who suffered them had no 
means to defend their good names. Wild lustrations had become a powerful 
weapon in political life in Poland. Those who supported the introduction of a 
lustration law believed that it would guarantee a minimum level of civility in 
political discourse, provide citizens with the necessary information to make 
informed political choices, and defend the categories of people affected by the 
lustration procedure from manipulation and blackmail. Generally speaking, 
they thought it would clean up the poisoned atmosphere of public life after 
communism. 
 The statute of April 11, 1997, imposes a duty on people born before May 
11, 1972 — which means all those who were adults according to law before the 
transfer of power took place in 1989 — who hold or are candidates for enu-
merated public positions in the state, to make a statement regarding their 
work for or collaboration with secret services (institutions of state security) 
between 1944 and 1990. The obligation to make a positive or negative lustra-
tion statement is imposed on a broad range of people holding executive posi-
tions in the state or important positions in the state administration, including 
the president of the republic, MPs, senators, judges, procurators, advocates, 
and people holding key positions in Polish Public Television, Polish Public 
Radio, the Polish Press Agency, and the Polish Information Agency. 
 Lustration statements consist of parts A and B, as stated in the annex to 
the statute. Part A is simply a declaration that a person did or did not work 
for or collaborate with institutions of state security. Part B (not made public) 
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includes details of work or collaboration in the case of a positive statement. 
The names of those who make positive statements are published in the official 
gazette, Monitor Polski, or, in the case of candidates for the presidency and the 
lower or upper houses of Parliament, in electoral proclamations. The names 
appear without details of the type of collaboration. In this way, those who 
declare that they were members of or consciously collaborated with the secret 
services can still be candidates for public office, and the decision about their 
future is left in the hands of the electorate. The Polish lustration law penalizes 
only a lie about collaboration, not the collaboration itself. 
 Verification of a negative lustration statement is performed by the com-
missioner for the public interest. If there is suspicion of a lie in the lustration 
statement, the commissioner initiates a case before the Lustration Court. 
Court rulings confirming lustration lies are made public. The legal effects of 
such court rulings are different depending on the position held by the person 
involved. MPs or senators will lose their seats but can run as candidates in 
the next election. In the case of judges, an additional ruling of the disciplinary 
court is required.
dEfINITIONS
Despite the lack of a legal definition of “lustration,” the law clearly designates 
three necessary elements in the lustration process, namely: institutions of 
state security during the communist regime between 1944 and 1990; persons 
holding public office; and past collaboration with institutions of state secu-
rity under the communist regime. Some combination of holding public office 
or aspiring to hold public office and former employment in or collaboration 
with the institutions of state security under the communist regime has to 
exist. The definitions of these elements are therefore crucial.
 Article 2 of the statute defines the security institutions of the state as all secret 
services in Poland, including intelligence and counterintelligence, between 
1944 and 1990. Article 2, subsection 11.2, also includes the military and civil 
institutions of foreign countries that fulfill the same function as the above-
mentioned Polish institutions. 
 Article 3 enumerates the category of persons holding public offices. As men-
tioned above, these are: the president of the republic, MPs, senators, and per-
sons nominated or elected to executive functions in the state; head of the civil 
service; directors in ministries, central offices, and voivodeship offices (state 
regional administration);21 judges, procurators, and advocates; members of 
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the board of Polish Public TV and Radio; directors of regional TV and radio 
centers; the director of the Polish Press Agency; and the director of the Polish 
Information Agency. 
 The last definition is collaboration. According to article 4.1, “collaboration 
is conscious and secret collaboration with operational or investigating units 
or organs of the state security as a secret informer or helper with the gather-
ing of information.” In its 1997 decision the Constitutional Tribunal provided 
binding interpretation of the notion of “collaboration.” The tribunal stated 
that a simple commitment to collaborate, even evidenced by a signature, is 
not sufficient, and that what constitutes collaboration are specific actions 
such as operational gathering of information and passing it to officers of the 
secret services.22 Subsections 2 and 4 of article 4 contain limitations on the 
definition of “collaboration.” These state that collaboration is not an activity 
that was imposed by statutes, and that “fake collaboration” does not count as 
collaboration.
 An amendment excluded collaboration with state security institutions 
imposed by law, a situation that could occur when categories of persons (for 
instance, border guard officers) were obliged by law to collaborate in order to 
preserve state security. The limitation was based on the idea that collabora-
tion in such cases was a legal duty imposed on individuals, who had to do it 
even if it was against their will. The counterargument, of a moral nature and 
put forward by the opposition to the amendment, was that nobody forced 
people to work in these institutions.
 More difficult is the question of so-called fake collaboration, in which a 
person claims to have signed a document that she or he would collaborate 
with the secret services without any intention to actually collaborate and 
that she or he never passed on any information or passed on only unimport-
ant information. Fake collaboration is difficult to prove because of the secret 
nature of collaboration in general. Due to limited evidence, it is nearly impos-
sible to make any judgment about whether alleged collaboration is fake or not. 
Furthermore, considering how secret services operate throughout the world, 
it is safe to say that for them there is no such thing as unimportant informa-
tion. All information is important and can be put to use at the proper time. 
 The Polish lustration law is aimed at categories of people who have a spe-
cial, delineated connection between past and present. The past element is the 
relation to state security institutions, as employment or collaboration. This 
group of people is in turn limited, from the point of view of lustration, by 
another criterion: that they hold specific public offices in the present. In other 
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words, collaborators with the secret services or former officers of state secu-
rity institutions who do not hold public offices at present or are not candi-
dates for such offices are outside the purview of the lustration law. 
ThE OffICE Of ThE COmmISSIONER fOR ThE PUBlIC INTEREST
The institution of the Office for the Commissioner for the Public Interest plays 
a crucial role in the Polish lustration law. The commissioner and two deputy 
commissioners are nominated by the chief justice of the Supreme Court from 
among the candidates eligible to become judges who have broad legal knowl-
edge and who were not collaborators with the secret services according to 
the understanding of the statute. Candidates who agree to be nominated are 
obliged to make a lustration declaration, which is first analyzed by the chief 
justice and than sent to the Lustration Court for verification. After verifica-
tion the commissioner and deputy commissioners are formally nominated 
for a six-year term in office. They cannot be members of political parties or be 
involved in any activities that are incompatible with the dignity of the office. 
They can be removed from office by the chief justice of the Supreme Court 
only in circumstances strictly enumerated in article 17c. The statute creating 
this office is meant to guarantee independence for the commissioners on the 
same level as for judges. 
 The commissioner, who is involved in all phases of the process, represents 
the public interest in the lustration procedure. In the initial stage the com-
missioner evaluates the lustration statement and is responsible for deciding 
whether it should be sent to the Lustration Court. After the Lustration Court 
issues a ruling the commissioner is entitled to appeal the decision. The func-
tions of the commissioner are analysis of the lustration declaration; gather-
ing information necessary for evaluation of the declaration; and starting the 
lustration procedure, described below, before the Lustration Court. The com-
missioner is also obliged to provide a report of his or her activity annually to 
the president, Sejm, Senate, prime minister, and chief justice of the Supreme 
Court. 
 The commissioner has a supporting office, which by the end of 2001 
employed thirty-seven people (including the commissioner and two deputies). 
Employed staff included nineteen specialists dealing with the lustration veri-
fication process (lawyers, historians, political scientists, etc.) and thirteen sec-
retarial staff. The budget of the commissioner’s office in 2001 was 4,308,000 
Polish zlotys (PLZ) (approximately US$1,250,000). 
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INITIATINg ThE lUSTRATION PROCEdURE
The lustration procedure can be initiated by the commissioner or a deputy 
commissioner when the standard investigation indicates there is justifiable 
doubt that a lustration declaration is true. Another option is for the Lus-
tration Court to start the lustration procedure ex officio in relation to the 
commissioner. The Lustration Court can also begin the procedure based 
on a petition by a person who stated that he or she worked or collaborated 
under pressure, including threats to the life and health of that person or 
close relatives.
PROCEdURE BEfORE ThE lUSTRATION COURT
Each case is heard by three professional judges (normally, in criminal cases, 
a hearing by three judges is reserved for serious crimes). In the original lus-
tration law there was a provision for the creation of a separate Lustration 
Court. After the failure to delegate judges to this court, as described above, 
an amendment named the Warsaw Appellate Court as the Lustration Court. 
The judges sitting on the Lustration Court bench are designated by the presi-
dent of the appellate court. The lustration law includes a provision that judges 
from the voivodeship courts (second level in the hierarchy of courts) can also 
be delegated to sit on the Lustration Court. 
 According to article 19 of the law, the lustration procedure is regulated by 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, with necessary changes as stipulated by the 
lustration law of April 11, 1997. All provisions of the code apply to the person 
accused of collaboration. The court, on its own initiative or that of parties to 
the proceedings, can hold hearings closed to the public. The procedure ends 
with the written decision of the court, which can be one of three types: stat-
ing that a lustration declaration was untrue; stating that a declaration was 
true; or making a decision to terminate a procedure due to lack of evidence 
on the basis of which to evaluate the veracity of the lustration declaration. 
The nonsecret part of the judgment is published in Monitor Polski, the official 
government gazette. 
APPEAl ANd CASSATION
Within fourteen days of the judgment, parties can appeal the decision of the 
Lustration Court of first instance. The appeal is then heard by three profes-
sional judges, at least two of whom, including the presiding judge, must be 
appellate court judges. Technically, an appeal is heard at the same Lustration 
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Court but with different judges. From the decision of the court of the second 
instance, parties have a right to cassation. Cassation is heard by the Supreme 
Court within three months.
REOPENINg ThE PROCEdURE
The lustration procedure can be reopened, after a legally valid judgment is 
made, in two cases: ex delicto, when an illegal act took place with impact on 
the Lustration Court judgment; or de novis, when, after promulgation of a 
legally valid judgment, new facts are discovered which put in doubt a lustra-
tion declaration.
SANCTIONS
The only sanction for an untrue lustration declaration is the loss of moral 
qualification to hold public office and a ban on holding one for ten years. 
The statutory requirement for holding public office is moral qualification to 
do so. Individuals currently in office who are found to have made an untrue 
declaration automatically lose their position. In the case of some professions, 
for instance retired judges, individuals also lose what amounts to their retire-
ment pensions. This is due to the legal construction that judges do not retire 
but rather, after reaching retirement age, are not in active service. They do not 
receive a pension as such but a percentage of their actual salary. 
functioning of the lustration law
Lustration as a topic in the context of transformation and decommunization 
in Central and Eastern Europe has a history of more than sixteen years. The 
lustration law in Poland, by contrast, has only been in force for six years. It 
is thus easier to illustrate some of the problems with the functioning of the 
lustration law than to make an overall holistic evaluation.
 It must be kept in mind that the stated aim of the lustration law was the 
security of the state and the elimination of potential political blackmail. How-
ever, in Polish public opinion there is another aim that is not explicitly stated 
in the statute, namely, the realization of some sort of transitional justice. Lus-
tration in public opinion is a substitute for decommunization, in this instance 
in the sense of major personnel turnover in the various state institutions. It 
is doubtful, however, whether this aim is being achieved, even in part, by the 
lustration law as it was designed by the Polish Parliament. This is due to the 
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limited nature of the law, the sanctions of which are restricted only to lustra-
tion lies. Nevertheless, the connection of lustration with transitional justice 
made the topic not only “hot” but sometimes explosive. In arguments made in 
the media, both supporters and opponents disregard the actual provisions of 
the statute and present the issue as highly normatively charged. 
 From the very beginning, however, the leading opinion makers in the 
media, especially the influential newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, covered the 
lustration process in a critical, if not negative, way, with the aim of turning 
the public against it. A crucial point in the lustration debate concerned the 
appointments of retired judge Bogusław Nizien´ski as commissioner for the 
public interest and Krzysztof Kauba as deputy commissioner. They were 
appointed by a former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Adam Strzembosz, 
on his last day in office on October 16, 1998. The controversy was triggered by 
two issues: the men who were appointed, and the fact that the appointments 
were made on the chief justice’s last day in office and without consultation. 
For several years afterwards, Gazeta Wyborcza ran a campaign to discredit lus-
tration by publishing articles that were not only critical, but sought to under-
mine the integrity of Commissioner Nizien´ski. Nizien´ski was a retired judge 
known for his anti-communist opinions, who never became a member of the 
Communist Party, but whose career as a judge nevertheless spanned the entire 
hierarchy of positions in the Polish courts. As he stated in one interview, he 
perceived his work on the bench as service to the nation and not to the com-
munist state. (Both the commissioner and the deputy commissioner have 
appeared extremely devoted to their offices and unafraid of controversy.)
 One point of contention that was raised in discussions of the lustration 
law and procedure was the accountability of the commissioner and deputy 
commissioners. In the statute, article 17a clearly states that both are obliged 
to act within the law and the constitution, and make annual reports. While 
neither position appears particularly strong, as designed in the statute the 
commissioner’s role cannot be reduced to that of a public prosecutor. The 
commissioner is endowed with the same level of independence as a judge, and 
yet she or he represents the public interest in the lustration procedure. This 
peculiarity reflects the specificity of lustration, which is not a typical proce-
dure as in criminal law. The institution represents a new type of legal institu-
tion in public law.23
 A second problem was connected to the order of verification of lustration 
declarations. The commissioner was criticized for focusing first on judges and 
advocates, a move that was interpreted as taking revenge on the professional 
groups with which he was most familiar. His argument was that the highest 
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number of positive declarations occurred within these categories, which made 
the negative declarations call for strict verification. Commissioner Nizien´ski 
explained that screening one person who had made a positive declaration 
naturally led to other persons from the same profession and territorial region, 
who, it seemed, had also made false declarations.24 On an alternative view, 
however, since the primary aim of lustration was the security of the state, and 
not decommunization, the verification order should have started with crucial 
positions within the structure of the state. In other words, the importance of 
the position from the point of view of the security of the state should have 
determined the order of the commissioner’s verification of lustration decla-
rations. Advocates and judges are not as important, in this sense, as minis-
ters and undersecretaries of state. Criticism of the commissioner’s activities, 
in this case, was therefore justified. The amendment that corrected article 17 
states that verification should be carried out in the order of state positions 
enumerated in article 7, starting with the most important.25
 The next objection was to the secrecy of the procedure, both during the 
initial verification conducted by the commissioner and later on before the 
Lustration Court. There is no easy way around this because classified mate-
rial is used in the verification procedure and in the hearing before the Lustra-
tion Court. On the other hand, it is true that such secrecy goes against the 
principles of openness of justice. Commissioner Nizien´ski stated that while 
the accused usually were not interested in an open trial,26 after requesting a 
closed hearing they often themselves made statements to the media, which 
fostered speculation about the entire procedure. This led to suggestions in the 
newspapers that the Lustration Court was a kangaroo court or some sort of 
inquisition having nothing in common with justice. 
 In a number of newspaper interviews and journal articles, commissioners 
have complained about the negative media coverage, which demonized the 
work of the first commissioner and focused only on sensational news.27 Com-
missioner Nizien´ski was a public figure who did not avoid conflict and was 
guided by a strong belief in the mission of his office. No doubt his strong per-
sonality left its mark on the operation of the office. He was responsible for hir-
ing, determined the organization of the support staff, and, more importantly, 
influenced public perception of the lustration process. On the other hand, his 
successor, Włodzierz Olszewski, keeps a low profile in the media, and it is dif-
ficult to find any reports on his activity, outside of formal announcements. 
 At the time of writing, 23,598 people have filled out lustration declara-
tions,28 which, according to the lustration law, are all subject to the commis-
sioner’s scrutiny, which obviously imposes a great workload on him and the 
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deputy commissioners. From 1999 to 2001, 150 persons declared that they had 
worked for or collaborated with state security institutions and their names 
were published in Monitor Polski. Among those were one secretary of state, 
five undersecretaries, and one MP. In 2002 not one positive lustration declara-
tion was filed. By April 30, 2004,29 the commissioner had filed 126 cases with 
the Lustration Court in relation to sixty-nine advocates; twenty parliamentar-
ians; twelve judges; nine ministers, deputy ministers, or higher civil servants; 
seven public prosecutors; six journalists; and three voivodes. By April 30, 2004, 
the court had made decisions in relation to 103 persons: 79.8% of first instance 
verdicts and 80% of cases started by the commissioner were appealed. Forty-
eight verdicts of the Lustration Court of the second instance were subject to 
cassation before the Supreme Court, of which eleven have been overturned 
and twenty-five have been upheld. In fifty-three of the 103 cases the court con-
firmed that the declaration was not true and in twenty cases it stated that the 
declaration was true. Fourteen cases were discontinued for various reasons.30 
 In the first year of his activity, the commissioner sent questions to the state 
security archives, where files were collected, regarding 2,296 people under 
verification; in 2000 he sent 4,168 requests for information; and in 2001, 4,174 
for a total of 10,638 persons. By the end of 2001, the lustration procedure was 
finished for 6,689 individuals — 28.35% of all lustration declarations lodged 
since 1997, when the law was adopted by Parliament.31 Out of the 1,896 indi-
viduals whose cases were reviewed by the commissioner for public interest, 
only forty-five had their cases submitted to the court and only twenty-three 
were found to have told lustration lies. 
 According to the commissioner’s report for 2001, by October 19, 2001, dec-
larations by all people in key positions in the state had been scrutinized. The 
parliamentary elections in 2001 brought 245 new declarations from MPs and 
50 from senators. As part of the verification process, the commissioner and 
his deputies interviewed forty-seven witnesses in 1999, fifty in 2000, and 112 
in 2001. All witnesses were former officers of the secret police, military intel-
ligence, or counterintelligence. Commissioners complained that witnesses 
were not cooperative and tried to hide the truth. In three cases the commis-
sioner informed the procuracy of obstruction of justice.32 
 The commissioner decided not to bring 293 cases before the Lustration 
Court, despite the fact that the names of those involved were mentioned in 
the archives of the special services, because there was insufficient evidence 
to substantiate collaboration due to the destruction of documents. Further-
more, witnesses claimed that they did not remember whether these individu-
als collaborated with the former security institutions. Among these people, 
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advocates again made up the biggest group with 181, followed by thirty MPs, 
twenty-seven people from the media, ten procurators, and sixteen high- 
ranking civil servants.33 
TABlE 1 
lustration figures
 23,598  Total lustration declarations (1999–present) 
 6,689  Individuals completed lustration procedure (1999–2001)
 278  Positive lustration declarations (1999–2004)
 126 Cases filed by Commissioner for the Public Interest with Lustration Court 
  (April 2004) 
 209 Witnesses interviewed as part of lustration procedure (1999–2001)
 103 Lustration Court verdicts (April 30, 2004)
 53  Declarations confirmed not true by Lustration Court (May 2002)
 20  Declarations confirmed true by Lustration Court (May 2002)
 14  Cases discontinued by Lustration Court (May 2002) 
 48 Verdicts subject to cassation before Supreme Court (April 2004)
 25 Verdicts subject to cassation before Supreme Court upheld (April 2004)
 11 Verdicts subject to cassation before Supreme Court overturned (April 2004)
 The commissioners’ reports have contained a number of complaints, 
the first of which is about the law’s impotence.34 Commissioners suggested 
that unreliable and uncooperative witnesses should be punished according 
to article 233 of the criminal code, which contains provisions regarding false 
testimony. The second complaint relates to the need for objective media cov-
erage of lustration activities, as mentioned above. Commissioners suggested 
that, to this end, the procedure before the Lustration Court should be open 
and public. The third complaint relates to procedural delays before the court 
due to absences of persons under review. The lustration law does not equip 
the court with any legal tool to require the presence of persons being inves-
tigated during the hearings, a situation that was abused. Often, individuals 
would produce medical certificates stating that due to illness they were not 
able to attend the hearing, while at the same time they were appearing on tele-
vision to take part in parliamentary deliberations or voting. The fourth com-
plaint is connected to access to archival resources of the former state security 
institutions. Since 2000 the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been transferring 
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archival resources to the Institute of National Remembrance. The transfer 
process has been very slow, and, even after the institute receives the archival 
materials, it lacks the funds to properly arrange and file them. 
 The lustration law does not operate in an institutional vacuum. The pro-
cess is implemented within an institutional setting, which plays an important 
role and brings with it a number of problems. The first and biggest problem 
was the impossibility of creating a Lustration Court according to the provi-
sions of the first version of the lustration statute prior to the subsequent 
amendments. According to the original provision, twenty-one judges for the 
special Lustration Court would be nominated by the judges’ self-governing 
body, the National Judicial Council, from candidates nominated at meetings 
of all judges in appellate and voivodeship courts. Those nominations had to be 
made within thirty days of the entry into force of the lustration law. Judges 
were to be delegated by the minister of justice for four years to the Lustration 
Court, which was to be located at the Warsaw Appellate Court. However, not 
enough candidates were nominated within the prescribed time. As the lustra-
tion law’s immediate aim, which was to establish an institutional structure for 
the lustration of MP and senatorial candidates before the parliamentary elec-
tions of September 21, 1997, was therefore not achieved, critics used this fail-
ure to claim that lustration was unnecessary.35 This obstacle was overcome, 
however, by the June 1998 amendment that created the Lustration Court as a 
special division of the Warsaw Appellate Court. 
 One of the most controversial issues connected with the functioning of 
the lustration law was a decision of the minister of justice/procurator gen-
eral to fire three procurators who had made positive lustration declarations 
admitting their collaboration with the secret services. The law itself does not 
include such a sanction in its provisions. What is penalized is providing a false 
declaration, not a positive declaration. Nevertheless, the minister of justice/
procurator general’s decision was based on the idea that the people in ques-
tion had lost the necessary moral qualification to perform the functions con-
nected with their offices. This was followed by an appeal to the presiding jus-
tices of the courts to remove judges who were compromised by collaboration 
with the communist regime’s state security institutions. The appeal provoked 
a rather negative, if not angry, reaction from the judiciary and lawyers’ profes-
sional organizations, such as the Association of Polish Lawyers.
 Disciplinary sanctions applied by institutions to persons who have made 
positive lustration declarations are a side effect or, as some claim, an exten-
sion of the lustration statute.36 It shows that lustration is sometimes confused 
with decommunization. Polish law should in some way regulate these types of 
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cases, either by accepting the application of disciplinary sanctions or strictly 
forbidding it. The exact scale of this phenomenon is unknown, but appears to 
be rather small. It could, however, become a larger problem with a change of 
the political context, for example, if the pro-lustration radical parties receive 
a bigger say in the public arena.
 Cases of judges and procurators were regulated by a statute of December 
8, 1998, on disciplinary responsibilities for breaching the independence of the 
judiciary; all such cases were only in relation to retired judges and procura-
tors. Between 1998 and 2002 the minister for justice started seventy-three 
procedures against retired judges and seventy-seven against retired procura-
tors.37 On April 17, 1999, the National Advocates’ Council adopted a motion 
stating that collaboration with the secret services between 1944 and 1990 
amounted to acts against Polish society and constituted a crucial breach of 
the moral requirement for the profession. The motion also asked those who 
had collaborated to leave the profession. Unfortunately, until the lustration 
procedure comes to an end it is impossible to know how many people are 
involved. So far, the names of a small number of those who returned positive 
lustration declarations have been published in Monitor Polski. Former mem-
bers of the profession removed from the list of advocates tried to appeal the 
decisions before the Constitutional Court, but without success.38 
the lustration process in public opinion
How has the general public perceived the Polish lustration law? After the 1992 
dismissal of Olszewski’s government because of Maciarewicz’s list and its 
inclusion39 of high-ranking officials such as Lech Wałe˛sa, lustration became 
a hot political issue. The next moment of high tension came in 1996, con-
cerning the political use of secret service files, when former Prime Minister 
Józef Oleksy was accused of being a Soviet spy and was forced to resign from 
office.
 Although polls cannot provide precise measurements of public opinion, 
they nevertheless can reveal trends. In opinion polls conducted by the Cen-
ter for Public Opinion Research [Os´rodek Badania Opinii Publicznej] (OBOP) in 
December 1996, 72% of respondents were convinced that many high-ranking 
officials had previously been informants and collaborators with the secret 
police; 77% believed that such officials should be removed from office.40 
According to polls conducted by the OBOP in June 1994 and December 1996, 
57% of the population supported lustration. In December 1997 that number 
rose to 76% and in November 1999 it dropped to 56%. Support for lustration 
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is strongly correlated with political party affiliation. The largest percentage of 
lustration opponents is within the SLD (former communist) electorate, while 
the largest percentage of supporters is within the post-Solidarity, right-wing 
electorate.
 It is interesting to note the trend that the public’s opinion of lustration 
became more negative after the lustration law became operational. In opinion 
polls conducted each year from 1994 to 2002, support for lustration dropped 
and negative evaluations increased. In 2002, a decidedly negative opinion was 
expressed by 31% of respondents and a decidedly positive one by only 33%. 
The opinion that the lustration law had a bad impact on political life in Poland 
was expressed by 51%, while only 30% believed that lustration improved polit-
ical life in Poland.41 Nevertheless, over the years support for lustration has 
remained relatively high and surprisingly steady. Over the years, on average 
more than 50% of the population has supported the lustration law in Poland. 
evaluation of the lustration law in poland
There are different methods of evaluating the lustration law. It seems to me 
that only one way, based on the realization of the aims of the lustration stat-
ute, is justifiable. In other words, the evaluation should be rooted specifically 
within the Polish context and not based on some abstract, universal criteria. 
It is commonplace for sociologists of law to argue that the operation or func-
tioning of specific norms and legal institutions depends on the institutional 
and cultural context. That context in the Polish case, and probably in any 
other post-communist country, is rather fragile as far as democratic insti-
tutional infrastructure and legal culture are concerned. One of the aims of 
the lustration law was to help to build a democratic and legal culture in post-
communist Poland by providing citizens with information about the prior 
involvement in the operation of the secret services of the communist regime 
of people aspiring to hold public offices; in this way, the idea was, citizens 
could make informed choices. The lustration law, by making public knowl-
edge the names of those who confirm their collaboration, frees them from 
potential political blackmail. It is impossible to measure whether lustration, 
after only six years in operation, has been able to fulfill this aim. At best, an 
indirect approach to answering the question can be tried. I will discuss this in 
the next section on lustration and post-communism in Poland. 
 From a sociological point of view, the largest group obliged to make lustra-
tion declarations have been lawyers — approximately twenty thousand people. 
The rule of law requires a strong legal profession with strong moral character, 
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which will guarantee the professional autonomy of law. Yet, despite years of 
functioning, the lustration process has not had a significant impact upon law-
yers. Nevertheless, it may help in the process of transforming the legal pro-
fession through at least partial sanation (cleansing), as demonstrated by the 
position, adopted by the self-governing body of the advocates, that advocates 
compromised by collaboration should make public their involvement, and by 
the disclosure of the identities of judges compromised by collaboration. 
 One of the critical factors in determining the effectiveness of lustration, 
particularly when the aim is to eliminate dangers to the new regime, is tim-
ing. The Polish lustration law entered into force very late in the transition 
because of political struggles. These struggles made lustration more politi-
cally charged, or connected with political processes. At the same time lustra-
tion lost its teeth while, paradoxically, public expectations grew higher.
 One of the positive outcomes of the lustration law’s late arrival is its “soft-
ness.” In comparison to the harsh Czech approach, lustration in Poland is 
not focused on revenge or the elimination of certain groups of people from 
power. It is focused on the penalization of lies. All necessary elements of the 
rule of law, such as presumption of innocence, broad rights of the defendant, 
and proper court procedure, are observed. This makes the Polish lustration 
process as civilized as possible. It is true that this civility could be improved by 
distancing the process from political abuse, speeding up the procedure before 
the Lustration Court, and providing objective coverage in the media. Never-
theless, the very existence of the lustration law and the institutions it created 
eliminated wild lustration and provided wrongly accused persons with a legal 
tool for their defense outside of the normal procedure for defamation. 
 The lustration law sought to clean up the public sphere, which requires 
transparency. Procedures before the Lustration Court should in turn be more 
open to the public. The secrecy of the procedures has not contributed to the 
realization of the aims of the law. Despite the fact that classified material was 
used, the openness of the procedure could be improved. 
 The lustration law was too often changed as an outcome of political pro-
cesses, which destabilized the lustration process. It is true that the first stat-
ute was not an example of “legislative art” and amendments were necessary, 
but some of the subsequent changes, made after the last election won by SLD, 
were introduced purely for political reasons. A good example of this is the 
manipulation of the definition of “collaboration,” as described above. 
 The lustration laws in post-communist countries do not serve the same 
function as security clearances in liberal democracies. Lustration is one of 
the legal devices for dealing with the past, alongside other procedures such 
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as decommunization, restitution of property, and trials for perpetrators of 
crimes committed under the communist regime for political reasons. All 
these legal tools should be analyzed together, but such a task is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. In the final section, however, I will discuss the lustration 
process in Poland within the broader context of post-communist efforts to 
deal with the past. 
the lustration law and post-communism
What I have offered hitherto is an analysis that focuses on the legal and socio-
legal dimensions of the Polish lustration law. Here I want to discuss the law 
from the point of view of social theory. The problem is that so far we do not 
have a satisfactory social theory of post-communism. That is why I will try 
to sketch the relationship between lustration and other strategies for dealing 
with the communist past in Poland after 1989. 
 All transitional justice projects presuppose some sort of social theory usu-
ally not very far removed from Durkheim’s concept of law as an expression 
of mechanical solidarity, as values shared by members of a society. Law is an 
expression of the moral matrix of society; in effect, law defends the type of 
social relations that are most valuable for the society. A post-Durkheimian 
perspective adds the assumption that legal institutions could infuse society 
with some of the values necessary for democracy and the rule of law. This 
assumption treats post-communist societies as in a transitional phase from 
point A to point B, where point B is a fully developed liberal-democratic soci-
ety with all the necessary institutions and values. Lustration, decommuniza-
tion, and restitution of property are legal mechanisms for the realization of 
that aim. 
 I prefer to use the term transformation, rather than transition, to describe 
the social processes after the collapse of communism. This allows us to look 
at the specificity of the new institutions developed, trace the elements of the 
new social and institutional structure, and stress the role of those institutions 
in building something new. I will adopt this approach to these extraordinary 
processes in my analysis of the sociopolitical context of the Polish lustration 
law. 
 The initial problem is the past, especially the communist past, with which 
all post-communist countries are obliged to cope. All have developed institu-
tions that allow them to do this. Those institutions are supposed to address 
local issues. Dealing with the past sounds like a universal problem, but behind 
it are always particularities — local settings, relations, and structures. The local 
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dimensions of policies dealing with the past were and are different, but it is 
possible to identify some similarities due to a common denominator — these 
are not policies to deal with just any past but with a specific past, namely, the 
legacies of communist regimes. 
 The case of the Polish lustration law is as specific as any other, but it is also 
puzzling. Some may find it puzzling that the country that led the dismantling 
of communism was the last to adopt a lustration law and that it adopted such 
a “soft” one. How do we explain that in the country in which there was an 
anti-communist organization (Solidarity) with ten million members — which 
was then suppressed by martial law imposed by General Wojciech Jaruzel-
ski on December 13, 1981 — the new political forces did not implement any 
decommunization measure? How do we explain the fact that a few years after 
the transfer of power, a post-communist party won a majority in an election? 
How do we explain that a former apparatchik and secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party won a presidential election against the 
legendary leader of Solidarity, Lech Wałe˛sa?
 These are the most visible puzzles from political life; there are also ques-
tions regarding other dimensions, such as economic life. Where have the mul-
timillionaires come from? How were they able to concentrate ownership of 
state property so quickly? What is their political genealogy? And there are 
questions regarding the moral dimension of social life. Why is public moral-
ity at such a low level in a society that not long ago generated a mass social 
movement such as Solidarity? How do we explain the erosion of the prestige 
of public authorities? Why did the majority of society not participate in the 
last democratic elections? Why is corruption so widespread? 
 These are important questions, but, one may ask, what do they have to do 
with lustration? Although it is impossible to connect lustration to everything 
that has gone wrong since 1989, lustration or its lack is very much connected 
to the project of building a new type of society and polity. In other words, I 
propose to look at lustration as a constitutional issue, as part of a broad spec-
trum of policies and legal strategies for “settling accounts with the past,” as 
part of the creation of the constitution of the new society.
 Efforts to deal with the past are not unique to Central and Eastern Europe. 
It is true that the past haunts this part of the world, due to its complicated his-
tory, and most recently its communist history. As mentioned above, it is puz-
zling that while all post-communist societies sooner or later were forced to 
face their communist past, lustration and decommunization measures were 
the “softest,” in terms of sanctions, in the countries that first broke with com-
munism: Poland and Hungary. One hypothesis is that because of the relatively 
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large proportion of both nations’ populations engaged in the anti-communist 
opposition, in comparison to other countries such as Czechoslovakia, there 
was no need to provide additional legitimacy for the new political elites. 
 Lustration and decommunization in Poland became an issue when a real 
struggle began for the future social and institutional structure of the country. 
This shows that, contrary to the dominant perception, lustration and decom-
munization are not backward looking but forward looking. It also shows that 
lustration and decommunization were and are part of the political process 
and political struggle. The peculiar character of the post-communist “negoti-
ated revolution,” using the term coined by Laszlo Bruszt, when all elements of 
social life undergo radical change at the same time, represents a type of trans-
formation in which dealing with the past cannot be reduced to the question of 
what to do about the “hangman.” The very problem of dealing with the past 
in post-communist societies is not only about responding to gross violations 
of human rights through retributive justice, compensation and restitution of 
property, and truth telling. Lustration and decommunization became legal 
tools in the rearrangement of the constitutional setting of society and state. In 
the Polish case the lustration law became the main tool in the political struggle 
because other avenues, such as decommunization, were blocked. Lustration 
became a part of the pursuit of historical justice, but more importantly part 
of the struggle over social justice, over the criteria and rules of redistribution 
of the national product and national assets, when the losers in the economic 
transformation, who not long before comprised the main force in fighting 
against communism, discovered that the major beneficiaries of the transfor-
mation were former nomenklatura and members of security apparatuses. 
 Before 1989 there was no articulation of any ideas regarding decommu-
nization or other ways of dealing with the functionaries of the communist 
regime. Generally there were two groups with positions on the matter: 
• radicals, who believed that the collapse of communism would result 
from some sort of revolution and/or war and the problem would be 
solved by revolutionary justice; and
• evolutionists, who believed in the evolution of the communist system 
towards the incorporation of human rights and limited autonomy 
with preservation of the dominant position of the Communist Party. 
In this stream of political thought, there was no room even to enter-
tain the idea of dealing with the past.
The peculiar type of exit from communism in Poland, first through round-
table talks and then the partly free election on June 4, 1989, revealed that even 
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the communists were not conscious of the issue. They did not demand “sun-
set clauses” or general amnesty. They did not take charge of and destroy the 
files, as was the case in Chile where the archives of the special forces were 
destroyed in order to make it impossible to hold functionaries accountable 
before the courts in the future.
 The so-called contract parliament, elected on June 4 and 18, 1989 (in two 
rounds of voting), established an Extraordinary Parliamentary Commission 
headed by the young deputy from the former anti-communist opposition, Jan 
Maria Rokita, to examine the activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.42 The 
aim of Rokita’s commission was to investigate the deaths of almost one hun-
dred people who died in unexplained circumstances but always in the con-
text of the activity of secret services or communist militia during the 1980s. 
Nearly at the same time, another Extraordinary Parliamentary Commission 
was established to deal with the decision on October 30, 1988, of the last 
prime minister of the communist regime, Mieczysław Rakowski, to declare 
the bankruptcy of the Gdansk shipyard, which was the cradle of the Solidarity 
movement. It is possible to treat the work of this commission as a first step 
in settling accounts for the economic catastrophe of the communist regime 
in Poland. 
 After a celebrated article penned by Adam Michnik, entitled “Wasz prezy-
dent, nasz premier” (Your president, our prime minister), a domino effect 
began. First came the creation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s government, but with 
two important portfolios (internal affairs and defense) reserved for President 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski’s people. Despite a relatively fast departure from 
agreements achieved at the round-table talks (visible in the very act of cre-
ating a government that did not include the communist party), progress in 
decommunization has been very slow.
 Another attempt at decommunization was the government’s effort to 
determine the legal status of the property belonging to the Polish United 
Worker’s Party (Communist Party). Weeks after the establishment of the 
commission the party dismantled itself. The disappearance of one of the two 
parties to the agreement achieved at the round-table talks accelerated politi-
cal change in the country. This does not mean, however, that Mazowiecki’s 
government, which accepted a “thick-line” policy separating the past from the 
present,43 was active in the process of decommunization. The government 
was preoccupied with the economy, inflation, and foreign policy. At the same 
time, the opposition movement started to fragment. Decommunization was 
taken up by the Center Alliance [Porozumienie Centrum], organized by Jarosław 
Kaczyn´ski. One of the more interesting decommunization ideas circulated at 
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this time of economic misery and high inflation in Poland was to impose a 
special levy on all members of the former Communist Party. 
 On March 20, 1990, the government established a committee to examine 
the archives of the Ministry for Internal Affairs. It was a reaction to informa-
tion in the media that some files in the archives were being destroyed by the 
secret services. The establishment of the committee was not part of any holis-
tic concept of preservation of the legacy of the security apparatus, however, 
but a response to the media’s claim. The still-dominant part of the new ruling 
elite did not perceive the issue of dealing with the past. 
 In July 1990 a supplementary inquiry began regarding the brutal murder 
of Reverend Jerzy Popiełuszko by SB officers on October 19, 1984, near Toru´n. 
Then, in September of the same year, the prosecutor’s office of the armed 
forces began an inquiry into the massacre of workers in Gda´nsk in December 
1970. On November 9, 1990, the Parliament, by a small majority of 167 votes to 
120, adopted a law on the assumption of the property of the former Commu-
nist Party by the state treasury. As a symbolic act, one week later the building 
that had housed the Central Committee of the Communist Party was turned 
into bank offices, and became the location of the Warsaw stock exchange.
 Despite this accelerated political change, manifested by the dismissal on 
July 6, 1990, of two close associates of President Jaruzelski — General Florian 
Siwicki as minister of defense and General Czesław Kiszczak as minister of 
internal affairs — and the subsequent resignation of General Jaruzelski from 
the office of the president, decommunization policies and legislative activities 
progressed very slowly. This was not because of the government alone; pub-
lic opinion was deeply divided over the issue. According to a public opinion 
survey conducted in November 1990, 42% of respondents supported a ban on 
former communists holding public office, while 45.5% were against such poli-
cies. In September 1991, 52% of respondents were against depriving the former 
communists of the right to hold public office. It appears that at the beginning 
of the period of economic austerity, a significant part of Polish society sup-
ported the presence of communists in the new democratic polity. 
 An important measure of historical retributive justice came in the form of 
a statute of April 4, 1991, which established “Stalinist crimes” as crimes com-
mitted between 1939 and 1956 against ethnic Poles or against Polish citizens 
of other ethnic origin. Stalinist crimes were not subject to the statute of limi-
tations. The same statute also established the main Commission for Inquiry 
into Crimes against the Polish Nation, based on the former Commission for 
Inquiry into Nazi Crimes, which stimulated new inquiries. Between 1991 and 
1995 the commission initiated 950 new inquiries and completed 620. Despite 
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the large number of inquiries, however, the courts received a very small num-
ber of indictments. Prosecution was often abandoned for lack of satisfactory 
documents and the impossibility of identifying perpetrators. If the trials actu-
ally started, they were prolonged, to the frustration of former victims. For 
instance, the trial of a high-ranking official in the Ministry of Public Security 
between 1945 and 1954, Colonel Adam Humer, and his colleagues accused 
of torture, only ended with a verdict at first instance after nearly three years 
(September 1993 to March 1996). So far approximately twenty verdicts have 
been reached. 
 A statute of February 23, 1991, focused on victims and annulled verdicts 
passed between 1944 and 1956 for activity aimed at the independence of the 
Polish state. This statute contained provisions for compensation for victims 
of communist crimes. On August 25, 1998, another statute denied pension 
privileges to judges and prosecutors who, between 1944 and 1956, were func-
tionaries of the apparatus of repression, that is, worked in the military admin-
istration of justice, secret court divisions, or so-called ad hoc courts. 
 It has been, and to some extent remains, nearly impossible to apply crimi-
nal justice in relation to crimes committed by communist state functionaries 
after 1956, which do not fall into the category of Stalinist crimes. Trials in such 
cases became possible with the adoption of the legal provision that the statute 
of limitations for crimes committed by public functionaries prior to Decem-
ber 31, 1989, started on January 1, 1990. An additional statute of May 31, 1996, 
forbidding the application of amnesties granted by the communist People’s 
Republic of Poland for functionaries who committed crimes, eliminated any 
doubts about the legal status of those crimes. 
 From the point of view of public opinion, however, these trials have been 
very long and extremely slow. For instance, in the case of the members of the 
Motorized Detachment of the Civic Militia [Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji 
Obywatelskiej] (ZOMO) platoon, who took part in pacification of the Wujek 
coal mine in which striking miners were killed, an indictment was filed with 
the court in December 1992, fourteen months after the inquiry was closed. In 
November 1997, six years after the beginning of the trial, the court found the 
former functionaries not guilty. But this was not the end of the procedure; 
there were appeals and the Supreme Court sent the matter back to the lower 
court. The trials are still continuing.44 A sort of breakthrough occurred when 
the former minister of internal affairs, General Czesław Kiszczak, was found 
responsible on March 17, 2004, for the deaths of the miners. It was the first 
time that a high functionary of the communist state was found guilty and 
sentenced by the court. 
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 Similarly, the inquiry into the case of the massacres in December 1970 in 
Gda´nsk began in October 1990, but an indictment was not filed with the court 
until April 1995, and the trials started three years later due to the absence of 
the accused. It is still ongoing. 
 A special case concerns the issue of the responsibility of General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski for the implementation of martial law on December 13, 1981. Despite 
the fact that Parliament declared the implementation of martial law illegal, 
the procedure against General Jaruzelski before the parliamentary Commit-
tee for Constitutional Responsibility was discontinued on February 13, 1996, 
after four years of procedure. In April 2006 the prosecutor’s office presented 
charges against General Jaruzelski in connection with this matter. 
 At the same time, the self-purification of state institutions was very slow 
and minimal. With the reorganization of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and dismantling of the SB, fourteen thousand out of twenty-four thousand 
functionaries decided to undergo the verification procedure [weryfikacja], or 
vetting procedure, required for readmission to the services45 (ten thousand 
decided not to apply). Ten thousand applicants qualified for further employ-
ment, and about four thousand became functionaries in the new State Secu-
rity Office [Urza˛d Ochrony Pan´stura] (UOP). The procedure was carried out by 
qualification commissions, which were mandated to disqualify applicants 
who, as functionaries of former intelligence or counterintelligence services in 
the previous regime, had violated the law or the human rights or dignity of 
other persons, or had used their position for private gain.
 The qualification commissions operated at the voivodeship level and at the 
central state level as appeals commissions. They were comprised of MPs, 
senators, lawyers and representatives from police headquarters, members of 
the Solidarity trade union, and other trustworthy citizens. Criticism of the 
verification procedure came mainly from the former Communist Party in the 
Sejm. The commissioner for citizens’ rights (ombudsman) at the time, Ewa 
łe˛towska, also criticized the procedure for violating the human rights of the 
former functionaries.46 After the completion of the verification procedure, 
two-thirds of the operational staff of the newly established UOP came from 
the pre-1989 Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of the disqualified former 
secret services operatives found employment in regular police forces and pri-
vate security agencies.
 Regular police forces and military intelligence were not subjected to the 
verification procedure. Military intelligence was reorganized and reduced in 
size, but the entire process was not subject to any external control. 
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 Verification of public prosecutors was based on the evaluation of their 
declarations of professional qualifications and activities. If the Ministry of Jus-
tice found the declaration to be false, the prosecutor was not reappointed. In 
1990, 10% of public prosecutors, that is 341 people, lost their jobs as a result of 
national verification. In the office of the general prosecutor, 33% of the staff 
lost their jobs.47 The process itself was quick and effective, but was criticized 
by the post-communist party for breaching the rule of law. Following com-
plaints made to the commissioner for citizens’ rights concerning the lack of 
an appeals mechanism, the Ministry of Justice set up a commission to review 
appeals; it overturned decisions in forty-eight cases. 
 There is also the issue of access to secret police files. In 1992 Germany 
became the first former communist country to open up secret police files to 
citizens. Other post-communist countries followed and passed similar legis-
lation, such as Hungary in 1994 and Bulgaria in 1998. This was not possible 
everywhere, however, from an economic and organizational point of view. In 
Poland the issue was discussed only in 1997 in connection with a presidential 
lustration law project in which it was suggested that a civic archive be estab-
lished within the framework of the state archives. In the wake of the September 
1997 election, this idea was absorbed into the Law on the Institute of National 
Remembrance [Ustawa o Instytucie Pamieci Narodowej], which was introduced 
in July 2000. The law regulates access of interested persons to information 
collected about them by the secret services between 1944 and 1989. In an 
opinion poll conducted in December 1997, 73% of respondents supported the 
view that each citizen should have access to his/her file, and 11% supported the 
opposite opinion. Many interested citizens will not find a file on themselves 
because the archives of the Office for the Protection of the State and then the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration preserved only about three 
million files on citizens. The Law on the Institute for National Remembrance 
granted the prosecutor of the institute the same procedural rights as public 
prosecutors. The institute started work on the communist period in Poland 
and has begun to play an important role in the lustration process due to the 
fact that all files are in its archives. 
 In this broad context of decommunization, lustration plays a peculiar and 
crucial role. It can be said that transformation itself is decommunization. This 
is true, but with the reservation that the post-communist structure is still in 
the process of solidifying itself, and the networks of communist connections 
influence public life mainly through their impact on the design and operation 
of the new institutions. In this way, the interests of the former nomenklatura 
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networks become embedded in the new political setting. This is why in the 
Polish case lustration was and is a battlefront. Post-communist forces sup-
ported it, but presented it as a normal clearance procedure as would exist in 
any democratic country. Anti-communists saw it as a limited tool for under-
mining a post-communist structure still controlled by the former nomenkla-
tura and secret services. 
 Since the parliamentary and presidential elections in November 2004, 
there has been talk about broadening the scope of lustration to include other 
professional groups, such as academics, as well as simplifying the procedure. 
One development is a new process of scrutiny within the Catholic Church 
in Poland — based on a sui generis lustration procedure. With the victory of 
pro-lustration political parties and declarations by the new government that 
it wants to change the law in order to broaden the process, it looks as if the 
lustration odyssey is not finished yet, sixteen years after the beginning of the 
transformation.
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applies to the screening of persons seeking to occupy (or actually occupying) certain 
public positions for evidence of involvement with the communist regime (mainly with 
the secret security apparatus), while ‘decommunisation’ refers to the exclusion of cer-
tain categories of ex-Communist officials from the right to run for, and occupy, certain 
public positions in the new system. However, in the public debate on the moral and 
legal rationales for and against the policies covered by these concepts, the two have 
been often lumped together.” Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts. A Study of Consti-
tutional Courts in Postcommunist States of Central and Eastern Europe (Dodrecht: Springer, 
2005), 245. For further analysis of the decommunization issue in Poland, see Bronisław 
Wildstein, Dekomunizacja której nie było (Kraków: Os´rodek Mys´li Politycznej i Ksie˛garnia 
Akademicka, 2000). 
3  The description of a political party as “post-communist” means that it existed in and 
was part of the communist political system. A general typology within the Polish party 
system is a division between post-communist parties and post-Solidarity parties. The 
two main post-communist parties were the Democratic Left Alliance [Sojusz Lewicy 
Demokratyczej] and the Polish Country Party [Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe].
4  For a detailed history of the debate about the lustration issue in Poland, see the recently 
published book by Piotr Grzelak, Wojna o lustracje (War around lustration) (Warszawa: 
Trio, 2005). For an overview of the main points of not only lustration but “dealing with 
the past” in Poland, see Noel Calhoun, Dilemmas of Justice in Eastern Europe’s Democratic 
Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 92–131; on lustration, see 104–6 and 122–20.
5  For an example of the role of secret services in the communist society, see Ewa Mat-
kowska, System. Obywatel NRD pod nadzorem tajnych słuz˙b (Kraków: Arcana, 2003).
6  Józef Oleksy, when he was prime minister, was accused by Mielczanowski, at the time 
the minister of internal affairs, of being an agent for the Soviet Union’s intelligence.
7  For more on the history of that department, with a staff of nineteen people led by 
twenty-six-year-old Piotr Woyciechowski, see Michał Grocki, Konfidenci sa˛  ws´ród nas. . . 
(Warszawa: Editions Spotkania, 1993). 
8  For a history of this drama in context, see Antoni Dudek, Pierwsze lata III RP 1989–2001 
(Krakow: Wydawnictwo Arcana, 2002), 257–69.
9  After 1989 unified oppositional forces fragmented into many political parties and 
movements. Parties that arose from the opposition and Solidarity are usually referred 
to as being post-Solidarity. This does not mean that post-Solidarity parties share 
the same ideology. They share only the same genealogy. Two liberal post-Solidarity 
CZARNOTA
256
parties were the Democratic Union [Unia Demokratycza], under the leadership of 
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called Maciarewicz list, on which Wałe˛sa’s name was mentioned. 
13  For an analysis of techniques used in the media to compromise lustration, see Radosław 
Sojak, “Demaskowani i wykluczeni. Dyskurs antylustracyjny w Polsce w swietle soc-
jologii wiedzy,” Terazniejszos´ c´ Czlowiek Edukacja, no. 2 (1998): 29–59. 
14  See Annna Potocka-Hoser, “Spor o lustracje — komunikacja bez porozumienia,” Kul-
tura i Społeczen´stwo, no. 2 (1996): 163–182, 178.
15  For an overview of the main features of the four drafts, see the table on pages 199 
and 200 in Ewa Bieniek, “Lustracja w krajach Europy Srodkowo-Wschodniej,” in 
Zagadnienia konstytucjonalizmu krajów Europy S´rodkowo-Wschodniej, ed. Tadeusz Mołdawa 
(Warszawa: Elipsa, 2003).
16  Before his successful presidential election, Kwas´niewski was a leader of the post- 
communist party and before 1989 he was one of the secretaries of the Central Commit-
tee of the Polish Communist Party [Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza] (PZPR).
17  Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of October 21, 1998 [Wyrok Trybunału Konsty-
tucyjnego z dnia 21 pazdziernika 1998 r.] and Decision of the Constitutional Tribunal of 
November 10, 1998 [Wyrok Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 10 listopada 1998 r.], Przegla˛ d 
Sejmowy, nr 6 (1988), 172.
18  The minority opinion criticized the amendment and wanted to invalidate the clause on 
substantive not procedural grounds. For instance, the president of the Constitutional 
Tribunal, Marek Safjan, argued in his dissenting opinion that the exemption of those 
who did not endanger other people’s rights and freedoms would introduce highly 
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chapter 7
lustration as Political Competition: 
Vetting in hungary
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vetting legislation and context
hISTORICAl ANd POlITICAl CONTExT
There is no record of vetting, or lustration,1 having been explicitly considered 
during the round table talks in 1989 at which Hungary’s transition from a 
communist regime to a democratic system was negotiated. Although Gyula 
Horn, prime minister during 1994–98, would claim that the 1990 lustration 
bill violated a “gentlemen’s agreement” reached during the negotiations to 
the effect that there would be no persecution of communist-era figures, there 
is no evidence to support his claim and many other participants in the talks 
denied that there had been such a deal. Rather, Brigid Fowler suggests that: 
historical justice might be seen as having fallen through a gap left in 
the mechanisms and politics of Hungary’s immediate transition: it was 
too large an issue, too clearly demanding of democratic legitimacy to 
be settled via elite pact while the transition itself was still in doubt; but 
it was too small and time-specific to be regulated explicitly in the new 
republic’s protected basic laws.2
Lustration was not a very prominent issue around the time of the transition 
or indeed in later years. Nevertheless, some specific incidents raised early 
fears about the security services and their possible continued influence in the 
new system: 
• In late 1989, a secret police officer told the Hungarian opposition that 
some opposition figures were still under surveillance, despite institu-
tional reforms that should have prohibited such activity. At the same 
time, it emerged that huge numbers of security service files has been 
deliberately destroyed.3 This became known as the “Danubegate” 
scandal and was a major factor in motivating both the public and the 
opposition political parties — the Alliance of Free Democrats [Szabad 
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Demokratak Szovetsege] (SZDSZ) in particular — to demand that the 
role of the secret services be curbed. 
• In fall 1990, the interior minister revealed to the Parliament’s National 
Security Committee that a list existed comprising former secret police 
informers, and that several current MPs were on it. This sparked con-
cerns about the moral probity and potential vulnerability to blackmail 
of contemporary politicians.
Hence, the first calls for lustration arose in response to fears that the com-
munist state’s security services retained influence even under the new dem-
ocratic system, and that the existence of documents and files relating to the 
agent network and security services operations during the communist era 
might disrupt the functioning of the new democratic system. The motivation 
for lustration in Hungary was thus initially to prevent blackmail and other 
abuses in contemporary politics. Only later, post-1995, did the debate become 
more concerned with a general moral cleansing. 
 Claus Offe4 has distinguished between “backward-looking justice” and 
“forward-looking justification” as two motivations for lustration. The latter 
category is concerned more with ensuring that the legacy of the past does not 
disrupt democracy in the future.5 In Offe’s model, both of the major factors 
creating a demand for lustration in Hungary — at least at the elite level — were 
essentially forward looking and aimed at ensuring the healthy functioning of 
the new democracy. 
 By contrast, much of the literature on lustration in Central and Eastern 
Europe focuses on backward-looking explanations. Two main models are put 
forward:
(1) One model, proposed by John P. Moran,6 argues that the conduct 
of the communist regime, in particular its attitude towards dissent, 
explains the strength of post-transition demands for lustration. If a 
communist regime strongly suppressed dissent, the model postu-
lates that there will be greater pressure from the public for lustra-
tion — as a kind of release mechanism or a way of “settling scores.” 
On the basis of this model, Moran predicted that Hungary, having 
had a relatively moderate (post-1956) communist regime under János 
Kádár,7 was less likely to engage in lustration or to pursue lustration 
energetically than, for example, Czechoslovakia or East Germany, 
where repression had been more forceful. 
(2) The other main model, outlined by Samuel Huntington,8 argues 
that the way in which the transition from democracy occurred is the 
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primary variable affecting subsequent lustration efforts. If the non-
democratic regime handed over power peacefully and as a result of 
calm negotiations or bargaining among the old and new elites, the 
model predicts a lower likelihood of subsequent lustration. If by 
contrast the nondemocratic regime’s exit had to be forced, lustration 
activity is expected to be more likely and more intense. Huntington 
predicted that Hungary would not pursue transitional justice; and 
indeed that only Romania and East Germany would.
Both models imply an understanding of lustration as a form of “punishment” 
for members of the old regime seen to have transgressed a moral law, rather 
than as a way of establishing a clean slate for the future. 
 A further model, put forward by Helga A. Welsh,9 is the first to consider 
the politics of the present as an important factor. She draws attention to the 
process of creating the legislation, giving proper significance to the fact that 
the post-transition elite plays a critical role in shaping the lustration debate 
and the legislation that eventually emerges. Welsh is concerned mainly with 
the level of turnover of the elite, that is, whether the Communist Party or its 
successor remained in power — or in an influential political position — after 
the first democratic elections. In this way, Welsh’s analysis complements 
those of Moran and Huntington, since the interests of the post-transition elite 
are partly determined by the character of the former regime and the way in 
which it handed over power. 
 According to Welsh, two conditions are necessary for a radical and enthu-
siastic pursuit of lustration: refusal by an orthodox communist regime to bar-
gain with the opposition until faced with mass protests; and the communists’ 
loss of influence in the early post-transition period. Given that the transfer of 
power in Hungary was peaceful and negotiated and that the socialists then 
lost power and became the official opposition in the first Parliament, Welsh 
would not expect early or vigorous attempts to pursue lustration in Hungary. 
It is arguable whether or not this fits the reality: while demands for a lustra-
tion law did occur both in 1990 and consistently over the following years, the 
passage of a law was significantly delayed until the end of the first Parliament 
in 1994 and lustration was thereafter implemented in a rather patchy and 
reluctant manner. 
 In defense of Welsh, one might question whether there was really full elite 
turnover in Hungary. Although the first elected government did not include 
the Socialist Party [Magyar Szocialista Párt] (MSZP) but rather comprised three 
other parties — the Hungarian Democratic Forum [Magyar Demokrata Fórum] 
(MDF), the Christian Democrats [Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt] (KNDP), and 
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the Independent Smallholders [Független Kisgazdapárt] (FKGP) — there has 
been much speculation and a certain amount of evidence to suggest that sig-
nificant numbers of these parties’ MPs had worked as secret agents for the 
former regime. Hence, while the communists lost influence in Hungary, per-
sons likely to be personally affected by lustration laws did continue to occupy 
critical positions of political influence. It is thus possible that the existence of 
vested interests in the government militated against the passage of a robust 
lustration law. This may explain why Hungary’s first post-transition prime 
minister, József Antall (MDF), adopted a strategy of “promising but not deliv-
ering lustration.”10 The communist-successor party, the MSZP, was also simi-
larly reluctant to lustrate for obvious reasons.
 Welsh argued that over time the issue of lustration could become politi-
cized such that accusations of a “less than honorable” past would be used as 
a political tool in the competition for power. This has indeed been the case in 
Hungary, and partly accounts for the fact that lustration remained a relatively 
high-profile issue even fourteen years after the transition began. Moreover, 
the fear of such abuses was a key motive for drafting the first Hungarian lus-
tration law. 
 Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak, and Brigid Fowler11 build on Welsh’s 
model to explore in what circumstances lustration is instrumentalized as 
part of the political game and to consider the motives and tactics of the advo-
cates of lustration, in order to explain how political competition affects the 
process. They suggest other present and future-oriented factors that help to 
explain the emergence and consistent renewal of demands for lustration. Cen-
tral to their explanation is an account of the transformation of the political 
Right in Central and Eastern Europe during the post-transition period. The 
Right has in many countries, and certainly in Hungary, gradually redefined 
its identity — largely as a response to the fact that former communists did not 
disappear from the political arena but rather managed to remain as viable 
competitors for power. In Hungary, by 1998, anticommunist rhetoric was a 
key factor in the election campaign of the right-wing Fidesz-Hungarian Civic 
Party [Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Párt] (Fidesz–MPP) and apparently an important 
reason for its electoral victory. Fidesz subsequently extended the reach of the 
lustration law while in government in 2000, and has consistently employed 
anticommunist rhetoric in criticizing its main rival, the MSZP.
 Williams et al. also show that attitudes towards lustration across Central 
Europe in recent years have been shaped largely by the policy on lustration in 
the early years of the post-transition period; that is, that views of lustration 
are formed partly in reaction to the experience of lustration. Thus, in the mid-
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1990s some right-wing advocates of lustration in Hungary sought to attribute 
the Czech Republic’s apparent post-transition success to its thorough lustra-
tion policy. Within Hungary, FKGP calls for its own members’ lustration and 
later for a lustration law may have reflected a perceived need to avert suspicion 
aroused by rumors about the past of its own party leaders and parliamentar-
ians. Such rumors were facilitated by the absence of a thorough lustration in 
the early years, which might have ensured that nobody then active in Parlia-
ment could have had a secret past.
 In addition, public opinion surveys suggest that there has been a consis-
tent demand for some kind of lustration policy from the Hungarian popula-
tion. Indeed, over the period 1992–2002, around 50% of the population sup-
ported the publication of information about former secret agents.12 Since the 
lustration law that was adopted has in most cases not led to public disclo-
sure, this raises questions about the extent to which it has served the public 
interest.
 Williams et al. point out that none of these factors is much related to 
the nature of the preceding communist regime or the nature of exit from 
it. Rather, they argue that in Hungary “security and transparency concerns 
among some liberals, and the pursuit of an anti-Communist agenda by mal-
contents on the radical right” were the main factors generating pressures for a 
lustration law after 1990.13
 The question of why Hungary chose to introduce lustration rather than 
another form of transitional justice — criminal prosecution, amnesty, or a 
truth commission, for example — is tackled by Cynthia M. Horne and Mar-
garet Levi. They argue that in Central and Eastern Europe, the fact that such a 
large proportion of the population was involved with the communist security 
services makes it “difficult to assess blame.”14 Put more bluntly, this would 
presumably also reduce overall willingness to punish involvement. How-
ever, it is not clear whether a large proportion of the population was indeed 
involved or whether this is a myth. Perhaps more relevant is the spread of 
informers throughout different social groups, meaning that there is no one 
cohesive group with an ax to grind against the other, as has been more clearly 
the case in countries where ethnicity or race have been factors, for example, 
South Africa.
 Perhaps the most interesting and ironic reason offered by Horne and Levi 
for the adoption of lustration in Central and Eastern Europe is their argument 
of path dependency — that is, “purging” those disloyal to the Communist Party 
was commonplace throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Indeed, 
the Czech word “lustrace” was used by the Czech secret police for conducting 
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checks on citizens’ loyalty to the Communist Party. In this explanation, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe is trapped by its communist past even in the methods 
it uses to try to overcome it. 
 Finally, Horne and Levi suggest that lustration became the dominant form 
of transitional justice used in Central and Eastern Europe simply because once 
it had been adopted as the strategy of choice by Czechoslovakia, other coun-
tries chose to mimic the policy — to lesser or greater degrees — rather than opt 
for an original or different solution.
 The major alternative to lustration considered in Hungary was the “Justitia” 
plan put forward by the MDF and made public in August 1990. It argued that 
“those who were responsible for Hungary’s catastrophic situation” should not 
be in a better position under the new democratic system than those who were 
not, and called for, among other things, the bringing to account of this group 
via criminal proceedings. The full scope of the plan was much broader, aim-
ing to curtail the ability of the former political elite to convert its power into 
economic capital, for example, by reducing the pensions of pre-1990 politi-
cal office holders and regulating the highest wages at state-owned companies. 
As noted by Fowler, this plan relied on a perception that the whole post-1956 
period, including the transition, had systematically privileged communist 
elites. It represented the Right’s frustration at the continued influence of com-
munist elites and its own inability to achieve its goals. 
 The main outcome of the Justitia plan was a bill proposed by Zsolt Zétényi 
and Péter Takács of the MDF, concerning the prosecution of criminal offenses 
committed during the communist era. The law provided that the statute of 
limitations start anew on May 2, 1990, for the crimes of treason, voluntary 
manslaughter, and infliction of bodily harm resulting in death, but only in 
those cases where “the state’s failure to prosecute the said offenses was based 
on political reasons.” Zétényi and Takács did not have the full support even of 
their own party, but given the fragility of the coalition may have been allowed 
to pursue the law as part of a political deal with the less fervent anticommu-
nists in MDF.15 In the law that was eventually passed, actions that had been 
legal in the communist system were not criminalized. Rather, the statute of 
limitations was extended only for previously defined crimes where prosecu-
tions had been blocked by the communist regime. The Constitutional Court 
later struck down the law on the grounds that, in the post-transition constitu-
tional rule of law state, it violated legal security since there should be no pun-
ishment without a valid law in effect at the time. This distinction between what 
was valid in the post-transition “constitutional state” and the communist-era 
“nonconstitutional state” would also figure in debates about lustration.
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lEgISlATION ANd dEBATE
Given the high level of politicization of the lustration debate in Hungary, we 
find it relevant to organize the following account of the various legislative ini-
tiatives according to the parliamentary terms in which they were introduced. 
Each section begins with a short description of the composition of the gov-
ernment and opposition at the time.
1990–94
The first parliamentary election in 1990 brought to power a governing coali-
tion of three center-right parties: the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), 
the Christian Democrats (KNDP), and the Independent Smallholders Party 
(FKGP). The communist-successor party, the MSZP, suffered a major defeat 
and hence the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) constituted the largest 
opposition party. The other main opposition party was Fidesz, which at that 
time was a liberal party. The governing coalition had a small majority and 
was rather fragile, creating “a persistent need to make various special deals 
with the various factions who were threatening to withhold their crucial 
votes from the government program.”16 The path of the lustration debate and 
resulting policy was shaped partly by such deals. 
 Although the government was composed of parties that had been loudly 
opposed to the communist state-party system, the first draft law aiming to 
resolve the problem of how to treat the agents and files of the former secu-
rity organizations was tabled by Gábor Demszky and Péter Hack, two MPs 
from the opposition SZDSZ, in October 1990. This Draft No. 482 set out three 
objectives: 
• to advance “the purity of democratic public life evolving after the 
transition”; 
• to put a restraint on the ability to participate in politics and public life 
of “persons who, acting on behalf of the organization [the Ministry 
of Interior Section III, Directorate III, the department responsible for 
internal protection17] played unambiguously political roles in the for-
mer regime”; and 
• to forestall “incidental abuses,” that is, the risk that, owing to a lack of 
security concerning the storage of files at the Ministry of Interior, con-
fidentiality could not be guaranteed and information might be leaked 
into the public sphere.
The activities regarded as relevant were service as a top-secret officer or a net-
work member.18
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 According to the draft bill, a register was to be compiled of all the people 
who had served as top-secret officers or network members for the III/III. One 
copy of the register would be held by the prime minister, another by the presi-
dent, and a third by the Parliament’s National Security Committee. The presi-
dent was then to disclose the names of those people on the list who were also 
in positions of public office. Prior to this act of disclosure, the bill required 
that the persons concerned should be informed that their names were on the 
register. The affected persons would then have the right to renounce their 
public office, in which case their involvement with III/III would not be made 
public, or to dispute the authenticity of the data by making an appeal in the 
courts — in which case the court would conduct a review of the evidence. 
 The names of the affected persons would thus be disclosed only if the 
authenticity of the data was proved (or unchallenged) and they chose to 
remain in their positions. In this way, the bill aimed at a lustration policy that 
was essentially without official sanction, other than the threat of disclosure, 
although the implicit expectation was that most affected individuals would 
resign rather than face public outcry. This focus on disclosure was to become 
the essence of the Hungarian lustration policy. Without actively prohibiting 
former collaborators from conducting public roles, the bill aimed to create a 
situation whereby the public could be sure that those serving in public office 
either had not worked as informers or, if they had, that the matter was com-
mon knowledge.
 The terms and conditions set out in the bill were very much the product 
of the political circumstances in which it was created. Prior to the munici-
pal elections in the fall of 1990, a conflict developed between the two largest 
parties in the Parliament: the MDF and the SZDSZ. A rumor emerged that 
the government wanted to use the former security service files in its posses-
sion to discredit the opposition before the elections, and in the conflict-ridden 
political atmosphere, this seemed credible.19 The bill’s primary aim was thus 
to prevent such abuse of the documents and it more or less fulfilled this task. 
 Although the draft was voted down by the government, it nevertheless 
created pressure for a lustration policy of some kind. Thus, on May 13, 1991, 
the government tabled its own bill on lustration: Bill No. 2294. The preamble 
set out “the promotion of the transparency of the democratic state” as the aim 
of the legislation. 
 Parliament started to debate the draft more than half a year later, on 
November 26, 1991. More than 250 amendments were accepted, though the 
bill consisted of only eight paragraphs. Given the number of amendments, 
the government asked to take back the draft for revision on June 22, 1992. The 
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government finally handed in its revised draft in the fall of 1993. The debate 
lasted until spring 1994 and the bill eventually adopted by Parliament came 
into force only on April 5, 1994. The vetting process was to be carried out by 
two or more Lustration Commissions each comprised of three judges. Three 
of the six judges for the first two Lustration Commissions were finally elected 
on April 7, 1994, the last day of the Parliament that had been elected in 1990. 
 The law, Act XXIII of 1994, retained the essential features of the Demszky-
Hack draft. The public positions to be vetted were defined in the second sec-
tion and included a broad sweep of offices from parliamentarians to senior 
public administrators (the categories are discussed in detail in the third sec-
tion of this chapter). The investigation process was intended to establish 
whether these individuals had performed one or more of the activities defined 
in section 1 of the act: that is, whether they had served as career officers,20 top-
secret officers, or network members of III/III; had been in a position in which 
they received information collected by III/III; had been a member of the fascist 
Arrow Cross Party [Nyilaskeresztes Párt];21 or had served as detachment police 
during the revolution of 1956. These were the past activities deemed relevant 
for vetting. 
 After carrying out the investigation (i.e., the process of vetting), the 
Lustration Commission could issue one of three types of decisions:
 
(a) a declaratory decision that the vetted person did perform the activity; 
(b) a dispensational decision (i.e., where incriminating data was found 
but there was insufficient evidence to prove the activity according to 
the law22); or 
(c) a decision on terminating the procedure (for example, because an 
individual resigned from office during the procedure or his or her 
mandate ended during the procedure). 
Those persons who underwent vetting but about whom no data was found 
(i.e., the majority of those vetted) received a letter to that effect. The individ-
uals to undergo vetting were also informed about the investigation when it 
commenced and were invited to provide information in hearings. 
 In sum, if the investigation found that persons had been involved in the 
relevant activities defined in section 1 of the law, they were given the oppor-
tunity to resign from their public position. If they chose to resign, the infor-
mation about their past was not made public. If they chose not to resign, the 
court issued a decision of type (a), but the individuals could retain their post. 
The only sanction of the law was thus the threat of disclosure. However, there 
was an expectation, when the law was drafted and passed, that individuals 
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found “guilty” would resign their office rather than face the disclosure of their 
past. Individuals undergoing vetting had ample opportunity to appeal the 
commission’s findings before they were published and to deliberate over their 
personal course of action should their involvement with III/III be established. 
The law therefore did not apply to people whose names were on the list, but 
who did not occupy the sort of offices defined in section 2 of the law (these 
aspects of the process are further elaborated in the next section of this chap-
ter). If the law does not regulate otherwise, the procedure of the commission 
is based on the 1996 Administrative Procedure Act (Act No. LXVII of 1996). 
 The repeated delays in finalizing the lustration law meant that Members 
of Parliament elected in 1990 effectively escaped lustration. The reason for the 
delay is debatable. Some argue that it simply took time to make a good law. 
Others, including Iván Szabó, former minister of the 1990–94 government, 
argue that the MDF-led government intentionally sought to delay the bill 
because the MDF would have lost its parliamentary majority if its own MPs 
had been vetted, since a large number would have been forced to resign.23
 Six months after the law was passed, the Constitutional Court proclaimed 
the main provisions of the law unconstitutional. Its 60/1994 (XII.24) AB adju-
dication raised two main questions in connection with the law and called on 
the Parliament to eliminate the unconstitutional parts of the law by Septem-
ber 30, 1995. 
 First, the Constitutional Court stated that the law was unconstitutionally 
arbitrary in the criterion used to define those who should undergo lustration, 
leading to unconstitutional discrimination between the groups obliged to 
undergo vetting and those free from such requirements. The court ruled that 
the groups liable for vetting should be selected according to a single principle, 
which was subsequently defined by Parliament (see the following two sections).
 Second, the court held that the law was unconstitutional in that it “failed 
to ensure the exercise of the right of informational self-determination,24 espe-
cially the involved person’s right to inspect his personal data.” As Halmai 
notes, prior to the passage of the lustration law, both the right of informa-
tional self-determination and the right of public access to legitimately pub-
lic data were strongly upheld by the Constitution.25 The lustration law pitted 
the two principles against each other. To resolve the issue, the Constitutional 
Court held that public persons have a smaller sphere of personal privacy than 
other individuals in a democratic state. 
 The court’s two objections were addressed by Parliament’s decision on the 
principle according to which individuals could be identified as liable for vet-
ting and by modifications to the law.
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1994–98
The government was defeated in the 1994 elections and the MSZP came to 
power in coalition with the smaller SZDSZ, thereby forming a center-left 
government led by Prime Minister Gyula Horn. 
 The new government was slow to present a new draft to Parliament, hence 
its law on lustration (Act LXVII) finally came into force in 1996, more than 
six months after the deadline laid down by the Constitutional Court. The law 
established the legal conditions for exercising the right of informational self-
determination, primarily by creating the Historical Office. All documents of 
the III/III career officers not relevant to the contemporary national security 
services — because of their data contents — were to be placed in this office 
(section 25/A (1)). All citizens had the right to apply for access to information 
regarding themselves. 
 The glaring problem with this solution is that the task of deciding what 
kind of data should be given to the Historical Office was entirely entrusted to 
the present national security services. It is therefore based on the — arguably 
highly unrealistic — assumption that a secret agency would label some of its 
own data redundant. While it might be acceptable that the proven interest of 
the present-day secret services can constitutionally limit the attainment of 
data, an appropriate guarantee procedure is required for the definition of the 
exceptions. This can only be ensured by court procedure. 
 According to the intention of the legislature, the law would have expired 
on June 30, 2000. However, the law has since been extended and the vetting 
process continues at the time of writing, in spring 2006. 
1998–2002
The center-right Fidesz-MPP won the 1998 elections and formed a govern-
ment with the MDF and the FKGP, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Fidesz 
had moved progressively to the right in the years before this election and con-
tinued to do so during its term in office. 
 In November 1998, László Csúcs MP (FKGP) handed in a new draft (T/378), 
which would have extended lustration to the upper ranks of the media, refer-
ring to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court decision 60/1994 (XII.24) AB, 
according to which the lustration of those participating in “shaping the pub-
lic opinion” is constitutional and reasonable. This proved highly problematic, 
since neither the Constitutional Court nor any of the existing laws allows a 
clear determination of which persons take part in influencing public opinion 
(as discussed further in the third section of this chapter). Csúcs finally with-
drew his draft but some of his ideas were incorporated into the government’s 
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subsequent draft. In 2000, Parliament adopted Act XCIII, which extended sig-
nificantly the list of those who should go through lustration, compared to the 
modification in 1996 and the original law of 1994. The new categories were 
mainly media representatives, although the problem remained that there was 
no law from which the concept of direct or indirect influence of public opin-
ion could be derived. 
 The next amendment, enshrined in Act LXVII of 2001, made essen-
tial changes in the legal status of the Historical Office, converting it into an 
archive where the documents of the present public security organizations 
should also be placed as well as the documents of the former public security 
organizations. In this way, the documents of the secret services of the (post-
communist) constitutional state and the (communist) nonconstitutional state 
were brought together. 
2002 onwards
On June 18, 2002, it was disclosed that current Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy 
had served as a top-secret officer of the former III/II directorate (counterintel-
ligence) of the communist-era Ministry of Interior. The scandal showed that 
the legislation in force was inadequate to ensure the purity of post-transition 
public life. Under the weight of intense press coverage and opposition pres-
sure, the government tabled two new drafts (T/541 and T/542) in an effort to 
finally settle the issue. 
 The main aims of draft T/541 (subsequently adopted on December 23, 
2002) were to establish a new Public Security Services’ History Archive 
(hereafter, the Archive), and to bring together all the documents of all of the 
security service directorates in that one location. In addition, the law makes 
the documents available, thus facilitating the exercise of the victims’ right of 
informational self-determination, but this followed the procedure already set 
out in the 1996 law.26 
 The aim of the legislation was therefore not so much to hone the process of 
vetting those in public positions, but rather to focus on how the state should 
deal with the information gathered by the past regime’s public security ser-
vices. The law set out the state’s role in providing or withholding information 
that might contribute to revealing the past; the need to reveal the past was 
held to be relevant primarily in the cause of compensating victims, as well as 
facilitating scientific understanding — that is, assisting historians in their aca-
demic pursuits. 
 One proposed amendment suggested that, if the legislature finds it rea-
sonable to reveal the functioning of the public security services thoroughly 
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and in detail, it could consider establishing a Public Security Commission 
of Enquiry — along the lines of a truth commission — to deal with the whole 
issue of lustration. However, this suggestion was rejected.
 Draft bill T/542 had rather different aims. Whereas T/541 took a fairly broad 
approach to revealing the past, with its emphasis on organizing the documents 
of the security services and making them available for the purposes of better 
understanding history, T/542 was more concerned with cleansing. It focused 
on people active in contemporary political life and sought to understand 
whether any hidden interests or agendas — relating to their conduct under the 
communist regime — might underlie their current actions. One controversial 
feature of T/542 was its suggestion that church leaders were liable for vetting, 
on the grounds that, like media representatives, they influence public opinion 
and undertake public tasks — and indeed receive significant financing from 
taxpayers’ money. T/542 was dropped after extensive amendments had been 
proposed.
 The 2002 law that was finally accepted represents a significant shift in 
policy, since it provides for the disclosure of information rather than just the 
avoidable threat of disclosure. It creates the opportunity to reveal the personal 
past of individuals in public office, although it does not clearly define which 
offices fall into this category. The basis of the law is the notion that the infor-
mation collected by the security services significantly influenced the life of 
a person and the society — through various operative games, deliberate gos-
sip, and, often, conscious disinformation. Hence, keeping these actions secret 
would deprive the individual and society of the chance to examine the true 
circumstances of past events. Moreover, by revealing what interests might lie 
behind the actions of public officials, the law aims to meet the constitutional 
requirement that “the functioning of the state should be transparent for the 
citizens.”
 The main features of the law are that:
•	 Anyone can request data and files collected by the former secret ser-
vice related to himself or herself. 
• Anyone can request the files of those people who are currently in pub-
lic office or had been in public office. The category of public office is 
not well defined in the law but has been taken to include anyone who 
serves (or served) in positions of executive power or the media. Indeed, 
it can be interpreted very broadly. 
• In the case of those in public office, some very limited information 
found in the Archive about an individual’s relationship to any of the 
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security service directorates (not just III/III) can be published. The lim-
its are not explicitly laid down in the law. In the case of an individual’s 
own files, only that data can be published which relates to that indi-
vidual alone, except in the case where another person gives consent to 
the publication of data relating to himself or herself. 
The task of historians in trying to discern which kind of activities an indi-
vidual engaged in remains difficult. It is nearly impossible to study an entire 
set of documents, not least because of the gaps owing to destroyed data. In 
some cases the motives can be concluded — for example, where documents 
are found relating to payment, reward, allocation of a state-owned flat, or out-
of-turn passport allocation. However, the files that are received relating to any 
public official have all names blacked out except the code name of the agent. 
Only since 2003 has it been possible for individuals to request that the iden-
tity of the agent (i.e., the real person behind the code name) be revealed. 
 Although the 2002 law could substantially increase transparency, the pro-
cedure is time consuming and expensive, which could deter many citizens 
from requesting documents. The passage of this law, and indeed the failure 
of draft T/542, has been criticized by several commentators.27 One common 
criticism is that the law that was finally adopted fails to guarantee that the 
Archive will receive all of the relevant documents, because the present-day 
security agencies have the task of deciding which documents to surrender 
and which to retain. This arguably leaves ample scope for the contemporary 
security services to inhibit, whether intentionally or not, the revelation of 
past events.
 The Medgyessy scandal in 2002 also prompted another development relat-
ing to lustration, since Parliament responded to the revelations by establish-
ing the so-called Mécs committee, led by Imre Mécs, an MP from the junior 
governing coalition party, SZDSZ. Since Medgyessy had been accused of 
working for Department III/II of the former security services, the scandal, 
among other things, drew attention to the fact that the vetting laws only cov-
ered activity for the III/III. The Mécs committee was therefore tasked with col-
lecting information relating to the other departments of the security services 
about the activities of all cabinet members since 1990. The information was 
provided by the contemporary security services and the Archive. The com-
mittee operated for some months and collected a great deal of information. 
However, before it was able to publish a list of individuals involved, the Con-
stitutional Court ruled that the parliamentary resolution founding the com-
mittee was unconstitutional, because there was no clear legal grounding for 
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the collection of this data by a parliamentary committee.28 Parliament should 
have established the committee in a law rather than through a resolution. The 
court further ruled that the work of the committee was unconstitutional. 
 In 2004 and 2005, new scandals arose concerning revelations that certain 
sports stars, musicians, and cultural critics were former agents of the political 
secret police. The evidence against them had been found by scholars in the 
Archive. These scandals prompted some MPs from the Socialist Party to pres-
ent draft modifications of both the law and the Constitution. The proposed 
amendment to the Constitution (T/14239) would make the personal data of 
those who were employees of the political secret services and those who 
cooperated with this organization public information. 
 The draft law (T14230) would publish the names of these persons. On May 
30, 2005, the draft amendment to the Constitution failed to gain the neces-
sary support, but the draft law was adopted by a vote of 194 to 6, with 129 
abstentions. The president, before signing the law, asked the Constitutional 
Court to oversee its constitutionality. In October 2005, the court, in its deci-
sion 37/2005 (X.5) AB, partly annulled the law. According to Hungarian regu-
lations, in such a case the president must send the law back to Parliament for 
correction. However, Parliament had not corrected the law before the end of 
its mandate in spring 2006. It is not yet clear whether the newly elected (in 
April 2006) Parliament will revisit the draft or not.
implementation and consequences of the vetting law
VETTINg BOdIES
According to the 1994 law, vetting was to be carried out by two or three com-
missions, composed of three judges each. The judges were nominated by the 
National Security Committee29 of Parliament in agreement with the president 
of the Supreme Court and elected by Parliament for a fixed period, normally 
two years, renewable indefinitely. The first three judges were named just 
before the 1994 election. However, the appointment of two of the three was 
annulled eighteen months later owing to incompatibility rules.30 Of the six 
judges elected in 1995, four remain members of the commission today, having 
served under three different Parliaments, reflecting a high degree of consen-
sus across the parties regarding their selection. In 2000, five new judges were 
appointed, bringing the total to nine. 
 The law provides no procedural guidelines or information about how to 
select the nominees, and there is no written information on how it has been 
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carried out in practice. Certainly, the judiciary did not select the judges; 
indeed the president of the Supreme Court only has the right to agree or dis-
agree with the proposal of the National Security Committee. The judges come 
from different regions within Hungary.
 Until 1996, the salary of the judges was decided by the government (cabi-
net). In matters other than payment, the terms and conditions applicable to 
the judges are those set out in the civil service law. Their payment is regulated 
by Parliament (by Act LXVII of 1996) and employers’ rights are exercised by 
the Speaker of the House. 
 The budget of the commission comes under the “parliamentary offices” 
part of the budget law, but is not listed as a separate item. Therefore the com-
mission’s spending, both past and present, remains unclear. The 1994 law pro-
vides that the central budget shall cover the expenses of those agencies related 
to reviewing the archives and providing data for the commission. 
 In terms of staff, each commission is served by one professional and one 
administrator. Since there is no archivist among them, the judges rely heavily 
on the expertise of the people working in the Historical Office (HO); prior 
to the establishment of the HO, they were helped by officials at the Ministry 
of Interior. The commissions do not employ experts; rather, the judge inter-
viewed stated that the judges educate themselves on the relevant matters.31
VETTINg PROCESS
The law determines the order of investigation by listing the different catego-
ries of positions to be vetted in order of “importance,” beginning with MPs, 
the president, and members of government, through to high-ranking public 
servants and finishing with media representatives, members of local gov-
ernments, and the judiciary. Within any one group of positions the order of 
investigation is alphabetical. Each Lustration Commission was involved in 
performing investigations in every category.
 According to information provided by the Lustration Commission, 9,548 
persons had been vetted by the end of 2004, of whom 20 were not suspected 
of serving as agents but rather were people who had received information 
from agents (and were thereby subject to vetting under section 1(d)). 
 As of the end of 2003, data indicating suspicious or incriminating evidence 
was found in only 126 cases (115 concerning former agents). Of these, twenty-
four individuals left office — which they could do at any stage throughout the 
process — and hence ceased to be liable for vetting. In these cases, we can pre-
sume that the individuals felt that sufficient evidence to prove their involve-
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ment with III/III had been found or expected that it would be found; indeed, 
many of these individuals probably resigned only after exhausting legal pro-
cedures to appeal against the evidence found. A further fourteen investiga-
tions were terminated (e.g., if an individual’s mandate in the role subject to 
vetting ended). In forty-two cases the Lustration Commission issued a “dis-
pensation,” meaning that some information had been found but it was insuf-
ficient to prove the person’s involvement. In only fifteen cases were decisions 
published, meaning that two pieces of evidence were sought and found: ten 
were people who had received information (and hence were liable for vetting 
according to section 1(d) of the law) and five were actual agents. Two cases are 
currently before the courts and a further twenty-nine are being investigated 
by the commission.
TABlE 1 
Summary of outcomes of vetting process as of early december 2003
 7,872 Total number of persons vetted
 126  Incriminating data found
 24  Individual resigned from office during investigation
 14  Investigation terminated (individual’s term in relevant office ended) 
 42  Dispensation issued  
 15  Decisions published32
 2  Cases currently in court
 29  Currently under investigation
SOURCE: Lustration Commission
The Report of the National Security Committee (1991) stated that there 
remained 43,983 “No. 6 cards”33 in the files, relating to 27,133 network persons. 
Comparing this to the data provided by the commission, we conclude that 
after examining almost 8,000 of the 27,133 individuals, the commission has 
been able to prove activity related to the III/III in only 29 cases. The commis-
sion published decisions relating to five persons, while twenty-four persons 
resigned from office (probably, we assume, in order to avoid the publication 
of a decision). In sum, incriminating data has been found in 115 cases, of which 
almost one-fifth chose to resign from office. This suggests that the law, while 
having no explicit sanction, has in effect made it difficult for persons with 
a past record of involvement with the former secret services to hold public 
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office in contemporary Hungary. However, in almost another 40% of cases, 
a dispensation decision was passed. In the case of only five agents — and ten 
others liable for vetting under section 1(d) of the law — were decisions pub-
lished revealing their past activity. The number may yet rise in the remain-
ing months of the procedure since thirty-one cases remain in court or under 
investigation. 
 Since only a tiny fraction of the commission’s work is made public — that 
is, the published decisions — it is impossible to know the distribution of those 
vetted among various institutions and categories. We can only say that the 
commission has screened every member of three Parliaments, as well as the 
highest-level officials in public service and the media. 
VETTEd INSTITUTIONS
polITIcIans
We do not know how many of the 126 cases of “data indicating suspicion” are 
related to MPs. The commissions have published only two decisions relating 
to MPs, both in 1997. Five people who later became MSZP politicians were 
initially vetted under section 1(d) of the law; when they subsequently became 
MPs, the commission republished these decisions. As of June 2004, Members 
of the European Parliament also became liable for vetting.
 According to the 1994 law, party officials and members shall not be 
screened (unless they fall into another screening category). Act XCIII of 2000 
decided to investigate the members of the regional and county-level party 
presidiums, or the corresponding level of leadership, but only parties having 
the right to be supported by the central budget are relevant in this group.
JUdIcIary and prosecUTIon
The vetting of judges and prosecutors was ordered by the 1994 lustration law, 
but before any judges had in fact been screened, the group was omitted in the 
1996 modification (Act LXVII). Judges and prosecutors ceased to be liable for 
vetting following the Constitutional Court decision (60/1994 (XII.24) AB) that 
the positions to be vetted should be decided according to a single principle; 
the legislature subsequently decided that this principle was that the position 
be elected by Parliament. The decision to make election by Parliament the 
appropriate single principle arguably reflected political considerations, with 
the socialist majority preferring a principle that minimized the number of 
positions liable for vetting.
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 Nevertheless, the 1996 law does provide for the investigation of ombuds-
men, members of the Constitutional Court, the president and vice presi-
dent of the Supreme Court, and the chief prosecutor and his deputies on the 
grounds that the holders of these positions are either elected by Parliament or 
are required to take an oath before Parliament or the president of Hungary. A 
further amendment to the law (Act XCIII of 2000) reintroduced the catego-
ries of judges and prosecutors to the positions to be vetted. 
 Notaries and solicitors did not fall into the categories identified by the law, 
but the 2000 amendment guarantees them the right to voluntary self-screening. 
pUblIc admInIsTraTIon
The 1994 law ordered screening up to the level of heads of departments (and 
equivalent positions) in the ministries. In local government, only mayors were 
to be screened (and only down to the level of towns, not villages). Other state 
employees were also to be examined, such as employees down to the level of 
department heads at the universities and colleges (if the state is the majority 
owner).
 However, the scope of screening in the public administration was signifi-
cantly curtailed in 1996, before the process had reached this group. The 1996 
law orders the screening of the public administration at the highest level only: 
the president of Hungary, members of the Cabinet, the president and vice 
presidents of the State Audit Office, state secretaries of the ministries, presi-
dent and vice presidents of the national bank, members of the Bank of Issue 
Board, and presidents and vice presidents of the Office of Economic Competi-
tion. The 2000 law did not extend the vetting categories in this field.
 The police, including part of the military and border police forces, were 
to be vetted down to the level of chiefs. This category was treated only as a 
subset of “public administration.” At no stage did any of the laws or even draft 
bills include a deeper vetting of the military or police. 
 There are no published decisions of the commission within this category.
The medIa
According to the 1994 law, the following positions must be screened: presi-
dents of Hungarian Public Television and Radio, the head manager of the 
Hungarian News Agency, editors and persons in higher positions than editors 
in those organizations, and editors and persons in higher positions than edi-
tors at those daily and weekly newspapers with a distribution of more than 
thirty thousand. 
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 However, because of the principle for defining positions influencing pub-
lic opinion chosen by the legislature in 1996 (following Resolution 60/1994 
(XII.24) AB of the Constitutional Court), only the presidents and vice presi-
dents of Hungarian Public Television and Radio and the head manager of the 
Hungarian News Agency had to be screened. 
 Act XCIII of 2000 requires screening of the media on a much wider scale, 
extending the scope of the law beyond the level of editors, to “those, who 
have the effect to influence the political public opinion either directly or indi-
rectly,” and is also applicable to commercial television, radio, newspapers, and 
Internet news agencies. In the case of television, radio, and the press, local, 
regional, and countrywide television channels and newspapers were affected, 
irrespective of their size. 
 The interpretation of these provisions was left to the commission, which 
faced considerable difficulties. While compiling a list of names and addresses 
for MPs had been straightforward, defining the relevant media personnel 
was far more complicated. Based on the rather vague criteria of influencing 
political public opinion directly or indirectly, the commission had not only to 
identify the relevant newspapers but also to select the names of journalists to 
be vetted. Constitutional Court Resolution 31/2003 (VI.4) subsequently omit-
ted the category of “indirect” influence. However, by this time, the screening 
of the press was almost finished. According to the legal representative inter-
viewed, the Constitutional Court decision brought the law into accordance 
with the commission’s practice (although unwittingly), since the commission 
had been unable to use the category of “indirect influence.” 
 The procedure related to the printed press began with the onerous task 
of selecting the relevant newspapers from a list of the many thousands of 
those registered at the Ministry of Culture. Because the closure of a newspa-
per does not have to be reported to the ministry, the commission had first 
to identify which newspapers still existed. That done, the commission pro-
ceeded by writing to the owner and head of the newspaper requesting a list 
of journalists34 who fit the category of the law (i.e., editors, etc.). There was 
no sanction for not cooperating with the commission.35 However, the judge 
interviewed by the authors could recall only one case where a newspaper had 
not cooperated. 
 The commission used the same method for radio and television stations. 
However, this practice could not be applied to the Internet news agencies, 
because there is no register of them. This question was raised and reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court (31/2003 (VI.4)), which did not find the provision 
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inapplicable. However, Constitutional Court Judge István Kukorelli, in a dis-
senting opinion, said that it is impossible to determine the list of Internet news 
agencies based on the text of the law. According to the judge interviewed, in 
the absence of a clear guideline from the law, the practice of the individual 
commissions was different. One commission did not examine Internet news 
agencies because of the lack of the required state register, and another com-
mission contacted one of the associations of Internet news agencies and 
asked for its help in compiling data about it. The commission also notified 
the speaker of the Parliament that a register and state agency responsible for 
registering Internet news agencies does not exist.
 Act XCIII of 2000 granted journalists who did not fall under the purview 
of the law the option to apply voluntarily for screening.
 Until December 2003, among all of the journalists investigated (presum-
ably comprising a few thousand individuals), only three were found by the 
commission to have performed the relevant activities. From the information 
provided by the commission, we cannot tell whether the two cases at court 
are related to journalists, although this is likely. 
 The judge interviewed was not certain if the screening of the press and 
electronic media (not including Internet news agencies) had been comprehen-
sive, but said that they had done what they could. The commission also asked 
the owners of newspapers to inform it if there were personnel changes in the 
positions to be vetted. Meanwhile, the board of trustees of the Hungarian 
Radio asked the ombudsman for data protection whether employers could 
ask employees to show the documents they receive at the end of the vetting 
process. The ombudsman ruled that employees cannot be compelled to do 
so.36 In his 2002 report to Parliament, the ombudsman wrote that “disclosing 
the state security past of individuals at present is the right of the individual or 
the lustration commission.”
PROCEdURE Of ThE COmmISSION
If the law does not regulate otherwise, the procedure of the commission is 
based on the 1996 Administrative Procedure Act (Act LXVII of 1996). The com-
mission was affected by later amendments, but there was no serious change 
with regard to procedure. The 1994 resolution of the Constitutional Court did 
not find it unconstitutional that the screening was not carried out by a court 
but ruled that the commission was constitutionally required to work accord-
ing to the Administrative Procedure Act. 
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 The procedure comprises several stages:
IdenTIfIcaTIon of persons who shoUld be veTTed  
Under The law 
Although the law determines what kind of positions should be screened, the 
individuals to be vetted must be identified. In the case of civil servants, identi-
fying the appropriate individuals was straightforward, because the law is very 
clear about the positions. However, the process of identifying those who fell 
under other, less clearly defined categories, for example, that of the press, was 
sometimes problematic. 
collecTIon of daTa from The regIsTer of The III/III 
Judges did not collect the data relating to the person under investigation 
themselves, but rather received it — initially from the Ministry of Interior and 
after 1997 from the HO. The collecting process began when the commission 
provided a list of the individuals to be vetted, after which ministry officials 
and later the archivists of the HO searched the register. They were required by 
law to send to the commission data that indicated involvement in the activity 
defined in section 1 of the law. In 1999, the Constitutional Court was asked to 
examine whether it was an unconstitutional limitation that the commission’s 
ability to examine documents depended on the decision of the possessor of the 
document; the Ministry of Interior both possessed the documents and decided 
whether they should be sent to the commission. The court was laconic in its 
decision, saying that the commission has the possibility to use other evidence 
as well, and that it “can evaluate the evidences freely.” 
 Indeed, the Lustration Commissions have in practice undertaken additional 
research in other archives, in some cases turning to the previous employer of 
the vetted individual and asking for old personnel files — for example, a CV 
helped them to clarify the facts. The commission has also been able to find 
witnesses — for example, a contact official or recruiting official of an agent. 
Such research by the commission was especially important in cases where the 
data found in the files were not sufficient to prove the activity, for example, 
where only a No. 6 card was recovered. According to the judge interviewed, 
the judges do not see it as their duty to find all data relating to the person 
under investigation, but rather carry out research until they find enough data 
for proof of the activity. 
 The HO submitted a report annually to Parliament, including an account 
of work done for the commission. When the HO was established, the vetting 
of MPs elected in 1994 and high state officials had already been completed. 
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The following data are taken from the J/2943 report of the HO, which has 
been submitted to Parliament, but not yet voted on. It concerns data about the 
activity of the HO related to the commission from 1997 until March 2003.37 
TABlE 2 
Commission requests for data 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 TOTAl
Requests for research 10 28 14 28 81 53 3 217
Number of persons concerned 26 244 44 97 1939 1842 42 4234
SOURCE: Historical Office
During 2004, the commission requested information from the HO relating 
to a further 1,676 persons, bringing the total number of persons about whom 
information has been sought to 5,910. The reason for the high number of 
investigations in 2001 is that Act XCIII of 2000 extended the positions to be 
investigated. The report cannot reveal in how many cases incriminating data 
was found.
The hearIng 
Until the modification of the related rules (in 2000), a hearing was performed 
in every case, irrespective of whether the commission had found any evidence. 
This equal treatment for all was intended to prevent a situation in which 
the media would suspect guilt if a hearing was held. However, in 2000 the 
policy was changed such that a hearing was made obligatory only in those 
cases in which incriminating data were found. This move reflected a need to 
save resources since considerable time and effort was wasted in sending out 
invitations to hearings and preparing for or holding hearings that few people 
attended.38 Moreover, the initial concern that the media would closely follow 
who attended the hearings — and might thus infer that someone had indeed 
been an agent — disappeared as media interest in the process waned.
 The procedure is that the vetted person is first informed that incriminating 
data have (or have not) been found and the relevant documents are presented 
at the first hearing, thereby providing the vetted person with an opportunity 
to question its reliability. The hearing is a closed meeting. Legal representa-
tives are able to attend, but in practice few individuals have taken lawyers to 
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the first hearing. However, vetted individuals do have legal representation 
during the court procedure. Vetted individuals are also informed if no infor-
mation relevant to the law is found in their case. 
evalUaTIon of evIdence
Criteria of proof of lustratable activity. According to Administrative Procedure 
Act, the judge’s right to evaluate the evidence is unlimited. The commission 
must investigate whether the vetted person served as a professional officer 
(either secret or open) at the III/III directorate of the Ministry of Interior, or 
had performed substantial activity for the III/III. In short, the commission 
was looking for evidence that individuals had:
• signed a declaration to undertake activity and submitted reports; or
• signed a declaration to undertake activity and received a payment, 
favor, or premium; or
• received a payment, favor, or premium and submitted reports; or
• had a No. 6 card and received a payment, favor, or premium; or
• had a No. 6 card and submitted reports.39
The lustration law thus determines what kind of data shall be searched for 
in the registers and requires at least two kinds of data for proof of activity. 
Considering the great numbers of documents destroyed, it is perhaps not sur-
prising that such extensive proof of involvement was found only very rarely. 
Resolution 60/1994 (XII.24) AB of the Constitutional Court makes it clear that 
the burden of proof does not rest with the person being vetted.
 The court recognizes that the documentation remaining in the files is 
incomplete. This view draws on the National Security Committee’s report, 
according to which most of the reports made by agents have been destroyed 
(or are held somewhere else in the archives of other parts of the secret service). 
Only the following documents remain: No. 6 cards, indirect evidence (e.g., 
financial documentation), and reports. Referring to the report, the Constitu-
tional Court also concludes that part of the documentation remaining is not 
authentic — specifically, the No. 6 cards, also called “network records” — and 
for this reason stresses the importance of procedural guarantees and access 
to court appeal. The court finds acceptable only such procedures as guarantee 
that the published data are authentic. 
The files and other evidence. In 1994, both the legislature and the Constitutional 
Court found it necessary to guarantee that in addition to the documents pro-
vided by the Ministry of Interior or the HO, the commission could use other 
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evidence. However, because the law explicitly states that the investigation 
shall be performed based on the data found in the documents determined by 
the law (section 8), the legislature emphasizes the prime importance of these 
documents. In practice, the commission has used additional information, 
including witness statements and documents from other archives, and has 
on occasion reviewed the original documents at the archive. The commission 
has consulted with external experts once or twice.
 The most commonly found document has been the No. 6 card. Indeed it 
may happen that only the information on the card is available and none of the 
other information required by the law. By requiring two pieces of evidence for 
proof, the legislature implied that the No. 6 card alone is not to be regarded as 
sufficient. This is supported by the 1994 resolution of the Constitutional Court 
that states that the No. 6 cards were not signed by the individuals which they 
concerned, and hence do not have sufficient force of evidence.40 
 In sum, there are two reasons for regarding the network register as pos-
sibly inauthentic: (1) because the network register is the internal register of the 
III/III, and (2) because data could be added into this register at a later date. 
Given that the register may not be authentic, the court stresses that the com-
mission performing the investigation “is not bound by the documentation 
covered by the law, but can use any legal means of evidence. . . the Commis-
sion does not investigate the documentation, but it shall prove the substantial 
activity.” 
 With regard to the first reason, an important question is whether it was 
the practice of the secret services to open a No. 6 card on individuals who 
had never worked as agents. According to one argument often heard in the 
Hungarian lustration debate, there are several possible reasons to suspect that 
No. 6 cards may have been created even for individuals who had not worked 
as agents: 
• every year a given number of agents had to be recruited; hence if insuf-
ficient numbers were really recruited, the officers had an incentive to 
open cards for non-agents as well; 
• recruiting officers may have been rewarded financially according to 
the number of agents recruited, and would thus have had an incentive 
to create false entries; 
• if two officers were competing to recruit a particular individual, one 
of them might have opened a card prior to successful recruitment in 
order to prevent the other officer from claiming the credit for recruit-
ing the individual. 
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The Report refers to the possibility that officers may have been financially 
rewarded for recruiting people, thus creating a possible incentive to falsely 
claim recruits. Whether or not this was common practice remains unclear. 
The Report says that, “it cannot be excluded that certain officers. . . had writ-
ten in the name of not-recruited people. But this manipulation could not hap-
pen too often. If the person had not reported continuously, a proposal had 
to be made for his exclusion from the service. Such kind of false recruitment 
would have been very complicated and risky.” Yet the Report also refers to a 
case in which an officer had to leave the secret service because of false recruit-
ing, thus suggesting that it may not have been common practice, or at least 
that individuals faced sanctions that might have deterred them from engaging 
in such fraud. 
 Archivist László Varga, interviewed by the authors, argues that even if the 
above reasons are plausible, one cannot assume that such methods were the 
usual practice of the security services. The No. 6 cards were established for 
internal use and nobody assumed that they would be accessible to others at 
some point in the future. Moreover, the security services worked according 
to a strict hierarchy and regulations, hence such systematic distortion of the 
data seems unlikely and might even have been counterproductive for career 
officers, who would presumably have risked punishment if their efforts to 
deceive their superiors in this way were found out. 
 With regard to the second reason, the former security services were 
accused of adding false documents in 1989–90, while all subsequent govern-
ments have been accused of destroying documents. However, these rumors of 
interference with the register may simply be part of the mythology surround-
ing lustration. According to András Gyekiczki (formerly deputy president of 
the Historical Office and chief of cabinet in the Ministry of Interior [1994–
98]), it would be almost impossible to add false incriminating data or docu-
ments, because the code names and details would need to be added to several 
documents to reflect the massive cross-referencing that occurred among the 
original files. For the same reason, it would be difficult to remove records of 
an individual’s activity since this activity could be reported anywhere else in 
the documentation. Nevertheless, the documentation of other secret service 
departments is not accessible. Therefore, in cases for example where only a 
No. 6 card was found (and the commission could not get any other evidence), 
it is not possible to say whether the card had been falsely placed in the register 
or whether relevant data might have been found in the archives of other secret 
service departments. 
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 Moreover, while the Report held the opinion that proof of cooperation 
might be possible if the examination were extended to the documents of other 
departments, in 1999 the Constitutional Court implied that the activity of the 
other parts of the security services was only partly unconstitutional — and, by 
implication, that it should not necessarily be subject to vetting. This judgment 
was made in the context of the debate over whether the archives of depart-
ments other than III/III should be opened; the court ruling meant that they 
remained closed. In its resolution of 1994, the Constitutional Court had classi-
fied the archives of the III/III “and partly of the other secret services” (our ital-
ics) as against the rule of law. The 1999 resolution of the Constitutional Court 
subsequently referred to the arguments of the 1994 resolution, such that “only 
the activity contrary to the rule of law is data of public interest.” 
 The poor success of the commission in searching for evidence other than 
the No. 6 card is evident from the statistics. In an interview with former agent 
PM, he said that in his case, no information was available for the commission 
other than the No. 6 card and his former contact officer, who remembered 
nothing. In his case, the commission was able to state that he was a former 
agent, but only because he himself had gone public with his past activity in 
1990. 
 The law does not say if the reports of the agent required by law as evidence 
shall be verbal or written, but from the published decisions it is obvious that 
by “report” the commission understands proof of the fact of giving informa-
tion either verbally or in writing. Thus, in the case of EI, given the absence 
of proof of reports submitted by him when serving as an agent, a witness 
statement from his former contact officer was “substituted” as evidence of his 
having submitted reports.41 There were also instances in which agents had 
reported verbally only, but in such cases the contact officer generally sum-
marized the report in writing and attached it to the file, thus providing evi-
dence of reporting. The 1994 resolution of the Constitutional Court refers to 
the Report: 
The Report says “yes” to the question as to whether it is possible to draw 
conclusions from the network registration as to who gave and who did 
not give reports. (Those who did not submit reports were excluded from 
the network and the documentation of this also survived.)
Nevertheless, to prove reporting activity without having the report itself has 
caused great difficulty for the commission. According to the legal represen-
tative of the commission, it could constitute proof of activity if the vetted 
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person was registered as an agent for a long period of time (more then two 
years) and during this period had met the contact officer many times. This 
interpretation originates from the Report, which takes the same view. The 
length of the period of being an agent is mentioned in the decisions.
 In short, documentation on the basis of which the activity of an agent 
could be indisputably proved has not generally been available to the com-
mission. Rather, the material has been limited in most cases to No. 6 cards 
(in themselves insufficient proof of past activity) and indirect evidence, for 
example, financial documentation showing that an agent received a payment 
or reward. 
 The content of the reports provided by agents is not mentioned in the law, 
despite arguments arising in the public debate that some agents who were 
blackmailed to cooperate tried to subvert the cause by providing only useless 
reports. However, the operative significance of the reports in most cases can-
not be estimated in retrospect, although the contact officers knew why the 
agency requested information from the agent and for what purpose it would 
be used. The published decisions suggest that only the fact of reporting was 
considered and the content of reports was not evaluated. 
 The commission does not evaluate how or why someone became an 
agent — for example, whether he/she was blackmailed by officers to cooper-
ate with the III/III — and does not impart this information in its decisions. It 
is possible that relevant evidence was not found, or at least not in every case. 
The fact of blackmailing was not mentioned in the case of the former agent 
known as PM, although he was considered a “trustworthy” person because 
the very little evidence found corresponded to the story that he had previ-
ously published. 
 Before the III/III sought to recruit someone, a report on the individual’s 
personal circumstances would be compiled. The agency used this to decide 
whom to target and how to approach an individual — that is, whether black-
mail would be necessary or simply the offer of some reward.42 According to 
the judge interviewed, while it is possible to consider the agent as victim if 
he or she was being blackmailed, when a person continues to submit reports 
over a long period, building a career using the contacts of the III/III, it is not 
clear whether that person remains a victim. The secret services did seek to 
convince agents that it was impossible to quit the agency either on their own 
initiative or by being expelled. This message appears to have been well com-
municated. Today this also strengthens the “agent as victim” view. However, 
there were cases in which a person quit the agency on his own initiative; this 
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occurred with SK’s two periods as an agent (he quit once in 1958, then again in 
the 1970s) and in the case of MP (he quit in 1987). 
 In sum, the content of the report, the circumstances of becoming an agent, 
whether or not one quit the agency on his or her own initiative, and the period 
of time spent as an agent could all be considered by the commission as part of 
the free evaluation of evidence, but in fact that appears to have played a role in 
only one decision. We also do not know whether the practice of the different 
commissions in regard to evaluating evidence varied significantly.
 If agent reports were not found, the practice of calling witnesses, where 
possible, was probably the most important evidence. The No. 6 card was a 
starting point in this respect, since it included the name of an agent’s contact 
officer. The commission did seek to reach these officers, although we cannot 
measure its success in doing so or in obtaining authentic evidence from them. 
It should moreover be noted that the contact officers in many cases could still 
be officers active in today’s secret services (if they were not serving in posi-
tions to be vetted under the law). It could happen that they would be called as 
witnesses against people whom they themselves blackmailed into cooperat-
ing with the secret service.
decIsIon of The commIssIon
As discussed earlier, the commission can issue a declaratory decision that the 
vetted person performed the activity; a dispensational decision (i.e., where 
incriminating data was found, but insufficient evidence to prove the activity 
according to the law); or a decision on terminating the procedure (for exam-
ple, because an individual resigned from office during the procedure or his 
mandate ended during the procedure). 
 The rules of decision making have not changed since 1994: 
(1) The commission in its decision declares whether the person under 
investigation performed the activity defined by the law. 
(2) The commission states those facts that form the basis of the 
decision. 
(3) The decision is to be communicated to the person without delay. 
(4) The decision is made by secret majority vote. 
(5) If the decision states that the person under investigation has per-
formed the activity determined by the law, the commission shall call 
upon the person to resign from his/her office within thirty days or 
initiate a procedure to relieve him/her of office. 
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(6) The commission shall also inform the vetted person that in the event 
of his or her not resigning, the decision of the commission shall be 
made public (fifteen days after the thirty-day period). 
(7) The commission shall also inform the investigated person about the 
option to go to court against the decision and ask for the decision to 
be invalidated. 
Thus, according to the law those who leave their office voluntarily are 
exempted from the explicit sanction of the law (i.e., publication of the 
decision). 
 The objective of the law was to make it publicly known when people serv-
ing in certain offices under the post-transition state had undertaken certain 
past activities related to the III/III. The legislature at no point sought to pass 
an incompatibility provision, such that those persons would be prevented 
from holding office. However, the option to resign one’s office has in prac-
tice functioned as an incompatibility regulation in that in many cases a vet-
ted person has chosen to resign. It is clear from the commission’s data that 
people affected have weighed the sanction of having their name published as 
a former collaborator against the option of leaving office, and many have cho-
sen to resign either before or after the decision of the commission.  
 The Hungarian News Agency and the Official Gazette publish the decision. 
Act XCIII of 2000 provides that data published by the commission are data of 
public interest and that access to and the dissemination of those data shall be 
the right of everyone.
Decisions published by the commission. Of the twenty-one decisions published 
by the commission, five are related to former agents (two post-transition MPs 
and three journalists), and one to a former career officer; the remaining fif-
teen refer to persons who received data from agents for use in their work and 
are hence liable to vetting under section 1(d) of the law. 
• According to the decision related to SK, a Christian Democrat MP, the 
evidence was established based on the signed declarations of recruit-
ment (two, on different occasions) and on reports made by him. 
• In the case of MV, a socialist MP, the commission had access to declara-
tions of recruitment and reports made by her. 
• In the case of PM, a journalist, nothing was found except the No. 6 card. 
No reports were found. The commission did bring in a witness — his 
former contact officer — but he remembered nothing. Thus, it was the 
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confession of PM that established the evidence. He was regarded as a 
trustworthy witness, because he had previously gone public about his 
past activity in 1990 and his story at that time fitted with the evidence 
found later. 
• In the case of GG, a journalist, his reports were found. He did not 
attend the commission hearing, hence the case was decided on the 
basis of the documents. 
• In the case of IE, a journalist, only the No. 6 card was found. The com-
mission also considered the statement of a witness, and the fact that 
he was registered as an agent for several years and he was not deleted 
from the register. It is clear from the decision that the statement of the 
witness was very important, because he told the commission that the 
vetted person made verbal reports and it was his duty to summarize 
them in written notes. According to the commission this evidence 
together established the fact that the person had reported for the III/
III. Hence the witness statement of the recruiting officer partly estab-
lished the fact of reporting.43
Another decision was published in spring 2004. It concerns a member of one 
of the regional party presidiums who during 1951–54 was an officer of the 
State Security Agency, operating within the Ministry of Interior (abolished in 
1956). He had served in 1957 in a police detachment. This is the only case of a 
published decision relating to a secret service career officer.
 We do not have any information about those who left office because of 
the vetting procedure, since their names are not published. However, in the 
case of IE, the decision also states that he had served in two positions falling 
under the purview of the law. When the procedure started, he left one of those 
offices. His other position was at the Hungarian Public Radio. In its decision, 
the commission referred to the statement of the president of Hungarian Pub-
lic Radio, to the effect that he was an editor, and thus the commission could 
investigate him. IE later argued that his position did not have the title of “edi-
tor” and that he should not be vetted in respect to this position. However, 
based on the president’s statement, his work was editorial, and hence practi-
cally he served as an editor.
appeals To The coUrT
Access to court was provided by the 1994 law. According to Resolution 
60/1994 (XII.24) AB of the Constitutional Court: 
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judicial review is possible against the decision of the Commission, and 
this has a delaying force in respect of publishing the decision. . . .The 
court shall review the decision of the Commission from the point of 
legality. According to the permanent practice of the courts, the legality 
of the decision shall also be established, if the statements of facts are not 
revealed, or the revealed facts were not evaluated correctly, the conclu-
sion drawn from the revealed facts are against the documents or not 
reasonable. 
If the court found that the decision of the commission was against legality, the 
commission started a new procedure.
 Because we can only access the published decisions of the commission and 
the decisions of the courts are not published, we cannot say to what extent 
the practice of the commission changed — especially in regard to evaluation 
of evidence — because of the decisions of the courts. According to the legal 
representative interviewed, the only change in the practice of the commission 
due to the practice of the court regarded the assessment of reports, as pre-
viously discussed. However, in his opinion the fact that the court can order 
the commission to start a new procedure not only based on the legality of 
the decision, but also on the basis of new evidence that was introduced in the 
court rather than in front of the commission, serves to curtail the authority 
of the public administration body (against the Administrative Procedure Act). 
In his opinion, not only the decision making, but also the hearing of new evi-
dence should be carried out solely by the commission. 
 None of the published decisions were for cases in which the Supreme 
Court had annulled the commission’s first decision and ordered a new pro-
cedure. This implies that no new commission procedures have resulted in 
decisions where the activity could be proven. Rather, it appears that the cases 
that were brought to court ended either with dispensation decisions, with the 
individual resigning from office, or with a decision to terminate the proce-
dure. The legal representative of the commission that we interviewed stated 
that resignation from office is generally the last resort, after all possibilities 
for legal procedures have been exhausted.
 The procedure is secret both before the commission and in court. This 
was challenged, but the Constitutional Court in 1994 found that is was not 
unconstitutional.
 The commission has not engaged in any public outreach or information 
campaigns.
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RUlES dETERmINEd By ThE COmmISSION
According to the law (article 17), the commission can regulate all those issues 
not regulated by the law. According to the 1994 resolution of the Constitu-
tional Court it is a constitutional requirement that in the application of this 
article the commission regulations shall establish no rights and obligations 
for people outside the commission. The judge we interviewed said that at the 
beginning of its activity the commission made some regulations relating to 
the procedure for information gathering and relations with the offices provid-
ing data. These regulations are all still applied today.
lENgTh Of ThE PROCESS
Both the information-gathering part of the process and the commission pro-
cedure could take several months. Court procedures generally last for about 
one year, even in cases when the court was asked to review a case urgently 
and despite Act LXVII of 1996 accelerating the court procedure by requir-
ing that the first hearing be held within thirty days. Thus, for an individual 
about whom incriminating data was found and who challenged the deci-
sion of the commission in court, the whole procedure could take about 
two years.
POST-VETTINg SITUATION
PM stated in his interview that his past as a former agent influenced his choice 
of career, making him consciously decide not to work as a civil servant. 
Instead he worked in the private sector and later became a journalist (at a time 
when the law was not applicable to journalists, although in any case he had 
already made his activity public). When his position as a journalist became 
subject to vetting, he decided not to leave the position, therefore the commis-
sion published a decision about him as well. 
 The two politicians found to have worked for the security services as 
agents are no longer MPs, but they did not leave their parliamentary seats 
immediately after their past activity was revealed. They did not stand as MPs 
in the subsequent Parliament, but during their term they continued to work 
in parliamentary committees. MV today contributes to the largest Hungarian 
newspaper; more information on his post-vetting career is not available. SK 
is retired because of his age. PM is a journalist at the newspaper for which he 
previously worked.
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specifying the scope of the law
The need to define the scope of lustration policy in two respects has provided 
the battleground for much of the policy debate in the last fifteen years. The 
problem amounts to specifying two circles:
(1) The public office positions that are liable for vetting — that is, should 
only politicians and public administrators be vetted, or should the 
wider society be included, for example, judges, the media, and the 
church?
(2) The activities performed for the communist security services that 
are regarded as relevant — that is, why was lustration limited to the 
III/III department, when several other departments existed and used 
agents to collect information?
The evolution of the debate on these two questions is analyzed in this 
section.
PUBlIC OffICES lIABlE fOR VETTINg
All lustration proposals in Hungary have agreed that parliamentary deputies, 
government members, and the president should be vetted. Beyond this, politi-
cal parties have argued in favor of adding or subtracting certain groups, largely 
according to partisan interests. The Right has generally sought to expand the 
scope of the law while the Left has attempted to curtail it.
 Section 2 of the law defines those officeholders liable for lustration. In the 
first law of 1994, this group included a broad range of political, administra-
tive, judicial, media, and education positions, and even business (in the case 
of state-owned firms) leaders. Although the law in some cases defined cer-
tain subgroups according to whether or not they were obliged to swear an 
oath before Parliament, there was no overall consistent criterion delimiting 
the officeholders liable for vetting. This was highlighted by the Constitu-
tional Court, whose Resolution 60/1994 (XII.24) AB stated that the law was 
unconstitutionally arbitrary in the criterion used to define those who should 
undergo lustration, leading to unconstitutional discrimination between the 
groups obliged to undergo vetting and those free from such requirements. 
 Resolution 60/1994 (XII. 24) AB further sought to provide a basis on which 
to draw this line by stating that posts liable for vetting should be those that 
“either through practicing executive power, taking a political public role, or 
through operating the. . . media of public opinion forming, are directly able to 
form public opinion. This principle is applicable only to those professionals 
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who have the task of political opinion forming.” The group could thus legiti-
mately include nonstate posts, such as the editors of private media outlets. 
The court also held that the precise determination of those posts to be vetted 
was a political decision, outside judicial competence, and required that this 
determination should be made on the basis of a single consistently applied 
criterion. Although the court said it must be the decision of the legislature 
to determine this principle, it also stated that the principle could be “elected 
positions.” The legislature subsequently defined the principle as election by 
the Parliament or being required to take an oath before Parliament or the 
president of Hungary. Since judges and prosecutors are not appointed by Par-
liament, they were subsequently excluded from the 1996 law. 
 One of the most theoretically controversial and technically difficult sets 
of posts to define has been the media. The 1994 Constitutional Court resolu-
tion did not find the screening of the press unconstitutional in itself. However, 
according to the Constitutional Court, the 1994 law determined the scope of 
the positions to be screened too broadly because under the law some people 
and newspapers not involved in political programs were liable for vetting. The 
1996 law thus required the vetting of only those media representatives who 
were appointed by Parliament.
 Amendments to the law introduced by the center-right government of 
1998–2002, culminating in Act XCIII of 2000, require screening of the media 
to a deeper level. This law extended the scope of vetting beyond the level of 
editors, to “those, who have the effect to influence the political public opinion 
either directly or indirectly” and is also applicable to commercial television, 
radio, newspapers, and Internet news agencies. The positions affected are: 
• the editors in chief, assistants to the editor in chief, editors, and com-
mentators of program suppliers who according to the 1996 law have 
direct or indirect influence on public opinion; 
• the editors in chief, assistants to the editor in chief, editors, reader-
editors, columnists, and main staff of public newspapers circulated 
nation-, region- or countywide and locally who have direct or indirect 
influence on public opinion; 
• and the editors in chief of Internet news agencies registered in Hun-
gary by the competent authority and with at least nationwide accessi-
bility, their assistants, and trustees invested with right of news release 
who have direct or indirect influence on public opinion. 
The move may have reflected the fact that the 1998–2002 government 
regarded much of the media as being allied with the leftist opposition; an 
BARRETT / hACk / mUNkáCSI
296
expansion of vetting might have been expected to have the effect of reducing 
the hold on the media of Left loyalists — perhaps more likely to have had a 
past of collaboration.
 Apart from representatives of the media, the 2000 amendment to the law 
extended the requirement to be vetted to political parties, specifically “mem-
bers of county and national presidency or adequate corporate representatives 
of parties entitled to state budgetary subsidy” and to professional judges and 
state attorneys. The law also created the possibility of voluntary vetting for 
lawyers, notaries, clergy, and media representatives who are not obliged to be 
lustrated.
 Again, bearing in mind the 1994 opinion of the Constitutional Court, the 
decision to reintroduce the category of judges was controversial. The 2000 
law simply retained the principle that those liable for vetting were the group 
of individuals who took an oath before Parliament and were appointed by it, 
but added an extra list of positions to be vetted. In 2003, the Constitutional 
Court then found the screening of judges not unconstitutional from the point 
of view of the independence of the judiciary (Resolution 31/2003 (VI.4)).44 The 
court repeated its earlier view that it was the political decision of the legisla-
ture to decide on which positions should be vetted. 
 By contrast, the EU Monitoring and Advocacy Program (EUMAP) of the 
Open Society Institute (a project monitoring human rights and the rule of law 
in ten Central and East European countries and the five largest EU countries) 
disapproves of the screening of judges:
lustration is, by its nature, an extraordinary intervention against indi-
viduals who might normally not be removable, and is justified by exi-
gent political circumstances, such as the political transition immedi-
ately after 1989. More than ten years after the event, the introduction of 
such rules at the least raises reasonable concerns that the motivations 
are more immediate and narrowly political. Because the initiative for 
expanding lustration at such a late date lay with the Government and 
Parliament, it may also be seen as an extension of political control over 
the judiciary, contrary to the spirit of the reform process.45 
Against this argument, it should be stated that, were judges to remain outside 
the scope of the lustration law, their credibility in court could be brought into 
question. 
 In 2003, draft T/542 (which was finally rejected) argued that if media 
representatives are liable for lustration, there is no constitutional reason 
why the leaders of churches are not. The interpretation that church leaders 
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do not meet the criteria of participants in political public life is problematic 
because based on this the inclusion of the leaders of public bodies — which 
the Constitutional Court regards as legitimate targets for vetting — could also 
be questioned. The option of entirely handing over the determination of the 
circle of people who should be lustrated to the legislature’s political consider-
ation would allow the legislature subjective judgment to decide which clergy 
or public body takes “political actions shaping public opinion.” This decision 
could only be made on a political rather than an objective basis. 
 Thus draft T/542 argued instead that despite the differences in the inner 
structure of churches, the political expression of opinion in churches is not 
independent from the leadership of the church. In this case the church offi-
cials to be lustrated would not be selected according to the legislature’s politi-
cal decision but by the autonomous inner rules of the churches; that is, the 
church would define the roles that shape public opinion. The lustration of the 
churches could be justified by their actions of public opinion shaping and the 
fact that according to the regulation in force the churches complete a range 
of public tasks. The churches also receive significant financing from tax rev-
enues and the majority of churches seek to play an active role in the task of 
renewing the country morally. However, this draft was eventually dropped 
and churches hence do not come under the purview of the lustration law.
 The final version of the law adopted in 2003 allows for access to limited 
information about the past security service activities of individuals currently 
performing “public activity.” In this regard, litigations appear likely, centering 
around: 
• whether or not a person falls into the category of those performing 
“public activity.” The law does not provide guidelines for the Archive 
to decide who falls into this category (even in the most obvious cases), 
therefore a person wanting to know whether there is anything in the 
Archive related to the presumed “publicly active” person may start a 
litigation to decide this issue; or 
• whether the documents to be made public are in accordance with the 
requirements of the law (i.e., that they constitute only very limited 
information). This might also consider what would be the possible 
consequences of publishing the data. This will again raise the issue of 
evaluation of evidence. 
The problem with such a series of litigations is that the courts may evaluate 
the evidence and pass different decisions at every stage, while new evidence 
will continuously be introduced. One valuable side effect of numerous such 
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court procedures might be that the authenticity of the register and the validity 
and force of the records may be clarified. In the meantime, the career officers 
of the secret service will increasingly serve as witnesses at the court, taking on 
the mantle of “respectable experts” despite their own past and the impossibil-
ity of knowing whether their witness statements are authentic. 
RElEVANT PAST “OffENSES”
The decision to limit lustration to the Ministry of Interior Section III, Direc-
torate III, responsible for internal protection, reflects the fact that the exis-
tence of only this department was public knowledge when the original 
Demszky-Hack bill was drafted. Once the much greater extent of the secu-
rity services was revealed, the main political parties still showed little inclina-
tion to extend the scope of the lustration law to other branches of the secu-
rity services. Rather, when in government, the MDF, MSZP, and Fidesz-MPP 
all argued that since only III/III had been abolished in 1990, any extension 
of the law to other departments would threaten the functioning of the new 
security agencies that were their legal successors. The MSZP further justified 
its position — particularly in response to criticisms by its 1994–98 coalition 
partner, the SZDSZ — by pointing out that the Constitutional Court had not 
found problematic the limitation of the 1994 law to III/III. 
 In addition to omitting informers for directorates other than III/III, the law 
also did not require the vetting of employees of the security services. Section 
1(a) lists professional positions in the security services that are lustratable. 
However, this group was to be vetted only if its members later took on public 
positions (e.g., if they became MPs, etc.), and were not liable for vetting if they 
simply remained employees of the successor security services. Hence, those 
who served on the staff of the communist-era security services have in most 
cases not been vetted and indeed may remain employed in today’s security 
services.
 While the first lustration law was being prepared, the opposition MSZP’s 
popularity was gradually growing. In an effort to quell the MSZP’s rise, the 
governing MDF gradually sought to broaden the scope of the law so as to 
include categories into which MSZP MPs might fall. The party argued that, 
in addition to collaboration with III/III, other past activities should be cov-
ered by the law: service in the police force in 1956–57, service in political or 
state positions in which one received information for decisions from public 
security organizations, and membership in the Arrow Cross Party, a wartime 
fascist organization. Since the membership of these groups could in any case 
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be ascertained from public records, the move to include these groups in the 
law appeared to reflect primarily political motives. 
 Amendments proposed by the SZDSZ during the 1994–98 period would 
have extended lustration to the whole security services, that is, also to the 
former departments III/I, III/II, and III/IV. However, the bill was passed with-
out the amendments, and when the SZDSZ appealed to the Constitutional 
Court, it rejected the motions in its adjudication 23/1999 (VI.30) AB. The 
court stated that only the III/III was established “to be the support of the 
state-party,” implying that other directorates of the security services were not 
unconstitutional:
The other secret services, though the connection was very close, only 
partly could do such activity [i.e., activity contrary to the rule of law]. 
Therefore the fact, that any person is still or was the professional officer 
of another, still operating secret service, is not necessarily data of public 
interest. 
The ruling was controversial since it took a view contradictory to that pro-
vided by a number of disclosed documents. Moreover, contrary to this state-
ment, the court’s earlier 1994 decision had in several places referred to the 
security services as a whole and had indeed quoted the 1991 Report of the 
National Security Committee of Parliament as saying that personnel regularly 
moved among the directorates of the security services. Moreover, the pub-
lication of documents from other branches has shown that they engaged in 
similar activities to the III/III. János Kenedi, a prominent expert on the secu-
rity services, has stated that orders given to the security services were general 
and did not differentiate among directorates; again implying that all direc-
torates engaged in similar activities. Another argument against vetting other 
branches is that publication of information might have threatened the lives 
of personnel working as spies abroad. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that 
this argument influenced the Constitutional Court.
conclusion
As predicted by Welsh, accusations of lustration have become a key tool of 
political competition in Hungary. Not only have changes to the lustration 
law over the years been motivated largely by the political interests of the par-
ties promoting them, but in addition accusations have been used to damage 
the standing and careers of political opponents. In this latter respect, the 
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authenticity of the data published is scarcely relevant, since an accusation and 
ensuing scandal is enough to smear the name of the individual concerned. 
Moreover, the frequency of such scandals and their occurrence across the 
political spectrum leaves the public with the impression that the vast major-
ity of politicians have a dishonorable past. 
 Such politicization of the lustration process is perhaps inevitable, but this 
tendency has arguably been exacerbated in Hungary because of the way in 
which lustration was designed and implemented. Three features of the law or 
the supporting legal framework are most relevant.
 First, the absence of a generalized public disclosure of the files means that 
lustration has not allowed “closure” on the past, but rather new cases and 
accusations continue to come to light. Rumors abound that today’s politi-
cians did serve as informers but that the Lustration Commissions were unable 
to find sufficient evidence. The lack of transparency of the commissions’ dis-
pensation decisions fosters such rumors. 
 Second, and perhaps to some extent underlying the original decision 
to avoid a general public disclosure, is the fact that Hungarian legal culture 
affords privacy a high priority. According to Hungarian legal thinking, both 
citizens and public figures are entitled to a high degree of protection of their 
privacy, although public figures are, by virtue of their office, entitled to less 
protection. Some experts have even argued that it is unconstitutional to 
reveal information relating to ordinary citizens. This drive to protect privacy, 
especially in the case of ordinary citizens, has played a major role in the many 
debates on proposed amendments to the law as well as in reaching interpre-
tations of how it should be applied. Even under the latest law, only limited 
information can be published, with the names of agents still protected from 
general disclosure. One implication of this approach is that potential benefits 
in terms of the moral cleansing of society remain out of reach.
 Third, the fact that the law regulates only information relating to activity 
for the III/III means that today’s politicians remain vulnerable to accusations 
that they served in other directorates of the security services. Indeed, Prime 
Minister Péter Medgyessy was accused of having served as a top-secret officer 
for the III/II (counterintelligence) department of the security services shortly 
after being elected in June 2002; he did not deny it. More recently, in 2004, the 
president of Hungarian Public Radio was accused of the same type of activity. 
This continued uncertainty means that one of the main aims of the lustration 
law — to prevent the blackmail of contemporary politicians — has not been 
achieved. 
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 Lustration has thus failed to provide transparency in the political sphere. 
Indeed, as Fowler points out, “sanctionless lustration” as in the Hungarian 
case, if successfully implemented, produces no more information for the pub-
lic. In short, a Hungarian citizen still cannot be sure that a serving MP did not 
work for the communist-era security services in some capacity or another. 
The defining feature of Hungarian lustration — the decision to limit sanctions 
to the threat of disclosure — has also proved to be one of its key flaws. On the 
other hand, in some cases even where compromising information has been 
revealed (e.g., during the Danubegate scandal), voters later elected the candi-
date in question.
 Perhaps one other reason why lustration in Hungary has failed to build 
trust in democracy or politicians is that it has been a very elite-focused mea-
sure. The individuals who underwent vetting were obviously drawn from the 
elite, but it was also primarily the elite that undertook the debate on lustra-
tion; ordinary people have seen only the scandals arising over the years. Only 
with the passage of the 2003 law has the wider public gained the opportunity 
to be more generally involved. Even then, given the time that has passed since 
the transition and the difficulty for the ordinary person of interpreting the 
files, it is not clear that the process will be much more inclusive or shed much 
more light on the past. In this respect, lustration in Hungary seems doomed 
to fail in any aims to perform a moral cleansing of society.
 Yet the counterfactual cannot be known. The existence of the law may have 
deterred some former agents from taking on public positions; this effect can-
not be measured but could be significant. It is also not clear that another form 
of historical justice — at least on its own — would have been preferable. Had a 
truth commission, for example, been selected, it seems unlikely that in such a 
politically divided society as Hungary the personnel with sufficient indepen-
dence and credibility to ensure a valuable process could have been appointed. 
Thus while the lustration policy has had many flaws, it might not have been 
preferable to ignore lustration entirely. Rather, the pursuit of a combination 
of different instruments of historical justice might have been the most appro-
priate way to proceed.
 Questions remain about how to handle the information gathered by the 
communist security services in future. Some experts argue that the best 
solution would be to open the archives and allow people to judge for them-
selves the guilt or otherwise of former agents. Unlimited access to the docu-
ments, permitting the exception only of documents compiled under the post- 
transition constitutional state, would provide a real opportunity to reveal the 
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past. At the same time it would serve the interest of the present especially in 
the case of participants in public life, since it would reveal what kind of inter-
ests (secret until now) may underlie or influence decision making. The open-
ing up of all documents would also clarify for those who intend to serve in 
public office which acts will not be protected by the constitutional state.
 Other experts would rather see all of the documents destroyed, or at least 
argue that the victims of surveillance should have ownership of the docu-
ments, to destroy, keep, or hand over to historians as they wish. On this argu-
ment, since the data were gathered illegally, it should be up to those affected to 
decide how the material is handled. However, still others argue that, now that 
the data exist, to destroy them would be to deny the role that they undoubt-
edly played in shaping history. The question is ultimately one that can be 
resolved only through the deliberations arising from the democratic process.
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appendix 1: list of interviews conducted
1 Zoltán Hodászi, judge serving on the Lustration Commission
2 István Sándorffy, legal representative of the Lustration Commission
3 Katalin Kutrucz, former deputy head of the Historical Office and deputy head of the 
new Archive established in 2003
4 András Gyekiczki, chief of cabinet at the Ministry of Interior (1994–98) 
5 PM, former agent, whose collaboration was terminated at his own initiative
6 László Varga, Archive of Budapest
7 Vilmos Sós, philosopher, was under surveillance
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appendix 2: chronology of key events
1989 year-end Danubegate scandal: press reports that contemporary opposition fig-
ures remained under surveillance and that the security services had been inten-
tionally destroying files from the communist era
1990 May MDF–FKGP–KDNP government takes office
 August Justitia plan published
 October Demszky-Hack bill tabled
1991 May Government tables lustration bill
 November Parliament starts to debate government bill; 
      Zétényi-Takács bill passed
1992 March Constitutional Court outlaws Zétényi-Takács bill
 June Government withdraws lustration bill for revision
1993 October Government tables revised lustration bill and debate starts
1994 March Lustration law passed 
 April Three judges elected to first Lustration Commission; 
      parliamentary elections
 July MSZP–SZDSZ government takes office
 Fall Screening starts
 December Constitutional Court outlaws some parts of the law; 
      sets September 30, 1995, as deadline for revisions
1995 December Government tables amendment
1996 July Amended lustration law passed (Act LXVII)
 Fall Screening restarts under new legislation; Historical Office established
1998 April Government loses parliamentary elections
 July Fidesz-MPP-led government takes office
1999 June Constitutional Court resolution (about 1996 law)
2000 June Amended lustration law passed (Act XCIII); 
      date when lustration law was originally supposed to expire
2002 April Government loses parliamentary elections
 June MSZP-SZDSZ government takes office; 
      scandal breaks about new prime minister; Drafts T/541 and T/542 tabled 
 December New law passed (Act III/2003)
2003 June Constitutional Court resolution (about 2000 law)
2004 December Time allowed for lustration process extended once again
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In order to understand the different political and social functions of the lustra-
tion law in Czech society in the last decade, it is necessary to return to its prin-
cipal rules, content, and political goals and the context of post-communist 
legal and political transformations. I shall therefore start with a historical and 
institutional background of the law and describe its content and main proce-
dures. I then focus on the problem of the rule of law and legal continuity in 
a revolutionary situation. In the final part of this chapter, I shall move from 
descriptive to prescriptive methodology and seek to illuminate some moral, 
political, and legal “problems with lustration.” 
 General criticisms of the law often fail to distinguish between different 
groups of individuals affected by it and, like the statute itself, make no distinc-
tion between the communist oppressors and their victims. Contrary to these 
views and despite the lustration law’s justifications using the rule of law argu-
ment, I shall criticize the statute for its failure to distinguish oppressors and 
their victims. The law’s purpose to defend emerging public administration 
and democratic government has been compromised by the harms it caused 
to many innocent and brave individuals. I shall conclude with remarks on the 
complex nature of justice and the limits of legal means in dealing with the 
communist past and its crimes and injustices.
the lustration act:  
history, criteria, and institutional background
The Czechoslovak lustration law, as formulated in Act No. 451/1991 of the 
Collection of the Laws “determining some further conditions for holding 
specific offices in state bodies and corporations of the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic” (commonly 
referred to as the “large lustration law”) and Act No. 279/1992 of the Collection 
of the Laws “on certain other prerequisites for the exercise of certain offices 
filled by designation or appointment of members of the Police of the Czech 
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Republic and members of the Correction Corps of the Czech Republic” (com-
monly referred to as the “small lustration law” because it only extended the 
lustration procedures to the police force and the prison guards service), was 
based on the idea that post-communist Czechoslovak society had to deal with 
its past and facilitate the process of decommunization by legal and political 
means. It intended to specify a carefully selected list of top offices in the state 
administration that would be inaccessible to those individuals whose loyalty 
to the new regime could be justifiably questioned due to their political respon-
sibilities and powers exercised during the communist regime. 
 Furthermore, the law also responded to the practice of “wild lustration” 
that had been going on since 1990. Before the first free parliamentary elec-
tions in 1990, all political parties except the Communist Party had their can-
didates “lustrated” despite the fact that the parties were not legally obliged to 
withdraw those with a secret police record from the ballot list. This practice 
only illustrates how strong the public pressure was to eliminate the risk of 
communist officials securing their power and influence in the new democratic 
condition. The lustration policy was introduced in the democratically elected 
Federal Assembly (Parliament) and, in March 1991, the Parliament’s internal 
“November 17 Commission,” which had been investigating the circumstances 
of the so-called velvet revolution and the secret police involvement in it, pub-
lished the names of ten MPs who had a record in the secret police registers 
and refused to step down.1 All these steps taken to clarify the status and past 
of new political figures plus political instability and the coup attempt in the 
Soviet Union in August 1991 subsequently motivated the federal government’s 
decision to draft a general lustration law.
 The Federal Assembly enacted the law, on October 4, 1991. Act No. 451/1991 
of the Collection of the Laws was drafted under the guidance of deputy Prime 
Minister Pavel Rychetský, who was politically affiliated with the Civic Move-
ment, the center-left post-dissident stream of the former revolutionary Civic 
Forum.2 The proposal had to achieve support in the Federal Assembly, which 
had already been politically fragmented and witnessed growing ideologi-
cal and national tensions. Supporters of the lustration law therefore had to 
negotiate the draft and accept some one hundred amendments proposed in 
fourteen committees and during the plenary sessions. The law was eventu-
ally enacted by the vote of 148 deputies (49.3% of all members of the Federal 
Assembly) from twelve parliamentary factions stretching from the Christian 
Democratic parties and Moravian autonomists to the Hungarian nationalists 
and liberal MPs representing the Civic Movement and the Public Against Vio-
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lence. The law could pass only due to the abstention of seventy MPs, which 
lowered the majority quorum.3
 The law was based on the principle of person-by-person specific vetting 
and provided two lists of offices and activities to which it applied: the first 
listed offices requiring a lustration procedure before individuals could assume 
them; the second enumerated power positions held and activities performed 
during the communist regime that disqualified candidates applying for the 
jobs given in the first list. Individuals holding the jobs at the time had been 
subject to the lustration procedure as well. 
 Despite a wide range of public offices subjected to the lustration procedure, 
positions contested in the general democratic elections had not been affected 
by the law. Offices protected by the lustration law included: all ranks of the 
judiciary and the prosecution office; the civil service, rank of head of depart-
ment and higher and senior administrative positions in all constitutional bod-
ies; the army and police force positions of colonel and higher; all intelligence 
service specialized in political surveillance and persecutions (exceptions 
could be granted by the minister of interior on national security grounds); 
all management positions in the national bank, state media, press agencies, 
and state corporations or corporations in which the state is a majority share-
holder; university administrative positions of head of academic departments 
and higher; and the board of directors of the Academy of Sciences.4 
 The disqualifying positions and activities during the former regime were 
linked to political bodies; repressive secret police, state security, and intelli-
gence forces; and individuals collaborating with these forces. 
 Disqualifying political positions included: Communist Party secretar-
ies from the rank of district secretaries upwards, members of the executive 
boards of district Communist Party committees upwards, members of the 
Communist Party Central Committee, political propaganda secretaries of 
those committees, members of the party militia, members of the employ-
ment review committees after the communist coup in 1948 and the Warsaw 
Pact invasion in 1968, and graduates of the Communist Party propaganda and 
security universities in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. These jobs and 
memberships were assumed to constitute a risk for the post-1989 democratic 
regime. Exceptions were made for those party secretaries and members of the 
executive boards of the party committees holding their positions between 
January 1, 1968, and May 1, 1969, that is during the democratization period 
of the “Prague spring of ’68” terminated by the invasion of the Warsaw Pact 
armies in August 1968.5
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 Regarding the security, secret police, and intelligence service positions, the 
following were enumerated by the law: senior officials of the security police 
from the rank of departmental chiefs upwards, members of the intelligence 
service, and police members involved in political persecutions. Nevertheless, 
the law originally allowed the minister of interior, the head of the intelligence 
service, and the head of the police force to pardon those members of the for-
mer secret police whose dismissal would cause “security concerns.”6
 The most controversial part of the law was that which listed the activities 
of citizens related to the secret police. They involved secret police collabora-
tors of the following kind: agents, owners of conspiratorial flats or individu-
als renting them, informers, political collaborators with the secret police, 
and other conscious collaborators such as candidates for collaboration.7 This 
complicated structure corresponded to the system elaborated by the commu-
nist secret police. The main issue was whether a person consciously collabo-
rated with the police or was just a target of secret police activity and possibly 
a nonintentional source of information gathered during police interviews. 
 It was often technically impossible to distinguish the two sides of one 
repressive organization — the secret police collaborators and their victims. At 
the same time, the government had to address the problem because the pub-
lic was most concerned exactly about the possible damaging impact of secret 
police agents on the emerging democratic political process and institutions. In 
February 1992, the Independent (Appeal) Commission required by the law was 
created, the purpose of which was to review the issued positive lustration cer-
tificates8 in light of the reliability of available facts and gathered secret police 
records. The commission consisted of the following members: chair, deputy 
chair, and one member were appointed by the chair committee of the Federal 
Assembly (Parliament) and could not be members of Parliament; two members 
were appointed by the federal minister of interior from his staff; one mem-
ber was appointed by the head of the intelligence service; one member was 
appointed by the minister of defense; six members were appointed by the chair 
committees of national parliaments (three members by the Czech National 
Council and three members by the Slovak National Council) and could not 
be members of the Czech or Slovak National Councils; and one member was 
appointed by the Czech minister of interior and one member by the Slovak 
minister of interior from their staff. Members appointed by the ministers and 
the head of the intelligence service had to be university law graduates. 
 The appointment procedure was a strange mixture of democratic elements 
(involvement of top bodies of the federal and national legislature), administra-
tive hierarchical procedures (appointments within the executive branch of 
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constitutional power), and attempts to provide equal representation of both 
nations of the Czechoslovak federation at the time. The membership com-
bined expert knowledge with lay elements. The appointment rules also show 
that the Czechoslovak and, later, the Czech lustration process was handled 
primarily by the executive branch of constitutional power, especially the Min-
istry of Interior, which set up a special bureau to administer the process of 
collecting the necessary data and issue the lustration certificates within its 
Security Office. 
 The category of secret police collaborators was divided into three subcat-
egories: category A of “agents, informers, and owners of conspiratorial flats”; 
category B of “trustees,” who, though not classified by any of the activities 
listed in category A, were conscious collaborators; and category C, “candi-
dates for collaboration,” who did not have to be necessarily conscious col-
laborators and often were just subjects of police surveillance and interroga-
tion. The commission’s principal goal was to decide whether those accused of 
collaborating with the secret police actually had been conscious collaborators 
or just innocent victims of political persecution recorded in the secret police 
files.
the lustration law in action 
The categorization of secret police collaborators led to a number of political 
protests, moral criticisms, and legal cases. It was especially category C that 
became the subject of controversy and resulted in a number of legal com-
plaints. By October 1992, the Independent (Appeal) Commission had reviewed 
a mere three hundred of the complaints, which was 11% of all the complaints 
submitted to the commission, and only in thirteen cases concluded that they 
were conscious collaborators with the secret police.9 No wonder that the 
commission’s chairman Jaroslav Baˇsta proposed the removal of this category 
from the statute. The Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, which reviewed the lustration law’s constitutionality after ninety-
nine members of Parliament complained to the court, eventually annulled 
this category.10 
 It is noteworthy that the court upheld the law’s constitutionality in general 
and stated that lustration in principle did not violate the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights, the International Convention on Economic, 
Social, and Political Rights, or the Discrimination Convention (Employ-
ment and Occupation) of 1958. Furthermore, the court declared unconstitu-
tional and therefore void those sections of the law (sections 2(3) and 3(2)) that 
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legislated specific powers to the minister of defense and the minister of inte-
rior to exempt individuals from the lustration procedure if it was in the inter-
est of state security. According to the court, these sections contradicted the 
principles of equality and due process of law guaranteeing that the same rules 
apply to those in the same position.11
 The staff handling the lustration process consisted primarily of admin-
istrative staff of the Ministry of Interior responsible for the protection of the 
communist secret police files. The position of the Independent Commission 
was specific because it was to deal with citizens’ complaints within the frame-
work of administrative procedure, before any judicial review, and on the basis 
of a rigorous and confidential fact-finding process. After the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in 1992, which declared unconstitutional the incorpora-
tion of category C into the law, the commission’s work became unnecessary 
and the body was dissolved. The lustration process subsequently became fully 
administered by the Security Office of the Ministry of Interior, which issues the 
lustration certificate. The certificate therefore is an administrative act against 
which a citizen can file an administrative complaint and even a civil suit.
 Regarding the procedure, an individual has to apply for the lustration cer-
tificate at the Security Office of the Ministry of Interior. Any person can apply 
for the certificate and it is the ministry’s duty to issue it. The certificate is man-
datory only for those holding or applying for jobs listed in the lustration law. 
An organization can apply for lustration of its employees only if their jobs 
are subject to the lustration law. In the case of a “positive lustration” result, 
an applicant can file an administrative complaint with the ministry and, if 
the original finding remains unchanged, file a civil suit against the ministry 
demanding the protection of “personal integrity.” 
 It is obvious that the law did not affect Communist Party members in gen-
eral and, among communists, targeted only party officials and party militia 
members. Individuals who ended up with a “positive lustration” record stat-
ing that they had collaborated with the secret police could still be active in 
politics because the statute did not apply to any office or position contested 
in the general election. However, the overwhelming majority of political par-
ties introduced a self-regulatory policy demanding all candidates to submit a 
“negative lustration” certificate before being listed in the parliamentary elec-
tion. The only parliamentary political party refusing to internally apply lus-
tration rules has been the Communist Party. The law thus created a situation 
in which members of Parliament and local councils could have a secret police 
record while, for instance, heads of different university departments would be 
subjected to the lustration procedure. Lustration did not apply to the emerg-
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ing private economy sector, either. Private companies did not have access to 
the secret police files of its employees and therefore could not apply for “pri-
vate lustrations.”
 Available figures show that around 5% of all lustration submissions 
resulted in “positive certificates” disqualifying applicants from their office in 
the mid-1990s.12 The most recent figures indicate a decline in “positive lus-
tration” to approximately 3% of all applications received by the Ministry of 
Interior since the enactment of the lustration law in 1991. The ministry cur-
rently receives between six thousand and eight thousand lustration requests 
per year and the total number of lustration certificates issued between 1991 
and 2001 was 402,270.13
 Furthermore, the law had been originally enacted for a limited period of 
five years, but was subsequently extended by Parliament several times and 
is still being enforced in the Czech Republic.14 In 1996, the Parliament of the 
Czech Republic extended the enforcement of the lustration law until 2000, 
overriding a veto of President Václav Havel, who criticized the prolongation 
of the act as contradicting its original design as an exceptional, temporary, 
and revolutionary measure restricted to the early post-communist period 
and unsuitable for a stabilized democratic legal system. In November 2000, 
Parliament extended the law once again despite President Havel’s veto. The 
extended law introduced an exemption from the lustration process of per-
sons born after December 1, 1971.
 The prolongation of the law by the Parliament of the Czech Republic was 
widely criticized as contradicting its original purpose and spirit. One of the 
main justifications of the law at the time of its drafting, which emphasized 
only a temporary effect of its discriminatory measures, thus turned out to be 
false. Instead of the statute’s termination after the initial period of five years, 
the lustration rules have become an intrinsic part of the Czech legal system 
and were supplemented by further vetting procedures required in relation to 
NATO membership of the Czech Republic, which materialized in 1999. In June 
1998, the Parliament therefore passed the Act of Protection of Secret Data, No. 
148/1998 of the Collection of the Laws of the Czech Republic, which set up the 
National Security Office responsible for the protection of all secret data and 
vetting all individuals with access to them. The act de facto expanded the lus-
tration law restrictions to other parts of the civil service and state administra-
tion because security checks, apart from security rules required by the NATO 
internal directives, involve the lustration process.15 
 The prolongation of the law was also addressed by the Constitutional 
Court in its judgment No. 9/2001Pl. US of December 5, 2001, in which the 
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court admitted that “the amendment of the lustration laws, which removed 
provisions about their restricted validity in time, was considerable interven-
tion in their meaning.”16 Although the court insisted that the lustration law 
should be perceived as a temporary legislative measure, it also said that the 
law still protected an “existing public interest” and “legitimate aim, which is 
the active protection of a democratic state from the dangers which could be 
brought to it by insufficiently loyal and little trustworthy public services.”17 
In other words, the “friend-enemy” political logic still persisted more than 
twelve years after the velvet revolution and the collapse of the Czechoslovak 
communist regime and justified extraordinary and temporary measures to 
protect the state administration. Nevertheless, the court’s ruling also empha-
sized that political circumstances change and the relevance of the lustration 
law decreases with the passage of time. It therefore is possible to imagine that 
a future constitutional complaint challenging the law might lead to a revision 
of the current position of the Constitutional Court. 
 As regards public reflections on the lustration process, a recent check 
showed that over 80% of the major Czech websites responding to the entry 
“lustration” are in fact advertising screening and security facilities for new and 
used cars. Fourteen years after the enactment of the lustration law by the Par-
liament of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the matter of dealing with 
the communist past appears to be almost symbolically obliterated by the spe-
cific needs of a consumer society. 
 This image provided by the virtual reality of electronic media is under-
scored by opinion polls that indicate a steady decline of interest in dealing with 
the communist past and extending the lustration law.18 Nevertheless, this lack 
of public interest contrasts with intense activity in the Assembly of Deputies 
(lower chamber of Parliament of the Czech Republic) during the first half of 
2003 when a group of communist deputies proposed abolishing the existing 
lustration law. The government refused to support the proposal; however, it 
went to the Assembly and, despite not having garnered a majority, the mea-
sure was supported by forty-eight deputies, some of them prominent social 
democrats.19 Although the Czech Social Democratic Party has always been 
rather lukewarm in its support for the lustration law, two smaller coalition 
parties backed the legislation and even threatened to leave the government 
if the law was abolished. Once again, parliamentary discussion of the lustra-
tion issues raised the problem of collective guilt, communist political crimes, 
human rights standards, due process of law, discrimination in the workplace, 
and so forth.
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 This contrast between the disinterested public and heated political debate 
illustrates the current state of the Czech lustrations very well. Opponents 
of lustration wanted to use the final stage of the European integration pro-
cess of the Czech Republic to abolish the law on the basis of its discrimina-
tory character, while the government, with a parliamentary majority of just 
two votes, realized that the whole issue was too risky for the fragile coalition 
and refused to abolish or substantially reduce the applicability of the existing 
lustration law.20 
the lustration act and “a democracy defending itself”
In Czechoslovakia, much like the revolutionary changes that took place in 
East Germany at the same time, the 1989 velvet revolution was an event gov-
erned by the political demands of constitutional democracy, civic rights, and 
the rule of law. It may therefore seem that the rule of law principle should 
have been enacted immediately after the power transfer. Taking seriously the 
minimum definition of the rule of law as the subjection of human conduct 
and especially political power to general laws, not individuals, one can see 
that the question of when the new political representation and democratically 
elected bodies are to unconditionally respect the principle of political equal-
ity (including the equal treatment of officials of the former totalitarian regime 
and its political organizations) becomes a key issue in any post-communist 
political society.
 A democratic political community is constituted on the principle of equal 
treatment of all citizens before the law. However, the rule of law and liberal 
democracy cannot be reduced to the institutionalized world of legal prin-
ciples, rules, and standards of human conduct. Principles and standards are 
inseparable from the social actors who observe and enforce them. Apart from 
its normative structure, every political and legal institution therefore must 
be examined in terms of those who act within its framework: individuals and 
social groups. Persons with decision-making and executive power can funda-
mentally determine the quality of political and legal processes. Every major 
political and legal change thus necessarily affects both normative structures 
and actors in the legal and political institutions. 
 Lustration therefore has to be taken as part of the broader politics of 
decommunization, which targets exactly the personal aspect of the whole 
process of post-communist political and legal transformations. It is based 
on the idea that some individuals cannot be trusted due to their position and 
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activities in the past regime and therefore should be excluded from access to 
certain public offices in the new democratic regime. In listing specific groups 
of people as banned from public offices, lustration gives evidence of the 
doubts and uncertainties accompanying the power transfer from communist 
rule to liberal democracy. 
 In order to understand the specific process of lustration, it is important to 
analyze the nature of political and legal changes in general. In Czechoslova-
kia, the revolutionary events of 1989 were typical of the logic of political con-
flict based on the concept of an “enemy”21 that needed to be neutralized and 
removed from power. The absence of any round table talks or power conces-
sions before the outbreak of public protests in November 1989 resulted in the 
regime change being dominated by the revolutionary confrontation between 
“us/friends/revolutionaries” and “them/enemies/nomenklatura.” Communist 
officials and the secret police and its collaborators therefore could be quite 
easily labelled as “political enemies.” 
 This urge to purge the state institutions from individuals linked to the pre-
vious communist regime was still present, for instance, in the Judgment of 
the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic No. 9/2001Pl US, of Decem-
ber 5, 2001, regarding the lustration law. Ten years after the enactment of the 
law, the court recalled the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
in the case Vogt v. Germany, which states that a democratic state is entitled to 
require of its bureaucrats that they be loyal to the constitutional principles on 
which it is based. In this regard it takes into account the experience in Ger-
many during the Weimar Republic and during the bitter period that followed 
the collapse of this regime until the passage of the Basic Law in 1949. Ger-
many wished to bar the possibility that these experiences would repeat them-
selves, and therefore established its new state on the idea of a democracy able 
to defend itself.22
 The court used the “democracy able to defend itself” argument in its judg-
ment upholding the lustration law as a constitutional instrument requesting 
the political loyalty of civil servants and protecting the democratic regime 
against political threats. In this respect, the post-1989 Czechoslovak and 
German decommunization policies resemble each other because they both 
strongly demanded supplementing the institutional guarantees of the recon-
struction of the democratic rule of law with necessary restrictive personal 
guarantees. They also used some notions and legitimation arguments elabo-
rated during the post-1945 German denazification policy, which are briefly 
addressed below. 
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 The idea of lustration is based on the belief that democracy is not only an 
impersonal mechanism for the reproduction of power in which law plays the 
role of a supreme regulative system, but also a matter of civil trust and loyalty. 
People must trust the new regime and the regime must trust its people. This 
would hardly be possible if old oppressors kept power in the new political 
situation. The danger of the persistence of old elites manifested its disastrous 
effects in ideological twists from international communism to ethnic nation-
alism and subsequent wars in the former Yugoslavia and some republics of the 
former Soviet Union. It was therefore necessary to satisfy the public expecta-
tions that the new power holders and civil servants would not threaten the 
authority of democratic political and constitutional institutions. The general 
principle of lustration was expected to strengthen the public trust and legiti-
macy of the new liberal democratic regime.
lustration and other forms of “dealing with the past”
Despite its respect for democratic legitimacy as materialized in the general elec-
tions, the lustration law was nevertheless highly controversial because it com-
promised the first precondition of justice and the democratic rule of law — the 
equality of all before the law.23 This equality was weakened because the very 
purpose of the lustration law was to administratively discriminate against 
specific groups of citizens by denying them access to public office. Instead of 
guaranteeing the equal treatment of every citizen of a political community by 
means of generally binding rules, some citizens were excluded from certain 
public offices in the new democratic regime due to their past political posi-
tion and activities. Legislating the lustration law, the post-revolutionary power 
ended up in a serious conflict with its own revolutionary demand of the rule of 
law constituted by equality of all citizens before the law. 
 Assessing the lustration law, it is important to return to the analysis of the 
nature of the revolutionary changes in 1989 and early stages of post-commu-
nist legal and political transformations typical of the problems of decommu-
nization and legal continuity. Every revolutionary change of a political regime 
calls for dealing with the political past.24 Different ways of dealing with this 
past subsequently determine political, moral, and social developments of a 
specific political community in the revolutionary transition.
 From the temporal perspective, revolutionary regime change is always 
stretched between the past and the future. At one end, there is the future full 
of expectations and hope. However, this future dimension is also unclear and 
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uncertain and comprises too many political possibilities, breaks, and unex-
pected turns. The primary goal of any revolution therefore is to stabilize its 
own future. At the other end, there is the past against which the revolutionary 
movement was targeted and set up its goals and demands. This past has to be 
rejected because it is “unjust,” “immoral,” “totalitarian,” and even “inhuman.”
 During the revolution, dealing with the past affects the political system, 
but also the systems of education, public morality, and economy. It therefore 
comes as no surprise that the legal system also experiences a complex change 
driven by the revolutionary caesura, political regime changes, and the sub-
sequent need to formulate legal rules and principles for the new social and 
political condition.
 Political regime changes always involve a complex change of the system 
of positive law, and the legislature, under these revolutionary circumstances, 
must address the most general questions of legal continuity and discontinu-
ity. In this respect, post-communist legal systems are typical of legal conti-
nuity and the method of fast enactment of new legal norms and regulations 
that gradually had to replace the communist legal system. This process was 
extremely dynamic and reflected revolutionary changes in the post-com-
munist societies. This lawmaking effort, the goal of which was to change 
the nature of the system of positive law and adjust it to the new political and 
social conditions, obviously involved the politics of decommunization.
 Legislation dealing with the past can then be divided into the two types of 
legislative acts: (a) pragmatic, purpose-oriented laws that confront the past by 
providing practical legal remedies for past injustices; and (b) symbolic laws that 
address general problems of political ideology and value-based political argu-
ments. In reality, the post-1989 legislation dealing with the communist past 
always combined the pragmatic and symbolic functions. For instance, the 
most technical provisions, such as lustrations in state-owned industrial com-
panies, had a symbolic value. Nevertheless, the distinction is useful because 
it helps to identify legislative acts with a direct legal effect and separate them 
from legislation that was primarily symbolic and intended to affect the sphere 
of public morality.
 The distinction is also essential because post-communist Czech society 
did not follow the pattern of truth and reconciliation commissions in deal-
ing with the past injustices in moral or quasi-judicial terms. Instead of public 
moral condemnation of the unjust political regime by an independent body, 
the Czech post-communist transformation was typical of Parliament using 
its legislative authority and creating the moral condemnation of the commu-
nist regime in the form of law itself. In 1993, Parliament thus enacted the Act 
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of Lawlessness of the Communist Regime and the Resistance to It,25 which 
condemned the communist regime, made communist officials and their sup-
porters responsible for its injustices, and praised those who resisted the com-
munist political system. Although primarily drafted as a symbolic act, provi-
sions incorporating the concept of “responsibility”26 raised opposing hopes 
and fears in both camps of the emerging democratic system. Some right-wing 
politicians wanted prosecutions of political crimes to go ahead because they 
interpreted the law — especially its section 5 extending the period of limita-
tions for crimes not prosecuted for political reasons between February 25, 
1948, and December 29, 1989 — as overturning the criminal law principle of 
period limitations. Some left-wing politicians even outside the Communist 
Party leadership feared that the law could lead to the politicization of crimi-
nal prosecution. Forty-one members of Parliament therefore submitted a 
complaint to the Constitutional Court and demanded that the law be declared 
unconstitutional and therefore void. 
 The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic rejected the complaint 
and upheld the act’s constitutionality. At the same time, the court ruled that 
the act, especially its sections 1(2) and 5 incorporating the concept of respon-
sibility and the criminal law period of limitation for prosecution, could not 
have any practical impact on the criminal law statutes and that the meaning 
of the concept of “responsibility” is moral, not criminal. The act thus could 
not open a way to establish criminal liability of former communist officials 
outside the framework of the criminal code. The court described the law as 
having primarily a moralizing purpose to mobilize public opinion and insti-
gate reflections of the communist period of modern Czech history.27
 Instead of setting up some form of a truth and reconciliation commission, 
Parliament established itself as a “moral institution” dealing with the commu-
nist past and symbolically mobilizing its public condemnation by the enacted 
law. Another primarily symbolic attempt to deal with the past, yet with strong 
practical and criminal justice consequences, was the establishment of a spe-
cial Office for Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of Commu-
nism operating as part of the Ministry of Interior and, from January 1, 2002, 
as part of the Service of the Criminal Investigation Police.28 The office was to 
continue the job of collecting and archiving information regarding the com-
munist regime, which had previously been done by two other governmental 
offices — the Office for Documentation and Investigation of the Secret Police 
(StB) Activities of the Ministry of Interior and the Center for Documentation 
of Lawlessness of the Communist Regime of the Ministry of Justice (originally 
set up as part of the prosecution office). The office’s public moral task is to 
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map all injustices, atrocities, and crimes related to the communist regime and 
its officials. It is to archive past political injustices and crimes and thus create a 
memento for future generations. Apart from this moral job, the office also has 
a specific criminal justice task: filing cases and prosecuting individuals who 
still are subject to criminal liability. Its activity is therefore both historical and 
supportive of the system of criminal justice — symbolic and pragmatic.29
 The office’s moral symbolic job was subsequently supported by the idea of 
publishing secret police registers and giving the public access to secret police 
files, which was inspired by the German legislation and coincided with the 
first extension of the lustration law. In 1996, Parliament therefore passed the 
Act of Public Access to Files Connected to Activities of the Former Secret 
Police, No. 140/1996 of the Collection of Laws of the Czech Republic. The law 
originally granted access only to persons potentially affected by secret police 
activities. Nevertheless, the statute was amended in 200230 so that the main 
registers of secret police collaborators could be made available to the general 
public.31 According to the current regulation, any adult person who is a citi-
zen of the Czech Republic can file a request to access the secret police files and 
documents collected between February 25, 1948, and February 15, 1990. 
 The access, which is provided by the Ministry of Interior, therefore is not 
limited to the person’s data and files. Nevertheless, the ministry protects the 
constitutional rights of personal integrity and privacy of other individuals 
who might be mentioned in the files requested by the applicant. The ministry 
therefore must make all information possibly affecting those constitutional 
rights inaccessible to the applicant unless it is related to the activities of the 
secret police and its collaborators. The applicant thus can access any details 
regarding the identity of secret police agents but would not be able to see 
information related, for instance, to their marital life or health problems. This 
shift of the state policy naturally resulted in a number of legal cases in which 
individuals demanded their names to be removed from the registers and their 
reputation reestablished.
 Apart from these legislative acts supporting the construction of the demo-
cratic regime’s political symbolism, laws with a primary purpose of practically 
benefiting the individual victims of communist injustices had been enacted 
by Parliament. They comprise especially the Act of Judicial Rehabilitation, 
No. 119/1990 of the Collection of the Laws, which legislated full rehabilitation 
of individuals unjustly prosecuted and imprisoned. The act reestablished full 
integrity and criminal law rehabilitation of those people and granted them 
financial compensation for the period of their imprisonment, the loss of jobs, 
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trial costs, and health harms.32 The state eventually paid three billion Czech 
koruna (approximately $110 million) to the judicially rehabilitated citizens.
 Other huge legal changes based on the notion of historical justice benefit-
ing the victims of communist injustices were restitution laws. In the Czech 
Republic, the process of restitution eventually covered all physical persons or 
individual entrepreneurs whose property had been unlawfully confiscated by 
the communist regime. Persons entitled to restitution also included inheri-
tors or family members of those whose property had been confiscated. The 
restitution process was based on natural restitution and financial compensa-
tion was provided only in those cases when it was impossible to return the 
confiscated property. Together with restitutions of property confiscated by 
the communist regime, restitutions of Jewish property (of both physical and 
moral persons) confiscated during the 1939–45 Nazi occupation were imple-
mented by a special set of laws.33 
 The politics of decommunization thus involved practical remedies ben-
efiting the individual victims and legislative acts of primarily symbolic nature. 
The lustration law then constitutes a third pillar of the Czech decommuniza-
tion policy based on the idea of practical measures necessary to protect the 
new democratic regime and temporarily eliminate potentially disloyal indi-
viduals from public administration. Nevertheless, the symbolic power of this 
practical purpose-oriented legislation has always been very strong and has 
become a cornerstone of all debates about decommunization and dealing 
with past injustices.
round table talks, the rule of law, and lustration
One of the main reasons that different countries incorporated different 
decommunization policies, including lustration laws, lies in the mechanism 
of round table talks. In individual countries of the former Soviet bloc, round 
table talks facilitated the transformation of the totalitarian systems into lib-
eral democracies and transferred power to the new elites. These talks played a 
central role in countries such as Poland and Hungary, which were more liberal 
and reform-oriented than other communist countries. In fact, these countries 
experienced a much more evolutionary and gradual rather than revolution-
ary and sudden political change. Their period of political transition was more 
informed by the idea of negotiations and political bargaining. This gradual 
transfer of power is usually described as a process of regulated and self-limit-
ing revolution.34 For instance, the Hungarian political rendszervaltozas (regime 
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change) was conducted entirely by constitutional acts and democratic pro-
cedures. The constitutional revolution in Hungary wished to avoid political 
divisions and establish new national unity. It was a transformation of com-
munism into liberal democracy entirely controlled and shaped by the exist-
ing constitutional and legal framework.35 Unlike the revolutionary changes in 
Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian transfor-
mation had the character of a constitutional amendment based on the idea of 
legislated regime change.
 The round table negotiations in Hungary and Poland proceeded accord-
ing to specific rules remotely resembling some procedures and principles of 
the rule of law. Unlike spontaneous actions of political resistance generated 
by crowds on the streets, the Polish and Hungarian way of dismantling the 
communist regime had the character of a transformation process in which 
the communist parties could actively participate. The communist parties thus 
could use the round table talks for pursuing their political interests and get-
ting the best possible position in the emerging democratic contest, which was 
to be facilitated by the talks.36 
 On the other hand, the fiction of the existence of the democratic rule 
of law in the round table talks was much weaker and could hardly play any 
fundamental role in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, 
which underwent a more radical revolutionary transformation. In those coun-
tries, the round table talks merely channelled the revolutionary situation and 
guaranteed the peaceful character of the revolutionary change. Until the last 
minute, the Czechoslovak and East German communist leadership remained 
entirely rigid and without the slightest will to change the neo-Stalinist form 
of political rule. They persecuted political opponents, enacted repressive leg-
islation, and organized political trials until the very end. Unlike Hungary and 
Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany experienced high political ten-
sions and the revolutionary politics dominated by the concept of “enemy” had 
a bigger impact on the post-communist transformation in the 1990s. The idea 
of a self-limiting revolution was weakened and this weakness opened much 
more space for the radical politics of decommunization, including the lustra-
tion law. 
 Round table talks and the idea of political regime transformation as a 
change based on general principles of equal justice necessarily invoke the 
question of the temporal emergence of the rule of law in post-communist 
political societies. Until when do we still witness the totalitarian principle of 
socialist legality and when is it possible to talk about the democratic rule of 
325
CZECh REPUBlIC
law? When is totalitarianism transformed into democracy and what role does 
the notion of the rule of law play in the process of decommunization?
 There are no simple answers to these questions. Some lawyers, politicians, 
and legal scholars in post-communist countries supported the fiction that the 
very existence of negotiations at the round table talks already indicated the 
existence of the democratic rule of law, and that no discriminatory measures 
against the communist regime officials such as lustration would therefore 
be justifiable.37 The claim that the rule of law had already existed at the time 
of transfer of political power from the Communist Party to the opposition 
could have a strong symbolic value and stabilizing effect during the period of 
gradual political transition. Nevertheless, it did not correspond to the reality 
of the 1989 revolutionary year in any country of the former Soviet bloc. On 
the one hand, the whole period of the 1990s is depicted as a time of creating 
the institutions of the democratic rule of law, their reconstruction, and adop-
tion of specific legal and political institutions mainly from the West European 
democratic countries. The rule of law is not a real state of political society. It 
is its goal and regulative ideal. On the other hand, it is essential to adopt the 
principles of liberal democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore necessary to 
simultaneously reconstruct the rule of law and confirm its existence in post-
communist societies. It is yet to be brought into existence, but must already 
be the guiding principle of political and legal transformation.
 The rule of law is not a structure that can be instantly created by political 
decision and/or consent. It is impossible to perceive the rule of law as a politi-
cal value the existence of which is determined merely by whether we believe 
in it or not. It is a highly complex structure of institutions, rules, and concepts 
that may take on a number of different forms and the reconstruction of which 
takes years and decades rather than weeks and months.
 The problem of founding the democratic rule of law and determining the 
moment from which it is absolutely necessary to enforce it represents one of 
the most difficult problems of “transitional” legal and political theory. We are 
confronted by the question of when the rule of law principles have to be gener-
ally and unconditionally imposed. The judgments of the Constitutional Court 
of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (No. 1/1992Pl US) and the Consti-
tutional Court of the Czech Republic (No. 9/2001Pl US) clearly show that the 
question has serious practical consequences and is not limited to the sphere 
of jurisprudence and political theory. It determines the extent and temporal 
limitation of enforcement of extraordinary, transitional legal measures such 
as the lustration law.
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lustration and legal retrospectivity
Apart from breaching the first principle of the rule of law — equal treatment 
of all before the law, the lustration law was also criticized for weakening the 
principle of legal certainty, encouraging the arbitrary use of law, and having 
retrospective effect. The principle of lex retro non agit certainly is a constitutive 
element of the rule of law and retrospective laws may weaken legal certainty. 
However, jurisprudence commonly describes retrospective legislation as a pos-
sible remedy for past injustices and a form of punishment for crimes that could 
not be prosecuted in the past for political reasons. Retrospective laws may 
partly compromise legal certainty by breaching time limitations of prosecu-
tion, but still represent an optimal way to reinstate justice and the rule of law. 
 The first example of retrospective justice can be taken from the famous 
appendix of Fuller’s Morality of Law, in which the new government has to 
provide legal remedy and punish crimes caused by the previous tyrannical 
regime.38 In fact, Fuller seeks to solve a problem that was haunting all post-
communist governments: how to punish obvious crimes committed by the 
tyrannical regime if, at the time of their commitment and according to the 
regime’s laws, they were not considered criminal acts and often had been in 
fact initiated by the regime’s legislation. Fuller comes to the conclusion that 
despite the fact that the prohibition against retrospective laws is a constitu-
tive principle of the rule of law, such laws may be used in exceptional circum-
stances if they support another constitutive principle of the rule of law — the 
principle that all crimes shall be prosecuted even if they may be treated as 
legal acts by a tyrannical power. 
 The second example of retrospectivity in law is Gustav Radbruch’s for-
mula, which favors the retrospective application of the suprapositive princi-
ple of equal justice in those circumstances when the law is in gross contradic-
tion to the equal treatment of all. Radbruch reacted to the National Socialist 
regime and its horror policies executed by legal means and summarized his 
position in the following words: “The conflict between justice and legal cer-
tainty should be resolved in that the positive law, established by enactment 
and by power, has primacy even when its content is unjust and improper. It is 
only when the contradiction between positive law and justice reaches an intol-
erable level that the law is supposed to give way as an ‘incorrect law’ [unrich-
tiges Recht] to justice.”39 The formula encouraged judges to resort to the justice 
argument in these extreme circumstances of conflicts between the positive 
law and suprapositive normative arguments of equality before the law.
 The difference between the two examples is obvious: the first is based on 
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democratic legitimacy because the retrospective law is enacted by the demo-
cratically elected legislature, while the second example of Radbruch’s formula 
facilitates judicial remedies of openly unjust laws in terms of natural justice. 
Although the democratic legislation’s main advantage consists of clear sets 
of rules for punishment of past political crimes and just compensation, the 
judicial solution is more flexible because it empowers courts to consider the 
individual circumstances of each case and review it from the perspective of 
equal justice. Although both methods are distinctly retrospective, neither of 
them opens a way to the arbitrary use of power by judges or the legislature. 
They show that legal certainty is only one of many elements of the rule of 
law that does not automatically rule out any possibility of retrospective and 
even discriminatory legislation and judge-made law in transitional periods of 
reconstructing the democratic rule of law.
 From the temporal perspective, the lustration law has the dual character 
of both prospective and retrospective legislation. The statute is prospective 
because it regulates conditions for future job and/or office applications. The 
law is retrospective in the sense that a number of actions and positions secur-
ing privileges in the past have become a ground for administrative discrimi-
nation in the present and future. It is not retrospective in the sense of crimi-
nal liability and therefore does not breach the principles of nullum crimen sine 
lege and nulla poena sine lege. Retrospective aspects in the lustration law, which 
demanded screening the political past of individual applicants, responded to 
the calls for political discontinuity and condemnation of the previous regime 
and its repressive practices. Prospective aspects responded to the calls for 
strengthening the political stability and security of the emerging democratic 
regime. No wonder that the European Court’s formula of “a democracy able 
to defend itself,” which was referring to the condition of the German Weimar 
republic, became popular in the post-communist judicial reasoning and was 
invoked to justify the extraordinary and temporary discriminatory means of 
the lustration law.40 
 Lustration has to be treated rather as a controversial element of the emerg-
ing rule of law and not as its mere denial due to the retrospective elements 
incorporated in the lustration law. Nevertheless, the statute’s controversy 
goes beyond the equal justice and prohibition of retrospective law debates 
and there are many conflicting views regarding its political and moral impact. 
Some critics even suggest that the law made the whole politics of decommu-
nization much less effective.41 Let us therefore turn our attention to some of 
these moral, political, and legal problems surrounding the lustration law and 
its social impact.
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early criticisms of the law and their weaknesses 
The political morality of liberal democracies contains one of the most fre-
quent and agitating words — discrimination. Democratic political life is con-
centrated around the fight against any forms of discrimination and for eman-
cipation of all citizens. People living under liberal democratic conditions are 
politically integrated by the concepts of equality and civil activism against 
inequalities. In this respect, lustration is a process going in the opposite direc-
tion and compromising the foundations of liberal democratic morality by 
its openly discriminatory character. Moral criticisms and arguments against 
the lustration law can be summarized as follows: you make certain groups of 
individuals second-class citizens because you prohibit them from access to 
public office; this contradicts the liberal democratic principle of open access 
to public office.42 Democracy cannot be founded on discrimination!
 This argument was used in early criticisms of the lustration law by human 
rights campaigners and organizations, such as the U.S.-based group Helsinki 
Watch. In 1992, the group reported on lustration legislation and called on the 
Czechoslovak authorities to repeal the statute. In an article published in The 
New York Review of Books,43 a former executive director of Helsinki Watch and 
senior advisor to Human Rights Watch depicted an atmosphere of suspicion 
and distrust in post-communist Czechoslovak society allegedly caused by 
lustration, and implicitly blamed the law for invoking the horror practices 
and “witch hunts” of the communist era.44 Helsinki Watch even suggested 
alternative solutions as follows: “(1) set up an independent, non-governmen-
tal commission to investigate and report on abuses of the previous regime; 
(2) prosecute those responsible for actual crimes, on the basis of specific 
charges and with full due process protections; (3) assure that no prosecutions 
or other adverse actions against individuals — for example, in employment 
and education — take place solely on the basis of political association or party 
membership.”45
 Similar arguments basically treating the lustration law as part of the com-
munist legacy and totalitarian practice, which creates an atmosphere of fear 
and police repression, are also typical of Tina Rosenberg’s famous book 
The Haunted Land, which won the 1996 Pulitzer prize for general nonfiction 
works.46 Rosenberg admits that a transition from dictatorship to democracy 
must not be undermined and all necessary steps should be taken to create 
a new democratic and political culture. She doubts that communist repres-
sion could be the subject of ordinary criminal justice and due process of law 
because of the sheer number of cases and the portion of population involved 
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in them. Nevertheless, she keeps a fundamental moral position that lustration 
is morally repulsive and harmful due to its discriminatory and labelling effect 
and avoids basic questions about reasons, goals, and addressees of discrimi-
natory measures.
 Apart from this fundamental moral critique of the lustration law as dis-
criminatory and therefore resembling communist past practices and under-
mining the democratic present, further criticisms pointed to the principle of 
collective responsibility, which creates a false impression that one can easily 
classify and distinguish oppressors from their victims. For instance, Václav 
Havel opposed the idea of publishing the names of all those with some form 
of secret police connection and feared that it could lead to new fanaticism 
and injustices. Although he emphasized the need to deal with the communist 
past, he wanted to do so with generosity, repentance, and a sense of forgive-
ness.47 Yet, despite this call for a moralist solution, he eventually signed the 
lustration law and proposed several amendments to it.
 Early criticisms often lacked sufficient knowledge of language, political 
and historical context, and even the real content and effect of the legislation. 
They therefore unsurprisingly caused negative responses even among human 
rights advocates and activists.48 Ignorance of basic facts and general lack of 
knowledge is especially striking in the case of the Helsinki Watch’s report 
and its alternative suggestions. In fact, Parliament established an independent 
investigation commission (November 17 Commission) as early as September 
1990 and it was paradoxically this body that came up with the concept of lus-
tration. The idea of prosecuting the “actual crimes” completely ignored the 
fact that many laws enacted by the communist regime actually had a criminal 
nature and therefore legalized otherwise criminal behavior. Taken as a general 
rule, the third suggestion that no adverse actions should be taken solely on 
the basis of political party membership would be one of the strongest accu-
sations of the politics of denazification in postwar Germany and certainly 
would have been appreciated by all high-ranking Nazi officials who could not 
be prosecuted for any “actual crimes” and still had been the subject of employ-
ment discrimination by the post-1945 democratic regime. 
 Furthermore, the Helsinki Watch’s critical report stated that the “law 
does not adequately guarantee a review of each case on an individual basis 
in a proceeding in which the accused is told the charges against him and is 
given sufficient opportunity to prepare a defence.”49 It has to be emphasized 
that lustrations are an administrative law measure. The “lustration certificate” 
is an administrative decision that states facts important for legal qualifica-
tion for certain jobs in state administration and state-owned companies. The 
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lustration procedure is not judicial, which means that any review of the cer-
tificate’s statement is primarily the subject of administrative process. Never-
theless, an applicant can go to the court and ask for a judicial review of the 
decision. This was also one of the reasons why the Independent (Appeal) 
Commission initiated a removal of category C from the law: the risks of legal 
actions against the Ministry of Interior were extremely high. Contrary to the 
criticism, judicial review of the lustration decisions is guaranteed by the law. 
Those who receive a “positive lustration” record can file a civil suit against 
the Ministry of Interior and demand their personal integrity to be restored in 
public. Cases are heard by regional courts, which otherwise commonly act as 
appeal courts in cases originally heard by the first instance district courts.
 The Helsinki Watch’s report was argumentatively weak, inconsistent, 
and failed to provide a thorough critique of the lustration law that would 
go beyond usual and decontextualized truisms. A similar example of such a 
hasty critical approach was an early decision issued by the Governing Body of 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) on March 5, 1992, which speaks 
about “more than one million people”50 potentially affected and calls on the 
Czechoslovak authorities to “scrap or change” the discriminatory law alleg-
edly contradicting the Discrimination Convention, 1958 (No. 111). After the 
subsequent exchange of reports between the ILO and the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Security of the Czech Republic, criticism was toned down and pri-
marily focused on proportionality between the lustration demand in general 
and specific positions for which a job applicant is requested to have a “nega-
tive lustration” record.51 
 In contrast to these approaches, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe, for instance, in principle admitted the compatibility of the lus-
tration law with the democratic rule of law provided its aim is to protect the 
state and not to punish individuals.52 It is based on the distinction of discrimi-
nation and punishment and thus emphasizes the importance of the protective 
function of democratically enacted laws. Similarly, although the European 
Commission expressed some concern regarding the continuing enforcement 
of the law, the lustration process did not become an obstacle to the accession 
of the Czech Republic to the European Union.53
 The paradox of establishing the democratic rule of law by breaching one of 
its constitutive principles could hardly be fully understood if one simply con-
siders the lustration law unjust because of its discriminatory character. This 
attitude draws on a broad picture in which the rule of law stands on the side of 
unconditional equality while the lustration law is compared to dark practices 
of the totalitarian past and condemned as contradicting the very concept of 
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liberal democracy. In such criticisms, the new regime is the subject of princi-
pal criticisms while all those subject to lustration are indiscriminately treated 
as victims. “Specific groups” are not specified at all and top members of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party could be consequently depicted 
as powerless victims of “witch hunts” just three years after they had orches-
trated the last round of political trials.
 Some critics of the law also claimed that it incorporates the principle of 
collective guilt and responsibility unacceptable in the rule of law.54 It is true 
that the law defines specific groups of individuals prohibited from certain 
offices and jobs. In this sense, the law has a generic effect and nobody can 
deny that it seeks to discriminate against the specified groups, though by 
administrative and not criminal law means. However, the law also incorpo-
rates the principle of individual will expressed by those affected by lustration 
(acceptance of a position or job within the party or secret police ranks, appli-
cation to become a member of the party militia, even the most controversial 
consent to become a secret police collaborator, etc.). The law presumes that 
a person who individually decided to become part of the communist repres-
sive institutions should be made responsible for this decision in the pres-
ent. It is by no means a statute indiscriminately hunting for all communists 
and members of the secret police and using the principle of collective guilt, 
as suggested by early moral and legal criticisms. However, the law presumes 
that the very act of joining higher ranks of the Communist Party organiza-
tion or repressive institutions, such as the secret police and the party militia, 
constitutes a solid ground of prohibition to take a job subject to the lustration 
procedure. Individuals are held prima facie responsible for their past political 
engagements.
 The fact that the lustration law fell far short of banning all communists 
and communist policemen from access to public office is illustrated by the 
case of Pavel Prˇibyl, who had been in the antiriot police unit that brutally 
acted against peaceful anticommunist demonstrations in January 1989. In the 
1990s, Prˇibyl had been briefly involved in business with other former com-
munist police officials and subsequently established his political career in 
the Czech Social Democratic Party. In August 2004, he was invited by Prime 
Minister Stanislav Gross to take the job of head of the Prime Minister’s Office, 
which he accepted. It took two weeks of public protests and media criticism 
before the prime minister decided to take action and Pavel Prˇibyl resigned his 
position. The Prˇibyl case clearly shows that the private sphere has never been 
affected by the lustration law and that its provisions did not automatically 
classify all communists and police members as second-class citizens. 
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oppressors and victims
Apart from the “friend-enemy” political logic dominating the early stage of 
the post-revolutionary legal and political transformation in Czechoslovakia, 
the post-revolutionary transformation also produced a much more compli-
cated logic given by the fact that totalitarian systems had historically unique 
power to make all individuals more or less part of their machinery. In the 
moral sense, almost everyone was a perpetrator and a victim at the same time 
and therefore guilty of creating their own suffering. It means that everyone 
was simultaneously a “friend’ and “enemy” of the communist state. This deep 
instability was subsequently transferred to the post-revolutionary political 
system and the public atmosphere, which heavily influenced the whole lustra-
tion controversy.
 In any critique of the lustration law, it is therefore necessary to start by 
focusing on the personal aspect of the legislation and distinguishing two 
different groups of individuals: oppressors and their victims. It is one of the 
worst moral consequences and the biggest failure of the statute that it made 
both groups subject to the same lustration process and subsequent discrimi-
nation. Considering all those party officials, members of the party militia, and 
secret policemen, it is quite hard to find any sympathy for their past activi-
ties. The moral argument against administrative discrimination provided by 
lustration is significantly weakened when we actually look at the past records 
of the lustrated persons, the validity of which is beyond any doubt. Discrimi-
nating against those who had been responsible for discriminatory policy and 
political repression in the totalitarian past is morally justifiable even in the 
democratic condition.
 However, the law is morally repulsive because it discriminates against 
many of those who had been subjected to the worst communist repression. 
A sadistic interrogator and her powerless victim, who had been forced to sign 
a statement of collaboration to protect her very life, had both been classified 
as persons dangerous to the new regime’s stability. A less emotional example 
would be a person who had been allowed to travel abroad as a student in the 
1950s and, in return, agreed to provide information should she encounter any 
archive data relevant to state security. Forty years later, this person could be 
classified as a secret police collaborator and banned from any senior position 
at her university. Furthermore, individuals famous for their civil courage and 
resistance to the communist persecutions could end up with “positive lus-
trations” because the secret police forged its documents. The lustration law, 
which was to eliminate persons without political loyalty to the new demo-
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cratic regime, failed terribly to reflect all these circumstances and, on top of 
that, exposed these regime victims to public humiliation. They were sacrificed 
so that the vast majority of society loyal to the previous regime for decades 
could feel morally purified and label all those responsible for their own 
“suffering.”
mOdEl CASE I
Vladimír Mikule is associate professor of administrative law in the faculty 
of law at Charles University. Like hundreds of thousands of other citizens of 
Czechoslovakia after the 1968 invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies, he lost his 
academic job for political reasons. Being one of the most distinguished public 
law experts in the country, he remained in touch with other persecuted law-
yers and academics and, though not a signatory himself, significantly contrib-
uted to drafting the Charta 77 petition and formulating its position in terms 
of legal and human rights standards.
 For these obvious reasons, Mikule joined the Civic Forum movement dur-
ing the 1989 velvet revolution and was co-opted to the Parliament. Soon, he 
became one of the MPs responsible for the legal design of democratic politi-
cal reforms in Czechoslovakia. However, Mikule’s name appeared on the 
communist secret police list of collaborators. After the Parliament’s internal 
November 17 Commission threatened to disclose his record, Mikule decided 
to resign his parliamentary seat and left the world of politics in 1990. 
 However, Mikule never consciously collaborated with the secret police and 
fit under the category which was later, by the lustration law in 1991, classified 
as category C — candidate for collaboration. He was regularly interrogated 
by secret police officers, but never disclosed any information about political 
dissent or actively reported on his dissident friends. He even provided useful 
feedback to them by discussing his police interrogations with them. Mikule 
therefore continued his battle for personal integrity and his case became an 
inspiration for the Independent (Appeal) Commission to propose the removal 
of category C from the law — ultimately done by the Constitutional Court in 
1992. Nevertheless, it took three more years before Mikule was finally cleared 
of any secret police collaboration in a civil suit before the court.
 Although the story may be perceived as having a happy ending because 
category C was discarded as unconstitutional and Mikule eventually won 
his civil suit, he still finds it extremely traumatic and recollects his suicidal 
tendencies during the commission’s campaign against him in 1990. His life 
entirely changed once again after he was forced to leave politics, which he 
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joined briefly after two decades of communist persecutions. Today, Mikule 
continues teaching in the Charles University faculty of law, regularly briefs 
members of Parliament and governmental officials on legal issues, and enjoys 
a reputation as one of few Czech lawyers who can “draft a bill,” but his own 
political career was ruined by indiscriminate screening applied in Parliament 
before the enactment of the lustration law. He was one of the first victims 
of the screening process, but his expertise and legal activism also made him 
one of the most important winners, revealing social and moral damages that 
accompanied the enforcement of the lustration law.
 The Mikule model case shows how the law hit hard among people affili-
ated with dissident activists and repressed by the communist regime. The only 
“guilt” of those people was that they resisted the regime and were put under 
surveillance by the secret police, which kept records leading to the “positive 
lustration” result. The communist secret police thus could ruin the personal 
lives of those people once again, long after it was dissolved. 
 In this case, the most serious objection is unreliable and insufficient 
evidence that harmed the victim, who subsequently had to take a long and 
painful journey to achieve justice and get his name cleared. However, it also 
shows that it was impossible to find formal criteria according to which a per-
son could be judged on whether he collaborated with the secret police or not. 
Under difficult circumstances, pressured and blackmailed, some individuals 
chose to sign a formal act of collaboration with the secret police but never 
harmed anyone.55 According to the lustration law, they were treated as secret 
police agents (category A) and shamed in public despite the fact that many 
of them were brave individuals and continued to be persecuted during the 
period of communism. Here, the law did not just open moral rifts in society, 
but led to moral catastrophe.
mOdEl CASE II
One of the most publicized and high-profile recent cases has been that of 
Jirˇina Bohdalová — a celebrity actress. She filed a lawsuit against the Czech 
Ministry of Interior and demanded her name be removed from the register 
of secret police collaborators. The trial revealed that in the 1950s, at the age 
of twenty-eight, she was psychologically tortured by secret police but never 
agreed to collaborate. She was temporarily prohibited from working for the 
state TV corporation, but was promised that, if she cooperated, her impris-
oned father’s situation could be reviewed and her sister could study at the uni-
versity. She was contacted twice a month but, according to the police records, 
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always was very cautious not to tell anything compromising. In 1961, the 
secret police decided to end its attempts to establish an active contact with the 
actress. Furthermore, Bohdalová never signed any official document except 
the most common statement of confidentiality. In January 2004, the munici-
pal court of Prague ruled that she had never been a secret police collabora-
tor, yet failed to oblige the Ministry of Interior to remove her name from the 
register. Nevertheless, the appeal court subsequently ordered the ministry to 
unconditionally delete the actress’ name from the register. 
 So far, there have been only a few similar cases in which citizens regis-
tered in the communist secret police files demanded their names be deleted 
from the official register and their public integrity restored. In most cases, 
the courts ruled in favor of individuals and against the ministry.56 It is likely 
that the publicity of the Bohdalová case will inspire other lawsuits against the 
ministry in which individuals might demand that it delete their records from 
the former secret police register. 
 Although the matter is only indirectly linked to the original lustration law, 
it nevertheless reflects the same problem of facing the “ghosts of the past.”57 
Apart from civil lawsuits against the ministry, it also creates a more general 
problem of retrospective change of information archived by a state institu-
tion. A desirable process of restoring the constitutional right of personal 
integrity thus represents a fundamental problem for historians and political 
scientists because courts order the ministry to destroy historical data. Some 
historians consequently call for indiscriminate publication of all materials 
collected by the communist secret police, which would open a way for draw-
ing a systematic map of the communist past and thus follow the example of 
Poland’s Institute of National Memory.58
 The Bohdalová model case reveals a different dilemma of the lustration 
process and the policy of publication of secret police files. Unlike Mikule, 
Bohdalová had never been a dissident and later, after the 1989 velvet revolu-
tion, did not aspire to a political career or a position subject to the lustra-
tion procedure. Her name was disclosed only after enactment of the Act of 
Public Access to Files Connected to Activities of the Former Secret Police, 
No. 140/1996, which accompanied the extension of the lustration law and 
expanded this particular form of legal dealing with the communist past. Like 
the Mikule case, this case shows that an individual can succeed in a civil suit 
only after a tiresome and distressing legal battle and cannot avoid the dirty 
practice of being publicly labelled as a “secret police agent.” Furthermore, a 
possible duty of the ministry to remove the name from official files is yet to 
be determined. 
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 Those who defended the law usually emphasized that the process of wild 
lustrations had already been going on before the statute was enacted. Accord-
ing to this view, sooner or later public revelations would be made about all 
persons with a record and it was better to give it a legal form rather than leave 
it to journalists with good contacts in the Ministry of Interior.59 Furthermore, 
the law’s defenders argued that, though these individual stories and personal 
tragedies were regrettable, Czech society was politically too fragile and had to 
eliminate from access to state offices potentially disloyal individuals and per-
sons who could be blackmailed because of their past records. Nevertheless, 
this purely purposive argument can hardly eliminate serious moral objec-
tions regarding the lustration law and publication of all secret police files and 
registers of collaborators.
 From the perspective of fact-finding procedures and reliability of facts, the 
lustration statute has always been dubious because evidence against individu-
als comes from archives of the secret police. These archives are incomplete 
because the secret police managed to destroy many important documents 
and entire files. At the same time, the archives contain facts and informa-
tion collected by the secret police itself and their reliability may therefore be 
questionable. The secret police was one of the most important pillars of the 
communist totalitarian regime described by the new democratic legislature 
as criminal and obviously could deliberately manipulate facts and create false 
evidence.60 The new regime thus paradoxically had to presume that all avail-
able police materials were correct and reliable unless proved otherwise. Sup-
porters of the law can hardly dispute this principal “factual” objection against 
lustrations. 
 Moreover, the problem of unreliability of the facts collected by secret 
police often benefits individuals who may have dubious pasts but keep good 
contacts with communist secret police officers who now willingly testify in 
their favor before the courts.
mOdEl CASE III
Jirˇí Cˇerný is a politician for the Christian Democratic Union–Czech People’s 
Party [Krˇest’anská a demokratická unie–Cˇeskoslovenská strana lidová] (KDU–CˇSL) 
and holds the position of deputy mayor in one of the Brno city districts. He 
was reportedly registered as a secret police agent in 1979 and received money 
for his information. People in regular contact with Cˇerný were suspicious of 
his possible role as a secret police agent in the 1980s. Furthermore, journalists 
have recently discovered his connection with Ludˇek Lhotský in 1985, which 
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had likely been reported by Cˇerný to the police and recorded on Lhotský’s 
secret police file. Nevertheless, Cˇerný was cleared by the court, which did not 
know about the incident at the time of the trial; it ruled that he was registered 
as a secret police agent, but there was no evidence that he truly acted as one. 
During the hearing, Cˇerný used a former secret policeman, Martin Valehrach, 
as his key witness, who testified that he had invented the whole file and the list 
of Cˇerný’s paid activities. 
 It is a controversial, yet common practice that former secret police-
men often testify in the lustration lawsuits before the Czech courts in sup-
port of those registered as secret police agents. For instance, Valehrach testi-
fied in another lawsuit of Jan Pavlík, who was dean of the faculty of arts of 
Masarykova University in Brno. Pavlík similarly argued that, though reg-
istered, he never acted as a secret police agent and Valehrach supported his 
claims.61 Controversies surrounding the reliability of evidence thus extend 
from the primary administrative process of lustration to its judicial review. 
 The lustration lawsuits therefore did not eliminate the whole controversy 
of fact-finding lustration procedures and, by relying on evidence given by for-
mer secret police, rather echoed early lustration debates and the argument 
that the law paradoxically preserved the communist secret police’s influence 
in the post-communist democratic situation.
conclusion: lustrations and the paradoxical concept  
of transitional justice
The lustration law could not separate victims from their oppressors; as a 
result, its moral and symbolic effect was extremely controversial. The law 
therefore failed as moral dealing with the political past as proposed by some 
of its supporters. 
 In the undifferentiated post-revolutionary condition, the Czechoslovak 
lustration law’s purpose was to protect the emerging political system and its 
rule of law by the paradoxical strategy of discrimination. This paradox should 
not be exaggerated and condemned from the fundamental perspective of 
democratic political morality because it is easily detectable in a number of 
political transformations from totalitarianism to liberal democracy.
 In the beginning of the 1990s, no post-communist country had an estab-
lished system of the rule of law but the countries with more evolutionary and 
gradual changes were much more affected by the fiction of the democratic/
legalist revolution, which defused an outright confrontation with the past 
regime at the level of criminal law and administrative discrimination.62 On 
the other hand, Czech society and its new political elites had been much more 
reluctant to accept such a fiction. This political attitude facilitated the enact-
ment of the extensive lustration statute with all its intrinsic controversies and 
contradictions.
 The lustration law fulfilled its role as a filter separating former political 
enemies from new democratic institutions and, contrary to the claims that 
the statute had instigated an atmosphere of fear and suspicion, contributed to 
the stabilization of Czech post-communist society in its early stage of trans-
formation.63 It contained the process of wild lustrations and reduced social 
anxiety and uncertainty regarding new political elites. However, the law’s 
impact on dealing with the communist past and moral effects were largely neg-
ative because the lustration process handled by state bureaucrats paradoxi-
cally inhibited public discussion of the totalitarian past, its political impact, 
and responsibility. The instrumental dealing with the past by legislation con-
tributed to the marginalization of moral issues of the political past during the 
1990’s. 
 At the same time, the lustration’s power to isolate the old political enemy 
helped to petrify the antiregime ideology and unreformed leadership of the 
Communist Party, which builds its popularity on political populism and 
antiregime feelings. The law’s political effects therefore are as controversial as 
the legal ones. The lustration statute and other laws attempting to legislate 
against the communist past have created strong political opposition and old 
enemies reproduce their mutual distrust and animosity. Lustrations are one 
of the reasons why old regime supporters keep their old ideological and polit-
ical positions and operate as an antiregime element in the new conditions 
of liberal democracy. In the regions of former East Germany and the Czech 
Republic, communists continue using the ideology of political extremism. It 
is both evidence of their rigidity and a consequence of the strict politics of 
decommunization.
 The lustration law paradoxically initiated the process of “building civil 
equality by discrimination.” The future equality was to be achieved by tem-
porary discrimination against those defined by the legislature as temporary 
threats to the emerging regime. From the legal perspective, the lustration 
law represents an example of transitional legislation. Despite all objections and 
doubts accompanying its enactment, the lustration law, taken from the per-
spective of jurisprudence, is not so exceptional because no reconstruction 
of the democratic rule of law proceeds in a purely principled and dogmatic 
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environment. The reconstruction is typical of contradictions, compromises, 
and logically paradoxical solutions. Examples from postwar Germany and its 
denazification politics, post-apartheid South Africa, and the decommuniza-
tion politics of other post-communist countries indicate that reconstructive 
legal and political efforts produce both principles and paradoxes.
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The Shield, the Sword, and the Party: 
Vetting the East german Public Sector
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introduction
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) celebrated the fortieth anniver-
sary of its founding on October 7, 1989, shortly before its fall. Enthusiasm-
on-demand dominated the official part of the celebration. But at the same 
time, the “people’s police” and police troops of the infamous Ministry of State 
Security [Ministerium für Staatssicherheit] (MfS, popularly called Stasi) clubbed 
down and arrested scores of protesters. The physical violence that was briefly 
unleashed in the repression of the Fall 1989 demonstrations was rather 
untypical for the GDR: the “leading role” of the Socialist Unity Party [Sozi-
alistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands] (SED) was mostly secured through more 
subtle and bureaucratized mechanisms. After the breakdown of the SED-
dominated regime, how should responsibility for the injustices committed be 
conceptualized? Many had upheld the regime in morally reprehensible ways, 
but only few had committed obvious crimes. Vetting mechanisms provided 
“sanctions” for conduct that was not criminal under the GDR’s own laws, 
but which was nonetheless considered reprehensible by most GDR citizens 
and outside observers. This was the social understanding of vetting among 
many East Germans. Legally speaking, however, vetting was not considered 
a response to past wrongdoing. Rather, dismissals were solely justified if a 
person was not suitable for holding public office. Past misconduct could, but 
need not, indicate such a lack of suitability. The gap between these two under-
standings of vetting policies produced much frustration over the course of the 
process. Vetting was initially demanded by East Germans on quasi-retributive 
grounds, but was codified and implemented with a utilitarian and prospective 
concern about the establishment of a loyal and credible civil service. 
 Vetting in unified Germany took place in two different arenas. On the 
one hand, elected representatives on the local, state, and federal level were 
frequently asked about their “first life”1 in the GDR. In some states (Länder),2 
persons who had worked for the secret police could not be elected mayors. 
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But since parliamentarians cannot be recalled or impeached for prior non-
criminal misconduct, any screening conducted in parliaments was not likely 
to have consequences beyond public expressions of indignation by the “clean” 
political parties. The vetting of the East German public sector, on the other 
hand, had profound impacts on the lives of many citizens, on the legitimacy 
of institutions, and on the perceptions of culpability. This chapter will there-
fore focus on the second arena of vetting: the public service. 
 Throughout the chapter, I will focus on two questions about the vetting 
process: first, what are the rationales for vetting? At least two very different 
rationales competed throughout the process. On the one hand, East Ger-
man civil rights activists demanded vetting in 1989 and later as a form of civil 
sanction for past misconduct. This rationale is self-consciously retributive. It 
focuses on past misconduct, and not on whether the persons changed their 
ways after 1989. To the contrary, those who had undergone a sudden personal 
transformation were derisively called Wendehälse, in reference to a bird that 
can turn its neck 180º without turning its body. The prevalent legal conceptu-
alization of vetting, in contrast, emphasized a person’s loyalty to the “liberal- 
democratic basic order” and discounted past misconduct if there was evidence 
that the persons had changed their ways. In other words, the laws and juris-
prudence on vetting were often seen as favoring Wendehälse. The gap between 
these two understandings was critical, as the local vetting commissions often 
operated according to the quasi-retributive understanding, while the adminis-
trators in the state ministries, and later the courts, operated from the vantage 
point of the legal conceptualization of the vetting rationales.
 The second focus of this chapter regards the conceptualization of miscon-
duct: if thousands of employees are screened, what does the vetting commis-
sion look for? Collaboration with the Stasi was elevated to a central position 
in the matrix of culpability.3 This place of prominence is not entirely deserved, 
as many readily agree. The reason for the single-minded focus is that the Stasi 
was perceived as the number one “enemy” during the fall 1989 revolution, and 
citizens therefore took special measures in securing and managing the Stasi 
files that later provided the evidentiary basis for the vetting process. 
 Although the vetting process was widely debated at the time, there are few 
comprehensive analyses.4 The extreme decentralization and fragmentation of 
the vetting institutions adds to the difficulties of providing an overview. Exist-
ing case studies either cover single institutions or focus on the legal frame-
work without incorporating the perspective of the participants in the local 
commissions. Overall numbers about the vetting process and its effects are 
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not available because the process was very decentralized and those who have 
the numbers are often reluctant to share them. In order to link the available 
numbers with concrete vetting procedures and the experiences of commis-
sion members and persons who were heard by the commissions, I will con-
centrate on a small set of case studies. I examine two very different institu-
tions — public universities and city administrations — in two very different 
cities — Dresden and Greifswald. These case studies are supplemented with 
available data for other states and institutions. The form of inquiry is heavily 
shaped by the availability of information. Given that many institutions, for 
example the state government of Saxony, do not publish even the most basic 
data on the vetting process, and that the proceedings of the vetting commis-
sions are still confidential, this study can only be preliminary. 
 The cases examined here represent institutions that insist on a high degree 
of public legitimacy and self-scrutiny (universities), and institutions with 
a lower profile and in less need of legitimizing procedures (city administra-
tions). Universities undertook a comparatively thorough vetting: through 
a three-step process in which vetting had a prominent role, the universities 
aimed to perform their own renewal in public. The scope of the inquiry was 
wider and the standards were stricter than elsewhere. The reason for the uni-
versities’ extensive commitment to vetting is their self-perception: as centers 
of intellectual debate with the responsibility for forming future elites, uni-
versities needed the appearance of a heightened moral authority that they 
could only gain through a thorough screening of their staff (similar concerns 
moved judicial officials when they conducted a thorough screening of judges 
and prosecutors). Municipal administrations, in contrast, had more stream-
lined and bureaucratized vetting processes. In the cities, vetting was clearly 
subordinated to the tasks of reforming the city, whereas universities tended 
to treat vetting as a precondition for any genuine future reform. The different 
approaches by these institutions can be taken as models for institutions that 
need to establish different degrees and forms of legitimacy. The most “severe” 
vetting process was probably conducted by the judiciary, which needed to gain 
public trust. The police, in contrast, retained a much higher proportion of their 
pre-1989 employees, ostensibly for reasons of necessity.5 Although universi-
ties are not the prima facie most important case of vetting, they demonstrate 
how institutions struggling to regain legitimacy used the vetting process to 
distance themselves from their former institutional collaboration. In addition, 
the numbers and records of the vetting process at universities are more readily 
available than would have been the case for the police or the judiciary.
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 The two cities differ in size and in the political affiliation of the respective 
state governments. Dresden, capital of the state of Saxony, is in the southeast. 
It has about 512,000 inhabitants. Saxony is one of the politically more conser-
vative states. Greifswald, in contrast, is a rather small city with a population 
of about 58,000 in the northeast. It is situated in the state of Mecklenburg 
and Western Pomerania, an area with one of the highest unemployment rates 
(21.6%) and a sparse infrastructure. While Saxony is mainly controlled by the 
Christian Democratic Party, the state government of Mecklenburg and West-
ern Pomerania shifted from a Christian Democratic and Liberal coalition in 
1990 to a Christian Democratic and Social Democratic coalition in 1994, to a 
Social Democratic and (post)Socialist coalition in 1998 and 2002. 
 The data are too sketchy to make a strict comparison of these four cases. 
Yet even incomplete information allows us to draw conclusions regarding 
the different approaches to vetting, the different procedures chosen, and the 
underlying rationales for vetting in the given institutional context. I first pro-
vide an overview of the vetting process based on the case studies and exist-
ing accounts of vetting in other institutions and show how different actors’ 
views of vetting during the 1989–90 transition shaped the legal framework 
for the vetting process. After examining the vetting process in the municipal 
administrations and universities in more detail, I will consider the relation-
ships between vetting and other transitional justice policies. 
vetting in the public sector: an overview
Vetting its employees was part of a larger process of downsizing the pub-
lic sector. In 1989, there were 2.2 million public sector workers in the GDR. 
Through privatizations and layoffs, this number decreased to 1.2 million in 
spring 1991, long before the process of personnel reduction was over.6 Vet-
ting was the first step in a large-scale process of restructuring and person-
nel reduction. Questioning and screening would identify those employees 
who were not suitable for continued public sector employment in a demo-
cratic state. Upon the conclusion of the vetting process, employees would be 
screened for their professional qualifications for the jobs they held or would 
hold after restructuring. And, finally, those employees whose personal integ-
rity and professional qualification were beyond legal doubt would be matched 
with the decreasing number of jobs, resulting in even more layoffs. 
 In 1990, the city of Dresden employed 18,000 persons. In 2000, only 9,769 
employees (54%) were left, of whom 36% had been hired after 1990. Yet only 
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about 520 employees lost their jobs as a result of the vetting, 2.9% of those 
employed in 1990.7 In 1990, the University of Greifswald had 5,650 employees. 
In 1998, 3,600 (64%) remained, including many new hires. Yet only about 90 
employees, 1.6% of the 1990 personnel, had to leave as a direct consequence of 
the vetting process.8 But many institutions “lost” up to half of their employees 
before the vetting even started; presumably a number of them left in anticipa-
tion of the widely announced process. The police in Thuringia, for example, 
had 12,000 officers in November 1989,9 but only 6,700 were still employed 
when the vetting process started in mid-1991. Many higher-level officers 
resigned because they either knew or feared that their careers were over; oth-
ers had been confronted with (nonbinding) votes by their subordinates sug-
gesting their resignation for specific reasons.10 Still, vetting was not the quan-
titatively most important part of the public sector downsizing and renewal. 
 The relationship between vetting and public sector downsizing is compli-
cated. On the one hand, vetting contributed to the downsizing, though not in 
overwhelming numbers. Yet in some cases, for example in the public school 
systems in Brandenburg and Saxony, administrators hoped that vetting alone 
would accomplish the needed downsizing. In these cases, opponents charged 
that accusations of past misconduct were simply masking an attempt to dis-
miss as many teachers as possible.11 Even if vetting was not a major source of 
dismissals, it introduced some notion of equity: in a situation in which many 
people would lose their jobs through no fault of their own, vetting would 
at least ensure that those culpable of past misconduct would not keep their 
jobs either.12 
 The most contentious aspect of the vetting process was the search for 
appropriate vetting norms. Since vetting was only formalized with the unifi-
cation treaty in 1990, opponents of the process characterized it as an imposi-
tion of West German norms on conditions under which these norms were 
inapplicable. Yet by the fall of 1989, the opposition movement was demanding 
vetting in order to establish trust in the public sector, identify secret police 
informers, and openly reckon with the past. The early impulses for vetting 
came from the East Germans, and many West Germans who later joined the 
state ministries and universities kept their distance from the vetting because 
they felt the matter “did not concern them personally at all.”13 But the prob-
lem of the norms’ pedigree is not solved by examining the beginning of the 
vetting process. First, the judicial interventions in the vetting process followed 
West German precedents almost exclusively while paying scant attention to 
the specifics of the context.14 And second, the charge that East Germans were 
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judged according to West German standards was an argument frequently 
used for forging political alliances and affirming identities as “East Germans.” 
qUESTIONNAIRES, hEARINgS, RECOmmENdATIONS,  
dECISIONS, ChAllENgES
Although the vetting process was decentralized, it followed a similar pattern 
in all jurisdictions. The public sector employer, for example a state govern-
ment, court, or city administration, decided on the procedure within the con-
straints of the law. Employers usually required employees to complete ques-
tionnaires about their political functions in the GDR and any MfS contacts 
they might have had. A commission set up to examine all employees within 
the institution then compared the questionnaires with the personnel files 
and other sources, aiming at making recommendations about retaining or 
dismissing employees. In cases where there was no evidence of relevant mis-
conduct, the commission immediately recommended continued employment 
with the reservation that their nonparticipation in MfS’ activities needed to 
be corroborated by a central office in charge of the MfS files. Employees for 
whom the commission had potentially damaging evidence or allegations had 
an individual hearing, to give the employees an opportunity to comment on 
and respond to the evidence. 
 Two basic models of vetting commissions emerged in response to different 
institutional demands and structures. In the administrative model, the commis-
sion was composed of members from within the institution by virtue of their 
function, and not as the result of an election. This model fitted vetting into 
the everyday administrative work but could not generate high levels of legiti-
macy because there was neither the democratic legitimacy of an election nor 
an independent check by members from outside the institution. In contrast, 
commissions operating according to the pluralistic model had a diverse mem-
bership drawn from representatives of the institution that was to be vetted 
and various outsiders deemed to have professional expertise (e.g., lawyers), or 
high moral standing (e.g., representatives of civil society or the church). Many 
members of these commissions were elected by their peers or appointed by 
state parliaments. This model demanded more resources and attention, but 
the resulting commissions were seen as more independent from the govern-
ments and institutions they screened and thus commanded greater legitimacy. 
The commissions would usually only issue recommendations that would be 
reviewed by the head of the administration or a task force commissioned by 
her. The scope and depth of this review varied. In many cases, the administra-
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tion only tried to ensure consistency across the vetting commissions in their 
jurisdiction. They also regularly discussed the applicable criteria with repre-
sentatives of the commissions.15 Sometimes, employees for whom dismissal 
was recommended had a second hearing before a different committee.16 
 When the authorities decided in favor of dismissal, they usually offered the 
employees a consensual termination of their contracts. This had the advan-
tage for the employees that they were not fired, which would carry a stigma, 
but the disadvantage that consensually terminated contracts could not be 
challenged in court. During the first years after unification, many employees 
were not fully aware of their rights, and were afraid to take their employers 
to court. A large number of those who were dismissed under the early, more 
stringent standards accepted the employer’s offer to terminate employment 
by mutual agreement. They could consequently not challenge their dismissal 
in court.17 Although the labor and administrative courts were very involved 
in reviewing challenges to the vetting process, many people were reluctant to 
follow the legal route.
 All vetting commissions faced significant evidentiary problems. In accor-
dance with a February 1990 directive by the pre-democratic transitional gov-
ernment, the employees’ personnel files were often “weeded out” by employees 
and well-meaning superiors.18 Many potentially compromising records were 
removed. Thus, the commissions would need independent information about 
the employees’ political careers in order to check the questionnaires against 
sources that did not rely on self-reporting. The commissions varied greatly 
in their ability and willingness to conduct thorough searches of the archives 
of the SED, trade unions, and other relevant institutions. The files were often 
under the jurisdiction of the successor organizations, which had no interest 
in allowing access to files that could compromise the professional careers of 
their members. As a result, vetting for misconduct of SED and other officials 
relied on self-reporting, institutional knowledge about the person’s conduct, 
or (unlikely) access to well-ordered files. Even commissions that insisted on 
high functions in the SED or one of its satellite organizations as a vetting cri-
terion found it hard to apply it consistently. At best, they only found “the hon-
est ones” and those whose functions and actions were widely known. Thus, 
the evidentiary problems compromised the vetting for categories of persons 
who were often no less culpable than those on whom the process came to 
concentrate. 
 The only category of files that was accessible in a managed way was 
the records of the MfS. In fact, commissions and employees had to put 
very little work into gathering this information as the Office of the Federal 
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Commissioner for the Records of the National Security Service of the For-
mer German Democratic Republic (the Stasi records) provided them with 
summaries and excerpts from the files. Without the work and assistance of 
this office, the vetting process would have had to rely almost exclusively on 
self-reporting. The excerpts from the Stasi files were the single most used and 
reliable source for the vetting process. As a consequence, in addition to a few 
higher-level SED functionaries, most of the persons who were dismissed had 
worked for the MfS. Prompted by this practice, public discussions about cul-
pability, collaboration, and suitability for public office narrowed down to the 
question of whether someone had been an “IM” [Informelle Mitarbeiter] (infor-
mal employee or collaborator) or not. This was an unintended consequence 
of the Stasi Records Act, which put vetting on a sound evidentiary basis at the 
expense of narrowing it down to just one category of misconduct. As it hap-
pened, this narrowing of the focus coincided with attempts of various politi-
cal groups to exculpate themselves at the expense of the Stasi.
lIES ANd PROgRESSIVE lENIENCy
How many people lied on the questionnaires, no one knows. Answers to the 
question about contacts with the Stasi, which is the only question on which 
independent verification could be sought, does not leave much room for opti-
mism about the employees’ truthfulness. In cases where the reconstruction of 
the percentage of misrepresentations — meaning persons who falsely claimed 
not to have worked with the MfS — can be deduced from statistics, it is around 
90%.19 This is confirmed by the experience of commission members.20 The 
rate of misrepresentations might be lower on other sections of the question-
naire because political functions, for example, are a matter of public record, 
while clandestine MfS work is not.
 There are several possible motivations for the untruthfulness. Some were 
sure that their files had been destroyed by the MfS in November 1989. Accord-
ing to an MfS report, on November 23, 1989, one woman whose case was 
decided by the Federal Labor Court “was told that all records on her. . . were 
destroyed and that it is impossible to construe a connection between her and 
the MfS in the case of anti-socialist developments.”21 Others feared they would 
be ostracized if they admitted to MfS contacts, and some might have thought 
that the attitude towards MfS informers would get more positive over time:
I have one or two friends who talked to me. They had signed such a thing 
some time ago. And they asked me, should I list it in the questionnaire 
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or not? And I said, if you write it in there, you’re out. And if you don’t 
write it in, and they find it out, you’re out. So don’t write it in. First of 
all because of the job, but also because of the social consequences that 
came with this. In each case of an unofficial informer that came to light, 
there was always talk and slander. They were dead, socially speaking. 
This is why I advised them to do it this way. Whether they followed my 
advice or not, I cannot say.22 
 It is unclear how many “got away” because their files were either destroyed 
or were not yet reconstructed by the time their employers wanted informa-
tion on them, but the bet on the progressive leniency of the vetting commis-
sions turned out to have been wise. Those who admitted to MfS work or were 
found out to have been informers early on had a significantly higher risk of 
being dismissed (see Graphs 1 and 2). In the state government of Mecklenburg 
and Western Pomerania, the rate of MfS collaborators who were dismissed 
decreased from 47% for the cases dealt with before 1995 to 13% for the cases 
dealt with from 1996 to 2003. The cumulative average of 35% hides the steep 
decline in the rate of dismissals.23 For the University of Greifswald alone, the 
rate of dismissals decreased from 74% for cases decided before 1996 to 29% for 
cases decided between 1996 and 2003.24 
 What accounts for this progressively increasing leniency in the vetting? 
Were the commissions just letting off steam at the beginning of the process? 
While commission members acknowledge that they learned to evaluate the 
cases of MfS informers “in a more nuanced manner,”25 other factors played 
into this steep decline and will be explored in detail later. In the case of Meck-
lenburg and Western Pomerania, the parties forming the state government had 
shifted: from 1990 to 1994, a coalition of the Christian Democrats and the Lib-
eral Party governed, succeeded by a coalition of the Christian Democrats and 
the Social Democrats in 1994, and then a coalition between the Social Demo-
crats and the SED’s successor party, the Party of Democratic Socialism [Partei 
des Demokratischen Sozialismus] (PDS), in 1998. The latter change of government 
produced a massive change in attitudes towards vetting, as participants attest.26 
It also made optional the hitherto mandatory vetting of new hires.
 However, there is a deeper reason for the progressive leniency, and it is 
connected with the rationales for vetting. If vetting were a quasi-retributive 
strategy concerned with past misconduct alone, the progressive leniency 
demonstrated by the government would point to serious flaws in the imple-
mentation of the process. Yet the legal rationale for vetting was that past mis-
conduct was an indicator, but not a determinant, of a person’s suitability for 
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public office. In this conception, the employees’ post-1990 conduct would 
count for the purpose of establishing whether they were indeed loyal to dem-
ocratic and liberal principles. A good post-1990 record could outweigh past 
misconduct. Obviously, employees whose Stasi ties were detected in 1992 had 
little good post-1990 conduct to show to the committee. In contrast, someone 
who had lied about having worked for the Stasi, and who was only found out 
in 1997, could point to eight years of devoted service in a democratic adminis-
tration, and would be far less likely to be dismissed. Thus, a vetting rationale 
that emphasizes concerns about employees’ current and future suitability in a 
democratic civil service is likely to result in a progressive decline of dismissals 
over time. 
 Progressive leniency seems to be supported by the idea that people should 
be given a second chance. However, the reasons why some employees were 
evaluated in 1992 and others in 1997 are at best morally arbitrary. It might be 
that the files of the latter persons were only found later. Or the employees 
who were already evaluated in 1992 had admitted in the questionnaire that 
they had worked with the Stasi, and the search for their files was accordingly 
expedited.27 In contrast, the requests for the files of those who had falsely 
indicated that they had not worked with the Stasi would be part of a massive 
pile of requests to be worked through much later. Since the vetting process 
stretched over a long period of time, the standards oriented to present rather 
than past conduct caused differential treatment of similar cases based on arbi-
trary factors. 
 From 1990 to 1992, before the federal commissioner’s office started work-
ing, the vetting processes were either solely based on self-reporting or empha-
sized abuses of power committed in SED functions. The screening for MfS 
informers only started in earnest in 1992, when the downsizing of the state 
governments was nearly completed. Accordingly, many who were later vetted 
for MfS work had already been integrated into the restructured institutions.
 How many people were dismissed as a result of the vetting process? The 
absolute number seems impossible to establish because of the fragmented 
nature of the process. However, the available numbers for some jurisdictions 
show general patterns and can lead to conclusions about the relative numbers 
of people vetted in institutions. The data show, first, that the search for MfS 
informers was the dominant theme in the vetting process. Only institutions 
that paid special attention to other forms of misconduct, as did the Dresden 
city administration, dismissed roughly equal numbers of employees for MfS 
work (271) as they did for other forms of misconduct, most notably abuse of 
power in SED functions (247). Until September 1992, the vetting commission 
359
EAST gERmANy
wIlkE
360
of the University of Greifswald had recommended 63 dismissals, 43 (68%) of 
them for MfS work and only 20 (32%) for other reasons. Other institutions 
either considered non-MfS misconduct only when it was brought to their 
attention, or in cases of high-level personnel.28 Since the overall numbers of 
non-MfS-related misconduct are impossible to establish, we do not know 
how strictly or consistently these criteria were applied. 
 The only area for which it is possible to gauge the consistency of the com-
missions’ work is the field of Stasi informers. For each institution, the number 
of queries to the federal commissioner’s office is known, as is the number of 
notices issued from that office in response. Notices say either that, according 
to the available files, there is no evidence the person worked with the MfS or 
there is evidence, and then give summaries and excerpts from the files. The 
rate of “positive” responses, stating that an employee had worked with the 
MfS, indicates how serious the MfS infiltration of an institution had been. The 
rates of informers typically ranged from about 3%, in universities, municipal 
administrations, and ministries of finance, up to 14% of the civilian employees 
of the Ministry of Defense,29 20% of the GDR soldiers, 16% to 18% in the state 
ministries of the interior, and 13% to 18% percent in the police forces, which 
make up large parts of the employees of the state ministries of the interior.30 
The large number of persons listed as MfS informers among the military and 
the police is partially due to the interpenetration of the MfS, police, and the 
army. Many who later became police officers did their military service in the 
MfS elite unit “Felix Dshershinky” and were listed as MfS employees for the 
duration of their service. In the Thuringia police, 458 of 1,611 informers (28%) 
were in this category. 
 People who worked for the MfS did so for different reasons, in different cir-
cumstances, with different intentions, and with varying intensity. Although 
the relative numbers of informers in the various institutions allow some con-
clusions about the Stasi’s penetration of the institution, they do not tell exactly 
how many people were informing on colleagues, friends, or family. A size-
able number of persons on whom the federal commissioner’s office returned 
evidence of collaboration had neither intended to damage anyone nor indeed 
caused any harm, and others had been pressured into signing a declaration. 
The commissions were therefore determined to conduct an individualized 
review of the cases, to invite the employees for hearings, and, if they were still 
undecided, to study the complete files. An additional moral problem was that 
not all acts of informing for the Stasi or taking instructions from them were 
recorded in the files: MfS collaboration that was part of someone’s duties on 
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the job did not lead to the opening of a file at the MfS, and therefore did not 
produce a “positive” response from the federal commissioner’s office. Stasi 
officers testified that collaboration “on the job” was often more effective for 
gathering information and for relaying instructions for the workplace harass-
ment of dissidents.31 Since these activities were not systematically recorded 
in the files, the commissions could not systematically establish the extent of 
the collaboration of higher-level administrators and managers with the MfS. 
This meant in some cases that the “small fry” who spied as informal collabo-
rators were dismissed while the “big fish” for whom spying was part of the job 
description could stay.
 The rates of dismissals of MfS informers might suggest some conclusions. 
First, the overall dismissal rates are between 25% and 45% in most institutions. 
This can hardly be described as the indiscriminate witch hunt that some feared 
it would become. However, the rates of dismissals were higher in the first 
years and then dropped. The cumulative dismissal rates in most institutions 
indicate that the commissions and administrators indeed tried to judge each 
case individually and did not automatically retain or dismiss employees who 
were listed as MfS informers. Yet the moderate cumulative averages in some 
cases hide steep changes over time. What are the reasons for the existing dis-
crepancies among the rates of dismissal in different parts of the same govern-
ment, and among different states? According to the legal framework for the 
vetting process, employers had to weigh the evidence of misconduct against 
conduct after 1990 and the requirements of the position that the employee 
wanted to hold. Obviously, some forms of misconduct can be acceptable 
for accountants but not for police officers or teachers. Thus, the differences 
might be due to the different ethical requirements for jobs in the respective 
government departments. The individualized criteria theoretically allow for 
large discrepancies in the percentages of “MfS-positives” who were dismissed, 
but the application of a large number of criteria makes the evaluation of the 
application of these criteria harder and potentially allows for arbitrariness.32
 Dismissing persons who were politically well connected for abuse of 
power surely sends political signals. But vetting was limited to the public sec-
tor, and was applied unevenly throughout the sector on the different levels of 
the federal system. The unemployment offices, for example, which are under 
federal jurisdiction, did not conduct any vetting before the mid-1990s, and 
effectively provided a safe haven for many who had lost their jobs in other 
parts of the public sector.33 There are also reports that teachers and police 
officers who were exposed as MfS informers accepted the offer to terminate 
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their contracts by mutual agreement and subsequently found employment in 
the western parts of Germany, where vetting did not take place.34
 Aside from exploiting gaps and loopholes in the vetting process, those who 
were dismissed could also turn to the private sector. “They are not prohibited 
from making money. They can earn money in the industrial sector, they just 
cannot represent the state vis-à-vis the citizens in the public sector,”35 said 
one former city official in Greifswald. The transition into the private sector 
was more viable in the earlier years, and for persons who already had “con-
nections.” This means that those who were part of the SED network and were 
dismissed early on probably had better chances of finding new employment 
than unofficial informers who were only found out later. The purpose of vet-
ting was not to subject them to the social stigma of indefinite unemployment, 
but this was the unintended consequence in many cases.
the prehistory of vetting
The rapid dissolution of the SED and then the GDR in 1989 and 1990 was 
largely unforeseen. A host of factors converged to create a situation that the 
regime was both unable and unwilling to control. By the late 1980s, both emi-
gration and dissent had increased and seem to have reinforced one another. In 
the first months of 1989, 36,484 citizens left the GDR legally, at least another 
4,849 illegally, and 2,070 were caught trying to flee illegally.36 Meanwhile, a 
wave of demonstrations that had begun in protest against the rigging of the 
May 1989 local elections mobilized increasing numbers of people. Protest 
and exit increased, and in mid-October the MfS and the police had given up 
on repressing demonstrations. Erich Honecker, head of state since 1971, was 
replaced by a very moderate reformer. Further government changes followed, 
and the borders were opened on November 9. Opposition groups and the SED 
started a dialogue to facilitate the change. The legitimacy of political arrange-
ments increasingly depended on the assent of the citizens’ movement.
 In mid-November, citizens felt strong enough to challenge the Stasi 
directly although the “shield and sword” of the weakened party was still alive 
and well. There were rumors about a possible coup by the Stasi and/or the 
army. On November 22, a public forum in Greifswald addressed the issue of 
the Stasi. The discussion was tense, a former city administator recounted: 
It did not take long until one of the speakers from the audience 
demanded that the Stasi should no longer exercise any police functions. 
I suggested a quick poll on this issue, and many agreed audibly. But in 
order to show the ratios, I asked for a show of hands. Almost all arms 
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were raised. Six were against it, 14 abstained. This was the turning point 
[Wende] for the comrades of the Stasi. They grew pale and very insecure. 
Suddenly the climate had changed.”37
 That night, for the first time, citizens “inspected” the local Stasi headquar-
ters. Since November 7, the Stasi had been shredding and burning files in 
response to the demonstrations that often passed by their buildings.38 Begin-
ning on December 4, 1989, local citizens’ committees occupied Stasi head-
quarters in Greifswald and most provincial capitals in order to prevent the 
further destruction of records. 
 The citizens’ occupation of the Stasi headquarters throughout the coun-
try was crucial for further policies regarding the Stasi for three reasons: First, 
had the destruction of the files continued at the projected pace, vetting would 
have become much more difficult. The more files that are available, the less 
informers can mistakenly pass scrutiny. Second, many of those who later 
shaped vetting policies on the local or central level, participated in vetting 
commissions, or worked in the office of the federal commissioner for the Stasi 
records had taken part in the occupations of Stasi buildings in 1989. And, 
finally, the occupation of the Stasi headquarters was perceived as an act of 
citizens taking moral possession of “their” files. “I want my file” was a com-
mon slogan. And during the months that followed, they did not let up. The 
office of the federal commissioner was a creation of this movement. For those 
who had been spied upon by the Stasi, the desire to control the files expressed 
the wish to recover mastery over their lives by reading what the Stasi had 
gathered, planned, and done. Just as individuals thought about “their” files 
as their moral property — after all, it was their lives that were documented in 
them — the citizens’ movement saw the great mass of Stasi files as the collec-
tive property of East Germans. The citizens’ movement demanded that the 
files be preserved, protected, and made accessible for victims and for vetting 
purposes. Later, when the West German negotiators to the unification treaty 
wanted to put the Stasi files into the federal archive — with the usual archi-
val restrictions — many who had occupied the Stasi headquarters feared they 
would be dispossessed of their only recently recovered history. 
 Thoughts about vetting had surfaced frequently during the early phases 
of the dissolution of the Stasi. At that point, the Stasi was still active and citi-
zens still feared that there would be Stasi-directed agents provocateurs among 
them.39 The newly emerging democratic movements usually expelled unof-
ficial informers, if simply because no one was sure whether these persons 
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were acting on their own behalf or at the request of the Stasi. Were they inde-
pendent or following orders? Were they citizens or agents? “The people are 
finally beginning to determine what is going on in this state. But there is still 
machinery of the old powers that remains invisible to us and is frightening 
us,”40 said one person to the Greifswald Commission of Inquiry. The demands 
for exposing the structures of the Stasi, for democratic openness, and for vet-
ting often went hand in hand. He continued: 
Citizens, help these informers to escape the spider web of the Stasi. 
We need to learn to look each other in the eye. Give them the chance 
to become upright citizens. Do not call for vengeance, but for uncov-
ering, punishing those who are guilty, and rehabilitating the victims. 
Distinguish between the seducers and the seduced, between the black-
mailers and the blackmailed. . . . A change in the structure and method 
of the apparatus needs to come with a change in personnel. Whoever 
was trained [gedrillt] in the repression of the people is not suitable for 
preserving our national security. For this important office, we need 
citizens who did not just watch the change [Wende] from behind their 
desks. Here, too, we need democrats. Trust can only grow where the 
past has been scrutinized by an independent investigatory commit-
tee. Then we will find out whom the people trust to take care of their 
national security.41
 In this speech, the two main rationales for vetting appear side by side, not 
yet contradicting one another as in later cases: vetting as the prerequisite of 
trust in public officials, and vetting as a milder form of punishment for past 
misconduct. Yet the warning that the country needs “democrats” and not 
people who watched the revolution from behind their desks suggests that the 
citizens’ movement would not be enthusiastic about welcoming persons with 
very recent and sudden changes of heart to key positions. 
 The Stasi extensively relied on ordinary unofficial informers (IMs) in all 
areas of society. The informers usually had to sign a declaration formaliz-
ing their status in the Stasi’s system. The recruitment of these informers was 
based, as the Stasi stated, on the “positive social convictions of the candi-
date, personal needs and interests of the candidate, the creation of desires to 
get backing or to make amends for his actions, on the basis of compromis-
ing material, or on a mix of those.”42 In short, people became IMs because 
they were convinced they were helping socialism, because they hoped for an 
advantage (like travel abroad), because they hoped to avoid a disadvantage, 
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or because they were blackmailed. Reasons and motives were mixed, so that 
each case needed to be evaluated individually. 
 The MfS had been a key player in monitoring and suppressing dissent since 
the 1960s. The MfS was founded in 1950 as the “shield and sword” of the party, 
grew in importance in response to the 1953 uprising, and steadily expanded 
until its dissolution in winter 1989–90. By that time it had 85,000 full-time 
employees and about 180,000 “unofficial informers,” dubbed IMs.43 The MfS 
aspired to know the opinions and attitudes of all the GDR’s citizens insofar 
as it was necessary for sensing dissatisfaction and opposition. It was both the 
secret service and the secret police. The Stasi combined the gathering of infor-
mation with acting upon the collected material. Among the Stasi’s most infa-
mous practices was Zersetzung, the “disintegration” or “subversion” of individ-
uals who had raised alarm in the Stasi. This insidious practice was designed to 
refrain from outright physical repression. Instead, the Stasi’s hidden network 
of informers and collaborators reshaped someone’s life and “organized” his or 
her personal and professional failure. A 1976 guideline asks Stasi employees to 
work on the basis of “exact evaluations of the work on the respective opera-
tive item [meaning the observed person], especially the developed indicators 
as well as the individuality of the person to be worked on.” Among the “time-
tested forms of disintegration” are “systematically discrediting the person’s 
public reputation and prestige on the basis of connected, true, and verifiable 
facts as well as false, credible, and nonfalsifiable and thus equally discredit-
ing facts”; “the systematic organization of professional and social failure in 
order to undermine the respective persons’ self-confidence”; “purposefully 
undermining convictions in connection with certain ideals, role models, etc. 
and the production of doubts about one’s personal perspective”; and “the cre-
ation of mistrust and mutual suspicions.”44 Practices like Zersetzung required 
the seamless cooperation of MfS and employers, often co-workers, and some-
times very close friends. Directors, high party functionaries, and personnel 
managers often kept “job-related” contacts with the Stasi. Often they were 
asked about employees or students, and sometimes they took orders from the 
Stasi regarding the “treatment” of specific persons.45 These contacts were a 
regular part of some jobs, and this fact was widely known. People who held 
such jobs often claim in retrospect that these contacts were trivial. Indeed, 
although the devastating effects of such “disintegration” on its victims are 
beyond dispute, it is hard to pinpoint responsibility. Not all participants in 
this “measure” would have been aware of the full scope of the action. While 
many persons were required to achieve the insidious goal, how much respon-
sibility did each of them have? Most of all, did they do anything illegal? One of 
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the often-stated goals of vetting is to censure noncriminal but unacceptable 
behavior, like participation in Zersetzung. 
 In spite of the moral complexities and the involvement of various insti-
tutions in the state repression, popular ire concentrated on the Stasi. The 
Stasi was secretive and was still subverting opposition groups while the 
SED functionaries practiced the talk of reform. Moreover, the Stasi, which 
was visibly burning the files with all their secret knowledge, was an easier 
and more obvious “enemy” than the SED.46 While citizens started digging 
through the Stasi files, the SED sat at the round table talks with a partially 
genuine desire to reform the country. An SED party convention in December 
1989 gave it a new name, SED–PDS (Unified Socialist Party–Party of Demo-
cratic Socialism) and a new chair, the lawyer Gregor Gysi. His strategy was 
to insist that SED members were normal citizens who had just been doing 
their jobs. Privileges and corruption were the lamentable exception.47 Indeed, 
people had very different motives for joining the SED, career advancement 
being one of them. It seemed implausible to penalize someone for mere SED 
membership because it was so widespread and the SED was a potent politi-
cal force in 1989 and 1990. Yet there were attempts to disqualify those who 
had used the power granted to them by the SED to the detriment of individu-
als, or against the interests of the institutions in which they had worked. But 
the initial focus on the Stasi remained. In Parliament, too, it was compara-
tively easy to focus on the Stasi and “to bring up. . . the goal to have a clean, 
ethically qualified, administration that had not been involved in breaches of 
trust.”48 Moreover, SED functionaries seemed to be “people like you and me,” 
while MfS informers were still hidden and shrouded by an aura of secrecy and 
betrayal. 
At the beginning people were screening for Stasi because, they said, 
these are the invisible pillars of the system, we cannot let them get away 
with that. We know who were the open supporters of the system. But 
this knowledge soon faded, and the SED functionaries especially have 
been hiding splendidly behind the entire discussion about the unofficial 
Stasi informers.49 
 The initial focus on the Stasi was soon incorporated into laws that would 
preserve and secure the Stasi files and regulate their use for information and 
vetting purposes. Similar provisions do not exist for SED files, or any other 
files. What started as an early focus on the breaches of trust committed by the 
Stasi was soon cemented into a vetting priority through the differential treat-
ment of the files in federal law. 
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the legal framework
The vetting process relied on two basic tenets: the laws governing the dis-
missal of public sector employees, and the law on the use of the Stasi’s files. 
The former supplied a rough framework of vetting criteria, and the latter pro-
vided the means of obtaining evidence for a carefully circumscribed area of 
misconduct. In this section I will outline the legal framework of the vetting 
process, focusing on how the laws conceptualize the purpose of vetting, and 
which criteria they propose.
ThE UNIfICATION TREATy
With unification in 1990, employees in the East German public sector nomi-
nally kept their jobs. Yet because the public sector was disproportionately 
large, staffed with party loyalists and persons who had abused the power of 
their positions, and not qualified under the terms of the West German admin-
istrative law, the unification treaty provided for easier dismissals under spe-
cific conditions in its appendix I, chapter XIX, section III, paragraphs 4 and 
5. First, extraordinary dismissals (with no advance notice) were possible if the 
employee “was active for the former Ministry for State Security” and it there-
fore seemed unreasonable to expect the employer to continue the labor con-
tract; or because the employee had “violated basic principles of humanity and 
the rule of law, especially human rights as guaranteed in the 1966 Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights and the principles contained in the 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights” (para. 5). The latter clause represented 
an attempt to introduce the bold language of moral indignation into the law 
without considering how to operationalize the criteria. The clause was usu-
ally not applied because of its vagueness and impracticability. Extraordinary 
dismissals were only contemplated for those who had worked with the MfS.
 The most common reasons for ordinary dismissals according to paragraph 
4 were the “lack of demand” (that is, for the employee), and the employee’s 
“lack of professional qualification” or “lack of personal suitability.” These 
clauses expired in 1993, unlike the clauses providing for dismissals because of 
MfS work. The clause on “personal suitability” imported a contested branch 
of West German labor law into the vetting process. Since denazification, but 
especially since the disputes about the radical Left’s “extraparliamentary oppo-
sition” in the 1970s, the jurisprudence on public sector employment hedged 
on the definition of what conduct, political or otherwise, should disqualify a 
person from public sector employment. The rationale for this ambivalence is 
that the state wanted to prevent its civil service from undermining the state 
369
EAST gERmANy
from within, as had ostensibly happened in the Weimar Republic (1918–33). 
But the far older conception of a German Beamter (civil servant) implies a high 
social status for civil servants in return for an elevated level of loyalty to the 
state.50 Thus, according to high court jurisprudence, a public sector employee 
has to make a plausible case that “in his entire conduct he stands by the liberal 
and democratic order of the Constitution.”51 
 The “personal suitability” clause in the unification treaty did not provide 
factual criteria based on the East German situation, but tacitly imported legal 
criteria from past disputes about public sector employment. During the early 
years, the task of establishing and applying the criteria was largely left to the 
vetting commissions. They established criteria based on their appreciation 
of facts and the institutional context, but these criteria were not used by the 
labor courts. The labor courts, newly created in 1992 and initially staffed with 
judges from the western states, were more competent in legal precedents than 
in distinguishing among various functions in the SED and different types of 
Stasi informers. The state commissioners for the Stasi records, whose task 
was to advise participants in the vetting process on these matters, were rarely 
consulted by the courts. When the commissioners issued guidelines for vet-
ting to their respective state governments, these guidelines explained the dif-
ferent categories of Stasi work and quoted court decisions at length.52 But the 
labor courts did not refer to these guidelines. On the contrary, the guidelines 
had to be periodically updated to reflect the changes in jurisprudence.53 The 
establishment of vetting criteria was later driven by the labor courts rather 
than by the state governments or the vetting commissions. 
 When can employees be dismissed? If they lack the “personal suitability” 
for continued employment. Their conduct in the GDR, therefore, is thus only 
relevant insofar as it impinges upon their current and future suitability for 
employment. Thus, the criterion is not guilt, or “entanglement in the system,” 
as German courts politely call it, but the suitability for a specific position. The 
link between past misconduct and present suitability depends on an underly-
ing conception of the possibilities and limits of personal transformation in 
times of political change. What does an individual’s Stasi file tell about one’s 
current readiness to stand up for liberal and democratic principles, if need be? 
If a teacher staunchly believed in real existing socialism in 1988, why should 
we not trust him or her to believe just as staunchly in democratic principles 
today? At least in principle, people can change, they can learn, and they are 
capable of reinventing themselves as reliable democrats. But how deep or 
shallow is such a personal transformation? And can it ever be credible to 
onlookers who have experienced a person in both his or her “GDR-self” and 
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his or her “democratic self”? Looking at current attitudes only risks mistaking 
adaptation for conviction, but do civil servants who obey law and order really 
need an unshakable democratic record, or is behavioral adaptation sufficient? 
 The labor courts agreed that “whoever had to fight our constitutional order 
because it was ‘reactionary’ and ‘imperialistic’ over a longer period of time as 
part of the mission in the functions that they held can not credibly subscribe 
to the contrary position, unless they had already distanced themselves from 
the ideology through concrete acts.”54 On the other hand, the employees can 
“show concrete circumstances that lead to the conclusion that they are now 
subscribing to the principles of the Constitution.”55 In each case, the lack of 
personal suitability can disappear over time as the employees adapt to the 
new normative system.56 This jurisprudence allows for personal change, but 
in making attitudes and the proof of attitudinal change the standard for suit-
ability, the courts run the risk of policing views rather than paying attention 
to past deeds.
 The question of weighing past misconduct against current adaptation trig-
gered different reactions from West Germans and East Germans. West Ger-
mans (and many PDS sympathizers who were busy reinventing themselves 
as democrats) tended to follow the labor courts’ line of argument that an 
employee’s overall personality should be evaluated, and that the more time 
had passed since 1989, the more the democratic credentials in the new system 
should count. A West German law professor summarizes this position: 
In principle I agree that one should not reduce people to acts from a 
long time ago that they are guilty of, if you can even describe it as guilt. 
Instead, you have to appreciate that people can develop, that they can 
acquire a better understanding, that humans beings can become guilty, 
that there is something like probation. . . . And it is really not about 
punishment. We are not dealing with criminal law here but with the 
law of public sector employment. And thus the question is whether 
an employee is trustworthy, which is a matter of current conduct and 
expectations for the future. This is of course a prognosis, and. . . one can 
say that in order to answer the question about the present, you [have to] 
look back into the past. But if the last four, five, six, seven years in which 
somebody has proven to be a capable colleague are part of the past, then 
it is harder to go back to old so-called mistakes.57
 Former members of the New Forum,58 in contrast, were ambivalent about 
these claims. They felt that a too rapid and successful adaptation to the new 
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democratic norms should be viewed with skepticism: “We were startled to 
find out that some people function perfectly in any system.”59 The contradic-
tions between the two competing vetting approaches are sometimes bridged 
by a stance that sees past misconduct irredeemable in cases where it caused 
specific harm to individual persons: 
The standard has to be whether there are persons who could find out 
by reading their file that this person was directly involved in the repres-
sion and had harmed them. . . . Then it does not matter much how this 
person has developed in the last years, because you had set the criterion 
that a job in a state governed by the rule of law [Rechtstaat] cannot be 
represented by someone who has visibly supported the unjust regime 
[Unrechtsstaat] and has harmed persons.60 
 Disagreements about the vetting process were partially rooted in deeper 
disagreements about human capabilities for change, and about continuity 
in personal identities. Those who wanted to separate their “first life” from 
their “second life” and those who had come from West Germany and were 
newcomers in the eastern parts of the country understandably insisted on a 
greater human capacity for reinvention, and advocated a focus on the pres-
ent. Others who had experienced their neighbors and colleagues in different 
“incarnations” insisted on looking at their “entire life story.”
 But even if it is agreed as to how much past misconduct matters, what 
exactly constitutes misconduct? The unification treaty mentions work for the 
Stasi as a form of grave misconduct but does not specify other misconduct 
that could indicate a lack of “personal suitability.” The major disagreement 
about the conceptualization of misconduct was whether occupying a certain 
function or position is sufficient, or whether there needs to be evidence of 
concrete misconduct beyond the normal duties attached to the function. On 
the one hand, persons held higher party offices voluntarily. Once they had 
these positions, they were expected, for example, to reprimand students for 
“political-ideological diversion” or ensure that SED members would have an 
advantage over others when it came to promotions. From this perspective, 
the chairs of the university vetting commissions in Mecklenburg and Western 
Pomerania agreed that “misconduct is already established if the employee held 
certain functions and positions. It does not need to be shown that he used his 
position to the detriment of others,” because “holding these positions is an 
objective entanglement in the unjust regime and thus constitutes an objective 
unsuitability” for public employment.61 As time passed, courts disagreed with 
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this rationale. A sanction demands the proof of concrete misconduct beyond 
the then “usual loyalty,” and holding a function in the party apparatus cannot 
constitute a presumption of unsuitability.62 
 The courts wanted to back their standard with the argument that “nor-
mal” conduct would not later be made blameworthy. Only conduct that went 
beyond the “loyalty that was necessary and usual for a career in the [GDR] 
public sector”63 could lead to questions about the employees’ suitability. 
Only those who went beyond the call of duty in committing “gravely repres-
sive or harmful” acts would be held accountable.64 By drawing on a distinc-
tion between “usual” and “excessive” conduct, the courts unwittingly helped 
to establish a narrative of moral normality in East Germany. This normality 
includes the “loyalty that was necessary and usual for a career in the public 
sector,” for example. This assertion of “normality” is disputed by others who 
emphasize, for instance, that most GDR citizens who were asked to become 
MfS informers refused to do so.65 Are careerists and informers the norm, or 
are they an exception? Should the decision to forsake advantages that would 
have come with an SED membership, or even with signing up as an MfS 
informer, be considered heroic or normal? These are key issues in the revalua-
tion of the GDR moral landscape.
 From 1992 to 1996, the jurisprudence slowly shifted towards principles that 
were careful to limit dismissals to persons who had committed exceptional 
and harmful misconduct, and that would factor in how well an employee had 
adapted to the new democratic conditions. Thus the courts shifted increas-
ingly away from the understanding of vetting that was predominantly shared 
by members of the vetting commissions.
ThE lAw Of ThE fIlES
The unification treaty provided the framework for the development of the 
vetting criteria, but did not equip the commissions with means for secur-
ing the necessary evidence to prove misconduct. The commissions profited 
from a law that aimed to make the MfS files accessible to different audiences: 
the Law on the Records of the State Security Service of the former German 
Democratic Republic (Stasi Records Law, Stasiunterlagengesetz).66 This law had 
a predecessor in one passed by the East German Parliament in summer 1990 
at the urgent request of members of the civil rights movement to facilitate 
“the political, historical, and legal reckoning with the activities of the former 
Ministry for State Security.”67 The West German negotiators to the unifica-
373
EAST gERmANy
tion treaty were “emphatically opposed” to giving this law validity under the 
treaty, but after a hunger strike by members of the citizens’ movement it was 
agreed that the unified German Parliament should pass a law on the Stasi files 
that respected “the basic principles” of the August 1990 law.68 
 The law established a federal office for administrating, sorting, and recon-
structing the files, with the federal commissioner for the Stasi records elected 
for five years. During the first two terms, Joachim Gauck, a pastor from 
Rostock, served as commissioner, and the office soon came to be known as 
the Gauck Authority (Gauck-Behörde). The Stasi Records Law established an 
elaborate system of making parts of the Stasi’s files available to restricted and 
specific audiences. There are different access rights for the Stasi’s victims, the 
Stasi informers, researchers, and public sector employers. Some pasts are 
more public than others. Those who were spied upon could petition to see 
“their” files, and from 1991 to 2003, more than two million petitions for access 
to individual records were filed.69 Hundreds of thousands of persons have 
accessed the Stasi’s knowledge about their personal lives. After seeing their 
file, people can decide whom to tell about what they read: their family, their 
friends, or the general public. The law empowers them to decide with whom 
to share the secret knowledge gathered by the Stasi. 
 Persons who worked for the MfS, in contrast, were less protected against 
having their pasts discussed by others. If they worked in the public sector, 
information on their activities could also be made available to their employ-
ers upon request. Churches, political parties, parliaments and governments 
at local, state, and federal level, and associations could also have their elected 
officials screened by the federal commissioner (sections 20, 21). In addition, 
lay judges, lawyers, and notary publics could be screened. The persons to be 
screened had to be notified, in some cases they had to consent. The employer 
or the organization would petition the commissioner for a notice (Auskunft). 
The commissioner’s staff would then search the accessible files and issue a 
notice stating whether there were indications that the employee or official was 
an informer for the Stasi. If there were no such indications, the commissioner 
issued a letter stating that there was no evidence in the currently accessible 
files that the person was a Stasi informer. 
 If there was evidence that an employee had worked for the Stasi, the com-
missioner’s staff returned a brief standardized report. The report contained 
the code name of the informer, where and for how long she worked, whether 
she signed a declaration of commitment, why she was recruited, whether she 
received payments, rewards, or awards for the work, how the work ended, 
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how many reports she wrote, and some information on the contents of the 
reports.70 Photocopies of relevant parts of the files would be enclosed. The 
employee could get a photocopy of the standardized report and view much 
of the enclosed material, with the exception of reports she had written about 
persons. The commissioner would not give a recommendation on how to 
evaluate this information; his role was to deliver the “facts” from the files. 
When employers needed advice on how to evaluate files, they could turn to 
the state commissioners for the Stasi records, who work independently from 
the federal commissioner.71 
 Although the federal commissioner’s office does not evaluate the con-
tents of the files, the Stasi Records Law defines the forms of contact with the 
MfS that are considered collaboration in the terms of the act. Many official 
forms of cooperation on the job are excluded from the notice and are thus 
tacitly marked as morally less troubling. Also, activities for the Stasi that 
ended before December 1975 — fifteen years before unification — are not to be 
included in the notice unless they involved the commission of crimes or viola-
tions of basic principles of humanity (section 19, para. 1).72 If someone had, for 
example, informed from 1970 until 1974, the employer would still get a notice 
that “there are no indications” of activities for the Stasi. Any Stasi work by 
minors and persons who only worked for the Stasi during their military ser-
vice and did not report on specific individuals would also be excluded from 
the notice. Neither would the notice include evidence that an employee who 
informed for the Stasi had been also spied upon because this would violate 
the victims’ privacy rights. But the employee was free to introduce such evi-
dence in the proceedings. 
 These examples show that the Stasi Records Law shaped the definition of 
misconduct by hiding certain forms of engagement with the Stasi from the 
view of the vetting commissions. The 1975 rule resembles the statute of limita-
tion extending the period of inquiry fifteen years backward from the time of 
unification, and a deadline in sections 20, paragraph 3, and 21, paragraph 3 
prohibits the use of the commissioner’s notices later than fifteen years after 
the passing of the law, meaning December 2006. These two dates provide 
the temporal framework for the vetting process even though the unification 
treaty allows the dismissal of MfS informers for work prior to 1975, and also 
at points in time after 2006. But without reliance on the notices issued by the 
federal commissioner, the vetting process is moot. 
 Persons for whom the federal commissioner had returned a “positive” 
notice with evidence that they had been informers often felt their case had 
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been misrepresented. In the notice, their personality is reduced to the declara-
tion they might have signed, to the reports they might have given. In one case, 
a person had been spied upon for years. Then the Stasi asked him to become 
an unofficial informer. He initially consented, but then announced his unwill-
ingness to be an informer at their next meeting: 
The fact is, I signed this declaration, and right at the next meeting I said 
I didn’t want to do this. So. That was it. And why did I sign it? There are 
different reasons. It has to do with my entire life before that. Because, I 
was more of a rebel than someone who would work for the Stasi. I was 
simply interested in what they wanted to know through me. On whom 
did they want to snoop? Because I had contacts with different groups, . . . 
and I simply wanted to know what they wanted from me. . . I was not so 
naive as to think that if I worked with the Stasi I could find out things 
that were unclear to me, piece by piece. So I went so far as to say, okay, 
and then there was a first meeting.73 
 The excerpts compiled by the federal commissioner only showed that one 
part of his contacts with the Stasi: “They only had the piece of paper with my 
signature on it, and they said, he signed.”74 In his own binder, he now has pho-
tocopies of both his files. The “victim file” has many photocopies of letters 
he wrote to his friends and family while serving in the army, together with 
various reports on him and friends. The “unofficial informer file” contains 
his handwritten “declaration of commitment” and reports from meetings in 
which he delivered no information and declared his unwillingness to work for 
the Stasi: “During the discussion it could not be achieved that the IM would 
change his position. It was determined that the IM is written off during the 
first six months because of his lack of suitability.” His “victim file” also con-
tains a rejection of a security clearance “because he refused to be an unof-
ficial informer.” Both files taken together provide a story of his encounters 
with the Stasi that makes sense, but his employer was issued a brief report 
based only on the informer file. Since he applied to see his “victim file” rela-
tively late, he also could not introduce evidence from that file at his vetting 
proceeding. There he was hard pressed to explain his apparent eagerness to 
work for the Stasi, and to prove that he did not deliver any information nor 
that he intended to do so. He concedes that “this is such a voluminous story. If 
this is to be worked through in a way that does justice to the person, it would 
simply exceed the technical capacities of such a commission. Nobody has so 
much time that they could reconsider all these stories.”75
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 The vetting laws tied vetting to an assessment of a person’s “personal suit-
ability” for public office. The courts went to great lengths to substantiate the 
criteria given by the unification treaty and suggested by precedents. The pos-
sibility and evaluation of a “personal transformation” along with the change 
in the political environment is one of the key moral and legal issues in this 
process. The clause allowing dismissals for non-MfS misconduct expired in 
1993, but dismissals for MfS work are possible into the indefinite future. Yet 
the Stasi Records Law, which regulates the availability of the MfS files for vet-
ting purposes, sets a time frame for the entire process by prohibiting the use 
of files for vetting after 2006.
vetting in the cities
Following unification in October 1990, city administrations faced an entirely 
new legal system and huge gaps in their budgets. While the universities were 
concerned about justifying public trust and their legitimacy as elitist insti-
tutions, the cities were trying to adapt to a new system that would require 
massive layoffs and a reorganization of the administration and service deliv-
ery at the local level. The issue of popular trust was not paramount, and was 
addressed only at the upper echelons: the mayor and the directors of adminis-
trative departments. Mayors and other local officials had been elected in May 
1990, so the democratic legitimacy of the heads of the city administrations 
was beyond doubt. The vetting for other levels followed a more administrative 
model and was less public than it was in the universities and the judiciary, for 
example. 
 The situations in Greifswald and Dresden were quantitatively different: 
The Dresden city administration had 18,000 employees in 1990. The Grei-
fswald city hall had just 300 employees, but the restructuring of the public 
administration moved other departments into the jurisdiction of the city. At 
one point, the city suddenly had 3,000 employees, but through privatization 
of services and layoffs, this number decreased to 1,260 at the end of 1997.76 
Everyone’s main concern was preserving municipal jobs, but nobody was 
prepared to extend this solidarity to people who had cooperated with the 
Stasi. The former mayor explains:
I called a general meeting for all municipal employees very soon [after 
being elected]. At that point, there were still 300 employees. And if 
someone was proven to have worked for the Stasi as an informal collab-
orator and had denounced people, then he would have to go, he would 
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be fired. Whoever was on that list and signed, or even received money, 
had to go.77
 The vetting process in Greifswald was split into two parts. First, the newly 
elected officials at the top of the administration reviewed the higher-level 
employees for Stasi cooperation, for politically motivated aspects of their job 
performance, and for their position in the SED hierarchy. Almost all depart-
ment heads had to leave their current positions, but many were later employed 
in lower positions in the same department.78 The replacement of department 
heads was motivated by both their conduct in the previous administration 
and the feeling that they would not be capable of leading departments in dire 
need of change.
In the part of the administration that I headed, almost all department 
directors were replaced by new people. This does not mean that the old 
ones were dismissed because of their political record, but because we 
wanted to establish something new. In the areas of culture, of education, 
we wanted to set new standards, and this was only possible with new 
leadership.79
 Since the schools were under the city jurisdiction — they were later moved 
to the jurisdiction of the state government — the democratically elected city 
officials also screened all twenty-two school principals, twenty-one of whom 
had been SED members, and most of whom were replaced.80 From the elec-
tion of the local governments in May 1990 until the establishment of state 
oversight over the municipal administrations, local officials often worked in 
a legal vacuum. This vacuum sometimes turned into a disadvantage when 
courts reviewed the vetting decisions made during those first months.
 The second step was the screening of all other employees for ties to the 
Stasi, but not for other forms of misconduct. This process took more time 
because the notices from the federal commissioner’s office were coming in 
very slowly. In order to evaluate employees who had worked for the Stasi, the 
city formed a small “working group.” One of the three members was from the 
employees’ council, one from the human resources department, and one was 
“someone who knew the Stasi issues quite well,”81 preferably someone who 
had participated in the organized dissolution of the city’s Stasi headquarters 
in December 1989. This working group was authorized to make final deci-
sions after interviewing the employees. The group was different from the plu-
ralistic commissions that evaluated judges, university employees, and police 
officers. It did not include persons from outside the vetted institution; for its 
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legitimacy it relied solely on the democratic mandate of the top city officials 
who were involved. The working group viewed its task as an administrative 
process with individual hearings, the weighing of evidence, and the respon-
sible exercise of discretion. Participants in this process stress that there was 
no automatic dismissal: 
It was important to see whether someone had signed a declaration, how 
many records were there that showed that he harmed someone? . . . But 
even if someone had signed the declaration, this was not immediately a 
reason to vote for dismissal. Some were blackmailed into signing, others 
were indirectly forced, and others did it from their political convictions 
to do something good for the state. We always examined the individual 
case.82 
 The working group either voted that the employee was suitable for contin-
ued employment, should be dismissed, or should work in a position with less 
responsibility and contact with the public. The city screened 1,553 employ-
ees, 1,495 of whom had not worked for the Stasi and 58 (3.7%) who had. The 
working group decided to continue employment for about half of them (28). 
The other 29 employees (one person had already left) were offered to leave by 
mutual agreement, and 11 accepted this option. In the end, 18 persons were dis-
missed; 12 of them sued for continued employment, and 5 of them were suc-
cessful.83 These numbers are miniscule in comparison to the other sources of 
job losses in the city administration. In 1991, many social services were trans-
ferred to the responsibility of the municipal government, which suddenly had 
to pay its employees West German wages. In the day care sector alone, about 
seven hundred employees had to be dismissed in one year: “These things did 
not have anything to do with justice. Rather, if someone was affected, there 
was no good reason for it but they could not do anything about it.”84 Since 
the number of people dismissed or demoted due to vetting was small in com-
parison to the general downsizing, there were no concerns that vetting would 
deprive the city government of irreplaceable personnel. Even very able people 
had to be dismissed due to budgetary concerns, and with the high level of 
unemployment, replacements would be easy to find. 
 In the city of Dresden, far larger numbers of employees had to be vetted. 
But here, too, the upper echelons of the administration were treated differ-
ently from the ordinary employees.85 Although this first stage of the vetting 
process, the screening for non-MfS misconduct, was limited to the upper 
levels of the municipal administration, the number of employees dismissed 
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for these reasons is high in comparison to other institutions. These numbers 
are the result of months of diligent full-time work by fifteen members of a 
preliminary vetting commission who sifted through the personnel files and 
SED archives, conducted hearings, and recommended 11 dismissals in 1990, 
67 in 1991, 148 in 1992, and 21 in 1993. This demonstrates that screening for 
abuses of power by SED functionaries required a significant commitment. But 
municipal officials felt that this scope of their vetting procedures was justified 
because the citizens would otherwise not trust a city administration that had 
implemented locally what the SED had planned in Berlin and Dresden.
 In 1993, the unification treaty clauses allowing for dismissals for non-MfS 
related misconduct expired, and the vetting process shifted to the MfS files. 
The notices from the federal commissioner were trickling in, and a regular 
personnel commission was formed to continue the vetting process in 1992. 
The members of the commission were almost exclusively drawn from within 
the human resources department. The commission dealt with about 509 cases 
in depth. The employees about whom there was evidence of activities for the 
Stasi were invited to a hearing with the members of this commission. The rel-
evant files and the minutes of the hearing were then discussed in the commis-
sion. In 264 cases (52%), there were no sanctions; 201 employees (39%) were 
dismissed, 30 of them without prior notice; 44 employees chose to leave by 
mutual agreement. Thus only 18% of those eligible to leave by mutual agree-
ment did so, and the others “almost uniformly” sued for reinstatement. 
 The procedures adopted by the city administrations followed the adminis-
trative model of vetting. The commissions were primarily staffed with mem-
bers of the administration: the human resources department in Dresden, and 
representatives of the human resources department, the employees’ union, 
and the mayor in Greifswald. The procedure in Greifswald even did away with 
the distinction between the commission’s recommendations and a review 
and final decision by the responsible administrator. Participants describe this 
procedure as adequate for the needs and context of the municipal govern-
ments. These institutions primarily delivered social services, administered 
welfare programs, and implemented the policies adopted by the city parlia-
ments. Thus the stress on the employees’ democratic credentials and the citi-
zens’ ability to develop trust in them was less pronounced then it was in dis-
cussions about the vetting of police officers, university employees, teachers, 
and the judiciary. All that the new administration asked from most low-level 
municipal employees was an outward behavioral adaptation and a willingness 
to study and apply the new regulations diligently. The democratic credentials 
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of the elected heads of the municipal administration would suffice for guar-
anteeing a democratic overall direction of the municipal administration. The 
only group of lower-level employees who were explicitly denied the “second 
chance” of behavioral adaptation were those who had not only worked for the 
Stasi but also actively harmed fellow citizens: “If someone caused damage to 
somebody else, by their work with the Stasi or whatever, it really doesn’t mat-
ter how they conducted themselves afterwards. They have to leave their posi-
tion, leave the municipal administration.”86 
 The vetting process was more limited in the municipal administrations 
than it was elsewhere, and it was specifically geared to the requirements of 
these institutions. 
vetting in the universities
Over the course of the fall 1989 semester, the universities’ role as pillars of the 
SED regime was gradually undermined. The ensuing crisis of legitimation 
soon triggered calls for vetting as the ritual purification from the corrupting 
influence of the SED and Stasi on research and teaching. During October 1989, 
local SED organizations tried to save their position by proposing reforms and 
promising to refrain from interfering with the university administration. 
Three days after the opening of the Berlin Wall, on November 12, 1989, the 
University of Greifswald’s department of Marxism and Leninism petitioned 
the university president for its own dissolution.87 
 This self-dissolution marked the beginning of a large-scale restructuring 
and downsizing. At the same time, the universities tried to shed their roles 
as participants in the ideological streamlining of the GDR elites and in the 
repression of those who dissented. The universities wanted to reinvent them-
selves as quickly as possible as independent and nonpolitical institutions for 
research and learning, and this required a thorough vetting process. The per-
centage of MfS informers in the universities was small in comparison to other 
sectors, but the influence of the SED and the access of the MfS to the univer-
sities’ officials were undeniable. A person whom the MfS recruited when he 
was a student recalls:
It was at the end of the first year, in spring. I had a lecture with the pro-
fessor who was chair of the department at that time. And before the lec-
ture he said I should come with him to his office. So he led me there, 
and a Stasi officer was sitting there, who wanted to recruit me. And the 
professor, he just went back and gave the lecture. And there I was, sitting 
there with this man.88
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 In this case, the MfS used the authority and implied authorization of the 
department chair to try to intimidate the student into signing with them. This 
method of recruitment was not unique. Universities also expelled students 
who had become too rebellious; and party membership and loyalty were 
important ingredients in many academic careers.
 As in other institutions, the moral demands for vetting intersected with 
the necessity to close down some academic divisions and reduce staff in oth-
ers. Academic departments that had become superfluous were dissolved, and 
their staff and faculty dismissed. In Greifswald, six departments were dis-
solved in the so-called unraveling (Abwicklung),89 and the fact that some of 
them were later reopened raised the question of whether wholesale Abwick-
lung was used to circumvent the requirement of individual review before dis-
missing employees. In Dresden, Abwicklung affected an even larger percentage 
of employees. All departments in the social sciences and humanities were dis-
solved in this way, and some were, controversially, later reopened with new 
personnel. The social sciences and humanities were often portrayed as the 
epicenters of ideological corruption. The forty-three unofficial MfS inform-
ers that the Greifswald Commission of Inquiry had found among university 
personnel were spread across all departments but were concentrated in the 
departments of Marxism/Leninism (7.9% of the departmental staff), northern 
European area studies (11.4%), and history (5.1).90 But the MfS had informers 
almost everywhere and was striving to improve: “In spite of a good yield of 
information from the medical school, further gaps in the web of IMs are to 
be closed in 1989 in order to avoid surprises.”91 Among the 2,700 students, 34 
(1.3%) were informers, most of them in the physics and medicine programs.92 
 Yet the downsizing process was a more immediate threat to more careers 
than any conceivable vetting process would have been. Dresden Techni-
cal University and its branches had 9,000 employees in 1990, only 3,400 of 
whom could stay. In the end, vetting played a quantitatively small role in the 
process of personnel reduction: at the beginning of the vetting process, 3,000 
employees had already left the university through Abwicklung, mutual agree-
ments, or dismissals. And among the 5,000 employees that had to be laid off, 
only 2% were dismissed as a direct result of the vetting process.93 In Greif-
swald, the personnel reduction was less drastic, from 5,650 to 4,000 and then 
to 3,600 in 1998. Yet there, too, employees soon started to leave if they saw a 
chance on the job market or knew they would not pass the vetting process: 
810 left voluntarily in 1991.94 The vetting process was not contributing much 
to the personnel reduction in quantitative terms, but it introduced some mea-
sure of moral equity into the downsizing process: 
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It was clear that a large number of the university’s employees would 
need to leave. . . . And then there was the issue: if hundreds of employees 
have to be laid off, maybe those who were politically compromised, and 
those who hindered other people’s advancement in the university, and 
those who had taken part in the political repression of students should 
be the first to be laid off.95
 Conversely, vetting would ensure that those who stayed were certified as 
reliable and trustworthy members of the “new” university and had not taken 
part in the abuses of “old.” Members of the university were especially keen to 
find out who among them had informed for the Stasi, and they did not want 
any informers to be participating in academic self-government. The academic 
senate formed an integrity committee and the medical school’s newly elected 
council resolved in its first meeting in April 1990 to ask each member to sign 
a declaration stating, “I have never been a secret informer for the former Min-
istry for State Security (MfS), have never signed a declaration of collaboration 
with the MfS for the purpose of delivering secret information, and have never 
received financial or other rewards in return for such cooperation,” and to 
agree to have the files examined “by an elected and independent commission 
according to applicable law.”96 This declaration of integrity concentrated on 
the Stasi, and on the provision of secret information to the Stasi. Presumably, 
many who voted for this declaration had been SED members, a number of 
them were SED functionaries, and some would have provided information 
to or taken orders from the Stasi as part of their jobs. The university senate 
declared this step of the council permissible but warned against narrowing 
the focus to secret informers: 
The Senate has been asked to disclose the MfS cooperation of members 
of the university in front of the Integrity Committee of the Senate. We 
declare that we are not authorized to do so. Moreover, we are not will-
ing to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty by such a general 
pronouncement of guilt or acquittal. We expect all members of the uni-
versity to seriously ask themselves where they have failed in the past and 
to what degree they were actively or passively involved in the injustices 
of the SED regime or in the ideological deformation of research and 
teaching.97 
 Yet in a situation of increasing competitiveness and job insecurity, open 
discussion about responsibility for past injustices did not take place. With 
unification in October 1990, the initial impulses towards vetting and reform 
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acquired a legal basis. The state governments, which are responsible for the 
public universities, each passed a Law on the Renewal of the Universities 
[Hochschulerneuerungsgesetz] to regulate restructuring and vetting processes. 
There were three steps: First, in the vetting process, all members of the uni-
versity would be evaluated regarding their political and moral integrity. Then 
they would be evaluated regarding their professional qualifications. Finally, 
the remaining jobs were matched with the remaining candidates. No job 
within the university was reserved, and everyone had to reapply for the posi-
tions they had already held. 
 By putting the vetting process first, the governments wanted to ensure 
that those who were “deeply entangled in the system” would indeed be the 
first to be laid off regardless of their professional qualifications. However, the 
sequencing was thrown off track because the January 1993 deadline for eas-
ier dismissals laid down in the unification treaty was too soon for the federal 
commissioner’s office. It had received screening requests for 86,526 employ-
ees — about half of all the queries filed to date — and had only responded to 
one third of these queries by the end of 1992.98 The academic review had been 
scheduled for spring 1992, so that dismissal notices could be issued in the fall. 
Since a rigorous vetting process would be impossible without the notices from 
the federal commissioner, the local vetting commissions started issuing eval-
uations with the reservation that the federal commissioner’s notice had not 
yet arrived. These preliminary evaluations were mainly based on the employ-
ees’ own admissions. Thus, some who had in fact cooperated with the MfS 
secured jobs and would only be dismissed years later when the notices arrived 
from Berlin. As a consequence, the three steps of the personnel renewal pro-
cess did not occur in a neat sequence. Sometimes the steps overlapped, and 
often step one was completed long after step three.
 The university vetting commissions in Saxony and in Mecklenburg and 
Western Pomerania were composed of members from within the university, 
from civil society, and legal experts. Officials insisted on a balanced mix of 
outsiders and insiders. The “insiders” were sometimes self-selected and only 
later elected by their peers in the university. The outsiders, appointed by the 
state parliament or the state government, were often legal experts and, as 
such, they were West Germans. The mixed composition of the commissions 
was supposed to legitimize them to different audiences with different con-
cerns. The members who were drawn from within the university considered 
themselves peers of those whom they were evaluating. They were expected to 
understand the context of the actions and the ethical choices. Many of these 
insider members had worked on the committees overseeing the preservation 
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of the MfS files in December 1989 and thus had expertise and experience in 
evaluating those files. In some cities, members of the vetting commissions 
apparently even knew which university employees had worked for the Stasi 
because they had seen the Stasi’s own lists in December 1989.99 They cite their 
involvement in the 1989 movement as a legitimizing factor for their member-
ship in the vetting commissions, but take care not to describe themselves as 
victims of the SED regime or the MfS.100 The role of the outsiders, often law-
yers from West Germany, was to bring the elements of emotional distance 
and legal expertise to the table: 
They also gave advice about how to proceed. I mean, we did not have the 
rule of law in the GDR. And they came from a part of Germany where 
there was a tradition of the rule of law for decades. So they brought these 
experiences into the commission.101
 In Saxony, the vetting commissions were called personnel commissions 
and had fifteen members: seven permanent members, including university 
employees and public figures, and eight nonpermanent members elected by 
the members of the department that was to be screened.102 In Mecklenburg 
and Western Pomerania, the vetting commissions were called Ehrenkommis-
sionen, best translated as “honor” or “integrity” commissions. Eight of their 
eleven members would be elected from within the university (four faculty, 
two students, two staff), and the other three members, usually lawyers, were 
appointed by the state parliament.103 In both states, a substantial number 
of commission members were elected by their peers, whom they would be 
evaluating. Yet the elections often ratified a prior informal selection process. 
The government officials preferred persons whose own commitment in 1989 
would make them proper representatives of the new regime. The regulations 
in Mecklenburg and Western Pomerania excluded from serving on the com-
missions all those who had worked for the MfS. There the government also 
instructed the chairs of the several vetting commissions that “no former SED 
members should work in the integrity commissions”104 although this sugges-
tion had no firm legal basis. In Saxony, candidates for the commissions were 
initially hand picked by officials and people whom they trusted: “We had 
some of them screened by the Gauck Authority. And then we asked them for 
further suggestions of persons who should be on the commissions.”105 This 
process produced twelve hundred members of personnel commissions, only 
two of whom later turned out to have been Stasi informers.106 The selection 
process was, in short, a mix between the democratic legitimacy of an elec-
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tion by peers, and a self-selection process that favored those who had associ-
ated themselves with the 1989 movement without considering themselves as 
victims. The outside members added elements of distanced impartiality and 
knowledge of the legal rules. 
 The first step in the commissions’ work was to draw up questionnaires 
that all employees had to answer. Failing to do so would result in immedi-
ate dismissal. They asked about a wide range of political and social activities 
and privileges. Yet almost everyone’s attention focused on one question or 
its variant: “Have you consciously cooperated with the former MfS or any 
other intelligence service?”107 Or, in Saxony: “Have you ever, officially or un-
officially, . . . worked for the Ministry for State Security or the counterintelli-
gence department of the Defense Ministry of the German Democratic Repub-
lic, or have supported their activities in any way?”108 The questions had to be 
answered truthfully, the employees were told; otherwise they might be liable 
to dismissal for lying to their employer (and the vetting commission). The 
legality of the questionnaires and the questions on MfS contacts was initially 
disputed but was later confirmed by the courts.109 As discussed above, the 
questionnaires yielded few admissions of Stasi work. Lying on the question-
naire alone would normally justify dismissals, but in light of the high num-
bers of “cheats,” both the vetting commissions and the courts were reluctant 
to press the issue: “If 80% of those entangled in the system did not tell the 
truth, we could not simply hold this against 80% of the people, right?”110 Here 
the numbers mattered for the decision not to penalize harshly cheating on the 
questionnaire: the vetting commissions and courts were not ready to attach 
substantial sanctions to conduct that was empirically “normal,” even though 
this normality was morally disturbing.
 After comparing the returned questionnaires with the personnel files, 
the commissions decided which cases showed indications of misconduct. In 
these cases, employees were invited to a hearing. Misconduct, according to 
the bylaws of the Greifswald integrity commission, was:
any deliberate act by which the employee has actively and in an elevated 
position helped to implement the policies of the regime of the former 
GDR, or any act, omission, or acquiescence by which the employee has 
used the political system to cause others personal or professional disad-
vantages that were not justified on professional grounds.
 Examples of misconduct included possessing high positions in GDR polit-
ical parties, and party and other leadership positions within the university 
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hierarchy. Examples of grave misconduct included work for the Stasi and caus-
ing the relegation of students for political reasons.111 Where there was no indi-
cation of misconduct, the case was closed and the employees were notified 
that they were evaluated positively, pending the notice from the federal com-
missioner. In all other cases, the employees were invited to hearings at which 
they were confronted with evidence from the files, asked to explain details, and 
given the opportunity to tell their side of the story. The hearings have been 
generally described as fair — even by persons who did not agree with the con-
clusions reached by the commissions. Still, “people who knew one another 
were sitting on different sides of the room. And someone who by chance sat 
on one side of the room had the right to ask the one on the other side ques-
tions about his life and his travels. This was not a pleasant situation.”112 
 Throughout the process, information on the cases was kept confidential. 
In spite of this, there were leaks and indiscretions, as can be expected when 
people know one another and there is much at stake. The confidentiality frus-
trated those who expected the commissions to clarify the participation of 
those responsible for political repression and discrimination, and it also made 
it hard for the employees to evaluate the work of the commissions: 
The one big problem with the integrity commission was that you did 
not see what it was doing. You only saw the results when people sud-
denly had to leave the university. Or when people were not eligible to 
apply for the new jobs. . . . From the effects you could see, there must 
have been something, but you never knew what the vote was based on. 
And this created space for new rumors.113 
 Without knowing the details of a case, it was impossible to gauge the stan-
dards and the consistency, so that it became possible for some to declare, “I 
don’t think they had any standards at all.”114 The tension between the con-
fidentiality appropriate to employment matters and the transparency neces-
sary for the evaluation of the commissions’ work seems inescapable. 
 Both in Saxony and Mecklenburg and Western Pomerania, the vetting 
commissions only made recommendations that were then reviewed by the 
ministries of education. In Saxony, the personnel commissions could vote 
“suitable” or “unsuitable.” If the commission was deeply divided, the minority 
could file a dissenting vote with the minister, who would then pay particular 
attention to the case.115 In Mecklenburg and Western Pomerania, the com-
missions could recommend a range of votes from “no misconduct” to “slight 
misconduct, no consequences,” and “temporary disqualification from par-
ticipation in academic self-government” to “ordinary dismissal” and “imme-
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diate dismissal” — altogether eight different votes. The greater differentiation 
allowed the commission to express moral disapproval of an employee’s con-
duct short of recommending dismissal. The votes in between “no miscon-
duct” and “dismissal” were disadvantages in the later stages of the restructur-
ing process: given the choice between a candidate with a “no misconduct” 
evaluation and another with a “disapproval,” the university often preferred 
the former. But regardless of the practical consequences, employees who 
received such votes were often troubled by the suggestion that they had com-
mitted misconduct. 
 At the University of Greifswald, most employees were found to have com-
mitted no misconduct. As of February 1995, with 1,873 notices from the Stasi 
files commissioner pending, 3,936 of all 4,415 vetted employees (89%) received 
a “no misconduct” vote. About 1.7% were recommended for dismissals, and 
the rest received votes in between the two ends of the scale.116 Employees 
from the social sciences and the humanities received the least favorable evalu-
ations: only 68% were granted “no misconduct,” compared to 80% in the 
natural sciences and 93% in the medical school. Also, 20% of the professors 
but only 3% of the mid-level researchers were recommended to leave the uni-
versity.117 These numbers reflect the differences in the intensity of SED and 
Stasi influence among the disciplines, and the high influence of SED loyalty 
for professional advancement in the GDR. 
 The university vetting commissions covered thousands of cases, most of 
them in 1991 and 1992, when they worked full time. Given the time pressure 
and the necessity of developing a consistent practice, the commissions cate-
gorized different forms of misconduct, compared them according to severity, 
and matched them with plausible votes. In Greifswald, the commission drew 
up tables with guidelines for evaluating different sorts of misconduct, such as 
job-related Stasi contacts, having been a member of the university-wide SED 
leadership, and active participation in politically motivated disciplinary pro-
ceedings.118 The commission seems to have given the votes indicated in the 
table unless the specifics of the case counseled for a more or less severe vote. 
So the probable range of the vote was clear before an employee appeared in 
the hearing, but the specific vote was not.119 Since persons who had served 
in similar positions often received the same vote, some tried to argue that the 
commission had decided how to vote simply based on the formal position of 
an employee in the hierarchy. This suspicion was fueled by the commission’s 
practice of using generic templates for formulating the reasons accompany-
ing the evaluation.120 This sometimes conveyed the impression that the par-
ticulars of a case had not been appreciated.121
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 At the University of Greifswald, 40% of the Stasi informers who had to 
leave the university did so through a mutual consent arrangement, relinquish-
ing their right to challenge their evaluation. Although there was no legal basis 
for appealing to the vetting commission to review a case, the commission 
made it clear that it would welcome such appeals and take them very seri-
ously. The informal appeals procedure was used by eighty-seven persons, 2% 
of those evaluated up to that point. In fourteen cases (16%), the commission 
changed its initial evaluation. Among those who brought their cases to the 
labor courts, very few won, a few of them lost, and the others entered into 
settlements with the university or the state government. In Dresden, two 
hundred fifty dismissals for various reasons in the faculties of engineering 
and natural sciences led to two hundred lawsuits, of which the employer lost 
thirty-three and won thirty-nine. In all other cases (64%), the university or the 
state entered into a settlement.122 Given the occasionally erratic labor court 
jurisprudence and the universities’ categorical unwillingness to reintegrate 
those that the vetting commissions had voted unsuitable, settlements were an 
attractive solution for the employers.
 Unlike most other vetting commissions, the university vetting commis-
sions dealt solely with the employees’ conduct before 1990. The Greifswald 
commission was formally authorized to investigate conduct up until March 
1991, but members of the commission said they did not feel responsible for 
investigating anything after November 1989. This helped the commission to 
counter reproaches that they were a tribunal on other persons’ political opin-
ions. For the commission, conduct prior to 1989 counted, and the political 
opinions that individuals held when they stood before the commission were 
irrelevant. If the commission could not honor genuine personal transforma-
tions, it also did not reward opportunistic adaptations. The decision not to 
inquire about post-1989 conduct was made before the labor courts started to 
stress precisely this factor. 
 The university vetting commissions in their different shapes were parts of 
a larger wave of layoffs at the universities. The commissions added small num-
bers of dismissals but an important element of moral fairness to the larger 
process of downsizing. Still, they could not attain the proclaimed goal that 
the first to go would be those whose prior misconduct disqualified them from 
holding positions in the public sector. Sizeable numbers of employees had lied 
about their involvement with the MfS. Due to the necessities of sequencing 
the different steps of the renewal process, they kept their jobs for some more 
years. When they were found out, they had a better chance of retaining their 
jobs than those who had admitted their involvement on the questionnaires.
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 The commissions were composed of insiders and outsiders so as to com-
bine the experiences and understanding of the members of the university with 
the emotional distance and legal skills of West German lawyers and others who 
had not been involved in the institution. Although some hoped that the vetting 
process would help the universities to “face the past,” this did not occur. On the 
one hand, the process took place within the parameters of the labor law, which 
bars public discussion of the cases examined by the commission. Neither the 
votes nor the particulars of any case were made public. On the other hand, 
those who were free to talk about these issues, the employees themselves, did 
not do so because their careers and their reputations were at stake. Those who 
passed the commissions’ muster could claim a legitimate status within the 
German university system. A favorable evaluation in terms of the vetting cri-
teria allowed those who kept their jobs to disassociate themselves from past 
injustices, often unjustifiably so. Yet as the new professors from West Ger-
many came to the universities, those East German researchers and professors 
who could keep their jobs could point to the vetting commissions to remove 
suspicions that their West German colleagues never had to face.
vetting in relationship to  
other transitional justice policies
How did vetting relate to other transitional justice policies? I will briefly con-
sider the relationship between vetting and prosecutions, truth telling, and 
rehabilitation. First, vetting and prosecutions remained separate. Yet both 
policies implicitly mark and affirm the distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. They participate in the retroactive drawing of a moral 
landscape. The choices they make in framing areas of responsibility and 
focusing on certain institutions but not on others shaped the public debate on 
political and moral responsibility. The more vetting is understood as a sanc-
tion for past misconduct — and not as assessing current suitability for public 
sector employment — the more vetting and prosecutions are understood to 
be on a sliding scale. Thus the failure to prosecute those who were politically 
responsible — for example the upper echelon of the MfS — while dismissing 
from mundane public sector jobs the low-level unofficial informers is widely 
viewed as incoherent.123 This view presumes that vetting is a milder form of 
sanction than criminal punishment but follows the same moral logic. Impu-
nity for those who were the superiors of those whose misconduct was exam-
ined by the vetting commissions accordingly undermines the legitimacy of 
the vetting process.
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 Second, vetting and truth telling stand in an uneasy relationship. The 
desire to know who was an informer, and to know who has abused power, is 
closely related to the wish to deny those people public sector employment. Yet 
vetting did not lead to more knowledge about the patterns of collaboration. It 
provided “sanctions” without publicizing what they were based on, thereby 
encouraging rumors. Unless those who were vetted chose to go public, the 
facts in each case were strictly confidential. This has been criticized as under-
mining the justice of the vetting process: 
If you have the rule of law and there is a legal statute and a court makes 
a finding and says that this person deserves this or that penalty, this is 
clear to the public. This is the purpose of sanctions for persons who 
have done something wrong. But in the Integrity Commission, every-
thing was watered down. Outsiders could really not see what was going 
on.124
 The embedded secrecy about past misconduct reinforced the understand-
ing that one’s past is strictly a private matter. While the vetting process might 
have encouraged more secrecy, it profited enormously from the institution 
whose task it was to create managed publicity for important aspects of the 
GDR past: the federal commissioner’s office for the Stasi records. The pub-
lic sector employers are only one constituency for the federal commissioner’s 
office. Requests by individuals, journalists, and researchers are also answered 
within the terms of the law. This institution would not have existed without 
the concerted efforts to first prevent the destruction of the MfS files and then 
prevent their transfer into the federal archives. Accordingly, the relative coher-
ence of the vetting policy depended on the prior decision to make the MfS 
files available for different purposes. The existence of a federal agency devoted 
to managing the MfS files was not matched by similar efforts to systematically 
work through and manage the SED files. Thus the laudable work of the fed-
eral commissioner risks narrowing the focus of dealing with the past to the 
MfS. But there is more to the past than what is in the Stasi files, and even the 
state commissioners for the Stasi records lament that those who did the dirty 
work for the MfS were being held responsible while those who had the politi-
cal responsibility for the giant security apparatus were not.125 Vetting benefits 
from a general policy of exposing the truth about one institution at the center 
of the security apparatus, but it does not by itself lead to more truth telling.
 Third, when people contemplated vetting the public sector, they initially 
envisioned dismissing those who had caused harm to others and promot-
ing those who had been harmed.126 Vetting and rehabilitation were seen as 
391
EAST gERmANy
two sides of the same coin. The mandates of some vetting commissions also 
included a rehabilitation component. Yet purposeful political discrimination 
in the GDR was often hard to prove later. Even where the evidence might have 
been sufficient, the moral imperative of rehabilitation in the form of promo-
tion or rehiring competed with the imperatives of downsizing. The legal basis 
for such affirmative action was also weak. In addition, there is the concern 
that the vetting process did not identify all those who had harassed colleagues 
for political reasons, and that those who had suffered would not want to 
come back to the same workplace. The trustworthiness of the public sector 
is still uneven and fragile, especially from the perspective of those who had 
been harassed while working there.127 Thus, efforts at reinstating employees 
to jobs from which they were removed for political reasons were present at 
the beginning of the vetting process. As jobs became increasingly scarce, the 
competition among those who had managed to keep their positions sidelined 
such concerns. Professional rehabilitation strategies can well be a comple-
ment to vetting programs, but they are bound to meet resistance where jobs 
are scarce and insecure. Instead of trying to offer the job that was once lost, 
it might be more appropriate and feasible to offer additional skills training to 
those who had been disadvantaged. 
conclusion
The vetting process in unified Germany was regulated by one general norm in 
the unification treaty, and yet the practice was uneven across sectors, states, 
and administrative departments. Institutions that required higher levels of 
popular trust in their moral authority, such as courts and universities, gener-
ally selected more demanding procedures. Their pluralistic vetting commis-
sions were composed of institutional insiders as well as representatives of 
civil society and legal professionals who were expected to ensure the impar-
tiality and integrity of the vetting process. In other parts of the public sector, 
such as in the municipal administrations, the vetting process was differenti-
ated according to the employees’ level of responsibility and public visibility. 
The commissions were formed from within the institution without elections. 
They viewed their work as purely administrative. In the four institutions exam-
ined here, the numbers of dismissals due to the vetting process were small in 
comparison to the job losses caused by shrinking public budgets. The most 
significant category of misconduct examined by the vetting commissions was 
collaboration with the MfS. Available numbers suggest that on average 25% 
to 45% of those who were listed as MfS informers had to leave the institution. 
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Many opted for ending the employment by mutual agreement, which saved 
them the embarrassment of having been dismissed but also deprived them of 
an opportunity to challenge the dismissal in court. 
 The two most contentious issues were the rationale for vetting and, closely 
related, the vetting criteria. Vetting was first proposed in fall 1989 and started, 
sometimes informally, in the spring of 1990. At that time, vetting was con-
ceptualized simply as a response to past misconduct, and not much thought 
was given to how a person’s views and conduct changed after 1989. The legal 
basis for vetting, in contrast, framed the policy as an attempt to assess the 
employees’ current and future reliability in a democratic public sector. This 
disagreement was virtually immaterial in 1990, when the unification treaty 
was ratified. But since the vetting process took much longer than projected, 
the difference between these two rationales grew stark. The contrast focused 
on several crucial questions: What is the relevance of someone’s conduct after 
1989 in comparison to their misconduct before 1989? Can old misconduct 
be redeemed by a rapid personal transformation in 1990? Is such a transfor-
mation even possible? With a focus on an employee’s suitability, pre-1989 
conduct fades in its importance as time passes. Misconduct in 1985 might 
have constituted a sufficient presumption of unsuitability for public sector 
employment in 1992. Yet after five more years of diligent democratic adminis-
trative work, this same employee might pass the suitability test. She was given 
a second chance, and she took it. Vetting according to the suitability rationale 
produces a progressive leniency.
 If vetting is seen in a more strongly retributive framework, in contrast, 
this progressive leniency is not permissible. The same form of misconduct 
should meet the same form of sanction, no matter whether it is discovered in 
1992 or in 1997. This view becomes all the more plausible if one considers why 
some cases were dealt with in 1992 and others in 1997. Oftentimes, this might 
be a matter of pure chance. In these cases, progressive leniency is simply a 
random unfairness. Yet those few who did not cheat when they filled out the 
vetting questionnaire had their cases expedited to facilitate earlier decisions. 
Relaxing the criteria over time punishes them for being forthcoming instead 
of giving them credit for their truthfulness. Thus if the vetting process takes 
place over a longer period of time, as the statutory fifteen years in Germany, 
it is important to choose standards that do not carry within them the seeds 
for troubling inconsistencies over time. Standards that rely on the employ-
ees’ current attitudes as a measure of how far they have distanced themselves 
from the past also run the danger of rewarding opportunistic adaptations and 
judging employees according to their views rather than on the basis of their 
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(past) deeds. Vetting according to the rationale of “personal suitability” tries 
to weed out employees who might not be able to act according to democratic 
and liberal principles. Vetting according to the quasi-retributive model, in 
contrast, focuses on persons who abused power in the past. These two groups 
might overlap, but they are not identical. Nor can courts convincingly square 
the circle by declaring that past misconduct is a sufficient indicator of current 
unsuitability. Bad democrats can have “clean” past records, and there are oth-
ers whose past misconduct was largely a result of their obedience, and who 
can be well integrated into a democratic administration. Both vetting ratio-
nales address important concerns that cannot be sufficiently dealt with if the 
vetting policy is based on only one or the other rationale. 
 Although vetting was meant to identify various forms of noncriminal 
misconduct, it was widely understood to be synonymous with the search 
for MfS informers. This identification is a result of a narrowing of the vetting 
focus in response to the availability of evidence and the criteria introduced 
by the laws. The focus on the MfS does not reflect an initial judgment of the 
relative responsibility for injustices of the MfS, the SED, and other organiza-
tions. However, the singular focus on unofficial MfS informers for pragmatic 
reasons implicitly cast this group of people as the main culprits. Other forms 
of MfS collaboration as well as the abuse of power by the SED, the trade union 
federation, and other organizations receded in importance behind the charac-
ter of the secret MfS informer. The party’s “shield and sword” is shielding the 
party even after its own demise. 
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introduction
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) defines “vetting”1 as 
“processes that involve the examination of employment and other records 
for the purposes of hiring or firing.”2 This definition reveals the key role of 
information in a vetting process. The objective of this chapter is to provide 
insight into the main challenges encountered by vetting processes in collect-
ing and processing information. To do so, I will attempt to answer several 
questions.3 What information is used in vetting processes (section 1)? Is there 
a link between transitional contexts (post-authoritarian, post-conflict) and 
the type of information on which vetting procedures are based (section 2)? 
In what ways does the nature of the information and its processing affect the 
results of vetting procedures (section 3)? In the third section, I will illustrate 
the operational challenges to and constraints on information management 
by looking into the case of police vetting in Bosnia and Herzegovina (post- 
conflict context), and by reviewing vetting processes in a number of countries 
in the former socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. Finally, I will explore the possi-
ble link between the information used in vetting and other transitional justice 
measures such as truth commissions and criminal courts (section 4). 
 This chapter argues that the major information-management challenges in 
vetting processes are fundamentally different depending on the transitional 
context: typically, post-conflict efforts have to address a lack of informa-
tion, while post-authoritarian ones are overwhelmed by secret archives that 
are not fully relevant to the vetting exercise. The chapter also demonstrates 
that the operational dimension (means, expertise, tasks, sequencing, etc.) and 
the implementation stage of vetting processes tend to be underestimated in 
vetting exercises, and that this substantially impacts the vetting outcomes 
independently of the context. Finally, regarding information sharing between 
transitional justice measures, the chapter defends the notion that while there 
is room for enhanced information interoperability, not all information can be 
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shared, and what can be shared is primarily conditioned by the existence of 
an overarching institutional framework.
what information is used in a vetting process?
Information can be defined as an “element of knowledge that can be coded 
to be preserved, processed, or communicated.”4 The concept of information is 
inseparable from that of communication: there could be no information with-
out a source and a destination. Since 1948, when Claude Shannon proposed 
the foundational theory of information and communication (a linear model: 
a source of information, a transmitter who transforms the message into a sig-
nal, a channel, a receiver who transforms the signal into a message, and a des-
tination), theories have evolved considerably. One of the major developments 
in these theories has been identifying the intrinsic relationship between the 
form of the information and its content. Therefore, I will pay particular atten-
tion to the form of the information, in an effort to grasp how it affects the 
very substance of the information in the context of vetting, and beyond that, 
the process itself. 
ThE dIffERENT ISSUES AddRESSEd By A VETTINg PROCESS
Vetting processes address a wide array of issues, which are heterogeneous, 
generic or specific, sometimes interconnected with one another, and of vary-
ing degrees of importance. The following are some examples of these issues 
(the list is not exhaustive but merely illustrative): 
• involvement in war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide;
• other gross human rights violations;
• corruption and abuse of authority; 
• illegal occupation of refugees’ housing; 
• involvement in criminal activity;
• incompetence;
• ties with political groups; 
• ties with armed groups; 
• activities or ties with police or security services; and
• the value and origin of assets (e.g., war profits).
In addition, during an ongoing vetting process a person’s compliance with 
the rules of the process itself has also been considered as an issue to be scru-
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tinized. In the former socialist-bloc countries studied here, the issues to be 
addressed were predetermined by laws in a more or less specific manner. 
INfORmATION ON whOm, ON whAT?
There is, first of all, information on persons whose past actions, and some-
times present actions, are vetted. The category of persons subject to vetting is 
defined by two criteria: 
• the nature of the relationship that the individuals maintain (or wish to 
maintain) with one or several organizations (in the broad sense of the 
term) involved in running the country during and after the transition;
• the nature of the relationship that the individuals maintain (or main-
tained) with one or several organizations implicated in the dynamic 
of the conflict (post-conflict context) or in the exercise of the fallen 
regime (post-authoritarian context). 
One must note here the case of individuals condemned for common crimes 
or misdemeanors outside of any organized framework or action that has ren-
dered them morally unfit to perform a function in a state institution. A vetting 
procedure should prevent these individuals from acceding to or continuing to 
perform such a function, but this is certainly not unique to vetting. A nor-
mal recruitment or promotion process in public administration would logi-
cally reach the same result. The first task of vetting, as an ad hoc or transitory 
mechanism, is to take an interest in the legacy of the conflict or the authori-
tarian regime. In this chapter, the terms “members of the organization” and 
“personnel” will be used interchangeably to designate those persons who are 
the subject of vetting processes. 
 Next are the facts examined. These concern first and foremost the actions of 
such personnel in the context of a tie with an organization, and they concern 
a variety of relevant abuses. Nonetheless, the information as a whole must be 
placed in a general and historical context that situates actions and offers an 
overall framework for interpreting them. The following is a basic typology of 
the five main substantial categories of information needed for vetting.5
The members or personnel of The organIzaTIon
Here one is interested in the information pertaining to the individuals, i.e., the 
basic information that makes it possible to identify the individual socially and 
legally, to become familiar with his or her on-the-job and off-the-job record, 
and his or her experiences and skills. 
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The organIzaTIons: The InsTITUTIons, organIzed groUps,  
and oTher socIal sTrUcTUres
Depending on the context of the vetting, the organizations targeted can be 
current or past organizations that may have participated directly in the 
conflict or in the authoritarian exercise of power. These include state institu-
tions (e.g., ministries and their subdivisions, national agencies, etc.), the estab-
lished corps (police corps, judicial corps, etc.), organizations (local or private 
police forces, security services, paramilitary groups, political organizations), 
organized groups (armed bands, local militia, etc.), and social structures 
(clans, tribes, etc.) that have played an important role during the period tar-
geted by the vetting. This information makes it possible to understand the val-
ues, goals, activities, and functioning of these different organizations, which 
constituted (or still constitute) the framework for the action of the members 
of interest for vetting. 
The lInk beTween The members and TheIr organIzaTIons 
This is information that makes it possible to understand the role(s) and activi-
ties of the members of organizations within those organizations. 
The conTexT 
Contextual background is general and historical information on how the key 
events unfolded during the conflict or under the authoritarian regime pre-
ceding the transition, which reveals in particular the situation and the roles 
played by the different actors and organizations. In a post-conflict context, 
the sequencing of events and the local dynamics are not always well known 
to all the actors involved in vetting. The conditions in the conflict zones and 
the fragmentation of territories, rendering some inaccessible to the media 
or other observers, make it difficult to have an overall and continuous view 
of the sequence of events. As a result, one will not find a reliable and unique 
source of a sound and comprehensive overview. One must reconstruct this 
perspective a posteriori and will find the information by compiling reports 
or books published by journalists, experts on the area, and even NGOs. 
Examples include the work of the Independent Human Rights Commission 
in Afghanistan and the Afghan Justice Project, the reports of the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) in the Balkans, and the reports of Human Rights Watch in 
Rwanda.
The specIfIc facTs examIned
The facts examined are specific and detailed, and may also concern the victims. 
They are actions attributable to an individual, a group, or an organization. 
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whAT ARE ThE SOURCES Of INfORmATION USEd  
IN VETTINg PROCEdURES?
The sources of information are well known; therefore, we will limit ourselves 
to listing and briefly describing them. However, it must be noted that the 
source of information affects how solidly that information is supported, its 
structure, its forcefulness, and the legitimacy of its content. 
InTernaTIonal InsTITUTIons 
The management of democratic transitions in post-authoritarian contexts 
remains within the national domain. In contrast, in post-conflict situations 
the international community is often extensively involved in managing the 
transition, and, as a result, produces information.6
naTIonal InsTITUTIons 
State institutions provide information about the organizations themselves, 
such as their values, goals, activities, and operations, but also about the 
persons they employed (or presently employ), as well as the positions these 
employees have occupied or still occupy. A United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) report7 proposes an interesting 
classification of “repressive institutions,” as follows:
• institutions created as an instrument of repression: intelligence and 
secret services, paramilitary groups, special tribunals, concentration 
camps, special prisons, and psychiatric reeducation centers; and 
• repressive structures within the conventional administrations that 
exist after the transition: armed forces, police forces, security services, 
civilian courts, and other organs of the civilian administration.
The information provided by these repressive institutions may in turn be clas-
sified into several subcategories:8 complaints, reports of tortures, inquiries, 
and so on.
cIvIl socIeTy 
Civil society sources of information include: local and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), independent research centers, and so 
forth;9 independent media, both national and international; individual tes-
timony (the victims themselves being the most important source); and the 
members of organizations subject to vetting (as required by the authorities in 
charge of vetting, or by their own leaders, they provide specific and substan-
tial information10). However, in the countries of the post-communist bloc, the 
boundary between offender and victim is not always clear.11 
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the link between information used in vetting  
and the transitional context
POST-CONflICT TRANSITIONS
Here I will look at several post-conflict countries, even though not all of them 
have implemented a vetting process. In Rwanda,12 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
East Timor, and the province of Kosovo,13 varying degrees of vetting occurred. 
In other countries, evaluations have been conducted with a view to putting 
in place a vetting process: Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), and Afghanistan.14 These evaluations are relevant to the extent that 
the results support the analysis of post-conflict contexts and confirm trends 
and characteristics identified in the countries that underwent vetting. 
 Conflicts often bring about the destruction of countries’ infrastructure 
and institutions. Archives are no exception. Peace accords, in such cases, 
call for structural reform or reestablishment of institutions (e.g., Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Liberia, Afghanistan, DRC, and Kosovo). The individuals who 
make up the personnel of new or much-altered institutions may be almost 
entirely different (Kosovo, East Timor, and Rwanda), or different in part (Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, DRC, Liberia, Afghanistan). The institutional memory 
of human resources is therefore either very limited (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
DRC, Liberia) or nonexistent (Rwanda, East Timor, Kosovo). When archives 
do remain, they have been partially destroyed and no longer accurately reflect 
reality (Afghanistan, Liberia, DRC, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti). The con-
tracting of personnel, dismissals, and appointments, both during the conflict 
period and at the beginning of the transition, is often done in whole or in part 
outside of any formal process. The result is a very loose sense of the numbers 
and nature of institutions’ personnel.
 Vetting efforts in post-conflict countries therefore cannot be based on 
existing institutional information, or can be based on it only to a very limited 
extent. Instead, the necessary data must be specifically produced to inform 
the vetting process. The major sources of information in these cases are the 
individual questionnaires and the specific surveys mandated by the vetting 
authorities (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Rwanda15). The information 
contained in reports by NGOs, testimony from members of civil society, as 
well as new articles and press reports have sometimes proved to be very use-
ful (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo16), at least to orient the research of the 
vetting authorities.17 
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ThE POST-TOTAlITARIAN TRANSITIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE
It seems that all dictatorial regimes systematically generate, in different pro-
portions, files on individuals.18 Nonetheless, it is useful to distinguish the 
post-totalitarian transitions of the communist/socialist bloc, which share 
structurally homogenous legacies that lead to similar outcomes, from the 
transitions from other dictatorial regimes. Post-authoritarian regimes such 
as Greece, South Africa, and Argentina do not represent a coherent category, 
properly speaking, and in none of these countries was vetting very significant, 
nor did it rely on the archives of the security services. It would be venture-
some in these cases to try to tie the nature of the context to the structure of 
the information used in vetting. Therefore, we will focus on the post-totalitar-
ian transitions in Eastern Europe.19
The archIves of ToTalITarIan rUle 
The merger of the three branches of government (executive, legislature, and 
judiciary) and a single party that exercises a monopoly over ideological pro-
paganda, police control, and repression are structural characteristics of totali-
tarian regimes identified in the well-known analysis of totalitarianism by 
Hannah Arendt.20 Each communist-bloc regime sought to subject individu-
als to a collective order, relying on an immense institutional network aimed 
at informing the state and Communist Party elite of the smallest movements 
of citizens, and allowing for the mobilization of a major repressive appara-
tus that, using a variety of more or less violent techniques, brought pressure 
to bear on individuals judged to be subversives. This elevation of the surveil-
lance function to the institutional level resulted in voluminous archives, such 
as those of the Stasi in East Germany.21 
 The democratic transitions in the Eastern European bloc, with the excep-
tion of Romania, resulted from negotiation without major violence or 
destruction, which ensured relative stability and continuity. While most state 
institutions never stopped operating and their files were not destroyed, most 
of the security and intelligence services were quickly dissolved.22 However, 
in all ten countries23 of the former communist bloc in democratic transition 
considered in this study, institutional measures were taken24 to preserve the 
archives of the security services.25 Four of them26 adopted specific laws on 
archives (on access or conservation); another five countries27 created spaces 
dedicated to storing their archives. 
 The archives have become an object of political struggle, and individual files 
are part of political life:28 in Poland,29 there is a veritable war of personnel files,30 
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which often become tools of blackmail; in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,31 for-
mer KGB agents engage in manipulation; in Romania, efforts are made to dis-
credit political adversaries because of their collaboration with the old regime; 
in the Czech Republic,32 manipulation of files has continued since 1989.
 In the communist-bloc countries, vetting is labeled lustration33 and is 
structured around the information contained in the archives of the secu-
rity services. These services’ files have become the quasi-exclusive source34 
of the different vetting procedures. It is legitimate, therefore, to ask why 
these sources of information have monopolized the vetting resources and 
mechanisms. 
The symbolIc dImensIon of ToTalITarIan governmenTs’ archIves
Although they are not reliable or complete sources, the archives of the repres-
sive institutions are fascinating35 and very charged emotionally. Of the ten 
countries of the communist bloc considered here, four have decided to keep 
their archives in a national institution devoted to preserving historical mem-
ory. This mass of files represents much more than the sum of the information 
it contains. The files have symbolic force; they represent a part of citizens’ 
lives, a part that has escaped them and that they want to recover. One can 
hear people clamoring, “I want to have my say,”36 or even, “I want my file.”37 
In the impassioned debates around victims’ access to their own files, the key 
questions are: Should all the files be destroyed? Should they all be made pub-
lic? Or should each individual be able to decide the fate of his or her own file? 
If the files are made public, won’t it contribute to dividing society?38
 At the societal level, the totalitarian nature of the former regimes engen-
dered varying degrees of widespread suspicion, an alteration of social rela-
tions, which are constantly soaked with a diffuse terror,39 and a fear of being 
observed in one’s most minimal acts and gestures. “They had to terrorize the 
population in order to ensure the stability of the regime.”40 Romanians, for 
example, were persuaded that one citizen in four was an informant.41 Michel 
Foucault, who analyzes the “microphysics of power,” offers a good description 
of the phenomenon: “The modality [of control]: it implies an uninterrupted, 
constant coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than its 
result; exercised according to a codification that partitions time, space, move-
ment as closely as possible.”42 These files represent power as exercised by con-
trol of every moment, and felt by everyone. Taking control of these files, and 
making a choice as to their fate, therefore, likely represents a reversal of the 
situation and accordingly a symbolic inversion of power. (In the case of East 
Germany, it is possible that the importance the Stasi files came to have and 
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the role the population played in preserving them are also linked to the key 
place of the Nazi files in the Nuremberg trials.43) 
 One must underscore a paradox.44 The files are the product of repressive 
institutions that operated on the margins, or at times in the shadows, of the 
law. The actions of the officials and their collaborators included modi ope-
randi such as blackmail, psychological or physical pressure, lying, and so on. 
The reality of the facts described in the files cannot be separated from the 
context in which they were created. However, in all these countries these files 
were treated by the new regimes as the source from which the truth would 
spring forth. 
The physIcal dImensIon of The archIves 
The volume of the information stored in the archives of totalitarian regimes 
is, in some cases, huge. The Stasi in East Germany presents a spectacular case: 
its archives took up 180 km of shelf space and held six million individual 
files.45 The Securitate of Romania had 18 km of archives.46 It appears, how-
ever, that none of the countries considered here was able to preserve all of the 
archives. Although the security services were dissolved, they did not disap-
pear all of a sudden.47 The personnel in charge of these institutions had the 
time to destroy certain files. In Hungary, for example, “for more than 10 years 
they [the elites of the transition] were able to exclude any civilian control and 
to be the ones to decide what should be deposited in the archives.”48 In East 
Germany, in a unique case, a citizen movement laid siege to and took over 
the offices of the Stasi on January 15, 1990, and it was under the pressure of 
street protests that the law on files was adopted in 1991. This citizen mobiliza-
tion, however, could not stop the destruction of numerous files.49 In the three 
Baltic countries of the former USSR (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the KGB 
had time to screen and then pull the most sensitive files, to destroy or falsify 
a great many others,50 and to repatriate a large part of its archives, especially 
those on Latvians and Lithuanians,51 to Moscow. In Lithuania, which has the 
largest set of documents of these three countries, certain dissidents saw this as 
a victory for communism, and beyond that, for Moscow, whose agents would 
in fact never be unmasked.52 According to Jozsef Vegvary, a lieutenant colonel 
in Hungary’s political police,53 of 110,000 files on recruitment, 100,000 were 
destroyed. In Poland, in 1990 and 1991, the employees of the Ministry of Inte-
rior carried out the massive destruction of confidential documents.54 
 While it is known that not all of the files were preserved, what about the 
integrity of those that were? The politicization and manipulation of certain 
files, and the fact that they were not completely and immediately removed 
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from the influence55 of the officials in charge of them,56 leads one to presume 
that the practice of falsifying or deliberately altering certain files was sys-
tematic, as was clearly the case in Poland.57 It must also be noted that limited 
resources during the transitions in Hungary58 and the Czech Republic59 forced 
the authorities in charge of vetting to retain the archives’ technical staff from 
the former regime, who could easily corrupt the files. Just how widespread 
this phenomenon was is impossible to assess. 
 How did a state apparatus collect, process, and act on the basis of such a 
large mass of information? In all these countries, organizing the collection 
of information during the authoritarian period relied on networks of infor-
mants recruited from among the population using a variety of techniques:60 
“The StB knew of numerous techniques for breaking down individuals.”61 In 
Poland, “recovery” of information entailed psychological manipulations that 
led informants to believe that they were providing information at their own 
initiative.62 In Germany, the Stasi used several approaches, including black-
mail.63 The mass of informants, numbering at least one hundred fifty thou-
sand, plus about ninety thousand public servants at their posts,64 helps to 
explain the magnitude of the volume of information. The lists of collaborators 
or of officials with links to the fallen power structure that circulate in several 
countries illustrate this phenomenon. In the Czech Republic, the Ministry of 
Interior published a list of seventy-five thousand names;65 and a dissident, Petr 
Cibulka, published another list with twenty thousand names of StB agents. In 
Poland, a journalist published his list, the “Wildstein list,”66 with two hundred 
forty thousand names. In Romania, there is talk of one million collaborators 
(out of a population of twenty-two million) who were directly involved in the 
institutional structures of the communist regime; in several ministries more 
than 90% of the civil servants were informants.67 
 Likewise, to complete the enormity of this picture, mention should be 
made of the large number of victims of the system, who underlie the fig-
ures cited above, and whose names fill the pages of the files. In 2003,68 it was 
reported in Germany that two million people who felt they were spied on had 
demanded access to their files. 
 When these archives were being created, the new information technolo-
gies (ITs) had not yet been developed. Recording information entailed simple 
techniques, and the specific files were on paper. This is a key factor when it 
comes to processing the files for purposes such as vetting. In addition, these 
files are technical documents using codes, a reflection of the culture of secrecy 
as well as a constraint of management and access. They were designed not to 
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be accessible and intelligible to most people,69 but to allow an effective, almost 
automatic, control of citizens. 
 From the beginning of these transitions, the volume, medium, structure, 
number, and variety of sources raised questions concerning the coherence 
and substantive relevance of the information that one could expect to extract 
from the archives. 
The oTher soUrces of InformaTIon for lUsTraTIon
When the bloc fell, large-scale archives other than those of the secret services 
and security agencies existed,70 particularly those of the Communist Party.71 
To the extent that the party apparatus was hard to distinguish from the state 
apparatus, it is only logical to think that the party’s archives certainly con-
tained substantial information relevant to the lustration process. However, 
those archives were not considered in the same light. For example, in Poland, 
while the files of the security agencies suffered damage, those of the Commu-
nist Party were not targeted. In East Germany, the files of the Socialist Unity 
Party (SED)72 were partially consulted in the context of local vetting proce-
dures, as with the municipal administration in the city of Dresden.73 Yet they 
were excluded from the jurisdiction of the vetting mechanism put in place at 
the federal level. This is a by-product of having a transition without a clear 
break. When the secret services and security services were dissolved, the 
question of the status of their files was posed at the institutional level. The 
communist parties, however, continued their legal and political existence, 
and their archives naturally remained their own responsibility. 
 The lustration processes used other sources as well. In most countries, 
personnel filled out questionnaires or declarations. Of the ten countries 
considered here, Hungary appears to be the one with the widest diversity of 
sources:74 there were hearings with members of organizations, testimony 
from victims, expert opinions, lists of personnel and payrolls, as well as lists 
of names that circulated on the Internet.75 The Czech Republic and Poland 
also saw lists of names published by civil society groups on the Internet.
 Another variable to be taken into account in vetting relates to the passage 
of time. East Germany is the most noteworthy case in which the duration 
of vetting has given rise to conflicting views on the expectations of the pro-
cess.76 The passing of time (the “Gauck” Office was still fully active in 2006, 
twelve years after it began its work) has enabled some of the persons in ques-
tion to build a new professional record in reformed institutions during the 
transition. This record, which is included in the personnel management files, 
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provides further input for the process. There are numerous cases of persons 
who have now been identified, more than ten years after the fall of the Ber-
lin wall, as having maintained ties or worked with the security services of the 
communist era, which, theoretically, rendered them unacceptable for the new 
duties they are now performing. Nonetheless, their professional record since 
then has been seen to offset that during the communist period. On the other 
hand, those persons who directly admitted having had ties with the secu-
rity service from the outset lost their jobs quickly and permanently.77 Their 
honesty was not compensated, but instead it took away their opportunity to 
redeem themselves. 
 The documents consulted for this study do not make specific reference78 
to archives such as lists of personnel, payrolls, or banking transactions, that 
is, to the administrative and accounting records that reflect an institution’s 
management. These sources are, however, very relevant to the vetting pro-
cess: they inform us of the functioning of the institutions, and the nature of 
the ties that individuals maintained (or maintain) with them.79
collecting and processing information  
in a vetting process
COllECTINg ANd PROCESSINg INfORmATION  
IN POST-CONflICT CONTExTS 
who defInes The soUrces, who collecTs,  
who processes, who decIdes?
In the absence of available information, a vetting process must itself generate 
the necessary information. In such situations there is a fundamental differ-
ence from the lustration processes undertaken in Eastern Europe, where the 
information already existed. In post-conflict situations uncertainty prevails, 
and the production of information represents an effort to produce certainty. 
In addition, the actors in charge of processing the information needed for 
vetting enjoy the “power of the expert.” An actor increases his or her power 
by mastering areas clouded by uncertainties.80 The absence of a specific legal 
framework for vetting reinforces this power. The actors in charge, beyond the 
processing of information and decision making, are also responsible for defin-
ing the sources, form, and substance of the information that will be the basis 
for the vetting process. The table below shows some examples. One can note 
the more or less significant involvement of the international community.81
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TABlE 1 
Actors’ involvement in collecting and processing information
COUNTRy/ ChOICE Of SOURCES  dECISION
TERRITORy  ANd COllECTION PROCESSINg mAkINg
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Police UNMIBH UNMIBH UNMIBH
Judge OHR (with  OHR (with OHR (with
 domestic involvement) domestic involvement) domestic involvement)
Kosovo
Creation of a new 
police force (KPS) UNMIK UNMIK UNMIK
Liberia
Implementing an 
interim police force  National Police UNMIL UNMIL
Final police project* National Police/UNMIL National Police/UNMIL mixed commission
Haiti* 
Reform of the police (PNH) PNH/MINUSTAH PNH/MINUSTAH PNH/MINUSTAH
Afghanistan* 
Appointment of high-level  Mixed/independent group  Mixed/independent group President
officials in the provinces (national and international). (national and international)
 Varied sources.  
DRC* 
Reform of the  Congolese National  Congolese  Congolese
national police  Police/MONUC National Police National Police
* Projects not implemented to date
The role of the international community, which has been in charge of the 
processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see below) and Kosovo, introduces a 
linguistic and cultural barrier that has a significant impact on how the pro-
cess unfolds and on its substance. This barrier gives rise to errors (in interpre-
tation and in the proliferation of tasks), weakens the guarantee of indepen-
dence sought by international involvement (the neutrality of local translators/ 
interpreters), and brings about a consequent increase in activity and in the 
need for resources. 
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how Is InformaTIon collecTed and processed?
The collection and processing of information in vetting should begin with a 
clear understanding of objectives, of the information to be obtained in order 
to reach these objectives, of the volume of information to be processed, of 
the type of processing required, and of the available resources. This allows 
the design of a realistic operational plan. However, the general post-conflict 
context and dynamic imposes its own logic on such a process for a number of 
reasons, including the following: 
• The sudden collapse of the formal mechanisms for managing institu-
tions does not allow for a precise view of the breadth of the challenge. 
Estimates of the number and nature of personnel are very approxi-
mate, very controversial, or even deliberately falsified. All of this makes 
it difficult to draw up a coherent operational plan. 
• The high expectations of victims and citizens, and the international 
community’s tendency to push towards an exhaustive approach to 
vetting, have a direct impact on the volume of information to be col-
lected and processed. 
• Victims, the international community, and much-sought-after donors 
may, at the same time, apply considerable pressure for a quick transi-
tion and reconstruction. 
• The human and financial resources required to rebuild a country that 
has just emerged from a conflict are always colossal, and available 
resources always fall short of these needs. The vetting process can-
not escape this constraint. (This is in sharp contrast to the abundant 
resources available to the Gauck Office in Germany; see the section 
below on processing information.)
In the following subsection I will try to illustrate the operational constraints 
on and the level of complexity inherent in information management in a post-
conflict context82 through a detailed examination of the police certification 
program in Bosnia and Herzegovina.83 
InformaTIon managemenT In The veTTIng of The polIce  
In bosnIa and herzegovIna
The certification program was started, designed, and managed within the 
human rights office of UNMIBH.84 The program, the need for which became 
apparent in early 1999, employed fifty people (one project manager, one inter-
national lawyer, twenty-eight international police officers who were also 
called “monitors,” and twenty national staff members, including secretaries, 
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lawyers, and interpreters). Before anything else, the idea was to take stock of 
all the police personnel inherited from the conflict upon the signing of the 
Dayton Accords in December 1995. It was necessary to know and understand 
who was exercising police powers: How many were they? Where were they? 
When and how did they join the police? What did they do? What had they 
done during the conflict? Could they continue to perform their functions? 
These considerations thus defined a general starting point. Once a starting 
point is clarified, a vetting process can decide, on the basis of established cri-
teria, who can and who cannot exercise police powers within the reformed 
police in a state newly reestablished under the rule of law.
 The program in Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into three major 
stages:85 
• registration, the goal of which was to take stock of all the personnel in 
the various police forces;
• provisional authorization to exercise police powers, the goal of which 
was to make an initial selection relying on basic criteria, reduce the 
total number, clarify who was and who was not authorized to exercise 
police powers provisionally, and distribute a provisional identification 
card; and
• certification, the goal of which was to expand the vetting criteria, espe-
cially into issues of integrity, and to extend definitive certifications to 
the members of the police forces.
Here I will focus on the first two stages, which lasted approximately two years, 
in order to illustrate certain phenomena. Little information is available on the 
third stage, certification.
 Registration, which began in October 1999, required the use of question-
naires that each member of the personnel had to fill out. Handling these 
questionnaires, which were filled out by approximately twenty-four thou-
sand persons (the number was unknown at the outset), can be identified as 
an administrative task. In the absence of a specific legal framework, decisions 
concerning data to be collected and the questions to be asked had to be made 
by those in charge of the registration program. In the midst of post-conflict 
restructuring, the political-juridical apparatus was impaired in its capac-
ity to produce specific laws and procedures. The legal framework of vetting 
was limited to the peace accords, UNMIBH’s mandate,86 and subsequent res-
olutions of the UN Security Council. The vetting mechanics were therefore 
defined through practice; they were the result of compromises between the 
operational constraints and the reality on the ground, minimum imperatives 
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regarding the criteria for competence and integrity of the police personnel, 
and the desired reduction in the maximum number of police. These were then 
specified and formalized according to official UNMIBH procedures.87
 Registration was done one police force at a time (there were fourteen, then 
fifteen including the Border Police88). The police personnel filled out the ques-
tionnaires in situ, at their headquarters, under the supervision of an UNMIBH 
team. These questionnaires were then examined at the UNMIBH headquarters 
in Sarajevo in order to verify whether the criteria were met. If so, an identity 
card was issued. The Ministry of Interior received the list of persons who had 
been authorized to exercise police powers provisionally with the respective 
identity cards, so as to distribute them. The list also mentioned all the persons 
who had not been authorized, stating the reasons for those decisions. The 
ministry had a right to respond, and supplementary exchanges of informa-
tion ensued. 
 The criteria for obtaining provisional authorization to exercise police 
powers were as follows:89
Positive criteria (allowing one to be eligible for a provisional authorization):
• minimum age eighteen years;
• being a national of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
• appearing in the list of personnel provided by the caretaker Ministry 
of Interior; 
• passing the UNMIBH knowledge tests and psychological tests;
• exercising police powers (as opposed to administrative tasks);
• complying with UNMIBH registration procedures. 
Negative criteria (prohibiting provisional authorization to exercise police 
powers):
• being publicly investigated by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY); 
• having a police record with other than minor offenses;
• having been previously removed by the International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) Commissioner (the police component of UNMIBH);
• making a false statement;
• being subject to criminal prosecution by a local court for a serious 
crime or war crime;
• appearing on the list of the Anti-Terrorist Police Brigades and not hav-
ing been approved by UNMIBH’s special selection procedure.
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Additional criterion:
• not illegally occupying housing with respect to which there is a judi-
cial decision benefiting the owner so that he or she may once again 
enjoy his or her property.
Vetting included a verification stage using the following sources of 
information: 
• individual performance reports (source: UNMIBH);
• reports or investigations of the Human Rights Office (source: 
UNMIBH);
• reports or investigations of the Civil Affairs Office (source: UNMIBH);
• situation reports of the IPTF monitors on the ground (the “SitReps”);
• reports by NGOs (e.g., International Crisis Group);
• list of candidates in the elections (source: Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]);
• information from the office of the prosecutor of the ICTY;
• reports from the SFOR;90
• list of the judicial decisions on illegally occupied housing (source: 
CRPC91);
• list of the Police Anti-Terrorist Brigades (source: SFOR);92
• judgments of the regular courts;
• arrest warrants (domestic courts);
• reports of internal disciplinary procedures of each police force.
The questionnaire used for vetting the police required specific information on:
• civil status;
• activities and places of residence in wartime;
• education;
• military experience;
• professional experience in the police and level of training;
• possession of real property and economic activity.
One then had to give the names of at least three persons (with their contact 
information) who could attest to the truth of the information. Follow-up 
on these references was very rare, occurring only in a few specific investiga-
tions. The form ended with a statement certifying the veracity of the infor-
mation provided by the respondent.93 Clearly, controlling the design of the 
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questionnaire was much more than a mere technical exercise, as it shaped the 
whole procedure. 
 But the question of power at the operational level also was posed from the 
outset of the information-collection process. The boundary between who 
was eligible to fill out the form (meaning, then, who was eligible to be regis-
tered) and who was not was often blurred. The UNMIBH monitors charged 
with registration and sent into the field to have the forms filled out inevita-
bly came across peculiar cases. Some examples included: persons in uniform 
supported by their superior, who claimed to be police but were not on the 
list drawn up by the caretaker Ministry of Interior; persons absent or said to 
be sick and whom the monitors had to search for; or persons having suffered 
war wounds (e.g., two persons whose legs had been amputated) who were 
confined to their homes and who the police chief claimed still exercised police 
powers. If the form was not filled out, the person was to be excluded from 
the process. 
 In practice, however, in order to avoid making the monitors into decision 
makers on the ground, to reduce pressure, and to ensure uniform treatment, 
all persons who came forward were registered, including the peculiar cases; 
any decision was deferred until subsequent processing of the information. 
This approach, dictated by operational constraints, had certain implications. 
In effect, the “review” logic of the certification program94 meant that one 
would be deprived of the possibility of exercising police powers if the cri-
teria were not met. All those who registered were de facto likely to obtain a 
provisional authorization to exercise police powers, and later to be certified; 
in other words, one who registered was accepted in the police a priori, and 
would only be excluded if he or she did not meet the criteria a posteriori.
 An example illustrates the importance of how the information is orga-
nized. UNMIBH, which has a mandate to oversee, advise, and train the local 
police, and to assist them in the reform process, was deployed after the sign-
ing of the Dayton Accords.95 The international police, under the IPTF compo-
nent, with an initial authorized force of 1,721 and then of 2,027, were present 
in seven regions. These territorial divisions are a legacy of the division used 
by the preceding United Nations mission, United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR). Each region has a general headquarters, which supervises the 
activity of, on average, seven to eight IPTF stations in its area of responsibility. 
In total there were fifty-four IPTF stations distributed throughout the country. 
Each day, the IPTF monitors report on the situation of the local police to their 
station commander. The station commander then prepares a situation report 
(SitRep) for the regional commander, who in turn submits a situation report 
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on the whole region to the central office for operations in Sarajevo. 
 When the certification process was initiated in 1999, this set of IPTF 
reports appeared to be a clear and promising source of information for exam-
ining the conduct of certain members of the police. The files contained about 
seven thousand reports. However, the type of data they contained made it 
impossible to use this source. In effect, the territorial organization of the IPTF 
did not correspond to that of the local police.96 The name of the local police 
station where events unfolded, therefore, did not appear in the report. What 
appeared instead was the name of the IPTF station issuing the report, and the 
name of its IPTF region. In certain cases a single IPTF station covered a terri-
tory that crossed the dividing lines separating the entities.97 As a result, three 
years of work of hundreds of monitors on the ground were of no use. The 
type of data stored in the SitReps was changed in early 2000 to make the data 
useful for vetting. 
 To cite another example, the names of the local police officers in the 
SitReps were not supplemented by their dates of birth, and sometimes only 
the surname was included. For example, of 23,902 names registered,98 149 
persons had the surname Kovacˇevic´ (five of whom had the given name Slo-
bodan), 146 had the surname Hodži´c (four of whom had the given name Amir 
and another four Emir), and 87 had the surname Savic´ (eight of whom had 
the given name Dragan). Furthermore, the reports were drafted in English by 
international police who had not learned the local language, not to mention 
the obstacle posed by the Cyrillic alphabet (except for the Russian-speaking 
monitors). This language barrier thus introduced an element of confusion in 
the spelling of names.99 Several reports described acts relevant to vetting but 
did not make it possible to attribute these to a particular individual with cer-
tainty. Therefore, they were not taken into account.
 The language issue in Bosnia is highly sensitive and very political. Each 
ethnic community asserts its own language: Bosniak, Croatian, or Serbian. 
Although there is no doubt that everyone understands one another perfectly 
well, the registration form had to be printed in the three languages. In addi-
tion, three types of forms had to be prepared, which introduced a risk: setting 
off to register in a Muslim zone with forms in the Cyrillic alphabet would have 
provoked major tensions. In fact, the registration was done with forms in four 
languages, as English was necessary for processing by international teams. As 
a result, with each question being written four times, the forms became less 
readable and information much more difficult to process.
 The following example illustrates the impact of organization and resources 
on how the data were processed. The complete process of registering one 
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person (here we are looking at the registration process, not vetting per se, 
which came later), took about two hours. Monitors had to explain the pro-
cedures, check names against a list of personnel, have the questionnaire filled 
out, take photographs and fingerprints, measure height, and administer two 
written tests (one psychological, the other on knowledge). A well-organized 
team of seven or eight persons could share the tasks and register three hun-
dred persons per day. Carrying out a registration session at the local police 
posts included a preliminary visit to check the adequacy of the facilities, plan-
ning the logistics, the registration itself, and a second round of registration for 
personnel who were absent the first time (those who were sick, on leave, or on 
special duty, etc.). With all these activities, it was not possible to register more 
than about two thousand persons per month. 
 An organizational issue arose as to whether several teams should work 
simultaneously across the country; for example, one per region. Different 
teams, however, would inevitably handle particular cases in different ways, 
undermining the consistency of the process. Moreover, given the large num-
ber of persons with the same name, a unique number had to be assigned as 
an identifier for each person registered. Sequential numbers are excellent 
identifiers, as they are simple and unique, and make it possible to impose sev-
eral controls on the processing to avoid mistakes.100 If seven teams had been 
sent out (one in each region) at the same time, however, generating sequen-
tial numbers simultaneously at seven different sites would have required the 
implementation of an organizational structure too complex to manage with-
out error in the UNMIBH context. The necessary technology, though rela-
tively simple, could not realistically be considered for use in the organization. 
To complicate matters further, there was very high turnover of the interna-
tional police working in the teams.101 In the end, therefore, it was decided that 
a single team would register one region at a time, resulting in a much longer 
process, with its advantages and drawbacks. 
 As time passed, the institutional environment changed, and this had a sig-
nificant impact on how the program unfolded. For example, it was necessary 
to manage, at the same time, the implementation of a new police force and 
the Border Police — which drew its members from the existing forces — each 
of which was at a different stage of the certification program. Furthermore, 
the conflict’s legacy included hundreds of thousands of displaced persons’ 
and refugees’ houses that were illegally occupied, many by police officers. 
The passage of time brought increased pressure on local police to deal with 
the illegal occupation of housing. While not an issue initially, the progressive 
normalization of the issue of such illegally-occupied housing throughout the 
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country forced UNMIBH to introduce a new vetting criterion at midstream in 
the procedure. It became necessary to go back to thousands of police already 
registered to request supplemental information on their housing situation, 
to evaluate its legality, and to condition the issuance of their identity card 
on regularization of their situation. In all, 8,300 cases of occupied housing 
were detected, 7,998 being illegal occupations. Those police either evacuated 
the housing they had occupied illegally (80%) or entered into legal contracts 
with the owners. Only three persons preferred to lose their positions in the 
police.102 A deadline of one month was set (easily extendable to two months) 
to come into conformity with this new criterion. 
 Information storage also had to be addressed. At the end of the certification 
program, which coincided with the end of UNMIBH’s mandate on December 
31, 2002, all of the records of the certification program (the “Registry”), which 
was the property of the United Nations, were shipped to the United States. 
The records are no longer accessible to the local authorities. This extreme sit-
uation, which is directly tied to the fact that the program was the responsibil-
ity of the international community, resulted from a shortcoming in the legal 
framework. The status of the certification program under domestic law has 
never been addressed. A legal imbroglio ensued over decisions contested by 
certain members of the police, which were brought before the courts, and for 
which the relevant information is not available. 
 The start-up of the vetting process in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a 
turning point for the country’s police force and for the UNMIBH operation. 
“Knowing” made it possible to finally take specific and systematic actions. The 
program made it possible to address certain areas of uncertainty, and gave 
structure to the mission’s activities (determining the total number of person-
nel, recruiting minorities, strengthening supervision of the police, etc.). It 
bolstered the overall strength of the mission.
 Operationally, however, the initial standards for management and control 
of information could not be maintained throughout the duration of the entire 
program for two main reasons: 
• the process became more complex as it unfolded: verifying the stan-
dard criteria for registration (phase 1) and for the provisional autho-
rization (phase 2) was simpler than evaluating the personnel files 
for integrity (phase 3). However, the team in charge was subjected to  
significant pressure due to the expiration of the mission’s mandate as 
set by the Security Council. At least six more months were needed to 
conclude the program satisfactorily;
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• in the final months, the local personnel and international police expe-
rienced a difficult time with uncertainties over the reclassification of 
personnel in the future mission of the European Union (EUPM), which 
was to succeed UNMIBH in January 2003 (reduction of forces to one-
third or one-fourth the previous number). Some personnel were more 
concerned with securing their future situation than carrying out day-
to-day activities.
key lessons To be learned  
from The bosnIa and herzegovIna example
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina examined here provides us with a num-
ber of important lessons learned about the management of information in 
post-conflict vetting processes. These include the following: 
• The vetting process is a decision-making process, in which decisions 
are made about confronting the collected information with defined 
criteria. A lack of clarity in the objectives of the process at a policy 
level will result in deflecting part of the decision-making power to the 
operational level (in the performance of tasks such as designing ques-
tionnaires, collecting information, etc.).
• The type of information collected and the way it is organized directly 
affect the nature of the outcomes of the vetting process. 
• The means (including technology) used to collect and process infor-
mation, the way they are allocated, and the way they are organized to 
serve the vetting process also have a substantial impact on the vetting 
results. 
• Immediate post-conflict contexts may be subject to rapid institutional 
changes. The capacity to collect and process information is a critical 
factor for the duration of the vetting process — the longer the process, 
the more its implementation may be subject to substantial changes 
affecting the consistency of the outcomes.
• International leadership and overall control of the entire vetting pro-
cess, often seen as a guarantee of independence and integrity, may, 
however, induce perverse effects due to cultural and language barriers, 
which, in turn, may undermine the reliability of the process. 
• One concrete legacy of a vetting process is an archive representing 
both an institutional memory that is subject to scrutiny and a living 
collection of data that belongs to the institution’s personnel manage-
ment system. The future usability of this output requires vision and 
policy decision making.
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PROCESSINg INfORmATION IN ThE POST-AUThORITARIAN  
CONTExT Of ThE COmmUNIST-BlOC COUNTRIES
In contrast to post-conflict cases, in the post-authoritarian transitions of the 
communist bloc the information necessary for vetting already exists and the 
mechanisms for making use of it are entirely the responsibility of the national 
authorities, which are either bodies created from scratch or ad hoc mecha-
nisms within existing institutions. These countries have adopted a wide vari-
ety of approaches to setting up lustration mechanisms, succinct descriptions 
of which are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
 The documents consulted for this study generally offer little in the way of 
details on the actual processing of information. In terms of the substance of 
the information, one notes difficulties in terms of how a vetting process inter-
prets the information found in the files. The information is highly variable in 
its content; following are a few examples: 
• In the most typical situation, the information is only partial.103
• Suspicions of falsified data and the pressures brought to bear on infor-
mants tend to undermine the validity of the information and make it 
difficult to interpret the connection between the individual and the 
institution. Accordingly, it is difficult to determine whether one is a 
victim or an informant. 
• Certain individuals appear as both victims and informants.104 The 
processing of the information and the rules of procedure induce a 
perverse effect: the fact of being marked as an informant prevails over 
the fact of appearing as a victim, while being an informant may be the 
consequence of being a victim.
• It could be that a “candidate” (for informant) was not successfully 
recruited, yet he or she is still mentioned in a file.105 
• The nature of the ties described between an informant and an institu-
tion is highly variable, and the definition of such a relationship thus 
becomes very hazy.106 The legal provisions are not so specific as to 
allow one to take a clear position. For example, one may have been 
an informant, been a secret agent, made an apartment available for 
interviews, agreed to recount one’s vacation experiences upon return-
ing from abroad (in exchange for a visa), or been an accomplice in a  
campaign aimed at discrediting a colleague, among others. 
• In addition to considering existing information, one must consider the 
absence of information. It appears that all the information on infor-
mants was not in the files. In other words, in practice certain informa-
tion was not written down.107 
RUmIN
426
• Several documents in the files are not signed108 or stamped, making it 
difficult to assess their validity.109
• Certain agents of the security services had an interest in entering in the 
files the names of persons who were not informants. In effect, agents’ 
evaluations or salaries depended on, among other things, their capac-
ity to recruit informants.110 An individual’s name may have been put 
on a list before he or she had even been contacted, in order to “reserve” 
that person before another colleague approached him or her.111 
 The data within the files as well as the files within the archives are orga-
nized to serve the goals of the institution that created them.112 In architec-
ture, the function of a building conditions its design; the same holds for an 
information system. There is a structural limit on the use of those archives for 
different purposes. Of course, as in the example of a building, certain archives 
lend themselves more easily than others to difference uses.
 There is also a major difficulty linked to the volume of files to be processed. 
The Gauck Office in Germany is certainly the vetting body that has received 
the most abundant resources; in 2003 (twelve years after it was opened), this 
office still employed 2,397 persons.113 Indeed, they were needed to process, 
from the 180 km of records, the two million requests for access to the files 
made during this period. The challenge regarding the volume to be processed 
has been compounded by the great decentralization and fragmentation of 
offices in charge of vetting,114 making control of the process all the more 
complex.115 In Hungary, the procedure is both time consuming and costly to 
the administration.116 In Poland,117 the transfer of the files to the archives of 
the Institute of National Remembrance has been very slow, and the resources 
allocated to the institute do not allow for the sound management of these 
archives. As for Romania, one can imagine, beyond the political obstacles 
accompanying the return of the communists to power, the challenge awaiting 
the managers of the 18 km of archives.118 It is acknowledged in the commu-
nity of archivists that the processing of a large number of requests may lead 
to the collapse of the activities of traditional archive-management systems, 
which as a general rule are chronically understaffed.119 
 There are also difficulties when it comes to interpreting coded informa-
tion. The codification of terms, and how this information is organized, makes 
recourse to experts essential. The archives of the information services are 
very characteristic in this regard.120 Despite a legal framework that offers sub-
stantial guidance, the search, extraction, and interpretation still necessarily 
require a purely technical stage. The integrity of evidence may be weakened 
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because the technical staff is often made up of the same people who worked 
with the archives under the ancien régime. They find themselves exercising 
a form of power that, depending on the contexts, goes far beyond their nor-
mally technical-administrative role. 
 As regards the storage of and access to the archives, the following table 
provides a glimpse on a country-by-country basis. It would appear that public 
access to the archives has been limited in certain countries by economic and 
organizational difficulties.121 
TABlE 2 
Storage of and access to archives
   PERSONNEl/ 
 ClOSEd VICTImS INfORmANTS* RESEARChERS JOURNAlISTS PUBlIC
Germany  x x
Bulgaria x
Estonia      x
Hungary  x  x  List in 
      2030
Latvia      x
Lithuania  x With 
   authorization
Macedonia122**  x
Poland  x  x x
Romania Restricted
 CNSAS
Serbia-
Montenegro123** x
Slovakia  Files    List 
            names124
Czech Republic  Files    List names,
      Files upon
      request
* Personnel/informants: the persons subject to a vetting process.
** Solely for information, not for vetting, in these two countries.
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key InformaTIon-managemenT lessons learned  
from lUsTraTIon In The posT-commUnIsT bloc
This overview of the various lustration processes in the countries of the for-
mer communist bloc in Eastern Europe provides us with a number of key les-
sons concerning the management of information in post-authoritarian con-
texts. These include the following:
• Even if the archives of a former authoritarian regime have undisputed 
value, the fate of these archives and the way they can contribute to a 
vetting process will remain controversial. The structure, integrity, reli-
ability, and volume of the information condition the vetting feasibility 
and outcomes.
• As in a post-conflict situation, the means available and methods used 
to process the information have a substantial impact on the vetting 
results. 
• Basing a vetting process entirely on the former authoritarian regime’s 
archives will unavoidably result in a questionable process. It is tanta-
mount to grounding the entire process on information that was not 
originally collected for the process. 
information, vetting,  
and other transitional justice measures 
Hardly any information, or even thought, exists on the possibility of using 
information collected through vetting processes in other transitional justice 
measures, but one can still raise a few important issues. I emphasize that I am 
not addressing the legal dimension of this issue here, which is fundamental 
but not the subject of this study.
 In general, it can be said that a court aims to determine the liability of 
individuals and to punish them accordingly; a vetting process aims to reform 
institutions by addressing the past conduct of individuals and their links to 
institutions; and a truth commission aims to account for the social dynam-
ics of the conflict and to participate in developing a collective memory. One 
can, then, establish a hierarchical model of information collected, processed, 
and produced by these different measures. To this end, one should introduce 
an important nuance — distinguishing between specific information and con-
textual information. Specific information is directly relevant for the assessment 
yielded by each transitional justice measure, whereas contextual information 
429
gAThERINg ANd mANAgINg INfORmATION
provides a framework for interpretation. These two categories are connected 
and complementary. 
 Let us take the example of an existing presidential guard, Alpha, made up 
of one hundred officers, created by a head of state, directed by officers X, Y, 
and Z directly subordinated to the head of state, and the activities of which 
were characterized by gross human rights violations under a given regime 
and over a specific period of time. In a simplified way:
• A truth commission is interested in gathering specific information 
that facilitates an understanding of all aspects of Alpha including: its 
environment and history; the overall state institutional apparatus set-
ting and Alpha’s position within that; its (formal and informal) rela-
tionship with the head of state; its role in the conflict or authoritarian 
regime; its genesis; its mandate; its violations; its victims; the role of X, 
Y, Z, and so on. All this information is very relevant for the truth com-
mission and can therefore be considered specific to it.
• A vetting commission, however, seeks in particular to collect, pro-
cess, and produce specific information about the past and current 
activity and role of each of Alpha’s members (including X, Y, and Z) 
who wishes to hold a public position in the post-conflict institutional 
framework. This information is specific to the vetting process, while 
much of the information in which a truth commission is interested 
(such as Alpha’s environment and history, etc.) is contextual.
• A court, for its part, examines all information regarding the individual 
responsibility of X, Y, or Z with respect to specific violations against 
individuals.125 Everything else is contextual.
Information that is specifically relevant for truth commissions can be con-
textually relevant for vetting efforts and prosecutions, while information that 
is specifically relevant for vetting can be contextually relevant for prosecu-
tions. The following diagram depicts a theoretical hierarchy of the relevance 
of information relative to each transitional justice measure. The largest area 
represents the information relevant to truth commissions, the medium area 
the information relevant to vetting processes, and the dotted lines the infor-
mation relevant to prosecution efforts.
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 A court prosecutes only leaders or members of an organization, the 
organization being a tool with which, or offering an adequate environment 
in which, an individual commits abuses. It does not make sense to think of 
individuals totally disconnected from any kind of organization being pros-
ecuted by a court for war crimes or other abuses. Having said this, prosecu-
tion is conditioned upon factual evidence regarding individual responsibility 
for specific abuses. (However, it must be remembered that a court will neither 
seek nor be able to prosecute all members of an organization.) 
 In a vetting process, individuals are subject to vetting because they wish 
to hold (or currently hold) a position in a public institution. Many of these 
individuals will not have been involved in any past abuses, but may still be 
subject to vetting. That is to say, although theoretically the same individuals 
may be subject to both prosecution and vetting, in reality these measures will 
generally not target the same people. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, 
the vetting of the police included prosecution by the ICTY as a criterion to bar 
individuals from exercising police powers. But this was not about the use of 
a special court’s substantive information in a vetting process; this was about 
interpreting the consequences of being targeted by both transitional justice 
measures. (This example is explained in more detail below.)
gRAPh 1 
The relevance of information to transitional justice measures
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 While a court will seek to prove the responsibility of an individual for a 
specific abuse, it is unquestionable that doing so requires a good understand-
ing of the responsibilities and activities of, as well as the links between, the 
members of that individual’s organization. Such a contextual understanding 
can be provided through information used in a vetting process (although not 
all members of the organization will be subject to a vetting process, since not 
all of them will seek positions in public institutions). 
 Furthermore, both a special court and a vetting process could certainly 
benefit from the information processed by a truth commission. A truth com-
mission, which seeks a more comprehensive understanding of the function-
ing of a former authoritarian regime or the dynamic of a conflict, offers an 
interpretative framework for both other measures. In addition, a truth com-
mission may have collected information that is specifically relevant to both 
these measures. 
 The challenges of interoperability of the information used by transitional 
justice measures can be illustrated, concretely, by returning to the case of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. 
The lInk beTween UnmIbh and The IcTy
UNMIBH had concluded an agreement with the Office of the Prosecutor of the 
ICTY to share information. The Netherlands had made available two police 
officers (liaison officers) to UNMIBH, who were stationed in The Hague in the 
Office of the Prosecutor. They received the lists of police under the certifica-
tion program. When the police officers consulted the tribunal’s archives, how-
ever, they turned up just one “hit” — the name of one police officer appeared 
in the archives. This information-sharing mechanism, then, did not prove 
very useful for vetting the police. This was for two reasons.
 First, the information received by UNMIBH was too limited to render any 
substantial interpretation. The possible informal contacts between the inter-
national police of UNMIBH in Sarajevo and at The Hague would have made 
it possible to learn a bit more about the nature of the information that was 
in the archives, without it being possible, however, to use that information. 
The organizational structure of a tribunal serves its own needs — it is focused 
on specific cases and persons alleged to be guilty. Searching for the name of 
a policeman in such a large volume of information as constituted by all the 
documents collected in the context of a complex investigation, which was not 
structured to respond to this demand, was very cumbersome. Second, and no 
less important, the margin of error caused by spelling problems and the large 
number of persons with the same names was too great. 
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 This is not to say that neither of these transitional justice measures held 
information that was specifically relevant to the other. However, the main 
constraints to improving the interoperability of such information lies in the 
fact that both measures were placed under different international authorities, 
which operated according to different standards, cultures, resources, priori-
ties, and so on. An attempt to create a formal and functioning system of infor-
mation sharing would have required two significant international institutional 
bodies, UNMBIH (and beyond, including the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations and the UN Security Council) and the ICTY, to come together and 
agree upon common grounds. In this case, the institutional challenge defeats 
the operational one. 
 This example points to a critical issue. It seems reasonable to think that the 
interoperability of information may be enhanced when all transitional justice 
measures operate under a single, overarching, institutional framework. This 
framework should guarantee the independent and complementary function-
ing of each measure.
conclusions
ThE ImPACT Of ThE TyPE Of CONTExT ON ThE VOlUmE,  
NATURE, ANd STRUCTURE Of VETTINg INfORmATION 
The link between the transitional context and the use of information in a vet-
ting process appears clearly in both the post-totalitarian contexts of the com-
munist bloc and post-conflict contexts generally. Whereas post-communism 
is characterized by the mirage of certainty — ”we’ll finally know” thanks to the 
“kilometric memory” of the authoritarian machine — post-conflict situations, 
in contrast, are characterized by blank pages on the history of the individu-
als, the organizations, and the conflict in general, pages that must be written 
before taking action. This leads to a number of conclusions. First, govern-
ments in post-authoritarian transitions should not think of the archives of the 
former governments as the sole source of information for an effective vetting 
process. Second, during conflicts it would be desirable to sensitize civil soci-
ety, the international institutions, the media, and all other actors who fight 
forgetting and impunity about the importance of the information collected 
during the conflict and the different ways in which it could be used in the 
mechanisms of transitional justice. Third, in post-conflict contexts, a program 
aimed at taking a census of or registering the personnel who are part of the 
major institutions, according priority to those in charge of civilian security 
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and internal security in the country, is a prerequisite for laying the bases for a 
successful transition. Taking stock in this way creates a realistic groundwork 
to secure a vetting process and initiate a broad institutional reform program. 
In addition, it is important that this process of taking stock be based on a lim-
ited amount of information. 
ThE ImPACT Of ThE OPERATIONAl dImENSION ON ThE SUBSTANCE 
Of VETTINg 
As a general rule, the operational dimension (means, technology, expertise, 
tasks, planning, etc.) substantially affects not only the functioning but also the 
results of vetting. It appears that this dimension, independent of the context, 
is not given its due by the decision makers designing vetting processes. The 
expectations of society and of politicians are based on norms, despite opera-
tional realism. It appears, in addition, that the vetting processes are designed 
by politicians and jurists in the absence of an information manager or expert 
in information management. Again, this general point leads to a number of 
implications. First, the design of a vetting process, regardless of the context, 
should adopt the following approach: (1) identify the goals of the vetting pro-
cess; (2) identify the information needed; (3) involve experts to take inven-
tory of the existing information, to evaluate the efforts needed to process that 
information, and to collect and produce the information that is lacking; and 
(4) reconcile the expectations, goals, persons targeted, and resources available, 
all within an acceptable timetable, before implementing the process. Second, 
and more specific to post-conflict situations, it is important that the team in 
charge of managing the vetting process be multidisciplinary and that it bring 
together capacities in program management, information systems, law, and 
political and social sciences. 
OPERATIONAl ImPlEmENTATION NECESSARIly RAISES ThE qUESTION 
Of POwER 
Although noting the power of experts is nothing new, I will emphasize that 
post-conflict contexts characterized by a lack of institutional structure and 
a high degree of uncertainty offer enormous opportunities to operational 
actors. This is certainly true for the management of a huge volume of highly 
specialized information. It is important, therefore, to provide a legal frame-
work for the work of the technical personnel with procedures to ensure over-
sight and transparent management of their activity.
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SyNERgIES Of NEEdS IN TERmS Of CONTExTUAl INfORmATION fOR 
ThE VARIOUS mEChANISmS Of TRANSITIONAl JUSTICE 
As discussed above, certainly at the general level synergies may arise among 
the transitional justice mechanisms in relation to the sharing of information. 
This suggests putting in place a sufficiently exhaustive and factual document 
collection endowed with a flexible and rich indexing system that answers 
the needs of the various mechanisms. Such a collection of documents would 
support the emergence of a common frame of reference for all the mecha-
nisms. In addition, it goes without saying that such a documentation center, 
which would bring together so much sensitive information, would become 
an important power center, with all the risks that this entails. Furthermore, as 
the Internet has demonstrated by becoming a powerful medium for human 
rights activists,126 new technologies offer new possibilities in the realm of 
information. The referencing, classification, archiving, and uploading to the 
Internet of all the information important for transitional justice could be one 
of the means of establishing such a collection of documents. 
Translated by Charles H. Roberts
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appendix
Table recapitulating vetting mechanisms and sources of information used 
  INfORmATION/SOURCES
COUNTRy VETTINg mEChANISm  fOR VETTINg
Germany 1991 law on Stasi files
1992 creation of the 
Federal Commission 
(Gauck’s Office)
Institutional — Stasi Files: 180 km of archives 
(remaining after partial destruction), 
access to victims and to defenders; in part, 
personnel files and archives of the Com-
munist Party (e.g., in Dresden), as well as 
the personnel files for employment after 
reunification.
Defendant : Questionnaire/Hearing
Bulgaria Several laws blocked 
(Constitutional Court) 
Law on academic milieu 
Institutional — Files of secret services: at the Min-
istry of Interior (partially destroyed and not 
accessible to the public for thirty years)
Estonia Law on citizenship (1992, 1995): Includes 
limitations related to activities with the 
secret services or the Communist Party 
under the USSR 
Declaration on moral character,  
collaboration with the KGB implies a  
hearing with the security services 
Institutional — Files of the KGB: Archives 
partially destroyed or transferred to Mos-
cow, storage of remaining files in the state 
archives accessible to each citizen.
Defendant — Declaration of Moral Character: 
agents must make a declaration of moral 
character of never having worked for the 
KGB.
Hungary 1994 lustration law (ties to former secret 
police) directed at twelve thousand 
administrative and elected officials
Creation of commission on lustration
Lustration by category of persons  
(7,872 persons)
At least two types of data required  
for evidence in archives.
Institutional — Files of secret services: partially 
destroyed (over 90% recruitment files 
destroyed in 1989), other archives at the 
Office of History (created in 1996), or clas-
sified as secret. Access for selection panels, 
victims, and researchers. List of/informa-
tion on vetted agents accessible in 2030.
Institutional — various: Tracking of payments 
for services rendered to secret services, 
other documents. 
Defendant — Hearing: Until 2000 compulsory 
hearings 
Civil society — Internet lists: Several lists of 
names circulate electronically on the 
Internet
Civil society — various: Testimonies of victims, 
views of experts, etc. 
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  INfORmATION/SOURCES 
COUNTRy VETTINg mEChANISm  fOR VETTINg
Latvia 1994 lustration law
 Former KGB agents must report to the 
National Office of Historical Memory127
 Investigation into candidates for elected 
office and certain administrative posts 
Institutional — Files of the KGB:  Archives par-
tially destroyed or transferred to Moscow, 
storage of remaining files at the National 
Office of Historical Memory. Free access.
Lithuania Several obstacles by the Supreme Court 
1991 former KGB agents cannot hold 
high-ranking administrative positions 
1991 decree: Parliamentary commission 
on the review of secret files to ban the 
Communist Party from elections.
1999 lustration law, KGB agents, who 
must report within six months to the 
special commission128
Institutional — Files of the KGB:  Archives par-
tially destroyed or transferred to Moscow, 
and in part returned to Lithuania and stored 
in the state archives (first shipment of two 
thousand boxes containing more than 
forty-two thousand files). Largest collection 
of documents in the Baltic countries. Access 
to files for victims and defenders after 
authorization.
Macedonia
(for information)
Law on the handling of the files of the 
secret services in 2000.
Access for victims to fifteen thousand files
Poland Lustration law in 1997
Special court for lustration 1997
Institutional: Archives of the former Ministry 
of Interior and security services stored at 
the Institute for the National Remembrance, 
created in 1999. Access for victims, journal-
ists, and researchers 
Civil society — Lists of names: in 1992 “list of 
agents,” in 2005, “Wildstein’s List” (Wild-
stein is a journalist) includes two hundred 
forty thousand names
Romania 1999 law created the National Council 
for the Study of the Archives of the 
Securitate/public access 
CNSAS (review of the files of the candi-
dates for administrative positions)
Institutional — Files of Securitate: Archives (18 
km of files) transferred in 2005 to CNSAS. 
Restricted access CNSAS
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  INfORmATION/SOURCES 
COUNTRy VETTINg mEChANISm  fOR VETTINg
Serbia and 
Montenegro
(for information)
Law on the secret files, of 2002, 
overturned by the Constitutional Court 
in 2003
Institutional — Files of secret police: Archives of 
the secret police closed, not used, and not 
accessible
Slovakia 1991 lustration law for five years
2002 law on the Institute for the 
Memory of the Nation/public access
Institutional — StB files: Archives of the secret 
police to the Institute for the Memory of 
the Nation (www.upn.gov.sk).129 In 2002 
public access to the list of names, access to 
files for the victims (their file, those of the 
StB agents, and those of the persons who 
turned them in)
Czech Republic Lustration law in 1995, for five years, 
renewed in 2001 for another five years
Law on the protection of secret data, 
in 1998
Institutional — StB files: Archives of the secret 
police to the Ministry of Interior (www.
mvcr.cz), to the National Bureau of Security, 
access for victims, since 2002 public access 
to the list of names, access to files upon 
request. Publication of a list of seventy-five 
thousand names of official collaborators by 
the Ministry of Interior in 2003 
Civil society — List of 20,000: List of twenty 
thousand names by the dissident P. Cibulka 
(www.cibulka.com)
South Africa No formal vetting mechanism
Streamlining to improve representative-
ness in the administrations and large 
companies 
Institutional or private — Personnel file: Use of 
personnel files to promote the skills of black 
personnel 
Argentina No formal vetting mechanism.  
Alternative: challenging promotions  
in the military and confirmations  
of electoral positions.
Institutional: Report of the CONADEP/ 
Personnel File/ Special investigation 
Civil society: Reports of human rights NGOs, 
research center (CELS), Permanent Assem-
bly for Human Rights (APDH), religious 
associations, victims’ testimony, written 
press, hearing 
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  INfORmATION/SOURCES 
COUNTRy VETTINg mEChANISm  fOR VETTINg
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Law on free access to information  
(2000 and 2001, not used)
Ad hoc procedure of the United Nations 
police mission (police personnel)
Decisions of the High Representative 
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council
POLICE
Institutional
Lists of personnel: Lists of police personnel 
of all the police forces (fifteen) and person-
nel files
Committee on housing: Decision on expul-
sion from housing illegally occupied 
 Courts: Guilty verdicts
International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia: Confidential information
UNMIBH: Investigation, reports on the 
action of the police 
Civil society: NGOs and press: Investigative 
reports by human rights NGOs (local and 
international), media
Defendants - Individual questionnaire: 
Individuals in question fill out a question-
naire and a statement (twenty-five thousand 
data sheets) 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
Candidates: Individual questionnaire
Haiti In proposal form Police/Applicants: Form identifying them 
Kosovo UNMIK Institutional sources: Ad hoc investigation 
by UNMIK 
Applicants: Questionnaire
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  INfORmATION/SOURCES 
COUNTRy VETTINg mEChANISm  fOR VETTINg
Liberia United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL)
Accra Accords 
Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003)
POLICE
Police and applicants: Registration form
DRC No law - Project to register police 
personnel and to take a census of other 
public servants
PROJECT Police and census public officials 
Institutional - personnel file: Updating 
personnel file based on questionnaires 
Employee - Individual questionnaire: Each 
employee (or supposed employee) fills out 
questionnaire 
Rwanda — JUDICIAL SYSTEM (includes judicial police)
Institutional: Ministry of justice and infor-
mation services 
Applicants: Registration form
East Timor United Nations Transitional Administra-
tion in East Timor (UNTAET) : United 
Nations Mission of Support in East 
Timor (UNMISET) 
Security Council Resolutions 1272 (1999) 
and 1410 (2002)
POLICE
Applicants: Registration form
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notes
1  Literally, “vetting” means “meticulous examination.” In the context of transition, one 
finds, in French, the idea of épuration, which goes further, as it includes a notion of final-
ity and purity not found in the English word “vetting.” French also has the term criblage. 
In the dictionary of the French Academy (http://atilf.atilf.fr), criblage designates the 
“action of passing through a sieve,” but it can also designate the “result of this action.” 
Under the entry for crible (sieve) one finds the figurative expression “to pass opinions 
through a sieve” (passer au crible les opinions), which means “to examine them closely, to 
screen them, eliminating those which are false or bad.” Vetting commissions known 
as commissions de criblage were set up at the end of the Second World War to identify 
collaborators, but unfortunately they were also used during the war to screen Jews to 
deport them. The word criblage remains the most appropriate and relevant term in the 
transition context. 
2  See “Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: Operational Guidelines,” in 
this volume.
3  This analysis is based on the case studies in this volume (Argentina, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, El Salvador, and South 
Africa), reports and articles concerning other countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slova-
kia), information collected during on-site missions (Afghanistan, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone), as well as stud-
ies of the archives of authoritarian and repressive regimes. The many documents con-
sulted on vetting do not specifically address the issue of information (or do so only to 
a limited extent). The vast majority of vetting processes have taken place in the context 
of post-authoritarian transitions, and these have been the most documented. There are 
only a few examples of vetting in post-conflict contexts. For such a context, attention 
will be more specifically focused on the vetting of the police by the United Nations 
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).
4  Pierre Larousse, Le Petit Larousse illustré 1999 (Paris: Larousse, 1998).
5  See chapter by Czarnota in this volume. In Poland the Parliament specifically names 
the first three categories.
6  The experiences taken into account in this study have used the following sources: 
reports of United Nations peacekeeping missions, international police missions 
(CIVPOL), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR), the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNOHCR), and other UN agencies. 
Reports are also generated by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), and ad hoc agencies such as the Office of the High Repre-
sentative in Bosnia, as well as special tribunals.
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7  Antonio Gonzales Quintana, “Archives of the Security Services of Former Repres-
sive Regimes, Report prepared for UNESCO on behalf of the International Council on 
Archives” (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
1997).
8  Antoon De Baets, “The Dictators’ Secret Archives: Rationales for Their Creation, 
Destruction and Disclosure,” in Scholarly Environments, ed. Alasdair A MacDonald and 
Arend H. Huussen (Groningen: Peeters Publishers, 2004).
9  It also includes religious organizations, some of which are heavily involved in the 
defense of human rights, as in Latin America.
10  This is done through forms, questionnaires, or testimony, either in hearings or in writ-
ten form.
11  See chapter by Priban in this volume.
12  The author spent three-and-a-half years in Rwanda, from September 1994 to June 1998, 
working mainly for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and 
directed the first phase of the European Union’s program to support rehabilitation of 
the judicial system, which began in June 1997.
13  To date, the final status of Kosovo, under United Nations administration, has yet to be 
determined. 
14  By the ICTJ for these four countries, and by the UK Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID) for the DRC.
15  Rwanda has proceeded to vet candidates for the positions of judicial police inspector, 
court clerk, alternate prosecutors, and judges. This procedure unfolded at the time of 
the formation of each of these professional corps (which was essentially undertaken 
by the international community, beginning in 1995). Vetting was undertaken under the 
caretaker authorities and carried out by the intelligence services. The institutions and 
infrastructure were totally ransacked and destroyed during the genocide of the Tut-
sis and the massacre of the moderate Hutus in 1994 and the subsequent flight of the 
Hutu population and the authorities in the face of the advance and taking of power by 
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chapter 11
due Process and Vetting
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introduction
The question of excluding from public service persons implicated in gross 
human rights violations and/or crimes (vetting) has taken on special impor-
tance today for the effectiveness of the rule of law, and for the strengthen-
ing, construction, or reconstruction of a state that guarantees human rights. 
This issue is clearly linked to the “duty to prevent” that is incumbent on 
states — their obligation to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations 
and to take steps to end impunity for such violations. Yet vetting procedures 
also raise the question of the rights of the persons targeted by such measures, 
for in the past these measures have repeatedly assumed the dimensions of 
veritable purges or witch hunts. Although vetting has taken on great impor-
tance in recent years in the contexts of democratic transitions, either at the 
end of armed conflicts or after the collapse of authoritarian regimes, one can-
not limit the scope of vetting to these instances alone. In effect, vetting may 
take place in different situations and vis-à-vis different public sectors, rais-
ing different problems and questions. The issues concerning the preventive 
nature of vetting and its scope of application, in terms of both the sectors of 
the public administration and the type of conduct targeted, are important for 
delimiting the procedural guarantees that should be respected in vetting pro-
cedures. Establishing regular programs or respecting procedural guarantees 
is an essential element of vetting programs, which distinguishes them from 
generalized purges. Nonetheless, although the international human rights 
organs and courts are divided on the issue of due process requirements in 
vetting programs, one may deduce from the case law certain criteria and 
guarantees that generally should be incorporated into vetting procedures. 
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the state’s duty to guarantee  
and vetting of the public administration 
Under international law, the state has a dual legal obligation: first, to refrain 
from violating human rights, whether by act or omission, and second, to guar-
antee the full enjoyment of fundamental rights. This last obligation includes 
the duty to prevent human rights violations, and the state is obliged to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to this end. This duty to guarantee is 
based on several international instruments1 and has been reaffirmed repeat-
edly by the United Nations General Assembly2 and in international case law.3 
International case law pointed early on to this duty to guarantee. In effect, one 
of the first precedents in the case law is the arbitration award of May 1, 1925, 
rendered by professor Max Huber in the matter of British claims regarding 
damages caused to British subjects in the Spanish zone of Morocco, in which 
it was noted that under international law, the state may be held responsible 
for a failure to prevent offenses: “The State should be held to exercise a higher 
order of vigilance with a view to preventing the offenses committed, in vio-
lation of military discipline and law, by persons who belong to the army.”4 
Accordingly, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) 
concluded that the states’ duty to guarantee comprises the whole set of obli-
gations aimed at preventing illegal conduct, and, if necessary, to investigate, 
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of such conduct, and to compensate 
the victims.5
 The duty to prevent raises the question as to the presence in the public 
administration — especially within the armed forces, police services, or other 
security agencies — of persons implicated in gross human rights violations. It 
is of note that in the periodic reports submitted by the states parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Com-
mittee has recommended, among the measures of prevention, that the state 
refrain from hiring and recruiting to the security forces persons implicated 
in gross human rights violations, as well as the permanent removal of mem-
bers of the security forces who were involved in such violations.6 The Human 
Rights Committee has also recommended, on several occasions, suspending 
state agents implicated in gross human rights violations while investigations 
into such events are ongoing.7
 In general, international human rights instruments do not explicitly 
address the question of vetting. Nonetheless, some instruments provide cer-
tain clues. Accordingly, the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation 
of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions8 and the Principles on the Effective 
Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
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Treatment or Punishment9 provide that persons who may be involved in extraju-
dicial, arbitrary, or summary executions, or in acts of torture or mistreatment, 
shall be “removed from any position of control or power, whether direct or 
indirect, over complainants, witnesses and their families, as well as over those 
conducting investigations” (principles 15 and 3(b), respectively). The Declara-
tion on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance10 provides, for 
its part, that the alleged perpetrators of a forced disappearance must be sus-
pended “from any official duties during the investigation” into that crime 
(article 16). 
 In addition, and even though they do not address the specific issue of vet-
ting, certain international instruments contain provisions — or, rather, crite-
ria — as regards the procedures for appointments, removals, and revocation 
for certain categories of public officials, especially in the administration of 
justice. The existence of those provisions is justified to the extent that they 
aim to preserve the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and the 
principle of separation of powers. For example, the Basic Principles on the Inde-
pendence of the Judiciary11 establish the criteria and procedural principles to be 
followed in the event of an accusation or complaint against a judge in the per-
formance of his or her judicial and professional functions: the right to a fair 
hearing; the principle (or the right) of an adversary proceeding; and the right 
to independent review of disciplinary decisions to suspend or remove.12 The 
Basic Principles also provide that “[a]ny method of judicial selection shall safe-
guard against judicial appointments for improper motives. In the selection of 
judges, there shall be no discrimination against a person on the grounds of 
race, colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judi-
cial office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be consid-
ered discriminatory.”13 The Basic Principles also provide that “[j]udges shall be 
subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour 
that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.”14 In addition, the Guide-
lines on the Role of Prosecutors15 set forth the principle of nondiscrimination 
in recruitment procedures, and, in the case of acts committed outside of the 
scope of one’s professional duties, the impartial procedures include a hearing 
and review by an independent body.16 
 Nonetheless, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights has 
adopted and/or recommended certain international standards that, among 
other issues, address vetting. Accordingly, the Updated Set of principles for the 
protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity17 pro-
vide that, as a means of guaranteeing the nonrecurrence of human rights 
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violations, the state should remove from public institutions those officials 
and public servants responsible for gross human rights violations, especially 
those who belong to the armed forces, police, security forces, and intelligence 
agencies, as well as the judicial sector.18 The Updated Set of principles state that 
such dismissals or removals from state agencies must be done within the 
framework of due process of law and with respect for the principle of nondis-
crimination.19 The independent expert on impunity, in charge of updating the 
Set of principles, had also noted that vetting procedures “should ensure a hear-
ing and a review by an independent and impartial body.”20 
vetting procedures and human rights 
The main goal of vetting is to ensure a norm-abiding performance of public 
service through measures that guarantee a structure made up of officials and 
public servants respectful of human rights. Vetting is aimed at ensuring that 
persons who have committed crimes or gross human rights violations do not 
have access to public service or are removed from it. Vetting thus covers both 
recruitment and appointment to public service, and the dismissal or removal 
of public employees and state agents. 
 Accordingly, the state has a duty to vet the public administration as part 
of its duty to prevent, and this vetting cannot be implemented in just any way. 
The state also has the duty to respect the rights of persons who are subject to 
a vetting process. 
 Depending on the specific circumstances, vetting may infringe on several 
rights of persons who are vetted: the right to hold a job in the public service in 
conditions of equality and without unlawful discrimination or unreasonable 
restrictions;21 the right to be protected from unlawful attacks on honor and 
reputation;22 the right to an effective remedy;23 the right to the presumption 
of innocence;24 the right to have one’s case heard fairly and publicly by a com-
petent, independent, an impartial tribunal;25 the right to equality before the 
law and to equal protection of the law without discrimination;26 and the right 
to work.27 
 Vetting is closely related to the right of access, on general terms of equal-
ity, to public service. As the Human Rights Committee has emphasized, this 
right entails “the right and the opportunity [for every citizen], without any 
distinctions based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and without 
unreasonable restrictions to have access, on general terms of equality, to pub-
lic service in his country.”28 Yet the committee also emphasized that “this right 
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does not entitle every citizen to obtain guaranteed employment in the public 
service”;29 that is, “25(c) does not entitle every citizen to employment within 
the public service, but to access on general terms of equality.”30 The guarantee 
of this right, as the Human Rights Committee has indicated, “implies that the 
State has a duty to ensure that it does not discriminate against anyone. This 
principle is all the more applicable to persons employed in the public service 
and to those who have been dismissed.”31 The committee has also noted that 
this right implies “a duty, of the State, to ensure that there is no discrimina-
tion on the ground of political opinion or expression. This applies a fortiori to 
those who already hold positions in the public service. The rights enshrined 
in article 25 should also be read to encompass the freedom to engage in politi-
cal activity individually or through political parties, freedom to debate pub-
lic affairs, to criticize the Government and to publish material with political 
content.”32 The Human Rights Committee has considered that the conditions 
of and limitations on the exercise of the rights protected by article 25 — par-
ticularly the right of access to public service under equal conditions — should 
be based on objective and reasonable criteria, and be regulated by law.33 It has 
also underscored that, “[t]o ensure access on general terms of equality, the 
criteria and processes for appointment, promotion, suspension and dismissal 
must be objective and reasonable.”34 The state should also, as the committee 
affirms, “ensure that persons do not suffer discrimination in the exercise of 
their rights under article 25, subparagraph (c), on any of the grounds set out in 
article 2, paragraph 1 [of the Covenant]”;35 that is, motivations based on race, 
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, wealth, birth, or any other situation. 
 The right to the presumption of innocence may also be violated by vet-
ting procedures, especially when they take on the form of purges and the 
persons subject to such procedures are exposed to popular revenge. Dismiss-
als or decisions not to appoint an applicant based on that person’s participa-
tion in a crime or human rights violation, for which the individual has been 
acquitted by a court, may in certain circumstances also violate the principle 
of the presumption of innocence. Nonetheless, one must bear in mind that 
the notion, nature, and scope of criminal liability do not exactly correspond 
exactly to the notion, nature, and scope of administrative liability of a pub-
lic official, especially in relation to his or her official duties. Thus, an illicit 
act may not entail an official’s criminal liability, yet it may imply his or her 
administrative responsibility as an official. So if a vetting decision is based on 
a final judgment of a court holding an official or a candidate for public service 
criminally liable, there would certainly be no violation of the principle of the 
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presumption of innocence. At the same time, the absence of a judicial deci-
sion condemning an official of a crime does not prevent the official from 
being suspended from certain public functions36 or from being relieved of all 
official duties for the duration of the investigation.37 
 Experience shows how certain vetting measures can violate the right to 
be protected from unlawful attacks on honor and reputation. In particular, 
certain lustration laws in former socialist countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe have stigmatized persons for the mere fact that they were officials of 
the authoritarian regime without having been implicated, directly or indi-
rectly, in the commission of crimes or human rights violations. 
 There is certainly a need to strike a proper balance that allows a vetting 
process to proceed while, at the same time, guaranteeing and protecting the 
rights of persons affected by such measures. As the United Nations Secretary-
General has emphasized, this question is of crucial importance for strength-
ening the legitimacy of official bodies, the restoration of the public’s confi-
dence, and the consolidation of the rule of law.38 
 Vetting measures should be implemented respecting the rule of law, and 
especially the principle of legality, and “in a manner respectful both of the sen-
sitivities of victims and of the human rights of those suspected of abuses.”39 
Accordingly, one fundamental issue is that of procedural guarantees in the 
vetting process. 
contexts and sectors targeted by vetting 
Vetting may take place in different situations or scenarios and vis-à-vis differ-
ent sectors of the administration, and in these contexts it may address various 
problems and issues. 
 As regards the situations in which vetting policies or measures are imple-
mented, one can schematically identify four typical cases. A first typical case 
is that of the reconstruction of the army, police, and/or other state security 
bodies, after their dissolution by provision of law40 or their physical disap-
pearance, especially because of the conflict and the destruction of institu-
tions.41 A second typical case is that of the construction of a new state entity.42 
A third typical case is that of vetting in the context of the restructuring of 
the state forces, without these having been dissolved, in the context of the 
return to institutional or democratic normalcy or upon the conclusion of an 
armed conflict.43 A final typical case is that of the regular vetting of the public 
administration in the context of the normal operation of the institutions. In 
these different contexts, vetting raises different questions. In effect, the first 
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two typical cases have dealt more — but not exclusively — with problems asso-
ciated with procedures for recruiting for the public administration. The last 
two generally raise the issue of the removal of public servants. 
 In addition, vetting measures may target public servants or prospective 
public servants in different sectors of the public administration. In effect, 
vetting targets not only the members of the armed forces, police, or prison 
services, all of which, given the nature of their activities, are generally the 
most involved in gross human rights violations such as extrajudicial execu-
tions, torture, and enforced disappearances; it may also target other sectors 
of the state apparatus, such as the judiciary. Vetting measures aimed at the 
different agencies and services of the executive branch may be very similar in 
terms of procedures and mechanisms, if not identical in certain cases. None-
theless, in the case of other branches of government, such as the judiciary, 
the principles of the rule of law, particularly the principle of the separation of 
powers, require specific vetting procedures and mechanisms. In the case of 
the judiciary, vetting should not only pursue the general objective of “clean-
ing up,” but also ensure the effective independence — functional, structural, 
and personal — of the judges. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
independence of judges and lawyers highlighted this aspect: “In the transition 
periods that follow a domestic armed conflict or the collapse of a dictatorial, 
authoritarian or particularly corrupt regime, it is logical that judges involved 
in human rights violations and corruption who wish to retain their posts 
should be held to account. Even in such cases, the international standards for 
a fair trial and the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary must 
be strictly observed. Otherwise, such ‘cleaning up’ may weaken the judiciary 
instead of strengthening it and undermine its independence.”44 
 The parallel existence of other situations and procedures may have an 
impact on vetting measures and on the rights of the persons targeted by such 
measures. In addition, the existence of judicial and/or disciplinary investi-
gations and/or decisions — especially in criminal matters — with regard to 
persons subject to vetting measures, especially when they have addressed 
the same facts taken into account in the vetting procedures, are of special 
importance. 
nature and scope of application of vetting procedures 
Vetting procedures are, in essence, administrative. Given their preventive 
nature and their aim of “cleaning up” the public service, they are not punitive 
per se.45 Accordingly, they cannot take the place of procedures that aim to 
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determine the criminal and disciplinary liability of the individual, and which 
are based on the legal notions of crime and disciplinary breach. Nonetheless, 
the separation between typical vetting procedures — that is, those that have 
the sole aim to clean out the state organs of individuals implicated in gross 
human rights violations and/or crimes — and criminal judicial proceedings is 
not absolute. First, criminal and/or disciplinary proceedings generally have an 
impact on measures taken in the context of vetting. More precisely, judicial 
and/or disciplinary decisions establishing the criminal or disciplinary liability 
of individuals should be taken into account in vetting procedures. Further-
more, as indicated by practice in several countries, it may also bee seen that, 
besides their punitive aim, criminal and/or disciplinary procedures can play 
a role in vetting. Dismissal and removal are the classic forms of disciplinary 
sanction. In some countries, the criminal legislation provides as possible pen-
alties, both accessory and principal, dismissal as well as disqualification from 
holding any position in the public administration. Finally, it is true that while 
vetting does not have, in principle, a punitive aim, vetting procedures are very 
close to disciplinary procedures when they involve dismissal or removal. 
 The material scope of the application of vetting measures, that is, the con-
duct that is the basis of such measures, is extremely important. The conduct 
targeted by vetting measures should be circumscribed to gross human rights 
violations and crimes under international law, as well as to acts criminalized 
under domestic criminal legislation. Including crimes under international law 
as conduct providing a basis for vetting measures should be independent of 
whether these crimes are criminalized in the domestic law, given the auton-
omous nature of these crimes and the fact that their lack of criminalization 
under domestic law does not relieve the person who committed them from 
responsibility under international law.46 
 Other conduct may be included in the list of acts or omissions giving rise 
to vetting measures. The debates on the lustration laws in the former socialist 
countries of Central Europe have posed the question of the need to remove 
from the state administration those who “held high positions in the former 
totalitarian communist regimes” and who “have shown no commitment to or 
belief in [democratic principles] in the past.”47 Nonetheless, experience shows 
us that the several cases in which mere membership in a political party or the 
public administration has itself been the basis for denying people access to or 
removing them from public service, without taking into account the respon-
sibility in crimes or human rights violations of the persons hit by vetting mea-
sures, have transformed such measures into purges and given rise to all sorts 
of vengeance. Such measures are based on a criterion of collective responsi-
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bility and impose a collective sanctions regime, both of which are prohibited 
by international law. This was the case, for example, of Law 445/1991 of the 
Czech Republic, known as the Screening Act, which prohibits certain persons 
from having access to key positions in the public administration and the judi-
ciary because of the posts they held up until 1989.48 The Human Rights Com-
mittee of the United Nations has found that such vetting measures raise “seri-
ous issues under article 25 of the Covenant”49 and it recommended that this 
law not be “enforced in a blanket manner and. . . not [be] used as a mechanism 
to deny persons access, on general terms of equality, to positions in the public 
service.”50 The International Labour Organization has also criticized this leg-
islation because it bases exclusion from public service on one’s political and 
ideological views.51 The Secretary-General of the United Nations has also crit-
icized such measures because they constitute “wholesale purges. . . involving 
wide-scale dismissal and disqualification based not on individual records, but 
rather on party affiliation, political opinion, or association with a prior State 
institution.”52 
 In this context it is important to underscore that in the area of criminal 
responsibility, forms of objective responsibility53 and collective punishments 
are banned by international law.54 Subjective responsibility in criminal mat-
ters and individual criminal sanctions are a principle of criminal law and a 
peremptory norm of international law.55 
 The issue of the criminal responsibility of individuals for their membership 
in a group or entity implicated in criminal activities was posed by the Nurem-
berg trials, against the horrors committed by the Nazi regime, for the Nurem-
berg Statute established objective criminal responsibility for membership in 
certain organizations of the Third Reich.56 Nonetheless, while the Nuremberg 
tribunal decided to declare the organizations targeted by the statute as crimi-
nal, “all the members of these groups were not recognized as criminals from 
the mere fact of their membership in such groups.”57 In effect, the tribunal 
stayed away from any application of objective individual criminal responsi-
bility. Accordingly, for members of one of these groups to be declared crimi-
nal they must have engaged voluntarily and knowingly in the criminal aims of 
the group or must have participated in the crimes over which the Nuremberg 
tribunal had jurisdiction, that is, war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes 
against humanity. 
 This principle was reaffirmed in article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949, and article 75 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 
12, 1949, relating to Protection of the Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Proto-
col I), and article 6 of the Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of August 
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12, 1949, relating to Protection of the Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its comment on article 
75 (section 4(b)) of Protocol I, noted: “After the Second World War and ever 
since, international public opinion has condemned convictions of persons 
on account of their membership in a group or organization. Objections were 
also raised against collective punishment inflicted indiscriminately on fami-
lies or on the population of a district or building. . . . It was therefore decided 
to outlaw all convictions and punishments which are not based on individual 
responsibility — in accordance with the now universally accepted principle 
that no one may be punished for an act he has not personally committed — as 
well as reprisals.”58 
 The principle of individual responsibility is equally fundamental in the 
disciplinary area, though its scope is different given the nature of disciplinary 
responsibility and the legal duties of the public servant, the breach of which is 
the basis of the notion of disciplinary infraction. 
 To the extent that vetting procedures generally target conduct character-
ized as criminal, either by domestic or international law,59 the principle of 
individual responsibility cannot be ignored. As highlighted by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, vetting measures should be based on the indi-
vidual participation in and responsibility for past abuses of public servants, 
and on their individual record.60 Along the same lines, and in the framework 
of the lustration or “decommunization” laws, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe emphasized that “in general, these measures can be 
compatible with a democratic state under the rule of law if several criteria are 
met. Guilt, being individual, rather than collective, must be proven in each 
individual case — this emphasizes the need for an individual, and not collec-
tive, application of lustration laws.”61 The “Guidelines to ensure that lustra-
tion laws and similar administrative measures comply with the requirements 
of a state based on the rule of law”62, whose application has been suggested 
by the Parliamentary Assembly, recommend in this regard that “No person 
shall be subject to lustration solely for association with, or activities for, any 
organization that was legal at the time of such association or activities. . . or 
for personal opinions or beliefs.”63 Nonetheless, as regards high-level public 
officials, these principles establish a criterion that is certainly questionable 
from the standpoint of the presumption of innocence and the burden of 
proof. In effect, guideline (h) provides that “where an organization has per-
petrated gross human rights violations, a member, employee or agent shall be 
considered to have taken part in these violations if he was a senior official of 
the organization, unless he can show that he did not participate in planning, 
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directing or executing such policies, practices, or acts.” While the principle of 
individual responsibility for negligent command is recognized in both crimi-
nal and disciplinary law,64 it would not be similar to a form of automatic and 
objective responsibility, and shift the burden of proof.
the case law on procedural guarantees and vetting 
As has been highlighted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,65 
the United Nations independent expert on impunity,66 and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe,67 one of the key issues in vetting is that of 
equitable procedures and procedural guarantees. The Secretary-General has 
also declared: “The inclusion of such due process elements distinguished for-
mal vetting processes from. . . wholesale purges.”68 Nonetheless, the case law 
of the international human rights organs and courts is divided on the ques-
tion of the application of guarantees of fair and equitable procedure before a 
court of law or an impartial body in vetting measures. 
ThE hUmAN RIghTS COmmITTEE 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has considered that in light of article 
14(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),69 the 
right to “a fair and public hearing by a. . . tribunal” applies to criminal indict-
ments and to “rights and obligations in a suit at law.” For the HRC, the notion 
of “rights and obligations in a suit at law” is based on the nature of the rights 
in question rather than on the status of one of the parties.70 The HRC has also 
considered that “The imposition of disciplinary measures taken against civil 
servants does not of itself necessarily constitute a determination of one’s 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, nor does it, except in cases of sanctions 
that, regardless of their qualification in domestic law, are penal in nature, 
amount to a determination of a criminal charge within the meaning of the 
second sentence of article 14, paragraph 1.”71 The committee draws a distinc-
tion between recruitment and appointment procedures, on the one hand, and 
situations of dismissal or removal, on the other.72 
 In principle, the HRC considers challenges regarding access to public service 
(recruitment and appointment procedure) not to fall under article 14(1) of the 
ICCPR. Accordingly, for example, the committee has considered the procedure 
for appointment of judges, “albeit subject to the right in article 25(c) to access 
to public service on general terms of equality, as well as the right in article 2, 
paragraph 3, to an effective remedy, does not as such come within the purview 
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of a determination of rights and obligations in a suit at law within the mean-
ing of article 14, paragraph 1.”73 In a different case, involving a candidate for 
a position in the administration of justice rejected by a nonjudicial body, the 
committee ruled identically.74 This same approach is followed by the HRC with 
regard to promotions within the public service. Accordingly, in a case regard-
ing denial of a promotion of a noncommissioned officer to the rank of police 
officer, the committee considered that “the procedures initiated by the author 
to contest a negative decision on his own request to be promoted within the 
Polish police did not constitute the determination of rights and obligations in a 
suit at law, within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.”75
 Nonetheless, the HRC has noted that a candidate for public sector employ-
ment should be able to contest his or her nonappointment if his or her rights, 
especially the right of access to public service under generally equal condi-
tions, have been harmed. In effect, pursuant to article 2(3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the state has an obligation to “ensure 
that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those 
rights.”76 It should be pointed out that the committee has noted, in general, 
regarding the clause of the ICCPR on the right to an effective remedy (article 
2(3)): “This clause is not mentioned in the list of non-derogable provisions 
in article 4, paragraph 2 [of the ICCPR], but it constitutes a treaty obligation 
inherent in the Covenant as a whole. Even if a State party, during a state of 
emergency, and to the extent that such measures are strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, may introduce adjustments to the practical func-
tioning of its procedures governing judicial or other remedies, the State party 
must comply with the fundamental obligation, under article 2, paragraph 3, of 
the Covenant to provide a remedy that is effective.”77
 As regards measures for removal or suspension from public service, the 
HRC considers that challenges of dismissals and/or removals have to do with 
the right of every person to have challenges regarding their rights and obliga-
tions resolved by an impartial court, protected by article 14(1) of the ICCPR. 
Accordingly, in the case of a former fireman dismissed initially by the regional 
authorities, in a decision that was then vacated by an administrative court, the 
HRC considered “that a procedure concerning a dismissal from employment 
constituted the determination of rights and obligations in a suit at law, within 
the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.”78
 In another case regarding a police officer dismissed as a disciplinary mea-
sure by administrative decision and without having been brought before 
a court with jurisdiction to make such a decision, the HRC “recall[ed] that 
article 14, paragraph 1, guarantees everyone the right, in the determination 
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of his rights and obligations, to a hearing by an impartial tribunal or court, 
including the right of access to a civil court.”79 The committee did not find 
a violation of article 14(1), as a court subsequently ruled on the illegality of 
the officer’s dismissal and ordered his reinstatement to the police. It should be 
emphasized that no legal obstacle was posed to the examination of this case 
of administrative dismissal in light of the right to bring challenges regarding 
one’s rights and obligations before a court. 
 In a matter involving the administrative dismissal a noncommissioned 
police officer , which was challenged in court by the former public servant, 
but never finally resolved by a court because of a long and tortuous proce-
dure, the HRC considered that the matter “raised issues under articles 14, 
paragraph 1, 25(c), and 26, in conjunction with article 2, paragraph 3, of the 
Covenant.”80 Given the extreme sluggishness of the different and successive 
procedures — both administrative and judiciary — pursued to challenge the 
legality of the dismissal, and the repeated failure to execute decisions, the 
committee concluded that such a situation was “incompatible with the prin-
ciple of a fair hearing”81 and constituted “a violation of article 14, paragraph 1, 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”82 
 In another matter, the HRC also held: “While the revocation of appoint-
ments within the judiciary must not necessarily be determined by a court 
or tribunal, the Committee recalls that whenever a judicial body is entrusted 
under national law with the task of deciding on such matters, it must respect 
the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as 
enshrined in article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fair-
ness and equality of arms implicit in this guarantee.”83 In another matter con-
cerning the dismissal of 315 judges by a presidential decree adopted outside 
of the procedures and legal guarantees provided for that purpose, and with 
no judicial remedy afforded, the Human Rights Committee emphasized: 
“With regard to article 14, paragraph 1, of the [International] Covenant [on 
Civil and Political Rights]. . . the authors did not benefit from the guarantees 
to which they were entitled in their capacity as judges and by virtue of which 
they should have been brought before the Supreme Council of the Judiciary 
in accordance with the law.”84 The committee also concluded that “those dis-
missals constitute an attack on the independence of the judiciary protected 
by article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant”85 and found a violation “of article 
25, paragraph (c), read in conjunction with article 14, paragraph 1, on the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and of article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.”86 
 In another case involving a municipal employee dismissed after a munici-
pal procedure, the HRC considered that the disciplinary removal of the 
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public servant fell within the scope of article 14(1) of the ICCPR.87 The com-
mittee also noted that “the decision on a disciplinary dismissal does not need 
to be determined by a court or tribunal, the Committee considers that when-
ever, as in the present case, a judicial body is entrusted with the task of decid-
ing on the imposition of disciplinary measures, it must respect the guaran-
tee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in 
article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality 
of arms implicit in this guarantee.”88 The HRC also upheld the importance of 
several procedural guarantees during disciplinary proceedings: the right to 
challenge members of the competent organ during disciplinary proceedings; 
the right to recuse members of the organ competent for ruling on a disciplin-
ary action;89 the principle of equality of arms, that is, “that the parties to the 
proceedings must have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of 
their arguments, which, in turn, requires access to the documents necessary 
to prepare such arguments”;90 and the right to equality before the courts, in 
the sense that the “procedure before the national tribunals must be conducted 
expeditiously enough so as not to compromise the principles of fairness and 
equality of arms.”91
 In sum, the Human Rights Committee draws a distinction between situa-
tions of access to public service (recruitment and appointment procedures), 
on the one hand, and situations of dismissal or removal, on the other. Regard-
ing the first issue, the HRC has considered that it concerns the application of 
article 25 of the ICCPR, governing the right to “access, on general terms of 
equality, to public service,” and does not raise the question of the determina-
tion of rights in a fair hearing by a tribunal (article 14(1) of the ICCPR). How-
ever, the committee has stated that, on this issue, candidates for employment 
in the public sector have the right to an effective remedy to challenge a deci-
sion of nonappointment and to vindicate their right of access to public service 
protected by article 25 of the ICCPR. Regarding dismissal or removal from 
public service, the HRC considers that challenges to such decisions belong to 
the sphere of the right of every person to have her or his rights determined by 
a tribunal in fair proceedings.
ThE INTER-AmERICAN COURT Of hUmAN RIghTS 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has noted on several 
occasions that the procedural guarantees provided for in article 8 (“Right to 
a Fair Trial”) of the American Convention on Human Rights92 apply to judi-
cial remedies and any judicial procedure (criminal, administrative, civil, tax, 
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etc.), and to any procedure to contest the acts of authorities that represent an 
attack on human rights.93 The IACHR has also noted that the guarantees of 
article 8(2), which establishes the minimal guarantees of criminal procedure, 
apply to any proceeding to determine or contest rights and obligations.94 For 
the court, the notion of “due guarantees,” in article 8(1) of the convention, for 
any type of procedure, is based on the notion of “due process of law,” which 
necessarily incorporates these guarantees. These procedural guarantees are, 
among others: the presumption of innocence; the right to defense and to be 
assisted by counsel; the right to prior and detailed notice of the charges; and 
the right to appeal the judgment before a higher court. These guarantees must 
be respected “in the administrative process and in any other procedure whose 
decisions may affect the rights of persons.”95 For the IACHR: “In any subject 
matter, even in labour and administrative matters, the discretionality of the 
administration has boundaries that may not be surpassed, one such boundary 
being respect for human rights. It is important for the conduct of the admin-
istration to be regulated and it may not invoke public order to reduce discre-
tionally the guarantees of its subjects. For instance, the administration may 
not dictate punitive administrative actions without granting the individuals 
sanctioned the guarantee of the due process.”96
 These principles have been applied by the IACHR in the case of the dis-
missal of 270 public employees in Panama after a demonstration for labor 
rights,97 and in a matter involving the removal of judges from the Constitu-
tional Court of Peru by the legislature;98 for the time being the IACHR has not 
addressed access to public service. In the Constitutional Court case, the IACHR 
emphasized the specificity of the removals of judges and noted that the pro-
cedures for that should be consistent with the Basic Principles (especially prin-
ciple 17) and guarantee the principle of separation of powers and the indepen-
dence of judges.99 While under the separation of powers that is essential to the 
rule of law, and even though the judicial function is of the exclusive purview 
of the judicial branch, the court has noted that in the event that other organs 
or public authorities exercise materially judicial functions, these organs and 
authorities have “the obligation to adopt decisions that are in consonance 
with the guarantees of due legal process in the terms of Article 8 of the Amer-
ican Convention.”100 The approach of the IACHR is, in broad strokes, similar. 
Accordingly, the IACHR has found that the removal of a judge by an organ 
that was neither competent nor impartial, without respect for the procedural 
guarantees of “due process of law” and without the right to an effective rem-
edy to challenge the removal decision, constitutes a violation of the right to 
due process and to judicial protection.101 
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ThE EUROPEAN COmmISSION ON hUmAN RIghTS  
ANd ThE EUROPEAN COURT Of hUmAN RIghTS 
The European Commission on Human Rights has considered that, in light of 
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,102 the guarantees of 
a fair and equitable procedure before a court do not apply to litigation related 
to public service, whether it involves the right of access to public service or 
the removal of one of its members. For the commission the imposition of dis-
ciplinary measures to dismiss or remove public employees and state agents 
does not affect civil rights, because their rights rise from the legal relationship 
with the public administration, governed by the public law and not by private 
law. In consequence and given the fact that the scope of article 6 of the Euro-
pean convention is limited to civil rights and obligations as well as criminal 
charges, the commission has considered that the question of the measures to 
dismiss or remove public servants is outside the scope of the article 6 of the 
convention. Indeed, the commission has considered, on several occasions, 
that disciplinary proceedings entrusted to officials or judges (which primar-
ily had to do with suspension and dismissal measures) do not address a civil 
right, and, accordingly, fall outside of the scope of article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.103
 The European Court of Human Rights has developed the same approach 
as the European commission. The court considers that “Disputes relating to 
the recruitment, careers and termination of service of public servants are as a 
general rule outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1,”104 because such disputes do 
not address a right “civil in nature.” That said, the court considers that article 
6(1) of the European convention could apply if the litigious claim addresses a 
“purely economic” right — such as the payment of a salary, or an “essentially 
economic” right, and does not involve “primarily discretional prerogatives of 
the administration.”105
 Nonetheless, in several cases, and given the different domestic legislations 
on the public administration and public service, the court draws a distinction 
between those public servants governed by public law (career service public 
servants) and those under private law (contractual employees). For the latter, 
challenges regarding recruitment, career service, and termination address a 
right “civil in nature” and, accordingly, article 6(1) of the European conven-
tion applies. This distinction has been subject to numerous criticisms, both 
in the doctrine106 and on the part of certain judges of the European court,107 
since it pointed to unequal protection by the convention of public servants 
in several member states, to the extent that public servants under public law 
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are deprived of the article 6 guarantees, while certain of their colleagues, sub-
jected to private law contracts, benefited from them, and this notwithstand-
ing the similarity of their function. In 1999, the European court modified the 
case law so as to put an end to this situation. In its well-known judgment 
in the matter of Pellegrin v. France, the court expressly indicated the need “to 
put an end to the uncertainty which surrounds application of the guaran-
tees of Article 6§1 to disputes between States and their servants” and to find 
a criterion that would make it possible “to afford equal treatment to public 
servants performing equivalent or similar duties in the States Parties to the 
Convention, irrespective of the domestic system of employment.”108 The 
court decided to adopt a functional criterion to determine whether the litiga-
tion raised a question of a “right civil in nature” and to set aside the formal 
criterion — which legal regime is applicable to the public servant — used until 
then. For the court, it was a question of rendering an autonomous interpreta-
tion of the notion of “public service” that would make it possible to assure 
equal treatment for public servants in the states parties to the convention, 
independent of the system of employment used domestically, and whatever 
the particular nature of the legal relationship between the public servant and 
the administration (contractual relationship or statutory and regulatory posi-
tion).109 The court found the basis for this functional criterion in “the nature 
of the functions or responsibilities carried out by the person concerned, and 
verifying whether his employment involves direct or indirect participation in 
the exercise of public authority and functions aimed at safeguarding the gen-
eral interests of the state or of other public authorities.”110 Accordingly, the 
court considered that article 6(1) of the European convention did not apply in 
disputes “which are raised by public servants whose duties typify the specific 
activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting as the depositary 
of public authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the State 
or other public authorities.”111 The court considered as an example of such 
activities, outside of the scope of article 6(1), those of the armed forces and the 
police.112 Yet, the court considered that other activities of the public service 
are not excluded from the scope of application of article 6(1).113
 It should be noted that the court justified this exclusion of litigation asso-
ciated with the public service from the scope of application of article 6 of the 
convention based on the fact that such public sector jobs “involve responsi-
bilities in the general interest or participation in the exercise of powers con-
ferred by public law. The holders of such posts thus wield a portion of the 
State’s sovereign power. The State therefore has a legitimate interest in requir-
ing of these servants a special bond of trust and loyalty.”114
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 In sum, European case law has considered that the guarantees of a fair and 
equitable procedure before a court do not apply to litigation related to public 
service, whether it involves the right of access to public service or the removal 
of a public employee, because such disputes do not address a right of a “civil” 
nature. However, the European court admitted the application of guarantees 
of a fair and equitable procedure before a court in two situations: (a) when the 
litigious claim addresses a “purely economic” right; or (b) when the nature of 
the functions or responsibilities of public servants do not involve participa-
tion in the exercise of public authority and their functions are not aimed at 
safeguarding the general interests of the state or of other public authorities.
procedural guarantees and vetting 
Beyond the differences in the case law of human rights bodies and courts, 
there is clearly a need to identify the procedural guarantees that should be put 
in place in vetting processes. The Secretary-General of the United Nations as 
well as other actors on the international scene have raised this question and 
provided responses.
 For his part, the United Nations Secretary-General has emphasized that 
“procedural protections should be afforded to all those subject to vetting 
processes, whether current employees or new applicants,”115 and that vetting 
mechanisms should operate “fairly, effectively and in accordance with inter-
national human rights standards.”116 In general, he identified the following 
procedural guarantees: the right of public servants or candidates for public 
service, during the investigation, to be informed of allegations against them 
and to be afforded the opportunity to respond before the entity in charge of 
the investigation; the right to be informed of the charges within a reasonable 
time; and the right to appeal an adverse decision to a court or other indepen-
dent body.117
 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, for its part, has 
noted the importance that vetting measures and the implementation of lus-
tration laws ensure “the right of defence, the presumption of innocence until 
proven guilty, and the right to appeal to a court of law.”118 The assembly has 
suggested that the states refer to the “Guidelines to ensure that lustration laws 
and similar administrative measures comply with the requirements of a state 
based on the rule of law.”119 These guidelines provide: “In no case may a per-
son be lustrated without his being furnished with full due process protection, 
including but not limited to the right to counsel (assigned if the subject can-
not afford to pay), to confront and challenge the evidence used against him, to 
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have access to all available inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, to present 
his own evidence, to have an open hearing if he requests it, and the right to 
appeal to an independent judicial tribunal.”120 
 Nonetheless, while the implementation of a regular and fair procedure 
accompanied by procedural guarantees is one of the key issues in vetting, it 
is no doubt difficult to establish a universal and single procedure for all situ-
ations and sectors of public service. At least two aspects should be taken into 
consideration, without this constituting an exhaustive list. First, and as noted 
above, vetting measures target several situations that have to do with different 
prerogatives of the state and that have to do with various human rights and 
duties of the state. Schematically, these can be summarized in two major situ-
ations involving vetting: measures geared to access to public service, through 
recruitment and appointment procedures; and measures involving the dis-
missal or removal of active-duty public officials and public servants. Second, 
vetting addresses the various forces and services of the state apparatus, both 
of the executive branch (especially the armed forces, police, and intelligence 
and security services) and other branches of government. Vetting proce-
dures should take into account the principle of separation of powers, which 
is inherent to the rule of law, particularly with a view to preserving the inde-
pendence of the judicial system. While certain procedural criteria could be 
established generally, as regards the judiciary and more particularly the enti-
ties involved in recruitment, appointment, and removal, clear rules should be 
assured to guarantee the independence of the judiciary. This encompasses its 
functional and structural independence as well as the personal independence 
of judges.
gENERAl CRITERIA 
Nonetheless, apart from these aspects, which require the adoption and imple-
mentation of specific procedures and mechanisms, it is possible to draw 
out certain general criteria for any vetting measure, be it for recruitment, 
appointment, or removal, and independent of the sector of the state appara-
tus. Accordingly, the following criteria should be heeded in establishing vet-
ting measures:
• Legitimacy. Vetting measures should have as their objective to “clean 
up” the state forces to remove individuals implicated in gross human 
rights violations and/or crimes, and to ensure access to and the regular 
exercise of public service, in keeping with the principles of the rule of 
law and respect for human rights. 
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• Safeguarding human rights. Vetting procedures should guarantee and 
safeguard the rights of persons who are targeted by such procedures, 
especially by offering them a legal remedy. They should, in particular, 
uphold the principle of nondiscrimination; the right of access to pub-
lic service in equal conditions; the right to be protected from attacks 
on honor and reputation; and the right to an effective remedy. 
• Objectivity. Vetting procedures should be based on objective and rea-
sonable criteria, setting aside any unlawful discrimination as well as 
prosecution based on political or ideological opinion. 
• Legality. Vetting measures and procedures should be governed by law 
so as to ensure they not be taken arbitrarily. Even if certain discretional 
powers may be granted for vetting, the conditions in which they are 
exercised should be established by law. 
• Individual application of vetting measures. Vetting measures, even col-
lective ones, must be based on the principle of individual responsibil-
ity, which includes the principles recognized in the area of command 
responsibility. Accordingly, they must set aside any form of objective 
or collective responsibility based, for example, on mere political affili-
ation or membership in the structures or services of the state. 
• Relative autonomy of vetting measures. Vetting measures should, in prin-
ciple, be autonomous in relation to criminal and disciplinary proce-
dures, properly speaking, and cannot replace them. Nonetheless, judi-
cial or disciplinary decisions ruling on the responsibility of the public 
servant or candidate for public service should be taken into account in 
vetting.
As regards the procedures themselves, a distinction should be made between 
vetting in relation to access to public service (recruitment and/or appoint-
ment) and vetting in relation to the exercise of public service (measures to dis-
miss or remove). 
CRITERIA ANd PROCEdURAl gUARANTEES  
IN RElATION TO ACCESS TO PUBlIC SERVICE 
As regards access to public service, vetting procedures should take into 
account the principles of merit and equal opportunity associated with access 
to public service, and the technical competence, objective qualifications, 
and integrity of applicants. They should also respect and ensure the right of 
access to public service in generally equal conditions, and the principle of 
nondiscrimination. 
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 The procedures should also provide for a phase of investigation and veri-
fication of the background of a candidate to a public service post. This stage 
should be under the responsibility of an independent, impartial, and compe-
tent body. The members who make up that body should be chosen for their 
impartiality, competence, and personal independence, especially with respect 
to the person subject to the investigation and verification. This body in charge 
of investigation and verification should be different from the one in charge 
of making the appointment. In the case of the selection and appointment of 
judges, the body in charge of the investigation and verification, and that in 
charge of the appointment, should be a judicial body that meets the condi-
tions of independence and impartiality.
 In the investigation and verification process, the candidate for public 
service should be informed of any allegations against him or her, especially 
regarding his or her involvement in human rights violations or crimes, and 
he or she should be afforded an opportunity to respond to them before the 
organ entrusted with the investigation. The victims of the acts attributed to 
the candidate for public service or their family members, as well as any per-
son who has a legitimate interest, should be afforded an opportunity to put 
forth their points of view in the procedure, at least in the stage of investiga-
tion and verification of the candidate’s background. 
 Finally, the procedures should provide for the right to a judicial remedy to 
challenge the decision, accompanied by effective guarantees. 
CRITERIA ANd PROCEdURAl gUARANTEES  
RElATEd TO REmOVAl 
As regards vetting that involves removal or dismissal, the procedures should 
ensure the following minimal procedural guarantees for public officials or 
public servants:
• The right to prior and detailed notice of the allegations or conduct 
attributed to the person in question. 
• The right to respond and defend oneself from the allegations and 
attribution of conduct, in keeping with the principles of equality of 
arms and adversarial proceedings, which implies: having the time and 
facilities needed to prepare one’s arguments; access to the documents 
needed for this purpose; the opportunity to present one’s own evi-
dence; and the right to be assisted by counsel. 
• The right to the presumption of innocence.
• The right to a public hearing. 
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• The right to have the procedure conducted in a sufficiently and rea-
sonably expeditious manner. 
• The right to review of a decision to remove or dismiss by a body inde-
pendent of the organ in charge of the appointment. 
• The right to appeal an adverse decision to a court.
The body in charge of the procedure may be judicial or nonjudicial, but in 
any event it must satisfy the conditions and guarantees of independence and 
impartiality. To that end, the public servant who is subject to the vetting pro-
cedure should have the right to challenge the independence and impartiality 
of the members or the body in charge of the procedure. In the case of proce-
dures against judges, the body in charge should be judicial, so as to guarantee 
the principle of separation of powers.
 The stage of investigation and verification of conduct attributed to a pub-
lic servant should be ensured by a body or officials different from the body 
that rules on the dismissal. This division of labor allows for a more impartial 
procedure. The members of such a body or the official in charge of the inves-
tigation should be chosen for their impartiality, competence, and personal 
independence. They should also be independent vis-à-vis both the public ser-
vant being looked into in the vetting procedure and the institutions or body 
that employ him. This last aspect is of the utmost importance for avoiding 
any “solidarity” or esprit de corps such as one finds in the armed forces and 
other state security services. 
 The victims of the acts attributed to the public servant, or members of 
their families, as well as any person who has a legitimate interest, should be 
afforded the opportunity to uphold their points of view and to produce docu-
ments or evidence in the procedure. It would also be useful for the institu-
tion in charge of overseeing the public administration and respect for human 
rights, such as the ombudspersons and other national institutions on human 
rights, to be associated with the procedure. 
final considerations
The question of vetting proceedings — that is, measures aimed at screening 
and excluding from public service persons implicated in gross human rights 
violations and/or crimes — is crucial for the effectiveness of the rule of law, 
the strengthening, construction, or reconstruction of a state that guarantees 
human rights, and the restoration of the public’s confidence. If vetting is aimed 
at ensuring that persons who have committed crimes or gross human rights 
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violations do not have access to public service or are removed from it, there is 
a need to ensure that the proceedings guarantee the rights of persons who are 
subject to a vetting process. To do so, vetting processes should be based on 
objective criteria, conducted by independent and impartial bodies, and pro-
vide procedural guarantees to the persons concerned. Fair procedures, with 
basic guarantees, are a vital element of vetting proceedings and distinguish 
them from generalized purges.
Translated by Charles H. Roberts.
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introduction
Vetting in post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitional situations is a 
complex phenomenon, and various plausible aims can legitimately be sought 
through vetting. In this chapter, I argue that transitional vetting should pri-
marily be understood as a measure to reform abusive institutions. How-
ever, as a stand-alone measure, vetting is generally insufficient to ensure that 
abuses are not repeated. A coherent and holistic approach to transitional 
reform is necessary — albeit not sufficient — to effectively prevent abuses from 
recurring. Reform measures to promote institutional integrity and legitimacy 
are particularly important to address a legacy of abuse and prevent its recur-
rence in societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule. These include, 
in addition to vetting, structural reforms to provide accountability, build 
independence, ensure representation, and increase responsiveness, as well as 
verbal and symbolic measures that reaffirm a commitment to overcome the 
legacy of abuse and an endorsement of democratic norms and values. Beyond 
transforming abusive institutions, a coherent and holistic approach to transi-
tional reform will also seek to empower the subjects of state oppression and 
victims of conflict-related violence to recognize themselves and be recognized 
as rights-bearing citizens.
 As an institutional measure, vetting needs to be adapted to the reform 
needs of a specific transitional situation and integrated in a coherent institu-
tional reform strategy. The case studies in part 1 of this volume reveal that, in 
practice, the design of transitional vetting varies considerably. In the conclud-
ing section of this chapter, I identify a number of normative criteria and con-
textual conditions to guide the design of a vetting process in order to effec-
tively contribute to preventing the recurrence of abuses.
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vetting to reform abusive institutions
A principal rationale for putting in place vetting processes in societies 
emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule is to transform abusive institu-
tions in order to prevent the recurrence of abuses. In post-conflict Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for instance, a vetting process was established for the police 
mainly because the continued presence of police officers who had committed 
abuses during the conflict was seen as a primary reason for continued dis-
criminatory law enforcement and ongoing abuse.1 Relevant decisions, com-
ments, and opinions by international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, as well 
as related United Nations documents, also understand vetting as this type of 
measure.2 In its observations on state party reports, the Human Rights Com-
mittee regularly recommended, as a measure of prevention, the exclusion 
from public service of serving employees and applicants who were involved 
in serious abuses.3 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stated, for 
instance, that “subjecting a person to official, repressive bodies that practice 
torture and assassination with impunity is. . . a breach of the duty to pre-
vent.”4 Similarly, the United Nations Principles to Combat Impunity empha-
size the administrative-preventive character of vetting5 and list the removal 
of public employees who are responsible for serious abuses as a principal 
institutional reform measure to prevent recurrence.6 In another example, a 
report of the United Nations Secretary-General states that “vetting the pub-
lic service. . . can play an important role in enhancing the legitimacy of official 
structures.”7 
 Others have argued that vetting and the exclusion of abusers is primarily a 
sanction.8 Exclusions from public service provide some sanction as they take 
away or preempt employment, public authority, and other privileges and ben-
efits of public office. The victims of abuses may experience some satisfaction 
in seeing that abuse is not rewarded with public privileges. The exclusion from 
public service of abusers can make victims feel recognized because it mani-
fests the seriousness with which the state takes the violation of their rights.9 
The sanction effect of vetting is particularly significant in situations where 
the scarcity of resources in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian context, as 
well as legal impediments and large numbers of crimes, preclude the crimi-
nal prosecution of many abusers, creating a so-called impunity gap.10 Vetting 
can help to fill the impunity gap by ensuring that those who are responsible 
for past abuses but are not criminally prosecuted are at least excluded from 
public service. While this provides a partial, noncriminal sanction, however, 
it is not an adequate sanction for serious abuses and should not be used as 
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a pretext for abandoning criminal prosecutions entirely.11 Substituting a vet-
ting process for criminal prosecutions is likely to be perceived by the victims 
of abuses as “cheap” justice, letting criminals off the hook.
 While punitive justifications play a role in establishing vetting processes, 
there are good reasons to understand vetting and the exclusion from public 
service of persons who committed serious abuses primarily as a measure 
of institutional reform.12 Citizens, and particularly victims of abuses, are 
unlikely to rely on institutions that retain or hire abusive individuals. Such 
institutions are unlikely to be trusted because their members committed 
serious abuses in the past; the continued employment of these people gives 
citizens, particularly the victims, little reason to be confident that things have 
changed and that abuses will not go on. This will be the case even more if the 
institutions not only keep on abusive members but also hire individuals who 
are known to have committed abuses.13 This lack of trust will make it difficult 
for such institutions to function effectively. To give an example, citizens will 
hesitate to report crimes to an abusive police because they cannot trust it to 
produce expected outcomes. As a result, the police will not be able to effec-
tively investigate and prevent crimes, and the citizens are likely to resort to 
alternative means to resolve insecurity and violence, possibly by taking the 
law into their own hands. Vetting processes help to reestablish civic trust and 
to relegitimize public institutions by excluding from them persons who have 
committed serious abuses in the past and have breached the trust of the citi-
zens they were meant to serve. Vetting contributes to establishing trustwor-
thy and, therefore, effective public institutions that respect and protect basic 
standards.14
 There is a second reason to consider vetting as a measure of institutional 
reform. In a post-conflict or post-authoritarian setting, public employees may 
well continue to use informal networks within which they carried out abuses 
in the past. Such organized networks may destabilize fragile public institu-
tions, resist the institutional reform process, and perhaps even undermine 
the objectives of the transition. Vetting and the exclusion of abusers, partic-
ularly from senior management positions, also contribute to disabling such 
structures. A frequently stated purpose of lustrations processes in Central 
and Eastern Europe was, for instance, to reduce the threat posed by former 
communist officials to undermine the transition to democracy.15 Disman-
tling criminal networks in public institutions and disabling abusive structures 
constitute important contributions to institutional reform in post-conflict or 
post-authoritarian settings and help to prevent the recurrence of abuses.16
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linkages with other reforms
As a reform measure, vetting affects the general functioning of the institution 
and relates in different ways to other institutional reform efforts. Taking into 
consideration these relationships and adopting a coherent reform approach 
can help to ensure the effectiveness of the vetting process itself and the insti-
tutional reform effort as a whole. First, a vetting process can have significant 
effects on the overall functioning of a public institution. A vetting process may, 
for instance, result in the removal of a significant number of public employ-
ees or may focus, in particular, on senior employees in key management posi-
tions. A vetting process may even involve the disbandment of an institution 
and the establishment of a renewed institution. The potential negative effects 
of vetting on the institution and its environment, particularly the risks of gov-
ernance gaps and increased criminality, need to be considered in the design of 
a vetting process itself, and other institutional reform measures may have to 
be considered alongside the vetting process to avoid or mitigate to the great-
est extent possible these effects.
 Second, other institutional reform measures could target the same pub-
lic positions as a vetting process, and these different processes could adversely 
impact each other. In post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, an entire 
public sector may have to be changed in order to meet the needs of states 
governed by the rule of law. Institutions might have to be merged or consoli-
dated, reduced in size or enlarged, newly created or abolished. The personnel 
composition of an institution might have to be modified to reflect the com-
position of the population, and ex-combatants might have to be integrated. 
Such sectoral and institutional reforms determine the number of positions in 
a public institution, affect the job requirements for individual positions, and 
limit the number of posts available for persons from each gender, ethnic and 
religious group, or geographic region. Vetting processes that are not coordi-
nated with such reforms may result in screening for posts that no longer exist 
or have different job requirements. Reform measures affecting positions that 
are also subject to vetting need to be carefully coordinated and sequenced 
with vetting processes in order to avoid adverse interactions between differ-
ent institutional reform processes.
 Third, other institutional reforms may help to safeguard a vetting process’ 
outcomes. A vetting process will be of little use, for instance, if appointments 
continue to be made arbitrarily and if the outcomes of a vetting process can 
be reversed informally by executive decision. Reform measures that help to 
prevent the reversal of the outcomes of a vetting process include, in particu-
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lar, efforts to establish merit-based recruitment, appointment and dismissal 
procedures, and other measures to stop political interference and to provide 
genuine separation of governmental powers.
 Finally and critically, vetting as a stand-alone reform measure is generally 
insufficient to prevent the recurrence of abuse and has to be accompanied 
by other institutional reforms to ensure the effectiveness of the overall reform 
effort. More often than not, the shortcomings of public institutions in societ-
ies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule are multifaceted and repre-
sent interrelated causes of malfunctioning and abuse. The multidimensional 
nature of the transitional reform challenge makes it generally necessary to 
complement vetting with other institutional reform measures and requires a 
holistic and coherent approach to institutional reform that may entail a com-
plex, resource-intensive, and lengthy process.17
two types of vetting, two approaches  
to institutional reform18
The case studies in part 1 of this volume reveal that, in practice, the design of 
vetting varies considerably. Two basic types of vetting processes stand out, 
however, in transitional settings: review and (re)appointment. A discussion of 
these two types underscores the institutional character of transitional vetting, 
reveals how these two types of vetting are related to two distinct approaches 
to institutional reform in transitional settings, and provides further indica-
tions why vetting should be coordinated with or accompanied by other insti-
tutional reform measures. 
 Review and (re)appointment can be distinguished by the category of per-
sons they primarily target: serving employees of a public institution or candi-
dates for service in a public institution. I take a review process to refer to the 
screening of the first category because it implies examining the background 
of serving employees and the removal of those who are found unsuitable 
for public service because they have been involved in serious abuses.19 The 
screening of the second category can be described as a (re)appointment pro-
cess because it involves examining the background of candidates for public 
service and the selection of those who are found most suitable. These may 
include both reappointed former public employees and newly appointed per-
sons who did not hold a position in the public service.
 More fundamentally, however, the two types of processes represent 
distinct approaches to reforming abusive institutions. The first approach 
represents the gradual restructuring of a continuously existing institution. The 
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abusive institution, with its employees, remains in place but is transformed 
by means of targeted reform interventions including vetting, which in this 
context takes the form of reviewing serving employees. The second approach 
to institutional reform involves the disbandment of the abusive institution and 
the establishment of a renewed institution. In this instance, vetting takes the 
form of screening candidates for appointment in public service.
 Vetting in transitional settings is commonly understood in terms of a 
review process.20 And, in fact, the most significant historical and recent 
examples of transitional vetting generally represent processes of “screen[ing] 
out” individuals who were involved in abuses.21 The terms describing many 
of these processes connote an understanding of removal from public service 
of unsuitable employees: denazification, purification, purging, lustration, 
decommunization, and de-Baathification.22 Most case studies in this volume 
describe various forms of review, including in Argentina, former East Ger-
many, Greece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, police vetting in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and military vetting in El Salvador.23 In the context of the 
United Nations, vetting is generally also understood in terms of a review pro-
cess24 and reflects, in particular, efforts in Latin America to remove human 
rights abusers from the security sector.25
 A review process aims to remove from public service those employees 
who were involved in serious abuses. Doing so fulfills a preventive function 
by helping to disable structures and networks within which these employ-
ees carried out the abuses. Removing abusers can also weaken sources of 
resistance to institutional reform and facilitate the implementation of other 
transitional justice measures. Moreover, replacing untrustworthy employees 
with new, more trustworthy ones can help to increase the legitimacy of an 
institution. Review as a measure of reforming abusive institutions can also 
help to provide recognition to victims of violence and state repression in that 
it acknowledges them as citizens with rights, duties, and legitimate needs. 
Finally, a review process can contribute to institutional reform in a different 
way. In addition to the presence of abusive public employees, the existence 
of incompetent employees is another recurring cause of the malfunctioning 
and lack of legitimacy of public institutions in transitional contexts. A review 
process can be used to replace not only abusive but also incompetent pub-
lic employees, thereby making a further important contribution to effective 
reform.
 However, the shortcomings of public institutions in societies emerging 
from conflict or authoritarian rule are often multifaceted, and transitional 
contexts are frequently marked by a fundamental crisis of trust in the public 
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sector. Although a review process can help to address some causes of mal-
functioning and contribute to increasing the legitimacy of public institu-
tions, it may not suffice to transform them into effective and actually trusted 
public bodies. A review process is limited in scope to replacing abusive and 
incompetent public employees. Broader, structural deficiencies, such as pro-
moting minority or gender representation or decreasing the overall number 
of personnel, are difficult to achieve just by removing abusive or incompe-
tent employees. In a review process, such broader concerns can be taken into 
consideration only within the scope of the appointment of replacements for 
removed employees or in separate reform activities. The Ad Hoc Commis-
sion in El Salvador, for instance, only vetted the military’s officer corps, while 
broader changes were accomplished by a deep and comprehensive reform of 
the armed forces.26 In former East Germany, vetting was just one part of a 
broader downsizing of the public sector.27 Complementing a review process 
with other reforms will often be necessary to address such structural deficien-
cies. Moreover, changing public perceptions of and promoting trust in a pub-
lic institution that was involved in serious abuses in the past may prove par-
ticularly difficult. In addition to actual structural reforms, verbal or symbolic 
measures that reaffirm a commitment to overcoming the legacy of abuse and 
an endorsement of democratic norms and values may help to build public 
trust in the institution.28
 When significant structural changes are necessary and the abusive insti-
tution is strongly distrusted, disbanding the institution and establishing a 
new one by (re)appointing all personnel represents a possible alternative to 
gradual restructuring through a review process.29 The vetting of the police in 
El Salvador described in this volume offers an example of a (re)appointment 
process.30 Disbandment and reestablishment generally provide an exceptional 
opportunity for general structural reforms that go beyond simply replacing 
individual personnel; in addition, the (re)appointment process itself allows for 
much broader personnel reforms, which are often necessary in transitional 
settings but difficult to achieve in a review process. In post-Dayton Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for instance, efforts to promote minority representation in the 
police by means of the review process conducted by the United Nations were 
of limited success, and an additional, special program was needed.31 Consid-
erable increases or reductions in personnel, or significant changes in the com-
position of personnel (which may be necessary to raise the representation of 
minorities or women or to implement significant organizational changes), can 
be achieved more easily when an institution is created de novo and its person-
nel is reestablished in a (re)appointment process.32 The (re)appointment of 
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judges and prosecutors implemented by the High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Councils in Bosnia and Herzegovina was more successful in restoring an eth-
nic balance in the judiciary and the prosecutors’ offices than the review of the 
police conducted by the United Nations.33 (It should be noted that an insuf-
ficient number of qualified minority applicants and the resistance of minority 
candidates to return to their places of origin, however, caused delays in the 
appointments and resulted in a high percentage of reappointments of incum-
bent judges and prosecutors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Changes in the com-
position of personnel by means of a (re)appointment process are limited by 
the availability of alternative candidates for recruitment.)34
 A (re)appointment process not only opens the way for broader reforms but 
may also provide a better opportunity than a review process to overcome the 
kind of deep crisis of trust in the public sector that is common in transitional 
situations. Disbanding the abusive institution, creating a new institution, and 
(re)appointing all personnel (of course, on the basis of merit and under trans-
parent and fair conditions) send a strong signal of a clear break with the past 
and a commitment to norms and values, more so than does a review process. 
(Re)appointing all personnel changes more than just a few faces within the 
institution — it changes the face of the institution itself.35
 On the other hand, a (re)appointment process may create difficulties that 
can be avoided more easily in a review process. Disbanding institutions does 
not only risk increasing criminality, creating security problems, and desta-
bilizing the transition by concurrently laying off a large number of public 
employees who may have the criminal know-how and the means to use force, 
who may have been involved in abuses in the past, and who may generally 
resist a transition that undermines their positions of power. Disbanding insti-
tutions can also create a governance gap if no effective provisions for alterna-
tive services are put in place and if replacements are scarce or take a long time 
to be identified. “De-Baathified” Iraq provides an example of both an increase 
in criminality and security gaps that resulted from the dissolution of the old 
army.36 In contrast, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina circumvented a breakdown of the judicial and prosecutorial 
services by keeping serving judges and prosecutors in place until such time as 
a (re)appointment decision had been made that would either reconfirm the 
incumbents in their positions or replace them with other candidates.37
 A (re)appointment process also represents a more substantive and far-
reaching intervention than a review process, one that can provide signifi-
cant opportunities for political manipulation and arbitrary interference in 
the workings of otherwise independently operating governmental sectors. 
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A (re)appointment process should, therefore, be limited to circumstances in 
which the public institution is fundamentally dysfunctional and when the 
necessary reforms are unlikely to be accomplished without it, or only at sig-
nificantly higher cost. A (re)appointment process should also make provisions 
to safeguard the separation of powers.38 Particular care has to be taken to pro-
tect the independence of the judiciary. In general, vetting and (re)appointing 
judges should be carried out by an independent commission of their peers.
 The differences between the two types of processes regarding the status of 
the persons undergoing vetting have considerable procedural consequences. In 
a review process, a serving employee risks being removed from public service 
or another curtailment of her employment rights such as suspension, trans-
fer, denial of promotion, demotion, or early retirement. In the determination 
of this possible limitation of a right, the public employee should be afforded 
the fundamental procedural guarantees that apply to an administrative due 
process of law.39 These include, in particular, initiation of proceedings within 
a reasonable time and generally in public; notification of the employee of the 
proceedings and the case against her; an opportunity for the person to prepare 
a defense, including access to relevant data; an opportunity for her to present 
arguments and evidence, and to respond to opposing arguments and evidence, 
before the vetting body; the opportunity of being represented by counsel; noti-
fication of the person of the decision and the reasons for the decision; and the 
right to appeal to a court or other independent body. An exception to this is 
that an employee who was unlawfully appointed can be removed without the 
need to further establish other reasons for her removal.40
 The procedural status of a candidate in a (re)appointment process is dif-
ferent. She does not risk removal or another infringement of an employment 
right but aims and hopes to be selected for public service. Access to public 
employment as such is not a right, and a candidate who challenges the fact that 
she has not been selected does not enjoy the due process protections that are 
granted to an employee who is removed from public service. (Re)appointment 
processes are, therefore, procedurally less complex than review processes. A 
candidate for public employment has, however, a right to “access, on general 
terms of equality, to public service.”41 Access to public service should, there-
fore, be based on criteria of equality, and the selection process should ensure 
equal application conditions and nondiscriminatory procedures. In case a 
candidate is not selected, she should have the opportunity to challenge the 
decision in court.42
 Review and (re)appointment processes also reveal broader procedural dif-
ferences that may have considerable implications for the design of a vetting 
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process. Review processes require two screening steps of a different kind: not 
only do the serving employees need to be screened, but so do the potential 
candidates to replace those who were removed. The required double effort 
adds a layer of complexity and may place an additional burden on a review 
process in terms of kind and amount of resources needed, in particular when 
a large number of employees has to be replaced.43 In a reappointment pro-
cess, on the other hand, all candidates can be screened in one turn. However, 
the number of applicants in a (re)appointment process may be significantly 
larger, particularly if it involves a general, open competition for all posts.
 The case studies in this volume show that review and (re)appointment rep-
resent distinct options of vetting in transitional settings. In the abstract, either 
option is possible and offers the distinct opportunities and risks that I have 
examined above. Choices about a type (and its variants) can only take place in 
concretu, weighing the opportunities and risks in their application to a specific 
context, and integrating vetting into a comprehensive institutional reform 
strategy.
institutional reform beyond vetting
A holistic and coherent approach to institutional reform in post-conflict or 
post-authoritarian settings will not only address shortcomings at the level of 
individual members of public institutions but will also look into structural 
deficiencies. Moreover, a holistic reform approach will situate the institu-
tion within its environment and possibly lead to changes in the institution’s 
role and functioning, as well as in the institution’s relationships with other 
actors. The choice of concrete reform measures will also significantly depend 
on the specific context, and there are considerable differences between post-
conflict and post-authoritarian settings. The possible measures comprise a 
broad range of activities including the provision of training, the revision of 
laws, the development of regulations and operating procedures, as well as the 
reform of organizational structures, information systems, and management 
practices. This raises a range of complex issues that are discussed, in par-
ticular, in the literature on governance and security system reform.44 In the 
remainder of this chapter, I aim to single out those measures of institutional 
reform that are generally critical, in addition to vetting, to address a legacy 
of abuse and to prevent its recurrence in societies emerging from conflict or 
authoritarian rule.
 The most massive and systematic abuses are generally committed by 
agencies and groups that possess the means to exercise coercive force, that 
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is, armed forces, law enforcement and other security agencies, and unofficial, 
nonstatutory armed groups. An effective strategy to prevent abuse should, 
therefore, give priority to these agencies and groups. Unofficial armed groups 
will generally have to be disbanded, and their members will have to be demo-
bilized or integrated into regular state institutions.45 The reform of armed 
forces will focus, in particular, on disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating 
surplus personnel into civilian life, demilitarizing the law enforcement sector, 
and limiting the role of armed forces to external defense functions. 
 Law enforcement agencies will maintain mandates to provide public safety 
that require the exercise of organized, coercive force including the powers to 
arrest, to detain, and to use deadly force.46 They will remain the most direct 
and visible manifestation of state authority. The use of organized, coercive 
force by law enforcement agencies, the secret and clandestine nature of much 
of their work, and the vast opportunities for political interference result in 
high risks of adverse effects on basic standards and make these agencies par-
ticularly prone to abuse.47 This is especially true in the fragile contexts of soci-
eties emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, when abusive law enforce-
ment agencies can subvert the rule of law and undermine the transition itself. 
The following sections focus, therefore, on the reform of law enforcement 
agencies.48
 Providing skills training to law enforcement personnel, supplying 
resources, and increasing organizational efficiency to overcome individual 
and organizational capacity deficits of law enforcement agencies is often the 
focus of international assistance to institutional reform in post-conflict or 
post-authoritarian settings. For instance, initial efforts to reform the police in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina after the signing in 1995 of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment concentrated on establishing a police academy; on providing basic and 
advanced training, as well as on-the-job training by placing international 
police officers alongside local officers; on restoring infrastructure; and on 
providing equipment, while comprehensive and fundamental institutional 
reforms lagged behind and moved ahead slowly. An effective vetting process 
started only in 1999 and many critical structural deficits were only addressed 
thereafter.49 In general, however, capacity deficits such as lack of skills and 
equipment are not the only and often not even the most significant shortcom-
ings of law enforcement agencies in post-conflict or post-authoritarian set-
tings. In fact, abusive agencies are often remarkably “efficient” in using their 
skills and resources for abusive purposes. The Yugoslav police, for instance, 
was a founding member of Interpol, and the police forces in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina were arguably efficient in imposing “ethnic cleansing” during the 
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conflict of 1992–95.50 An exclusive focus in the post-conflict or post-authori-
tarian period on strengthening the capacity of abusive law enforcement agen-
cies carries the risk of assisting their members to continue their practices, and 
possibly even enabling “more efficient abuse.” Addressing a legacy of abuse 
should, therefore, not be limited to developing an agency’s capacities but 
must also deal with the means its members employ and the ends they pursue 
in the use of these capacities. This is what I call the integrity dimension of 
public service.51
 In post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, integrity-building reform 
measures will aim, at a minimum, to ensure that the members of a law 
enforcement agency refrain from committing serious abuses. Beyond this 
minimalist standard, integrity-building reforms will promote a public service 
that equitably responds to the needs of all citizens. Promoting the integrity 
of an abusive law enforcement agency may require a fundamental shift in the 
focus of its members: from serving the state, an authoritarian regime, or par-
tisan interest groups to serving the citizens; from oppression, impunity, and 
arbitrariness to service, public accountability, and legality; and from provok-
ing fear to responding to the public’s needs.
 Building the integrity of a law enforcement agency also promotes its legiti-
macy and citizens will have more reason to trust an agency that is not abusive 
but responsive to their needs. Integrity-building reforms may, however, not 
be sufficient to overcome the fundamental crisis of trust that is characteristic 
of societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule.52 A legacy of mas-
sive and systematic abuse can continue to undermine the legitimacy of a law 
enforcement agency after conflict or authoritarian rule have come to an end 
as the citizens, particularly the victims of abuses, do not know if — and often 
have good reason to doubt that — the members of the agency truly share and 
abide by its basic norms and values. Post-conflict and post-authoritarian set-
tings are, therefore, frequently characterized by a basic lack of trust in law 
enforcement agencies. As noted earlier, an agency that is not trusted will find 
it difficult to function effectively because it is unlikely to be relied upon by 
citizens who are not confident that the agency will provide for their needs and 
produce expected outcomes. 
measures to build institutional integrity and legitimacy
In addition to integrity-building measures, specific legitimacy-building mea-
sures can help to overcome a fundamental crisis of trust and to transform 
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untrustworthy law enforcement agencies into trusted ones.53 This section first 
describes integrity-building measures and then specific measures to build the 
legitimacy of law enforcement agencies.
 Institutional reform measures that seek to build the integrity and legiti-
macy of law enforcement agencies can be divided into two groups: mea-
sures targeting individual members of an agency; and measures targeting 
institutional and sectoral structures. Each of the measures can contribute 
to (re)establishing the integrity and legitimacy of law enforcement agencies. 
None of these measures, however, is likely to restore on its own the integrity 
and legitimacy of an agency that carries the burden of a legacy of massive and 
systematic abuse. Individual reform measures contribute most effectively to 
restoring the integrity and legitimacy of an agency when they are constitu-
tive elements of a coherent and, therefore, credible reform effort. Institutional 
reform will be even more credible and effective when it forms part of a com-
prehensive transitional justice policy.54
REfORm mEASURES TARgETINg INdIVIdUAl mEmBERS Of AN AgENCy
In addition to vetting and the exclusion of abusive employees, integrity-build-
ing reform efforts that target individual members of a law enforcement agency 
include, in particular, positive measures such as human rights training and 
other professional standards training. Such training aims at increasing the 
knowledge and understanding of professional standards in order to change 
attitudes and behavior on the basis of insight. In the recent past, the inter-
national community has made significant efforts to develop internationally-
accepted professional standards, particularly in the judicial and law enforce-
ment sectors. These include, among others, international and regional codes 
of conduct for law enforcement officials, principles on the independence of 
the judiciary, guidelines on the role of prosecutors, principles for the treat-
ment of prisoners, principles on the use of firearms, and anticorruption stan-
dards.55 In post-conflict and post-authoritarian settings, international gov-
ernmental and nongovernmental organizations regularly invest significant 
efforts and resources in professional standards training for law enforcement 
and other security agencies. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
for instance, frequently conducts human rights and professional standards 
training in countries emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule.56 Other 
international organizations active in this field include the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, the UN Development Program, the UN Children’s Fund, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization for Security 
mAyER-RIECkh
496
and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and many other interna-
tional and regional governmental and nongovernmental organizations. 
 The effects of training programs on actual conduct are difficult to assess 
and I am not aware of any comprehensive impact assessments of such train-
ing. Circumstantial evidence from post-conflict and post-authoritarian set-
tings, however, raises doubts about the effectiveness of stand-alone training 
efforts in the absence of structural reforms.57 Training without accompany-
ing structural reforms may raise doubts both among the members of the law 
enforcement agency and among citizens about the sincerity of the reform 
effort. In societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule, environ-
mental pressures, lack of alternatives, and habit are likely to provide greater 
incentives than training without structural reforms and to result in continued 
abuse. And citizens are unlikely to trust a reform effort that appeals to insight 
only but does not establish mechanisms to sanction abuse.58
REfORm mEASURES TARgETINg INSTITUTIONAl  
ANd SECTORAl STRUCTURES
The absence of certain structural arrangements facilitates the commission 
of abuse. Political systems, for instance, that lack an effective separation of 
governmental powers are more open to partisan political interference by the 
executive with the judiciary or the law enforcement agencies. Situations of 
crisis such as conflict or authoritarian challenges to the political system fre-
quently lead to the erosion of protective structures and abusive actors regu-
larly benefit from their absence. Institutional and sectoral reforms in transi-
tional settings will, therefore, aim to put in place structural arrangements that 
discourage or even prevent the commission of abuse. Four areas of structural 
reforms are generally critical to preventing the recurrence of abuse by law 
enforcement agencies in such settings: providing accountability; building 
independence; ensuring representation; and increasing responsiveness. Addi-
tional verbal or symbolic measures will further promote the legitimacy of law 
enforcement agencies in transitional settings.
accoUnTabIlITy
Accountability means being answerable for one’s actions.59 Accountabil-
ity mechanisms are vehicles of answerability. They provide checks to assess 
whether the actions of members of law enforcement agencies adhere to pre-
scribed standards and they ensure sanctions for abusive conduct. Without 
accountability, the commission of abuses remains without consequences and 
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integrity matters little. The result is a climate of impunity that facilitates the 
commission of further abuses. A lack of accountability points to an insuffi-
cient commitment to integrity. 
 Establishing effective accountability mechanisms is particularly important 
for building the integrity and legitimacy of law enforcement agencies that have 
been involved in massive and systematic abuses in the past and experience a 
fundamental crisis of legitimacy. In general, accountability mechanisms for 
law enforcement agencies can oversee both the conduct of their members and 
their performance in providing public safety. Although it is generally impor-
tant that the members of law enforcement agencies are accountable for both 
conduct and performance, building integrity and legitimacy requires, in par-
ticular, the establishment of effective accountability mechanisms to monitor 
the professional conduct of the members of law enforcement agencies and 
end impunity for serious abuses. Such mechanisms help not only to address 
past abuses but also to stop ongoing abuses and ensure that future abuses do 
not go unpunished.
 Formal accountability mechanisms to monitor the conduct of the mem-
bers of law enforcement agencies can be grouped in two levels:60 internal 
accountability such as ethics codes, line supervision, and internal discipline; 
and external oversight such as ombudsperson services, legislative commit-
tees, civilian complaint review bodies, criminal liability, and civil liability.61 In 
addition to internal accountability and external oversight, census and identi-
fication processes — of the sort described below — are particularly relevant to 
establishing accountability and preventing the recurrence of abuse in societ-
ies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule. Strictly speaking, census and 
identification constitutes not an accountability mechanism but a process that 
creates certain necessary conditions for accountability.
 As a result of conflict, membership in law enforcement agencies with large 
numbers of personnel is often not clearly defined and the number of person-
nel is unknown. Frequently, the boundaries of such agencies are fluid and 
porous.62 Following authoritarian rule, information on membership in law 
enforcement agencies is often not accessible, there are different levels of affili-
ation with the agencies, and clandestine networks with their members and 
informal associates may continue to operate. Such circumstances promote 
a culture of impunity that facilitates the arbitrary and illegal exercise of law 
enforcement powers. A census and identification process clarifies the number of 
members of an agency, individually identifies them, and stops persons from 
informally joining and departing from law enforcement agencies. The census 
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consists in registering, in accordance with basic and commonly agreed-upon 
criteria of membership such as being included in a personnel list, all members 
of a law enforcement agency. During identification, each member is issued a 
personal identifier such as an identification card that recognizes the person as 
a member. The census and identification helps to determine the boundaries 
of a law enforcement agency, allows the state to (re)establish control over its 
agencies and their members, and permits citizens to identify who is autho-
rized to exercise law enforcement powers and who is illegally impersonating 
a law enforcement official and should be sanctioned. Knowing, identifying, 
and being able to identify both the members of a law enforcement agency 
and persons illegally impersonating law enforcement personnel is critical to 
ending abuse and constitutes an important early step in establishing account-
ability and the rule of law. Census and identification processes also provide 
the basis for effective and efficient personnel management systems including 
recruitment, appointment, discipline, and dismissal procedures.63
 During conflict or authoritarian rule, not only are abuses committed but 
professional standards are frequently not clearly defined, processes to enforce 
them do not exist or are dysfunctional, and law enforcement power is exer-
cised in a realm of arbitrariness and secrecy. Internal accountability mecha-
nisms are aimed at addressing these deficiencies. Effective internal discipline 
mechanisms are systems within law enforcement agencies to monitor, inves-
tigate, and report on conduct of their members and sanction abuses in accor-
dance with defined and known professional standards.64 Such mechanisms 
help to build a common work ethic that disapproves of abusive practices. In 
post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, it will frequently be necessary to 
revise rules and regulations and codes of conduct emphasizing the service 
nature of law enforcement; to improve information collection, management, 
and analysis systems to track officials with particularly high numbers of com-
plaints; and to establish professional and well-resourced internal investiga-
tion bodies with accessible public complaint offices. In addition to discipline 
mechanisms, internal procedures to review the use of force and firearms are 
particularly important. Among the various functions of law enforcement, the 
use of coercive force and firearms carries the greatest risk of serious abuses. 
Formalized internal procedures will help to identify both misconduct and 
effective remedies.65
 Effective external oversight is another important accountability mechanism 
to prevent the recurrence of abuses by law enforcement agencies.66 External 
oversight mechanisms for the law enforcement sector are not only important 
to ensure that basic standards are respected in the provision of security, they 
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also play a critical role in building the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies. 
Both the independence of external oversight from the agencies it monitors and 
the publicity of its operations increase public confidence in the effectiveness 
and fairness of accountability. The tasks of external oversight mechanisms 
vary and include review functions (monitoring, taking and investigating com-
plaints, sanctioning abuses, identifying systemic root causes, and proposing 
remedies) and policy functions (overseeing, at the policy and strategic level, 
the functioning and operations of security agencies). External oversight bod-
ies can have independent enforcement powers (investigations and discipline) 
or play supervisory and advisory roles (referral of complaints and oversight of 
investigations and discipline).67 External oversight mechanisms of the secu-
rity sector comprise independent civilian oversight bodies, legislative and 
executive oversight functions, and the prosecutors and the courts. External 
oversight bodies will be more effective and will avoid the risk of turning into 
another instrument of political interference if they are broadly legitimized, 
enjoy independence, and function with transparency.
 Experience in security sector governance suggests that internal discipline 
and external oversight functions complement each other.68 Internal discipline 
mechanisms alone run the risk of giving in to internal pressures and an inap-
propriate esprit de corps that is commonly found in law enforcement agen-
cies, and may not enjoy citizens’ trust. External oversight, on the other hand, 
can act more independently and put pressure on the agency it monitors but 
cannot substitute for effective internal accountability mechanisms, which 
have more direct access to information and can intervene more quickly and 
systematically. Multiple accountability mechanisms can complement each 
other and contribute to the effectiveness and credibility of oversight of the 
extraordinary powers of law enforcement agencies.69
Independence
Although law enforcement agencies should be subject to legitimate and effec-
tive external oversight, they should not be exposed to inappropriate political 
interference by a government or be under the partisan political control of a 
particular faction. They should, instead, enjoy operational independence to 
effectively implement their mandates in accordance with legitimate laws. A 
careful balance must be struck between, on the one hand, legitimate review 
and policy-setting functions and, on the other hand, inappropriate case-
based interference. Not only the judiciary should enjoy independence; law 
enforcement bodies should also be free from partisan interference. In post-
conflict or post-authoritarian settings, limiting political appointments and 
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establishing merit-based appointment procedures, in conjunction with vetting 
processes, are generally of particular importance for building the operational 
independence of law enforcement agencies. Parties to a conflict or authoritar-
ian regimes generally ensure their control over the law enforcement sector by 
assuming broad powers to appoint and dismiss the members of law enforce-
ment agencies at all levels. As a result, law enforcement officials fill positions 
not because they are competent but because the ruler, regime, or a faction 
wills it so, creating dependencies that are likely to result in unprofessional 
and abusive conduct. Vetting processes combined with the establishment of 
merit-based appointment procedures not only promote the competence of 
the members of law enforcement agencies but also significantly enhance their 
independence and that of the entire agency. Creating merit-based appoint-
ment procedures also constitutes a condition for the sustainability of a vet-
ting process, ensuring that its outcomes are not arbitrarily reversed.
 Specific measures may be necessary to guarantee the operational inde-
pendence of those holding leadership positions in a law enforcement agency. 
Political interference is often ensured by appointing nonprofessional faction 
loyalists or party members to leadership positions in law enforcement agen-
cies. Various models exist to promote the independence of these positions. 
Efforts focus, in particular, on requiring professional qualifications for lead-
ership appointments and on entrusting external, nonexecutive bodies with 
appointment powers. The recently established Police Service Commission 
in Nigeria, for instance, is responsible for the appointment and promotion 
of all members of the Nigerian police except for the inspector general.70 The 
creation of police commissioner posts in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides 
another example. These posts were created to deter inappropriate interfer-
ence by any politically appointed ministers of interior. A police commissioner 
is appointed by an independent board and is responsible for the management 
and operations of police service.71
represenTaTIon
Conflict or authoritarian rule frequently leads to the domination and exploita-
tion of law enforcement agencies by one particular group or segment of soci-
ety. Such groups can be ethnic, geographical, religious, and factional, among 
others. The general underrepresentation of women in law enforcement agen-
cies is often worse in post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings. Domination 
by a group, particularly in law enforcement agencies, frequently results in dis-
criminatory practices, abusive conduct, and misuse of public resources, and 
undermines the legitimacy of a law enforcement agency.72 In societies emerg-
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ing from conflict or authoritarian rule, terminating group domination helps 
to establish basic internal checks and balances. In addition, representative 
composition teaches members of the agency to respect colleagues from other 
groups and, through them, the diverse groups of society. Representation also 
helps the members of the agency to better understand the needs of the society 
they are mandated to serve and to overcome discriminatory practices. More-
over, representation is a critical factor in increasing the trustworthiness of a 
law enforcement agency.73
responsIveness
Law enforcement agencies that pursue the special interests of a regime or a 
partisan group are prone to ignore the interests of the citizens and risk turn-
ing into instruments of oppression and abuse. As a priority, transitional 
reform should seek to transform law enforcement agencies from serving the 
state, an authoritarian regime, or partisan interest groups to serving all citi-
zens and being responsive to their needs without discrimination.74 Account-
ability, independence, and adequate representation all play a part in building 
a responsive law enforcement service. In addition, an array of measures that 
can be grouped under the rubric of promoting community policing spe-
cifically contributes to developing the responsiveness of a law enforcement 
agency. Community policing refers, in particular, to efforts by law enforce-
ment agencies to enter into direct contact with the citizens they are mandated 
to serve, to understand their needs and address their problems, and to adopt 
a preventive, problem-solving approach to policing.75 In states with broadly 
legitimate and effective law enforcement agencies, most of the work of these 
agencies is instigated by requests from citizens rather than by demands from 
government or being self-initiated.76 
 Promoting responsiveness also plays an important role in building the 
trustworthiness of law enforcement agencies, in particular in societies emerg-
ing from conflict or authoritarian rule that have experienced oppression and 
abuse by these agencies and have learned to distrust them. Building direct 
contacts with citizens and becoming responsive to their needs will go a long 
way in changing public perceptions about these agencies. Listening to the 
needs and concerns of citizens in the design of the reform process itself will 
further promote public trust.
legITImacy
The integrity-building measures described so far all serve to promote 
the legitimacy of law enforcement agencies.77 Agents who act with more 
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integrity as a result of professional standards training are more likely to earn 
the trust of citizens. Effective accountability mechanisms that provide answer-
ability in a transparent and credible manner and sanction abuses will help to 
reassure citizens that those who operate the law enforcement agency know 
and abide by these standards. Promoting the separation of powers and merit-
based appointment procedures will help restore confidence in the impartial-
ity and reliability of law enforcement agencies. Agencies that include among 
their members representatives from the various groups of society are more 
likely to be trusted and used by these groups. And the public perceptions of 
law enforcement agencies that cultivate community relations and respond to 
citizens’ needs will improve.
 In post-conflict or post-authoritarian settings, these integrity-building 
measures may, however, not be sufficient to restore civic trust, particularly 
of victims, in law enforcement agencies that were involved in massive and 
systematic abuses. Societies emerging from conflict or authoritarian rule are 
frequently marked by a fundamental crisis of civic trust; specific and targeted 
legitimacy-building measures might therefore be necessary — in addition to 
integrity building — to overcome this crisis and help transform untrustworthy 
agencies into trusted ones. Such measures include, for instance, apologies 
by representatives of agencies that were involved in massive and systemic 
abuses;78 memorials, commemorative days, and museums to remember vic-
tims of abuses and acknowledge the role of specific agencies in those abuses; 
the renaming of streets and public places that bear the names of officials or 
agencies with histories of abuse; the changing of coats of arms, insignia, 
and uniforms that are associated with an abusive past; and agency-based 
truth-seeking efforts. These targeted legitimacy-building measures verbally 
or symbolically reaffirm a commitment to overcome the legacy of abuse and an 
endorsement of democratic norms and values.79 Unlike integrity-building 
measures, these do not aim to change conduct (and thereby build civic trust) 
by providing training or to develop structures that discourage abuse. These 
measures do not “promote trust through action” but by reaffirming norms.80 
They do so by acknowledging past abuses, by expressing a turning away from 
an abusive past, and by affirming a commitment to norms. 
 These specific legitimacy-building measures can of course not replace 
integrity-building reforms that require actual behavioral or structural 
changes. Stand-alone verbal or symbolic reaffirmations of norms that are 
not accompanied by actions to give effect to these norms also lack cred-
ibility. Such “empty promises” are unlikely to convince citizens to trust law 
enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, reaffirmations may usefully complement 
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integrity-building reforms which by themselves may be insufficient to build 
trust in agencies that were involved in massive and systematic abuses. Such 
acknowledgements of past abuses and expressions of commitment to norms 
may help to convince citizens, particularly the victims of abuses, of the sin-
cerity of the reform efforts, and to move them from distrusting to trusting a 
law enforcement agency.
measures to empower citizens
The primary targets of transitional reform are abusive public institutions. 
Principal responsibility to transform abusive institutions and to prevent the 
recurrence of abuses rests with the representatives of these institutions and 
those overseeing them. Citizens, particularly the victims of abuses, are not 
responsible for institutional reform and should not be burdened with it. And 
yet, in the exercise of their mandates, public institutions relate to citizens, 
whose role also changes in the course of the transitional reform process. No 
longer are they mere subjects of state oppression or victims of conflict-related 
violence; instead they truly become citizens with rights, responsibilities, and 
needs that public institutions are called to serve. In transitional contexts, the 
process of recognizing the victims of past abuses truly as rights-bearing citi-
zens occurs mostly by reforming abusive institutions, as well as by providing 
other transitional justice measures.81 At the same time, however, the former 
victims of violence and subjects of state oppression begin to recognize them-
selves and be recognized in this transformation process as citizens with rights 
and duties and legitimate needs. And they can be empowered to do so. Efforts 
to empower citizens include, for instance: public information campaigns to 
inform citizens about their rights and duties in their relationship with law 
enforcement agencies and other public institutions;82 conducting surveys to 
assess public security needs and give former victims and citizens in general 
a voice in the reform process; informing the media about the role and func-
tions of law enforcement agencies to enable journalists to report and knowl-
edgeably comment on the work of these agencies; training civil society orga-
nizations in monitoring law enforcement agencies and in reporting abuses; 
informing and training civil society organizations, and citizens generally, 
about accountability mechanisms and how to effectively use them; establish-
ing legal aid offices; assisting citizens in accessing law enforcement agencies 
and representing their needs; and others. Such efforts not only empower citi-
zens but also impact, in turn, the institutional reform process: empowering 
citizens further clarifies the role of law enforcement agencies and helps to 
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build a relationship in which both sides recognize each other in their legiti-
mate roles.
normative criteria and contextual conditions
The preceding discussion reveals that, as a measure of institutional reform, 
vetting needs to be adapted to the reform needs of a specific transitional situ-
ation, complemented by other reform measures, and integrated in a coher-
ent institutional reform strategy. In this concluding section, I identify several 
normative criteria and contextual conditions that should be considered in the 
design of a vetting process and, to a large extent, also of other transitional 
reform processes. Normative criteria refer, in particular, to the aims of tran-
sitional vetting and the basic legal standards relevant to the practice of vet-
ting. Contextual conditions relate, in particular, to opportunities, risks, reform 
needs, resource requirements, and sustainability considerations. The norma-
tive criteria provide a framework to guide the design of a vetting process in 
response to the requisites of given contextual conditions.
 Pablo de Greiff in this volume elaborates in detail on the plausible aims 
of transitional vetting and emphasizes that vetting can pursue plural ends. 
Among others, vetting can have punitive and preventive functions; it can 
facilitate other transitional processes; it can promote civic trust; and it can 
help provide recognition to victims of violence and repression. However, as 
I have argued above, whatever aims are pursued by transitional vetting, its 
defining functions — be they preventive, enabling, trust-inducing, or provid-
ing for recognition — all relate to an effort to reform abusive institutions. A 
purely individual-punitive explanation of transitional vetting, for instance, 
remains unsatisfactory.
 Understanding transitional vetting as a measure to reform abusive institu-
tions provides a normative dimension that can help to guide the design of a 
vetting process at three distinct levels. First, the design should aim to ensure 
that the vetting process itself contributes, to the greatest extent possible, to the 
envisaged institutional reform goals. I elaborated above on the specific oppor-
tunities and risks of review and (re)appointment, and how they can contrib-
ute in different ways to the institutional reform functions of a vetting process. 
For instance, a (re)appointment rather than a review process may provide a 
better way to reform a largely dysfunctional and severely abusive public insti-
tution in order to build civic trust and provide recognition to victims. Second, 
the vetting process needs to be incorporated in a comprehensive institutional 
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reform framework and coordinated with other institutional reform activi-
ties to achieve the desired reform goals because the deficiencies of a public 
institution in transitional settings are usually multifaceted.83 For instance, 
conducting a vetting process for an institution that is exposed to heavy politi-
cal interference may not significantly contribute to building civic trust if it is 
not accompanied by an effort to shield the institution from such interference, 
establish merit-based appointment procedures, and institute effective demo-
cratic oversight.84 And, third, since vetting shares its institutional reform-
related aims, particularly providing recognition and building civic trust, with 
other transitional justice measures such as criminal prosecutions, truth seek-
ing, and reparation programs,85 coordinating and relating vetting with these 
other measures can help to achieve these aims more fully and, therefore, also 
contribute to the effectiveness of the vetting process itself. For instance, com-
bining the removal from a public institution of abusive employees with their 
criminal prosecution and with reparative measures to the benefit of the vic-
tims of these abuses stands a better chance to build civic trust in the institu-
tion than a stand-alone vetting measure.
 Basic legal standards relevant to the practice of vetting are a fundamental 
expression of the rule of law and can also affect design choices. They include, 
in particular, the principle of individual responsibility,86 due process guar-
antees,87 and guarantees relating to the right to access, on general terms of 
equality, to public service.88 Purges and large-scale dismissals on the basis of 
mere affiliation with a group, for instance, contravene the principle of individ-
ual responsibility and are likely to be discriminatory. As I elaborated above, 
different legal standards apply in review and (re)appointment processes. 
The applicable standards also vary according to the category of institution 
targeted. In particular, designing a vetting process for judges should respect 
standards related to the independence of the judiciary. Security personnel, 
on the other hand, enjoy limited protections and can be more easily removed 
from their positions. Institutional differentiation is therefore called for in the 
design of a vetting process.89
 These normative criteria provide a useful albeit broad guide in the design 
of a vetting process. The contextual conditions in a concrete, historical situa-
tion further determine the design strategy. A vetting process needs to achieve 
its aims in the context of a specific, transitional society and therefore adapt to its 
conditions. These conditions broadly include the opportunities for and risks 
of a vetting process, the reform needs, resource requirements, and sustain-
ability considerations. 
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 Opportunities for transitional vetting depend largely on actual govern-
ment authority, political will, a vetting mandate, and the timing of a vetting 
process. Actual government authority and control over the institutions to be vet-
ted is a condition to put in place a vetting process. Post-conflict contexts are, 
however, often marked by a relative absence or division of government author-
ity.90 Peace agreements that end internal armed conflicts frequently provide 
for complex power-sharing arrangements between former warring factions. 
Transitional governments that are established to administer the country until 
the organization of national elections regularly reflect a delicate balance of 
power between former warring factions. Such governments lack broad public 
legitimacy and, frequently, their mandate to govern is limited both legally and 
in actuality. In addition, former warring factions may continue to exercise 
actual control over significant parts of the country’s territory. The establish-
ment of a vetting process may have to wait until actual government authority 
has been established, for instance following the formation of an elected and 
broadly legitimized government.
 Establishing a vetting process requires not only actual government author-
ity but also political will. Transitional contexts are often politically contested. 
Former rulers or warring factions frequently hold on to power in the post-
conflict or post-authoritarian context but have little interest in supporting 
the transitional agenda. Rather, they will often aim to maintain the status 
quo and hold on to the gains they made during the conflict or the authoritar-
ian rule. Public employees who risk losing power through a vetting process 
are likely to resist it being established and to obstruct its implementation. 
Reform-minded constituencies may not have the upper hand in these envi-
ronments and may have to tread carefully to avoid a resumption of conflict 
or authoritarian rule. The political will may not — yet or ever — be sufficient 
to put in place a vetting process. The establishment of a vetting process can, 
however, be significantly facilitated by an explicit and clear mandate. A specific 
reference to vetting in a peace agreement or a Security Council resolution, for 
instance, will be more difficult to circumvent and help to overcome political 
resistance.91 Should there be enough political will to establish a vetting pro-
cess, the level of will can still significantly impact the actual design of the pro-
cess. Softer vetting options — such as merely screening new appointments or 
promotions, or limiting the number of institutions or positions to be covered 
by the process — may, for instance, be more acceptable in environments where 
individuals involved in serious abuses in the past continue to hold positions 
of power in government or even in the institutions to be vetted. 
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 On the other hand, removing such “spoilers” may also constitute a “quick 
win” that can be important not only to build momentum for the vetting pro-
cess itself and the broader institutional reform process, but also to facilitate 
the implementation of other transitional justice measures and to advance the 
overall transition.92 At the same time, the demands of other transitional pro-
cesses, such as a politically challenging and resource-intensive electoral pro-
cess, could draw away resources and political attention from a vetting pro-
cess; might pursue different ends such as broad political inclusion; or result 
in a change of responsible actors such as a new government. The implications 
of timing raise complex questions of sequencing and interrelations with other 
transitional processes, and the process has to be adapted to political develop-
ments. The timing will condition strategic design choices such as the institu-
tion or group targeted by a vetting process, the type of mechanism selected, 
or the composition of a vetting body. Timing considerations, therefore, need 
to be carefully considered in designing a vetting process.
 Several risks of transitional vetting, in particular governance gaps and an 
increase in criminality, have already been alluded to above and do not need 
to be further discussed here. But there is also the danger of political misuse of 
transitional vetting. A vetting process could be misused, for instance, to get 
rid of independent judges or political opponents, in particular when removals 
are based on some form of group affiliation and the process degenerates into 
a political purge. In fact, a recurring response in post-conflict or post-authori-
tarian settings to the presence of undesirable elements in the public service has 
been and continues to be variants of what can be labeled purges that do not 
fall within the definition of vetting generally used in this volume.93 Such mea-
sures do not do justice to those affected by the process and can be expected 
to create resentment among them. Purges are unlikely to be perceived as fair 
and their contribution to building civic trust is likely to be limited, in particu-
lar among those associated with persons undergoing the process. The indis-
criminate nature of purges also makes it difficult to integrate them into an 
institutional reform process that needs to be carefully calibrated to achieve its 
objectives.94 The danger of political misuse can be largely averted by a respect 
for relevant legal standards in the design of vetting processes.
 The reform needs represent additional contextual conditions that need to 
be considered in the design of a vetting process. The nature of the conflict 
or authoritarian past and the general level of economic and political devel-
opment of the country in question will affect the kind and seriousness of 
the abusive behavior to be scrutinized; the number, sort, and position of 
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persons involved in the abuse; the kind and number of institutions to be vet-
ted; the pool of potential replacements; and the prevalence of other institu-
tional defects that need to be reformed. The case studies in this volume reveal, 
for instance, that the challenges for vetting in the former communist coun-
tries in Central and Eastern Europe were significantly different from the chal-
lenges in the Latin American transitions. The former countries had to deal 
with a large number of public employees and collaborators who were gen-
erally involved in relatively low levels of abuse that were recorded in detail 
in secret police archives, whereas the situation in the latter countries was 
marked by a limited number of officials who were involved in serious and 
massive abuses but who did not keep detailed records of their acts.95 Vetting 
efforts in Latin America could, therefore, concentrate on relatively small num-
bers of perpetrators but had to rely significantly on documentation provided 
by nongovernmental organization, whereas Central and Eastern European 
lustration efforts had to manage huge amounts of existing information and 
had to process large numbers of cases. The former Yugoslavia emerged not 
only from serious armed conflict but also from communist rule; the duality 
of that transition presented a set of peculiar challenges that also affected the 
design of the vetting processes that took place. For instance, difficult decisions 
had to be made about the period and type of abuse to be covered by a vetting 
process. These contexts differ again drastically from the more recent post- 
conflict transitions in sub-Saharan Africa that are characterized by an absence 
of functional state institutions, a high number of not only public employees 
but also unofficial armed groups who committed acts of serious violence, and 
a significant involvement of the international community in the peace settle-
ment and the immediate post-conflict period.96 Among others, vetting pro-
cesses in these contexts involve, therefore, tremendous efforts in collecting 
relevant background information and international actors repeatedly play an 
important role in these processes.
 The reform needs also determine what other reform measures are neces-
sary and how vetting should be incorporated in a broader framework of insti-
tutional reform to comprehensively address the multifaceted shortcomings 
of an institution in a post-conflict or post-authoritarian setting and to ensure 
sustainability of the vetting process by parallel, supporting reform measures. 
Different contexts raise different reform needs and significantly different 
requirements for the design of vetting processes.
 The success or failure of vetting processes also depends significantly on the 
provision of adequate resources. Capacities are generally limited in transitional 
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contexts, various reform projects compete for the same scarce resources, and 
the requirements of transitional vetting are usually underestimated. Vetting 
processes are generally complex, time-consuming, and resource-intensive 
exercises requiring multidisciplinary skills, in particular when they concern 
institutions with large numbers of employees. The specific resource needs of 
a certain vetting process depend, however, largely on the transitional contexts 
and the concrete reform needs, and vary between different variants of vet-
ting. Significant factors that determine the resource needs include the number 
of cases to be processed (including the job applications to be expected), the 
infrastructure of the country in question, the availability of background infor-
mation on the persons to be vetted, the quality of this information, and its 
verifiability. Again, different contexts raise different challenges. Post-conflict 
contexts are often characterized by high levels of uncertainty, a breakdown 
of record and information management systems, and a collapse of the gen-
eral infrastructure. As a result, reliable information about the persons to be 
vetted is often scarce and difficult to obtain.97 Certain authoritarian regimes, 
on the other hand, leave behind large archives with files of questionable reli-
ability that need to be processed and verified.98 If the resources required for a 
certain vetting process are not available, its implementation has to be post-
poned or phased, or its design has to be adapted to limit the resource needs. 
For instance, a less ambitious vetting process could just target the senior staff 
of an institution, and all other cases may be passed on to the regular disciplin-
ary mechanism.
 A final consideration about the design of a vetting process concerns its 
sustainability. As a transitional measure, vetting is usually a one-off exercise 
that responds to the exceptional challenges and circumstances of a society 
in transition. Ensuring the sustainability of vetting also requires, therefore, a 
transfer of outcomes and capacities to relevant permanent state structures. 
For instance, decisions made during the vetting process should be recorded 
by the personnel management system of the institution; vetting documents 
should be integrated into the personnel files; and acquired know-how should 
be transferred. Ensuring a seamless transfer of information and capacities 
from the exceptional, one-off transitional mechanism to regular and perma-
nent structures should be considered during the design of the vetting process. 
In particular, its regulations, procedures, and systems should be compatible 
with relevant permanent structures. The transformation of an exceptional 
vetting mechanism into a regular appointment and disciplinary body might 
also be considered.99
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conclusion
In this chapter, I argue that vetting is best understood as a measure to reform 
abusive institutions. The discussion about review and (re)appointment pro-
cesses not only highlights the institutional dimension of vetting but also shows 
that it is generally an insufficient measure to reforming law enforcement 
agencies that were involved in massive and systematic abuses in the past. In 
addition to vetting, efforts to prevent the recurrence of abuse in post-conflict 
or post-authoritarian settings need to focus, in particular, on integrity-build-
ing structural reforms that discourage abuses and increase the responsiveness 
of law enforcement agencies; legitimacy-building measures that verbally or 
symbolically reaffirm a commitment to overcome the legacy of abuse and an 
endorsement of democratic norms and values; and efforts to empower the 
subjects of state oppression and victims of conflict-related violence that help 
them to recognize themselves and be recognized as rights-bearing citizens. 
 Each of these measures can make a significant contribution to prevent 
the recurrence of abuse. None of the measures on its own, however, is likely 
to achieve the hoped-for transitional transformation and different reform 
elements depend on each other. A legacy of massive and systematic abuse 
often leads to a deep institutional crisis that calls not only for a holistic but 
also a tailor-made approach to transitional reform if it is to be effective and 
sustainable. Although certain normative criteria can guide design choices, 
there is significant flexibility regarding the specific form of an institutional 
reform process and its design should be adapted to the conditions of a par-
ticular transitional context. Frequently, vetting will constitute an important 
element of a coherent transitional reform strategy and individuals involved 
in serious abuses should generally be excluded from public service. The prac-
tice of vetting shows, however, a significant rate of failure that is the result 
of both normative misconceptions and operational miscalculations. Great 
care is necessary in the design of a vetting process to integrate it in a coherent 
reform strategy and to minimize the risk of failure. Not engaging in a process 
that is likely to result in deeply flawed outcomes and is unlikely to build more 
trustworthy public institutions should not be dismissed a priori as a possible 
course of action.
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See my chapter on Bosnia and Herzegovina in this volume.
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chapter 13
Vetting and Transitional Justice
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Various measures that can be loosely grouped under the label of “vetting” have 
long been a part of common practice in post-conflict and post-authoritarian 
transitional situations. Although we will tighten the meaning of the term 
below, one only has to recall the massive purges of collaborators that took 
place in many countries in the aftermath of World War II; or that a good 
number of the countries in the “third wave” of democratization, to use Hun-
tington’s term, including Greece, one of the countries with which the wave 
started, implemented vetting measures.1 And the practice continues apace 
despite the fact that it remains largely understudied, and that frequently the 
measures implemented are acknowledged to be less than successful even in 
generous interpretations of “success.”2 The lack of clarity and the obfuscation 
that pervade the general issue cover not only questions about the potential 
and limitations of vetting measures, or basic questions about implementa-
tion — which the thematic chapters in this volume address — but also ques-
tions about the justification and the ends of vetting. 
 This chapter concentrates on the latter set of issues, on questions of aims 
and justification. Among other things, it will try to clarify the purposes that 
can legitimately be sought through vetting measures.3 Two caveats are in 
order. First, of course, a complex practice can always be set in place in order 
to achieve more than one aim. Second, the defining aims of a practice always 
underdetermine the shape the practice should take. This chapter does not 
assume a reductionistic position concerning the ends of vetting — accepting 
that it can pursue plural ends at the same time — nor a normatively naive posi-
tion according to which, having defined the aims of a practice, its “blueprint” 
follows as if through simple deduction — accepting, of course, that there are 
different means of satisfying a given aim. Having said this, however, questions 
about ends and justification do set some constraints on practice and imple-
mentation. And precisely because vetting is a practice that, both in the distant 
and in the recent past, has known so many examples of unrestraint, this is an 
important exercise. This chapter will defend an understanding of vetting that 
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emphasizes its preventive aims (and deemphasizes both the punitive and the 
deterrent justifications) and will seek to clarify the relationship between vet-
ting and other transitional justice measures by examining the potential of vet-
ting as an enabling condition of the other transitional justice measures, and, 
at a more conceptual level, by examining its potential to foster the trust of 
citizens in the institutions of the state. 
vetting and impunity
The idea of ridding institutions of abusers and collaborators in the aftermath 
of conflict or authoritarianism, as is well known, has a long (but not neces-
sarily distinguished) history.4 At the most general level this is an expression 
of the desire for a new beginning, or at least a renewal, which is perfectly 
understandable under such circumstances. However, there is no such thing 
as a “new beginning” and the idea of renewal is nothing more than shorthand 
for something that requires articulation. Consequently, not just any means for 
satisfying these inchoate desires will be the object of consideration here. I will 
follow recent efforts to distinguish vetting measures from massive, summary 
dismissals or purges, and will use the term “vetting” to refer to processes for 
assessing the integrity of individuals to determine their suitability for con-
tinued or prospective public employment.5 The reason why purges and mas-
sive, summary dismissals should not be considered forms of vetting, properly 
speaking, has nothing to do with numerical considerations, but rather with 
the criteria used for dismissals and the procedures and guarantees that are 
applied in either case; vetting here designates processes in which the criteria 
of assessment relate to individual behavior, which therefore calls for individual 
review, and for offering individuals some procedural guarantees. Mere mem-
bership in groups, including political parties, should not be the primary cri-
terion of exclusion. Clearly, just as many — or few — people can be excluded 
through vetting as through purges; the numbers ultimately depend, to begin 
with, on how widespread the perpetration of violations may have been. 
What is critical, from the standpoint of justice, is, precisely, to select criteria 
designed to track individual abusive behavior.6 
VETTINg AS A PUNITIVE, dETERRENT, ANd PREVENTIVE mEASURE
Regardless of where the exact boundaries of vetting may be set, various aims 
have been ascribed to the practice, and these aims have been used to ground 
justificatory arguments. Given the manifest “impunity gap” faced by societies 
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emerging from conflict or authoritarianism, it is not surprising that vetting 
as well as other transitional justice measures have been thought to address 
this gap. My aim in this chapter is not to counter the positions I will review, 
but to subject them to scrutiny. However, I do not take these positions to be 
equally plausible or convincing. I have ordered them in increasing order of 
plausibility. 
 That vetting has a punitive dimension can be easily seen. In fact, this is part 
of what justifies our concern with offering procedural guarantees to those 
who are subject to it.7 Vetting subjects people to loss of jobs and income, 
never an indifferent loss, but particularly not under circumstances, all too 
common in post-conflict and transitional societies, in which economies are 
in crisis and job creation is stagnant if not receding. The effects of such loss 
are particularly severe for members of the security sector, most of whom may 
not be particularly highly skilled or have skills that can be easily transferred to 
other economic activities. But beyond that, vetting typically subjects people 
to shaming;8 being vetted out of a job is not the same as suffering the impact 
of, say, downsizing. The more public the exclusion, the greater the potential 
for becoming the recipient of the public’s opprobrium.9
 However, punishment as the main rationale for vetting should be seen 
as problematic, at least if it is meant as an exhaustive account. In the end, a 
mainly punitive interpretation of vetting highlights the impotence of the 
criminal justice system. Imagine a transition in which even the worst offend-
ers, against whom there is sufficient evidence to initiate prosecutions, get off 
with nothing worse than being relieved of their jobs and whatever shaming 
that leads to. This would require some explanation, and what such explana-
tion would try to do is to provide an account, precisely, of why these people 
do not receive more severe punishment. 
 Another way of expressing the point is the following: even if there were a 
society that espoused a completely nonpunitive approach to its transition, it 
might find good reasons to vet some of its institutions. Naturally, it would do 
so for reasons other than punishment.
 None of this is an argument against the punitive use of vetting. The point, 
rather, is that the punitive rationale does not seem to capture the whole rea-
son (or better, all the reasons) that we engage in vetting. Some of these reasons 
are spelled out in what follows.
 Vetting, as other justice measures, could also be thought to be a deter-
rent. This seems to me to be either a purely aspirational claim, or an empirical 
one, and as such it stands or falls on empirical evidence. The problem is that 
gathering such evidence is peculiarly difficult, for it would have to be of the 
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counterfactual sort; in other words, it would require comparing outcomes 
(the behavior of some people with and without vetting in place) and this is the 
sort of experiment that we do not know how to carry out directly. Support for 
the proposition can be gained by proxy (for example, through comparative 
analysis), but this will always be a debatable ground. Leaving this epistemic 
problem aside, there are reasons to think that attributing strong deterrence 
powers to vetting is not particularly plausible: if, for example, more severe 
forms of punishment (including the death penalty) in “well-established,” effi-
cient, and expeditious legal systems have dubious deterrent value, it is not far 
fetched to think that deterrence is not the strongest defense of vetting in the 
midst of all the uncertainties of a transitional situation.10
 Vetting is also often said to have a preventive function11 — and prevention 
is not the same thing as deterrence. Rather than focusing on the possible reac-
tions of individuals to particular measures, as the deterrent argument does, 
this claim operates at a different, more structural level. The argument takes 
vetting to be something akin to an anti-Mafia measure. Thus, its purpose is 
not primarily to send signals to individuals (i.e., that they will lose their jobs 
and social standing if they engage in certain behavior), but to disable structures 
within which individuals (who, by the way, may have refrained from criminal 
activity were it not for those structures) in fact carried out criminal acts. This 
is a more defensible position than the preceding one, fundamentally because 
it need not commit itself to controversial assumptions about the behavior of 
individuals given certain incentives. The most controversial assumption the 
preventive argument can simply eschew has to do with a claim about recidi-
vist tendencies, namely that those who have committed certain offenses are 
more likely than others to commit them in the future. This is a questionable 
assumption on its own terms (for, among other reasons, it abstracts from 
peculiar social conditions that enable criminal activity, conditions in the 
absence of which many individuals may have refrained from participating in 
crime, and which are also, precisely, the typical conditions in conflict situa-
tions), but it also conflicts with a commitment to “meliorism” — the idea that 
autonomous individuals have the power to improve themselves — which is a 
part of the liberal doctrine that constitutional democracies try to institution-
alize.12 Vetting, then, is defended on the grounds that it may prevent the recur-
rence of violations, not necessarily because the sanctions it metes out (loss of 
job, public prestige, etc.) are sufficient to deter individuals, but because it dis-
mantles networks of criminal activity, even if it does not reach each and every 
participant in activities that violate the rights of others. 
527
VETTINg ANd TRANSITIONAl JUSTICE
vetting as an enabling condition
Up to this point the analysis of the possible aims and justification of vetting 
has proceeded largely in abstraction from other transitional justice measures, 
such as criminal prosecutions, truth telling, reparations for victims, and other 
forms of institutional reform. In trying to situate vetting in a transitional con-
text, it is important to start with some caveats.
 First, there have been plenty of transitions in which no formal vetting pro-
cedures, not even of rule of law institutions, have been established (e.g., Chile, 
Argentina, Guatemala, South Africa). There have also been transitions with 
very modest and sector-specific vetting (El Salvador, Greece, etc.). Thus, we 
should not overstate the importance of vetting in transitions. 
 Second, the relationship between vetting and other transitional justice 
measures depends on many factors, which include whether the different mea-
sures are deliberately designed to relate to one another, and also on how they 
are sequenced. This is in turn a complicated issue that hinges on many fac-
tors that are irreducibly contingent and contextual. In what follows, and for 
the sake of clarity in the presentation of the potential that vetting has to con-
tribute to other justice measures, I assume that vetting can be implemented 
early on in a transitional process.13 Needless to say, this will not always 
be possible. 
 Third, even if, as I will argue, vetting can be considered an enabling condi-
tion of other transitional justice measures, obviously when it is botched — and 
there are plenty of ways of getting it wrong, including doing it through pro-
cesses that offer few guarantees, that are overly expansive in their attribution 
of responsibility, and so on — vetting may also make the implementation of 
these measures more difficult. Thus, to illustrate, among transitional justice 
measures, arguably vetting is the one that has lent itself more frequently to 
political manipulation. I cannot offer a full account here of why I think this 
is the case, but the following factors are part of that account: post-conflict 
or transitional prosecutions are infrequent to begin with, and they gener-
ally involve sufficient due process guarantees so as to raise a shield against 
easy political manipulation; and truth-telling exercises, particularly by way of 
truth commissions, are also extraordinary events and the publicity that sur-
rounds them is one among many factors that have kept such commissions 
from falling into the trap of partisan politics. Vetting, on the other hand, usu-
ally involves thousands of people, and the processes more often than not take 
place with little public scrutiny, offer weak procedural guarantees, and, con-
trary to even the best outcome of prosecutions or truth telling, what hangs 
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in the balance is (some degree of) control of public institutions — a strong 
incentive to engage in it for partisan political purposes.14 
 Vetting may also create difficulties beyond making the implementation of 
transitional justice measures more complicated if the process is plainly defec-
tive. That possibility needs to be acknowledged. It is often claimed that vet-
ting may create governance vacuums.15 Perhaps the claim is overstated, given 
that, unlike indiscriminate purges, most vetting procedures do not lead to the 
dismissal of massive numbers of people.16 But that is not to say this cannot or 
that it has not happened. In two post-conflict cases (and also cases that may 
be closer to purges than to vetting as defined in this chapter), namely post-
World-War-II Germany and “de-Baathified” Iraq, governance gaps appeared, 
leading to the rehiring of people formerly expelled from their jobs. Another 
difficulty that is frequently attributed to vetting is an increase in criminality. 
This claim may also be overstated, in particular because in very complex and 
fluid transitional and post-conflict situations it is not easy to isolate the effects 
of a single initiative. Be that as it may, it is undeniable that in some countries 
(e.g., Haiti) the participation in criminal activities of former members of the 
security forces who have been vetted has increased, and that in itself is a wor-
risome trend.
 Fourth, and once again in the spirit of tempering naive hopes, we do well 
to remember that under most circumstances vetting, like the other transi-
tional justice measures, will only weed out the worst elements in an institu-
tion, leaving plenty of “undesirables” in place. 
 Having said all of this, however, it is still possible that vetting may indeed 
facilitate the application of measures such as criminal prosecutions, truth 
telling, reparations for victims, and other forms of institutional reform. That 
is, vetting may be thought of as an “enabling condition” of other transitional 
justice measures.17 Local human rights NGOs in Morocco, for example, have 
claimed that the lack of cooperation with the recent truth commission, the 
Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER),18 on the part of some sectors of the secu-
rity forces can be explained by the continued presence of officials who should 
have been vetted. Thus, the absence of vetting made truth telling more dif-
ficult, and, the claim is, by contrast, that the IER would have been more effec-
tive in its truth-telling function if, as is likely had these officials been vetted, 
it could have accessed these institutions’ archives and have had more unhin-
dered access to other members who would then have been willing to give 
testimony.19 
 Similarly, there are instances in which vetting may facilitate criminal pros-
ecutions. Argentina may be a case in point. As is well known, the prosecutorial 
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efforts started by President Raúl Alfonsín — which led to the trials of the junta 
leaders20 — came to a halt in that country after a series of coup attempts.21 
Had some of the military officers been vetted, perhaps it would have been 
more difficult for them to organize the uprisings. The fact that the rebellious 
officers were mostly junior increases the plausibility of the thesis. Of course, 
it is possible that they may have revolted by virtue of the mere chance of being 
vetted, but in the calculus of probabilities the fact that vetting, for all its puni-
tive effects, is not the same as a criminal sentence must be factored in, even if 
by itself this may have been insufficient to tip the scales against the officers 
organizing the revolts. The question is open in this instance, but the general 
point remains: it is not unreasonable to think that security forces that have 
been vetted may collaborate more with, or at least impede less, prosecutorial 
efforts. 
 The relationship between vetting and reparations is slightly more compli-
cated, but here again similar conclusions may be reached, even if through a 
more indirect path. One can imagine situations in which an argument analo-
gous to that made to show how vetting can facilitate the implementation of 
truth telling and prosecutions could plausibly be defended regarding repara-
tions. To begin with, to the extent that reparations are a form of recognition 
of state responsibility,22 those who are responsible for the abuses are likely 
to oppose the establishment of reparations programs. Thus, vetting those 
responsible for the abuses may weaken one of the sources of resistance to 
reparations. 
 However, unlike criminal prosecutions and even truth telling, which can-
not be successfully implemented without thereby affecting fundamental inter-
ests of those responsible for the violations (hence their opposition to these 
measures), it is sometimes thought that reparations can be successfully imple-
mented without the perpetrators having to pay this price. Indeed, reparations 
have sometimes become the object of a proposed bargain (rarely so grossly 
articulated, but real nevertheless): reparations benefits of a certain magni-
tude are offered to victims in exchange for leniency in the domains of pros-
ecutions and truth telling. Thus, for example, in the aftermath of Pinochet’s 
return from detention in England, when it was clear that criminal prosecu-
tions against members of the military were in the cards for Chile, the political 
party aligned with him, the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI), traditionally 
lukewarm on the topic of reparations, suggested a major restructuring of the 
reparations programs that had been in existence for more than ten years, so 
as to expand their coverage, and, importantly, to significantly increase the 
magnitude of their benefits, but with one catch: beneficiaries had to waive all 
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claims against perpetrators.23 Fortunately, this proposal did not prosper. This 
is by far not the only example of this sort of bargain. Arguably, a bargain of 
this sort underlies the law passed in Colombia in 2006 to demobilize para-
military forces known to be responsible for gross human rights violations.24 
Although neither of these two cases involved vetting directly, they show 
how reparations can become the subject of peculiar political dynamics that 
sometimes lead perpetrators or their backers to support the implementation 
of reparations measures (but only as part of a quid pro quo). Clearly, this is 
“support” that reparations can do without, so even in cases such as these, vet-
ting may facilitate the implementation of legitimate and effective reparations 
programs. 
 Finally, it is reasonable to think that vetting may also facilitate the broader 
sorts of institutional reform measures that are often called for in the after-
math of conflict and in transitions to democracy.25 The argument again is that 
vetting may weaken sources of opposition and resistance to reform especially 
regarding, for example, the restructuring, downsizing, and rationalization of 
security forces; predictably, this will be easier to accomplish once entrenched 
interests in maintaining the status quo have been dislodged from positions of 
power.26 
 It is important to reiterate that the preceding arguments are not meant to 
yield predictions. Whether vetting in fact enables or impedes the implemen-
tation of other transitional justice measures is an empirical matter that can-
not be decided a priori. All sorts of intervening causes and incentives play 
a significant role in leading to specific outcomes. The arguments presented 
here also assume what must be acknowledged to be a simplistic relationship 
between vetting and other transitional justice measures: that these measures 
are sequenced in a particular way, with vetting coming early in the process or 
at least sufficiently earlier than other measures so as to allow them to benefit 
from its results, something which cannot be taken for granted either. Never-
theless, my hope is that to the extent that the arguments are reasonable, they 
help to clarify the reasons why it makes sense for post-conflict and transi-
tional societies to try to vet their security forces, as well as one particular way 
in which vetting can relate to other transitional justice measures. 
vetting and a holistic conception of transitional justice
In order to fully understand the place of vetting in a transitional justice pol-
icy, one has to go beyond contingent pragmatic relationships, as important 
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as these may be. In the final part of this chapter I will argue that there is a 
compelling conceptual argument to think of vetting as part of a holistic tran-
sitional justice policy. Despite the fact that each of the measures that form a 
part of such a policy — criminal prosecutions, truth telling, reparations, and 
institutional reform (of which vetting is one modality27) — has its own spe-
cific goals, they share two mediate goals, namely, to provide recognition to 
victims, and to foster civic trust.28 Now, these goals are closely related to jus-
tice, being both conditions and consequences of the achievement of justice. 
Achieving justice through the legal system presupposes that those whose 
rights have been violated are recognized as having standing, and this means 
that they are recognized as individuals, as victims, and more fundamentally 
as rights bearers. At the same time, the achievement of justice contributes to 
entrenching these forms of recognition. Similarly, civic trust is both a condi-
tion and a consequence of justice. Legal systems presuppose a certain level of 
trust, and at the same time, at least in part by stabilizing expectations, help 
lower the risks associated with trust.29 So, beyond the commonality of ends, 
what ties together the different elements of a transitional justice policy is the 
peculiarity of these ends, namely that they are justice related in just this way. 
This is what makes the different measures part of a holistic conception of tran-
sitional justice. 
 Having this as a background, since the main goal of this chapter is not to 
present a particular conception of transitional justice but to clarify the prac-
tical and conceptual relations between vetting and other transitional justice 
measures, I will concentrate here on its trust-inducing potential.30 
 VETTINg AS A TRUST-INdUCINg mEASURE
In societies emerging from conflict or authoritarianism, vetting may have 
trust-inducing consequences. This is important for several reasons, which I 
will elaborate after a brief description of a norm-based account of trust. These 
reasons include that trust facilitates social interactions and there is a strong 
connection between trust and justice. 
a norm-based accoUnT of TrUsT31
Before attempting to explain how vetting may be thought to induce trust, it 
will be necessary to specify a conception of the type of trust in question. Trust 
in general, as a disposition that mediates social interactions, “is an alternative 
to vigilance and reliance on the threat of sanctions, [and] trustworthiness. . . an 
alternative to constant watching to see what one can and cannot get away 
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with, to recurrent recalculations of costs and benefits.”32 Trust, then, at a gen-
eral level, contrasts with the sort of constant monitoring and appeals to sanc-
tions that speak of suspicion. 
 Still, it can be said that while trusting someone involves relying on that 
person to do or refrain from doing certain things, trust is not the same thing 
as mere predictability or empirical regularity. If that were so, the paradigm 
of trust would obtain in our relationship with particularly reliable machines. 
That reliability is not the same as trustworthiness can be seen in our reluc-
tance to say that we trust someone about whose behavior we feel a great deal 
of certainty but only because we both monitor and control it (e.g., through 
enforcing the terms of a contract), or because we take defensive or preemp-
tive action.33 Trust, far from resembling a sort of “mechanical reliability,” 
involves an expectation of a shared normative commitment. I trust someone 
when I have reasons to expect a certain pattern of behavior from her, and 
those reasons include not just her consistent past behavior, but also, crucially, 
the expectation that among her reasons for action is the commitment to the 
norms and values we share. In this sense, although trust does not involve 
normative symmetry — trust is possible within largely asymmetrical relation-
ships including those within deeply hierarchical institutions — it does involve 
normative reciprocity: trust develops out of a mutual sense of commitment 
to shared norms and values. This explains both the advantages of trust and 
the risks it always involves: dispensing with the need to monitor and con-
trol facilitates cooperation immensely, and not only by lowering transaction 
costs; but as a wager (no matter how “safe”), that at least in part for normative 
reasons those we trust will not take advantage of our vulnerabilities, we risk 
having our expectations defeated. 
 Now, the term “civic” in “civic trust” I understand basically as a limiting 
qualifier. Trust can be thought of as a scalar relationship, as one that allows 
for degrees. The sense of trust at issue here is not the thick form of trust char-
acteristic of relations between intimates, but rather “civic” trust, which I take 
to be the sort of disposition that can develop among citizens who are strang-
ers to one another, and who are members of the same community only in 
the sense in which they are fellow members of the same political community. 
True, the dimension of a wager is more salient in this case than in that of trust 
towards intimates, since we have much less information about others’ rea-
sons for actions. However, the principles that we assume we share with oth-
ers and the domain of application of these principles are much more general. 
To illustrate, the loyalty that binds me to intimates is significantly thicker 
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than the loyalty to, for example, a common political project that binds me to 
fellow citizens. 
TrUsT and socIal InTeracTIon
Despite its thinness, some form of civic trust is crucial for large-scale social 
interactions. This is most obvious in the domain of economics, where the 
effects of distrust have long been studied: weak networks of trust severely 
limit the range of options of action available to economic agents. An envi-
ronment characterized by mistrust is one that requires agents to make large 
investments in information, monitoring, and sanctioning.34 The opportunity 
costs of such investments may be large enough by themselves to put more 
than a dent in economic productivity. Hence, it is not surprising to find that 
“interpersonal trust is strongly linked with economic development.”35 Of 
course, the effects of distrust can go far beyond increasing transaction costs; 
it is an understatement to say that in such contexts certain actions are con-
sidered as live options — as opposed to merely theoretically possible courses 
of action — only to be discarded because they have become “too expensive.” 
What likely happens under these circumstances is that the range of options 
to be considered is significantly constrained, and even preferences themselves 
are adapted downwards.36
 There is no reason to believe that these effects of the lack of trust are con-
fined to the economic sphere. Indeed, in the domain of democratic politics, in 
which gathering information about what others are doing, monitoring their 
activities, and relying on sanctions become not simply “expensive” but may 
undermine both the legitimate means and ends of democracy, the absence of 
trust is particularly pernicious. Given democratic constraints, it is especially 
true that interpersonal trust is essential to the cooperation with strangers that 
is a prerequisite for the large-scale political organization on which modern 
democracies are based. 
TrUsT and JUsTIce
The literature on social capital is full of illustrations of the many ways in 
which trust facilitates all sorts of important social interactions.37 This alone 
justifies taking an interest in measures that can promote trust. However, since 
the discussion thus far has taken place at a high level of generality and has 
pertained mostly to “horizontal trust,” that is, trust among citizens, rather 
than “vertical trust,” that is, trust between individuals and the institutions by 
which they regulate their common lives, some additional steps are called for. 
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 Let us then return to the argument that civic trust is at one and the same 
time a condition and a consequence of achieving justice through a legal sys-
tem. There are myriad ways in which a legal system relies on the trust of citi-
zens.38 At the broadest level, a legal system works only on the basis of citizens’ 
generalized norm-compliance. In other words, the legal system can cope with 
norm-breaking behavior only when it is exceptional. This means that most 
social interactions are not directly mediated by law, but rather, at some level, 
by trust between citizens. Closer to home, however, all legal systems rely not 
just on the trust that citizens have towards one another but on the trust that 
they have in the systems themselves. In the absence of total(itarian) surveil-
lance, criminal legal systems must rely upon citizens’ willingness to report 
both crimes that they witness and crimes that they suffer.39 And this willing-
ness to report, of course, rests upon their trust that the systems will reliably 
produce the expected outcomes. This is actually a complex sort of trust: in 
police investigations, in the efficiency of the court systems, in the honesty 
of judges, in the independence of the judiciary (and therefore in the execu-
tive’s willingness to protect and promote that independence), in the at least 
minimal wisdom of the legislature, and in the strictness (but perhaps also the 
simultaneous humaneness) of the prison system, and so on. Needless to say, 
each of these objects of trust can be further analyzed. 
 On the other hand, it is not just that legal systems rely upon the trust of 
citizens both among one another and in the system itself. Legal systems, when 
they operate well, also catalyze trust, once again both among citizens them-
selves and in the system itself. Indeed, John Rawls takes the rule of law’s abil-
ity to generate social trust — which he understands in terms of the reliability 
of expectations — as a definitional aspect of the rule of law: 
A legal system is a coercive order of public rules addressed to rational 
persons for the purpose of regulating their conduct and providing the 
framework for social cooperation. When these rules are just they estab-
lish a basis for legitimate expectations. They constitute grounds upon 
which persons can rely on one another and rightly object when their 
expectations are not fulfilled.40 
To the extent that law helps to stabilize expectations, and that it helps to 
diminish the risks involved in trusting others, especially strangers, it contrib-
utes to the generation of trust among citizens. 
 As for the catalytic role of law in generating trust in legal institutions, the 
underlying argument should be clear: legal institutions, insofar as they are 
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reliable, provide further reasons for citizens to rely upon them for the resolu-
tion of their conflicts. This simply follows from the fact that trust is some-
thing that is earned, rather than arbitrarily bestowed, and this is true just as 
much for institutions as it is for individuals. The easier way of seeing this is by 
noticing attitudes towards law in societies where the legal system is perceived 
as inaccessible or otherwise unreliable.
 But, if we are going to be precise and consistent with an account of trust 
that centers on norm-based behavior, our task is not done, for it is not clear 
what, on this account, trust in institutions might mean. Strictly speaking, if 
trust is a relationship that cannot be reduced to mere empirical regularity, but 
one that involves an awareness of mutual normative reciprocity, this is pos-
sible only among individuals, and then there is no such thing as trust in insti-
tutions. Nevertheless, we trust institutions, and the people who inhabit them. 
How so? Claus Offe offers the following explanation:
“Trusting institutions” means something entirely different from “trust-
ing my neighbor”: it means knowing and recognizing as valid the values 
and the form of life incorporated in an institution and deriving from 
this recognition the assumption that this idea makes sufficient sense to 
a sufficient number of people to motivate their ongoing active support 
for the institution and the compliance with its rules. Successful institu-
tions generate a negative feedback loop: they make sense to actors so 
that actors will support them and comply with what the institutionally 
defined order prescribes.41 
By way of contrast, people mistrust institutions because they suspect (cor-
rectly) that the values embodied by those institutions do not “make sufficient 
sense to a sufficient number of people to motivate their ongoing active sup-
port for [these institutions] and the compliance with [their] rules.” Trusting 
an institution amounts to knowing that its constitutive rules, values, and 
norms are shared by its members or participants and that they regard them 
as binding.42
 The argument that I am interested in exploring is that well-designed vet-
ting measures can be trust inducing, that they can promote trust in insti-
tutions.43 The initial plausibility of this claim is easy to see if we start with 
the oft-reported effects on victims and others of encounters with former 
perpetrators still in positions of authority.44 Particularly chilling examples 
are often reported by women who encounter police officers who abused 
them, sometimes as they searched for missing relatives. Predictably, it will be 
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impossible for an institution inhabited and operated by such personnel to 
garner the trust and confidence of those it is intended to serve, when the latter 
had become their victims. 
 This commonsensical explanation of the untrustworthiness of institu-
tions that have not vetted their personnel after periods of widespread abuse 
is fine — as far as it goes. But it risks underdescribing the sources of distrust in 
these institutions; distrust under such circumstances usually does not target 
the particular individuals known (or suspected) to be responsible for viola-
tions, but the institutions as a whole. Why is this the case? The norm-based 
account of trust sketched above suggests an answer: the continued presence 
of known violators in the ranks of the police and other security forces, for 
example, betrays that the basic rules of the legitimate exercise of power, and 
specifically of the use of force, do not “make sufficient sense to a sufficient 
number of people to motivate their ongoing active support for the institution 
and the compliance with its rules.” Again, the critical point is that the lack of 
commitment to rules is not just that of the perpetrators, but rather a broader, 
systemic problem; the institution is distrusted for having employee retention 
“policies” that keep these people in their jobs; for having a culture of crony-
ism that protects perpetrators from being sanctioned; for having weak over-
sight structures; for having a lack of commitment to the prevention of the 
recurrence of abuses, and so on. If trust is plausibly accounted for in terms of 
commitment to norms, given the generality of the relevant norms, it is easy to 
see how breaching them impacts on the trustworthiness not only of the rule 
breaker, but of the institution of which she or he is a member. 
 Conversely, vetting those responsible for human rights abuses signals 
seriousness and commitment that goes beyond issues of personnel selection 
alone. The general point is that although, as Alexander Mayer-Rieckh has 
argued in this volume, vetting should properly be seen as part and in need of 
a broader array of institutional reform tools, and as an instrument that con-
cerns mainly personnel, choices about the latter can be, with good reason, 
taken to reflect institutional commitments to norms. “Repeopling” abusive 
institutions with new faces (and, of course, under reliable and transparent pro-
cedures), then, is not a bad indication of whether basic norms have acquired 
the requisite sense to make institutions trustworthy. This is important in its 
own terms, and also as a contribution to, and a consequence of, the applica-
tion of soundly designed, holistically conceived transitional justice measures.
 Modesty about the reach of vetting with, but particularly without, other 
transitional justice measures is called for; re-peopling unreconstructed insti-
tutions with new faces will obviously not, by itself, correct all institutional 
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defects: thus, in a country in which there are many different institutions in the 
area of security with overlapping mandates and attendant weakening of over-
sight and accountability, leaving these institutions unmodified is unlikely to 
significantly transform their trustworthiness in the short or the long run, no 
matter how many new faces are brought in. Similarly, no matter how much 
personnel is renovated and how thoroughly institutions are reformed, unless 
these reforms are accompanied by other transitional justice measures such as 
prosecutions, truth-telling, and reparations for victims, there will always be 
a significant sense in which important claims to justice would remain unre-
deemed. This is one of the implications of arguing that although institutional 
reform (including vetting) can make a contribution to transitional justice, on 
its own, of course, it cannot bear the full weight of the multiple and various 
claims to justice that arise in post-conflict and post-authoritarian transitional 
situations. 
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I have benefited from comments offered by Roger Duthie and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh, and from dis-
cussions during the meeting of authors held at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Study Center. The 
views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the ICTJ’s position. 
1  See Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 
For a salutary, “revisionist” account of vetting in Greece, see the chapter by Sotiropou-
los in this volume. 
2  With the appearance of two ambitious studies of reparations for victims of human 
rights violations, which add to the copious literature on criminal prosecutions and the 
growing one on truth commissions, it is now even truer than ever that vetting is the 
least studied transitional justice measure. To be sure, after the great transformation of 
the Eastern and Central European countries post-1989, academic interest in “lustration” 
followed, but since then the topic has garnered remarkably little attention. Some of the 
earlier studies on vetting are reproduced in Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice (Wash-
ington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1995), vol. 1. The two recent studies on 
reparations are Pablo de Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2006) and K. de Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, and P. Lemmens, eds., 
Out of the Ashes. Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations 
(Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006). On criminal prosecutions see Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: 
Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (New York: Times Books, 1998), and 
now, the articles in a dedicated journal, the Journal of International Criminal Law. On 
truth commissions, see Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2001). 
3  This chapter examines questions of the aims and justification of vetting primarily from 
a human rights perspective. In the literature on state building, for example, vetting is 
defended on grounds of security, of the orderly management of governance institu-
tions, and of the “signaling effect” of vetting, that is, its use to indicate a regime change. 
I will not examine these arguments here. 
4  See, for instance, Herbert Lottman, The Purge: The Purification of the French Collaborators 
After World War II (New York: William and Morrow, 1986), and the papers in part 2 of 
Jon Elster, ed., Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to Democracy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2006). 
5  International Center for Transitional Justice, “Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict 
Settings: Operational Guidelines,” Sections I and IV.E, in this volume.
6  “Abusive behavior” is used instead of “criminal behavior,” mainly because there may be 
circumstances in which gross violations of human rights, serious crimes under inter-
national law, or other forms of serious misbehavior have not been locally criminalized, 
and yet may become vetting criteria. 
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7  On this topic, see chapter by Andreu-Guzmán in this volume. 
8  The shaming potential of vetting measures can be enhanced or diminished through dif-
ferent design features; people with “positive” vetting records (i.e., those whose records 
provide grounds for exclusion) can be given the opportunity to resign and their records 
kept confidential (as in Hungary), or they can be fired and their records made public. In 
Argentina, which does not have a formal vetting procedure, military promotions can 
be impugned in a process that involves public hearings in the Senate. See the chapters 
by Barrett, Hack, and Munkási in this volume. 
9  Whether the potential is realized is a factual, empirical, and highly contextual mat-
ter. In Poland, for example, the vetting procedure, to which candidates for public 
office among others had to submit, did not punish collaboration with the communist 
secret services, but only making a false vetting declaration. This meant that the col-
laboration of many candidates became a subject of public knowledge. The expectation 
of the framers of the law was that this would dissuade the electorate from voting for 
candidates with a record of collaboration. But for many reasons, which may include 
the long time lag between the relevant activities and the coming into effect of the law, 
that the relevant “crimes” were not violent crimes but the giving of information to the 
former secret services, and that this was something that tens of thousands of people 
did, a good number of candidates in these situations were actually elected, despite their 
previous collaboration. See chapter by Czarnota in this volume. 
10  The forms of uncertainty that are relevant for this argument are at least twofold. The 
first is about the course of the transition. The fact that, especially at the pre-transitional 
stage and even in the early stages of the transition, it is rarely a foregone conclusion 
that a new regime intent on vetting will be able to consolidate its hold on power may 
weaken the deterrent potential of any proposed measure (and may actually generate 
incentives to block the transition). The second has to do with uncertainties (doubts) 
about the probabilities of being subject to any justice measure. It has been observed in 
the criminological literature that beyond a certain threshold, more than the length of 
sentence, what ends up having deterrent potential is the degree of certainty of being 
apprehended, tried, and convicted, and hence having to serve a sentence. In countries 
where the security and justice sectors have been left in disarray, this is highly unlikely. 
It is doubtful that vetting has a significant deterrent power. 
  As for the general deterrence power of the death penalty, obviously the greatest 
penalty, see the materials of the Death Penalty Information Center, on whose website 
one reads:
 Even as the use of the death penalty continued to decline in the United 
States, the number of murders and the national murder rate dropped in 2004. 
According to the recently released FBI Uniform Crime Report for 2004, the 
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nation’s murder rate fell by 3.3%, declining to 5.5 murders per 100,000 people 
in 2004. By region, the Northeast, which accounts for less than 1% of all U.S. 
executions, continued to have the nation’s lowest murder rate, 4.2. The Mid-
west had a murder rate of 4.7, and the murder rate in the West was 5.7. The 
South, which has carried out more than 80% of all U.S. executions, again had 
the nation’s highest murder rate, 6.6. 
 See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2065 (accessed November 1, 
2006). 
11  See Mayer-Rieckh’s chapter on vetting and other institutional reforms in this volume.
12  For a succinct account of meliorism as a liberal commitment, see John Gray, Liberalism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). 
13  For the view that vetting is better done early in a transition or not at all, because post-
poning it increases the risk of partisan political manipulation of the process (a view 
largely based on Central and Eastern European experiences), see Charles Bertschi, 
“Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria,” 
East European Quarterly 28, no. 4, (1995): 435–51, and Carmen González-Enríquez, “De- 
communization and Political Justice in Central and Eastern Europe,” in The Politics of 
Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, 
Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma Aguilar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 218–47.
14  The targeting of thousands of people, the uneven publicity, and the weak procedural 
guarantees are features that vetting shares with many reparations programs. However, 
the partisan political stakes of vetting are significantly higher, which might explain why 
despite the similarities the claim that vetting has lent itself to more political manipula-
tion than reparations remains plausible. For a review of the politicization of lustration 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe, see Cynthia Horne and Margaret Levi, “Does 
Lustration Promote Trustworthy Governance? An Exploration of the Experience of 
Central and Eastern Europe,” in Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition, ed. 
Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 52–74.
15  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Future of the Liberal Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1993).
16  Even in the Czech Republic, whose vetting system applied quite extensively, the num-
bers of people actually removed from their jobs was comparatively small. See chapter 
by Priban in this volume. 
17  Again, notice the modality. This is not a predictive claim. Whether vetting facilitates 
the application of other transitional justice measures is an empirical matter. 
18  Morocco’s Instance Equité et Réconciliation (IER) was established in 2004 by King Moham-
med VI to investigate human rights violations (forced disappearances, arbitrary deten-
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tion, torture, sexual abuse, deprivation of the right to live as a result of unrestrained 
and inadequate use of state force, and coerced exile) during the period 1956 to 1999 — a 
period which overlaps almost completely with the reign of the King’s father, Hassan II, 
who ruled from 1959 to 1999. This was not a truth commission operating in a situation 
of “regime change.” In addition to a great deal of institutional continuity in the country, 
there was also lingering personnel continuity. Most of the worst abusers had retired 
by the time the IER started its investigations, but not all. No vetting has taken place in 
Morocco to this date, and this is one of the demands of human rights NGOs. Interviews 
conducted in Rabat, with various human rights organizations during 2005–2006. 
19  The IER itself complained of “inadequate cooperation” on the part of some authori-
ties. In its summary of findings, it says: “The Commission faced obstacles in its truth-
seeking mission, including the limitations of certain oral testimonies and their fragil-
ity. However, these were overcome by referring to written sources. Other difficulties 
relate to the deplorable state of national archives and the inadequate cooperation of 
certain authorities, whereby certain officials gave incomplete answers about cases they 
were questioned about, while certain former, retired officials refused altogether to con-
tribute to the efforts to reveal the truth.” IER, “Summary of the Findings of the Final 
Report” (Rabat, n.d.), 6.
20  In December 1985 the trial of the nine heads of the military juntas in Argentina ended 
with the following results: General Jorge Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera were sen-
tenced for life; General Roberto Viola to seventeen years in prison; Admiral Armando 
Lambruschini to seven years; Brigadier Raúl Agosti to four-and-a-half years; General 
Leopoldo Galtieri, Brigadiers Rubén Graffigna and Basilio Lami Dozo, and Admiral 
Jorge Anaya were absolved. Although all of them benefited from the pardons extended 
by President Carlos Menem in 1989, as it turns out this was not the end of their con-
frontation with the criminal justice system. The literature on Argentina is extensive. 
See, e.g., Alexandra Barahona de Brito, “Truth, Justice, Memory, and Democratization 
in the Southern Cone,” in The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Soci-
eties, ed. Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, and Paloma Agui-
lar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 119–160. 
21  On the military uprisings in Argentina, see Deborah Norden, Military Rebellion in Argen-
tina: Between Coups and Consolidation (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996). 
22  As I have argued they ought to be if the benefits are to count, legitimately, as reparations; 
see Pablo de Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” in The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 451–477. 
23  See, for example, “La Paz Ahora” (UDI’s proposal), published in La Nación, June 20, 
2003; http://www.lanacion.cl. 
24  Law 975, 2006. 
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25  Mayer-Rieckh, in his chapter on vetting and other transitional reforms in this volume, 
insists again on the importance of seeing vetting as only one narrow measure in the 
domain of institutional reform, and one that frequently needs to be accompanied by 
others if its effects are to be significant and long lasting. 
26  Vetting’s potential to help implement these different transitional justice measures in 
the first place is enabling in a different way: as Mayer-Rieckh has argued, vetting may 
improve the efficiency of rule of law institutions so that they investigate crimes, render 
justice, provide reparations, and so on. The point is that the contribution that vetting can 
make to a transition goes beyond removing obstacles that may lie in the way of putting 
transitional justice measures in place. Vetting can contribute positively to the operation 
of institutions that are rarely created de novo or totally and thoroughly transformed.
27  I am following Mayer-Rieckh in thinking about vetting as a form of institutional 
reform, without rehearsing his argument. See his chapter on vetting and other transi-
tional reforms in this volume. 
28  In this chapter, both for reasons of space and of clarity, I will elaborate the argument 
about the trust-inducing potential of transitional justice measures in reference to vet-
ting. I will be very brief about how the different elements of a holistic transitional jus-
tice policy provide recognition, for as far as possible, I want vetting, and not a general 
conception of transitional justice, to remain the focus of this paper. Thus, the fol-
lowing will suffice: the various transitional measures can be interpreted as efforts to 
institutionalize the recognition of individuals as rights bearers. Criminal justice can 
be interpreted as an attempt to reestablish the equality of rights between the crimi-
nal and his or her victim, after the criminal severed that relationship with an act that 
suggested his or her superiority over the victim. Truth telling provides recognition in 
ways that are perfectly familiar, and which are still probably best articulated by the 
old difference proposed by Thomas Nagel between knowledge and acknowledgment, 
when he argued that although truth commissions rarely disclose facts that were previ-
ously unknown, they still make an indispensable contribution in acknowledging these 
facts. The acknowledgment is important precisely because it constitutes a form of 
recognizing the significance and value of persons — again, as individuals, as citizens, and 
as victims. Reparations are the material form of the recognition owed to fellow citizens 
whose fundamental rights have been violated, manifesting that the state has taken to 
heart the interests of those whose rights went previously unrecognized. Finally, institu-
tional reform (to which vetting aims to contribute) is guided by the ideal of guaranteeing 
the conditions under which citizens can relate to one another and to the authorities as 
equals. For a full elaboration of this argument, see my “Justice and Reparations.” 
  In addition to serving justice in general and the two mediate goals of recognition 
and civic trust, transitional justice measures also share two final goals: first, social 
reconstruction or reconciliation, and, second, making a contribution to processes of 
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democratization, but I will not discuss this here. On reconciliation, see my “The Role 
of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes,” in The Age of Apologies, ed. Mark 
Gibney and Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
forthcoming). 
29  For an elaboration of this argument, see my “Truth telling and the Rule of Law,” in Tell-
ing the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies, ed. Tristan Anne 
Borer (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).
30  Obviously, the fact that vetting has this potential is significant on its own terms, inde-
pendent of the particular conception of transitional justice sketched in this chapter. 
31  The material in this section borrows from my “Justice and Reparations,” “Truth telling 
and the Rule of Law,” and “The Role of Apologies in National Reconciliation Processes.”
32  Annete Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” in Moral Prejudices (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1994), 133.
33  Laurence Mordekhai Thomas illustrates the point with a telling example: “Trust does 
not amount to prediction: if I put everything under lock and key and invite you into 
my home, I can quite confidently predict that you will not steal anything, yet nothing is 
clearer than that I do not trust you.” “Power, Trust, and Evil,” in Overcoming Racism and 
Sexism, ed. Linda Bell and David Blumenfeld (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1995), 160.
34  Claus Offe, “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark 
E. Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42–87. The economic limita-
tions that follow from distrust go beyond those that stem from the high costs of infor-
mation gathering, monitoring, and sanctioning. In the early days of the post-Soviet 
period, firms in the former Soviet republics, for example, conducted business only on 
the basis of prepayment schemes, a notoriously inefficient strategy (albeit contextually 
reasonable). Furthermore, these firms solved disputes via private protection rackets, 
which manifested, sustained, and encouraged illegal activities. See Vadim Radaev, “How 
Trust is Established in Economic Relationships when Institutions and Individuals Are 
not Trustworthy: The Case of Russia,” in Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition, ed. 
János Kornai, Bo Rothstein, and Susan Rose-Ackerman (New York: Palgrave, 2004). 
35  It goes without saying that this correlation is a complex one. Ronald Inglehart not only 
recognizes that “trust shapes economic development rates, as well as the reverse,” but 
he is also emphatically interested in examining other factors that might affect levels 
of trust, such as religion and the history of political institutions. See his “Trust, Well-
being and Democracy” in Democracy and Trust, ed. Mark E. Warren (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), 88–120, 91ff.
36  Both Robert Goodin and Cass Sunstein have argued that at every level of income, but 
notoriously among the poor, preferences are accommodated to perceptions of possi-
bility in order to avoid the acute dissonances that would follow the awareness that there 
is in fact no direct relationship between effort and success. See Goodin, “Laundering 
Preferences,” in Foundations of Social Choice Theory, ed. Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 75–101, and Sunstein, “Democracy and 
Shifting Preferences,” in The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State, ed. Allan Hamlin 
and Phillip Pettit (Oxford: Polity Press, 1989), 196–230.
37  See, for example, Robert Putnam, “The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Pub-
lic Life,” American Prospect 13 (1993): 35–42. In the literature on conflict, see Nat J. Colletta, 
Teck Ghee Lim, and Anita Kelles-Viitanen, Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia: 
Managing Diversity through Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001). 
38  For a closer analysis of this issue and of how truth-telling efforts, in particular, can con-
tribute to the rule of law in transitional situations precisely by fostering civic trust, see 
my “Truth telling and the Rule of Law.”
39  From the perspective of well-ordered societies it is hard to conceive of circumstances 
in which people would not bother reporting even serious crimes like murder. But this 
indeed happens. In Colombia, for example, during the late 1980s more than 35% of 
murders were never even reported. See Mauricio Rubio, Crimen e Impunidad (Bogotá: 
TM Editores, 1999).
40  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 235. 
My emphasis. 
41  Offe, “How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?” 70–71. 
42  Tom Tyler and Yuen J. Huo provide the results of empirical research that confirm that 
“judgments about the motives of the particular police officers and judges with whom 
people have personal experiences have more influence on whether people accept the 
decisions of these legal authorities than do evaluations of the favorability of their out-
comes. . . . [W]hen people’s actions develop out of a trust in the motives of the authori-
ties with whom they are dealing, they consent and cooperate with those authorities’ 
directives.” Trust in the Law (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002), 75. 
43  Notice again the modality of the claim. This is not a prediction. The argument is about 
what it is reasonable to think vetting can achieve. Whether vetting achieves this, in fact, 
is of course an empirical question that depends on many factors. 
44  See chapter by Sotiropoulos in this volume. 
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Vetting Public Employees in Post-Conflict Settings: 
Operational guidelines1
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executive summary
Vetting to ensure minimum standards of integrity in public service is widely 
recognized as an important institutional reform measure in post-conflict set-
tings. Little systematic attention, however, has been paid to the topic, and there 
exists a broad variety of views about, and approaches to, vetting. This dearth 
of analysis affects the practice of vetting as well, and many countries emerging 
from conflict handle such processes poorly, and often unfairly. These opera-
tional vetting guidelines build on systematic research that included country 
case studies, an assessment of related United Nations practice, and a review of 
relevant literature.
 The operational guidelines are divided into six sections. The first defines 
the concept of vetting and situates it in the context of institutional reform and 
transitional justice. The second discusses conditions for a vetting process and 
risks of undesirable consequences. The third section describes different types 
of vetting processes. The fourth proposes a methodology to design a vetting 
process. The fifth section presents institutional reform measures that gener-
ally need to accompany a vetting process to safeguard its results and ensure 
the effectiveness and sustainability of the overall reform effort. The final sec-
tion provides sources of additional information on vetting within the United 
Nations system. 
 While institutional reform to prevent the recurrence of human rights abuse 
is an obligation under international law and vetting is a measure states are 
encouraged to undertake, there is significant flexibility regarding the form of 
vetting processes. Vetting strategies need to address the unique historical and 
political challenges of each society emerging from conflict. Different types of 
institutions also raise specific concerns, and vetting strategies need to respond 
to the particular requirements of the institution in question. The fundamental 
rights of the persons subject to vetting need, however, to be respected and the 
political misuse of vetting must be prevented (see below IV.E).
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i. why vet public employees in post-conflict settings?
Vetting ordinarily refers to a process of assessing integrity to determine suit-
ability for public employment. Integrity refers to a person’s adherence to rele-
vant standards of human rights and professional conduct, including her or his 
financial propriety (see below IV.C). In post-conflict settings, vetting has the 
specific aim of transforming institutions involved in serious abuses during 
the conflict into public bodies that enjoy civic trust and protect human rights. 
The public, and particularly victims of abuses, are unlikely to rely on insti-
tutions that retain or hire individuals with serious integrity deficits. Vetting 
processes aim at excluding from public service persons with serious integrity 
deficits in order to reestablish civic trust and relegitimize public institutions, 
and to disable structures within which individuals carried out serious abuses. 
Vetting public employees, in particular in the security and justice sectors, is 
now widely recognized as an important measure of governance reform in 
countries emerging from conflict.
 But to maximize its impact and ensure its sustainability, vetting generally 
needs to be part of a much broader reform of the institution concerned. More 
often than not, integrity deficits of public employees are not the only short-
comings of public institutions in post-conflict settings, and the exclusion of 
persons who lack integrity may not bring about the changes necessary to 
build a fairly and efficiently functioning public institution. While a detailed 
discussion of comprehensive institutional reform goes beyond the scope of 
this document, the following guidelines situate vetting in the broader context 
of personnel reform and introduce other key institutional reform measures 
(see below V).
 Institutional reform is an integral component of a comprehensive transi-
tional justice policy and an obligation under international law in response to 
serious abuses: reforming institutions is not only critical to prevent the recur-
rence of human rights abuses but it also enables institutions in the security 
and judicial sectors to provide criminal accountability for past abuses. Vetting 
and excluding abusers is an institutional reform measure states are encour-
aged to undertake under international law in post-conflict settings. Under cir-
cumstances of limited or delayed criminal prosecutions, vetting can also help 
to fill the “impunity gap” by ensuring that those responsible for past abuses 
at least do not continue to enjoy the rewards and privileges of public office. 
Vetting should, however, not be used as a pretext for not pursuing criminal 
prosecutions. But the scarcity of resources in a post-conflict context, as well 
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as legal impediments and large numbers of crimes, often preclude the crimi-
nal prosecution of all abusers.
ii. what factors determine the design of a vetting process?
Post-conflict circumstances represent extremely challenging settings, and 
often also provide unique historical opportunities, for institutional change. 
In these contexts, a number of critical factors should be considered during the 
design of a vetting process. On the one hand, several basic conditions should 
be met before a vetting process is set up (A). On the other hand, the design of 
a vetting process should seek to prevent certain undesirable consequences (B). 
A thorough analysis to determine the conditions for a vetting process and to 
assess the risks of undesirable consequences is recommended before design-
ing a vetting process.
A. ENSURE BASIC CONdITIONS
1. polITIcal condITIons: Is There governmenT aUThorITy  
and polITIcal wIll?
A vetting process requires a measure of stability, actual government author-
ity, and political will. Any particular transition has its own characteristics and 
context that might make it either more or less open to vetting. Vetting pro-
cesses regulate access to positions of power and are highly political undertak-
ings, in particular in post-conflict situations. Resistance to reform is a regular 
feature in countries emerging from conflict and the position of post-conflict 
governments is often tenuous. Individuals who risk losing power through a 
vetting process will resist its implementation. Public employees who were 
involved or complicit in past abuses have an interest in covering up those 
abuses and protecting their positions. Both actual government authority over 
the targeted institution and political will are necessary to implement a vetting 
process. The nature of the transition should be carefully analyzed, potential 
resistance to the vetting process should be considered in advance, and reform-
minded constituencies who may assist in the design and implementation of a 
vetting process should be identified.
 The level of political commitment will also influence the design of a vet-
ting process. For example, a review of serving employees may result in their 
removal from positions of power, which is likely to raise significant political 
resistance. The softer option of merely screening new appointments, on the 
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other hand, is generally politically less controversial and requires a lower level 
of governmental authority or political will.
2. InsTITUTIonal condITIons:  
whaT are The posITIons sUbJecT To veTTIng?
A clear definition of the positions subject to vetting is a prerequisite for any vet-
ting process. At the end of a conflict, the public sector is generally in crisis. Fre-
quently, the sector continues to operate within the organizational structures 
that perpetuated the conflict. The institutional context is often fragmented. 
Some institutions are not functioning, leaving a governance gap. Other insti-
tutions have overlapping mandates, leading to competing responsibilities and 
redundant capacities. The number of public employees is often inflated. The 
organizational structure of an institution is often distorted and does not meet 
the needs of a country governed by the rule of law. Commonly, an institution’s 
personnel do not represent the population it is mandated to serve.
 In such a context, the entire public sector may have to be changed in order 
to meet the needs of a country governed by the rule of law. Institutions might 
have to be merged or consolidated, reduced in size or enlarged, newly cre-
ated or abolished. The personnel composition of an institution might have to 
be modified to reflect the composition of the population, and ex-combatants 
might have to be integrated. Public sector reforms and internal organizational 
changes determine the number of positions, affect the job requirements for 
individual positions, and limit the number of posts available for persons from 
each gender, ethnic and religious group, and geographic region. In most cases, 
organizational changes should be taken prior to establishing a vetting process 
if they affect positions that will be subject to vetting. Otherwise, individuals 
might be vetted for positions that are subsequently changed or eliminated, 
and the vetting process might have been superfluous or even counterproduc-
tive, which would undermine the credibility of the entire reform effort. In 
some instances, however, where the process of organizational change might 
be protracted or lengthy, some form of targeted vetting might have to precede 
organizational change, provided such vetting does not prejudice or compro-
mise the underlying reform process. While public sector reform and internal 
organizational changes might represent conditions for a meaningful vetting 
process, they also constitute significant reform achievements in themselves. 
The Capacity and Integrity Framework (CIF) is a simple tool to assess institu-
tional reform needs in post-conflict settings.2
 The type of institution concerned will also affect the design of a vetting 
process. Vetting judges, for example, will have to give due consideration to the 
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independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers. Vetting processes 
for elected officials or candidates for elected office should be designed so as to 
minimize the risk of interference with the will of the electorate. Vetting secu-
rity agencies usually elicits significant challenges concerning the processing 
of large numbers of employees.
3. IndIvIdUal condITIons:  
who are The persons To be veTTed?
In addition to defining the positions that will be subject to vetting, the indi-
viduals to be vetted have to be identified. A post-conflict situation also raises 
significant and peculiar challenges in this regard. In many instances, mem-
bership in a public institution is not clearly defined and the number of per-
sonnel is unknown. In other instances, membership in an institution may 
not be accessible — such as in clandestine organizations operating within or 
at the behest of the state. Often, the boundaries of institutions are fluid and 
porous in countries emerging from conflict. If the target group of a vetting 
process — that is, the personnel of an institution or a specific group within 
an institution to be vetted — is not clearly known, it needs to be identified by 
means of a census or registration process, and informal access to and depar-
ture from the group of persons to be vetted have to cease. A failure to identify 
the target group prior to establishing a vetting process would allow circum-
venting it and might render the entire process obsolete. The identification of 
personnel, in particular in the security sector, often represents a relatively 
noncontentious start to a reform process and constitutes a significant reform 
achievement in itself. A personnel census will also provide reliable data on the 
shortcomings of the employees; assist in planning a realistic and viable vet-
ting and personnel reform process; and might be used to establish a proper 
personnel management system for the institution in question. 
 Identification is not enough. Reliable records about the integrity of the 
persons to be vetted are a condition of any meaningful vetting process and 
need to be established. During periods of conflict, information about abuses 
is often covered up and evidence destroyed. Frequently, personnel files have 
not been established or have been improperly maintained, manipulated, or 
destroyed. Commonly, the police, prosecutors, and courts failed to investigate 
or prosecute abuses and indeed may have maintained a climate of impunity. 
Frequently, nongovernmental organizations monitoring and investigating 
human rights abuses have been suppressed.
 A vetting process may be broadened beyond existing personnel to include 
external candidates. The pool of potential external candidates, as well as 
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their general competence and integrity, should be assessed and their avail-
ability determined in order to minimize the risks of governance gaps and 
to measure the time and resources needed to identify, prepare, and train 
replacements.
 To collect reliable integrity data in the post-conflict period, background 
information might have to be collected proactively from a variety of sources. 
Sources of information include, among others, personnel files, court records, 
party files, election registers, United Nations reports, NGO reports, truth 
commission reports, media reports, and independent investigation reports. 
Providing the public with an opportunity to come forward with informa-
tion is another useful avenue to collect information on the integrity of serv-
ing public employees and external candidates. Provided the security situation 
permits, lists with the names of employees and candidates could be broadly 
publicized and a contact point could be established to receive information on 
the background of employees and candidates.
4. legal condITIons: whaT Is The veTTIng mandaTe?
A firm legal basis will significantly facilitate the establishment of a vetting 
process. Any vetting process will be contested and create some political resis-
tance. An explicit commitment to vetting in a peace agreement or a Security 
Council resolution will be more difficult to circumvent. Peace negotiators 
should encourage the inclusion of specific vetting provisions in peace agree-
ments in order to place a clear obligation on the parties. If special domestic 
legislation is required, it should be clear, precise, and in compliance with con-
stitutional requirements and international standards.
5. operaTIonal condITIons: are The resoUrces adeqUaTe?
The success or failure of vetting processes significantly depends on a thor-
ough evaluation of operational needs and the provision of adequate time and 
resources. Capacities are generally limited and resources scarce in a society 
emerging from conflict. Various reform projects compete for scarce resources 
and the requirements of vetting processes are generally underestimated. Vet-
ting processes are complex, time-consuming, and resource-intensive exercises 
requiring multidisciplinary skills, in particular when they concern institutions 
with large numbers of employees. International support to a post-conflict vet-
ting process will often be a condition for its successful implementation (on 
the role of international actors in the vetting process itself, see below IV.D).
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6. Temporal condITIons: how Is The TImIng?
Post-conflict contexts are determined by various and often conflicting agen-
das and timetables, and vetting may compete with other transitional pro-
cesses. A political transition may, for example, rely on individuals who could 
be affected by a vetting process; an election could benefit from or be restricted 
by a vetting process; or the findings of a truth-seeking exercise might feed into 
a vetting process. The timing of a vetting process raises complex questions of 
sequencing and interrelations with other transitional processes, and has to be 
adapted to the political developments. The timing will also condition strategic 
design choices such as the institution or group targeted by vetting (see below 
IV.B), the type of mechanism selected (see below III), or the composition of a 
vetting commission (see below IV.D).
B. AVOId UNdESIRABlE CONSEqUENCES
1. polITIcal mIsUse
A vetting process can be misused for partisan political purposes. For exam-
ple, vetting of judges could be used to undermine the independence of the 
judiciary. Removals can be based on group or party affiliation, rather than 
on individual conduct, target political opponents, and degenerate into politi-
cal purges. Such processes undermine, rather than reinforce, human rights 
and the rule of law, create resentment among those affected by the process, 
and are unlikely to achieve the necessary reform goals. International human 
rights standards have to be respected in the implementation of a vetting pro-
cess itself in order to avoid its political misuse (see below IV.E).
2. governance gap
The public service needs in the post-conflict period have to be considered. 
Vetting, by removing larger numbers of public employees (in particular senior 
or expert), may disrupt the functioning of public service and create a gover-
nance gap. In the interim, imperfect public service is usually preferable to no 
service at all. Interim arrangements with existing institutions might have to 
be put in place, a vetting process might have to be implemented in phases, 
and replacements might have to be identified proactively in order to avoid a 
governance gap.
3. desTabIlIzaTIon
Removed public employees who do not find alternative employment and 
are not integrated into society may drift into criminality and destabilize a 
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sensitive political balance. In particular a large number of removed security 
personnel may turn to armed opposition or organized crime and create a secu-
rity threat. The potential destabilizing effects of removals should be assessed 
prior to designing a vetting process, and options to provide severance pay and 
other temporary assistance should be explored. Vetting processes may also be 
linked with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs (DDR). 
However, care should be taken to consider the rights of victims, and assistance 
to removed employees has to be balanced with the needs of victims.
iii. types of vetting
The type and scope of a vetting process can vary considerably. This section 
describes different ways of vetting in post-conflict settings. These types are 
neither exhaustive nor necessarily exclusive. 
A. VET All OR VET CERTAIN POSITIONS
A vetting process can target all positions or only certain positions of a public 
institution or a certain category of positions across institutions. In general, a 
vetting process that targets all positions might be desirable to ensure that all 
employees and candidates meet minimum standards of integrity. For opera-
tional reasons, a general vetting process might, however, not be feasible, in 
particular when the institution in question has a large number of personnel. 
In such a context, a vetting process might prioritize senior managers. Such a 
process requires fewer resources and can be implemented more quickly than 
a vetting of all personnel. Improving the quality of senior managers is likely to 
have a catalyzing effect because their authority provides them with significant 
leverage over the entire reform process and because it sends a clear message 
that the reform will move forward. Once the managers of a public institu-
tion meet minimum standards of integrity, the normal internal discipline and 
appointment mechanisms might be able to address the integrity deficits of the 
regular employees. Vetting senior managers is, however, likely to meet signifi-
cant resistance because it affects positions of power and requires considerable 
political will for its implementation.
 Rather than prioritizing senior managers, a vetting process could also tar-
get the personnel of a specific unit that has a well-known history of human 
rights abuse or professional misconduct. The personnel of these units might 
constitute a liability to the reform process. A failure to exclude persons with 
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serious integrity deficits undermines the trustworthiness of the entire public 
institution and might contravene international law (see below IV.C).
B. REVIEw OR REAPPOINT SERVINg EmPlOyEES
In a review process, a special mechanism is established to screen serving pub-
lic employees with the aim of removing those who are unfit to hold office. 
Basic due process standards apply, the burden of proof falls on the reviewing 
body, and balance of probabilities will be the appropriate standard of proof. 
A review process should generally be established when regular discipline and 
appointment mechanisms would be overwhelmed or unavailable, and when 
broader personnel reforms are not necessary.
 In a reappointment process, on the other hand, the public institution is 
first disbanded, a successor institution is established, and there is a general 
competition for all posts with the aim to select the most suitable. All serving 
employees have to reapply if they want to continue working and external can-
didates can also apply. To avoid a governance gap, the serving employees may 
remain in office until such time as a final decision is made about their future 
employment status. A reappointment process turns all employees into appli-
cants and shifts the burden of proof to the applicant, who has to establish that 
he or she is the most suitable for the post. Applicants in a reappointment pro-
cess do not enjoy the due process protections of serving employees in a review 
process, as there is no right to be appointed to public office. Applicants have, 
however, a right to equal access to public service. These procedural simplifi-
cations streamline the vetting process significantly. A reappointment process 
also offers a better opportunity to undertake fundamental personnel reforms 
(such as modifying the gender or ethnic balance, and downsizing or merging 
institutions).
 A reappointment process represents, however, several serious risks. Reap-
pointment could enable political interference by the executive branch of 
government in otherwise independently operating sectors, undermine basic 
due process rights, and leave a governance gap while the process is ongo-
ing. It might also require a large number of qualified replacements. A reap-
pointment process should therefore be limited to circumstances when the 
institution is fundamentally dysfunctional or compromised, and needs to 
be changed significantly. The process should be carried out as quickly and as 
early as the circumstances permit in order to avoid protracted periods of legal 
uncertainty.
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C. VET SERVINg EmPlOyEES OR ExTERNAl CANdIdATES
Rather than vetting serving public employees, a vetting process could be 
limited to new appointments, including transfers and promotions, and only 
screen candidates for positions that are or become vacant. The political stakes 
are lower in vetting processes for candidates for new appointments, which 
regulate access to public posts, rather than in vetting processes of serving 
public employees that will result in the removal from positions of power of 
those who are unfit to hold office. Limiting a vetting process to new appoint-
ments, transfers, or promotions is generally less intrusive, politically less con-
troversial, and can constitute an important long-term measure to profession-
alize the public institution.
 This softer option of vetting does not, however, ensure the removal of 
serving public employees with serious integrity deficits, significantly slows 
down the renewal of personnel, and is unsuitable for fundamental reforms 
of the institutional framework. Yet vetting candidates for new appointment, 
transfer, or promotion might constitute the first phase of a vetting process 
that is later expanded to vetting serving employees when the political circum-
stances are more opportune.
d. A SPECIAl OR A REgUlAR mEChANISm
In general, a special, ad hoc commission has to be established to implement a 
vetting process (see below IV.D). In certain instances, it may also be possible 
to use regular procedures to remove public employees with serious integrity 
deficits. Unlike any special process, regular procedures do not infringe on the 
certainty of the law and are less costly and disruptive. Regular procedures 
could take the form of either internal disciplinary mechanisms or of executive 
decisions when the positions concerned are political appointments.
 Regular disciplinary procedures can be used when the percentage of indi-
viduals affected by the vetting process is small; when the institution remains 
functional and there is no urgent need for wider reform; and when there is 
sufficiently strong political will to implement self-reform. However, the chal-
lenges of a post-conflict context generally overstrain regular disciplinary pro-
cedures, and the capacity and will of public institutions to self-reform are par-
ticularly limited in those situations.
 Appointments by executive order are reversible informally without due 
process concerns and removals by executive order provide an opportunity 
for quick personnel changes. Executive decisions are, however, more open 
to abuse and the lack of formality may lead to perceptions of bias. Replacing 
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political appointees by executive order is generally also highly contested in a 
post-conflict context, especially where delicate peace processes have resulted 
in power-sharing relationships. The establishment of a more formal vetting 
process to accompany executive appointment and removal processes should 
be considered.
iv. how is a vetting process designed?
This section suggests several steps to design a vetting process. While this 
approach will not answer all questions that arise in the development of a vet-
ting process, following these steps will help in designing vetting processes 
that respect both specific contextual needs and international standards. 
The assessment of the conditions of the process and of the risks of undesir-
able consequences (see above II) should inform the entire design of a vetting 
process. 
A. INfORm ANd CONSUlT ThE PUBlIC
To reestablish civic trust and relegitimize public institutions, the public needs 
to be aware of and trust the reform process itself. Transparency about the vet-
ting process and consultation about its objectives will help in building con-
fidence in the process, in reducing uncertainty experienced by the person-
nel subject to the process, and in ensuring that it effectively responds to the 
actual needs of victims and society in general. There is no “one-size-fits-all” 
response to vetting and public consultations help in designing context- and 
institution-specific vetting strategies. Public awareness can also help in pre-
empting later efforts to cast doubts on the validity of the process. Not only 
should a vetting process, therefore, include a public information mechanism 
but the design of the process itself should be informed by broad consultations 
with civil society, in particular with victim groups and other reform-minded 
constituencies. Opportunities should be provided to victims of abuses and 
civil society organizations to provide background information about public 
employees and candidates, as part of the data collection process on which to 
base vetting decisions.
B. ESTABlISh VETTINg PRIORITIES ANd SElECT VETTINg TyPE
In a post-conflict context, the entire public administration might benefit from 
a vetting process. Vetting processes should, however, prioritize the military, 
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the civilian security sector, intelligence services, the judiciary, and other 
institutions that underpin the rule of law. In general, these institutions were 
involved in the most serious abuses in the past. At the same time, they have 
primary responsibility for maintaining stability and security, and for protect-
ing basic human rights. Reforming these institutions creates important condi-
tions for an effective and expeditious transition to peace and the rule of law.
 On the basis of an assessment of the basic factors that determine the 
design of a vetting process (see above II), the most appropriate type of vetting 
process for the institution in question (see above III) should be selected.
C. dEfINE VETTINg CRITERIA ANd OUTCOmES
The integrity of a public employee or a candidate for public employment refers 
to the person’s adherence to international standards of human rights and pro-
fessional conduct, including a person’s financial propriety. The precise kind 
and scope of integrity required for public employment depend on the circum-
stances of the particular post-conflict context, as well as on the requirements 
of the specific position. Criteria should be based on a thorough assessment of 
what is required and realistic in the particular situation, with the aim of estab-
lishing fair and efficient public institutions. For example, a very high integ-
rity standard may result in the exclusion of an unacceptably large number of 
employees. Or an integrity standard that is difficult to verify is unlikely to be 
usable in practice. A number of international codes and guidelines provide 
standards and indicators that may assist in the development of integrity stan-
dards for post-conflict vetting.
 But to be efficient, effective, and credible, a vetting process should not be 
disconnected from broader personnel reform measures that are needed in the 
post-conflict situation. More often than not, integrity deficits are not the only 
shortcomings of public employees in post-conflict contexts, and the exclu-
sion of persons who lack integrity may not bring about the necessary person-
nel changes. The employees of a public institution may, for example, not only 
include human rights abusers, but also lack qualifications and skills, and the 
personnel as a whole may fail to represent the population it is called to serve. 
A vetting process may, therefore, also include criteria of individual capacity 
(professional competence, physical aptitude, etc.) and of representation (gen-
der, ethnicity, geographic origin, etc.). 
 Criteria may compete with each other and the design of a comprehensive 
personnel reform program may require difficult trade-offs between differ-
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ent reform objectives. Generally, the legitimacy and effectiveness of person-
nel reform will depend on attaining minimum standards in each of the three 
categories of integrity, capacity, and representation. However, as a general 
rule, involvement in gross violations of human rights or serious crimes under 
international law should always disqualify a person from public employment. 
These include in particular genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
extrajudicial execution, torture and similar cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, enforced disappearance, and slavery. These are serious crimes that 
indicate a lack of integrity at a level that fundamentally affects a person’s cred-
ibility to hold public service. If a person were convicted and punished for such 
crimes — and, in fact, states have an obligation to prosecute these crimes — 
exclusion from public service would be a normal consequence.
 Substantive criteria (integrity, competence, and representation) may be 
complemented by formal criteria such as compliance with the vetting pro-
cess, appearance at the announced interview time, full completion of the reg-
istration and vetting forms, submission of required documents such as birth 
or school certificates, and appearance on a personnel list. Such formal criteria 
take on increasing significance in processes where reliable information on the 
background of the persons to be vetted is limited. Individuals with significant 
integrity deficits are often reluctant to subject themselves to the scrutiny of 
a screening process and may, therefore, exclude themselves from the formal 
requirements of a vetting process.
 The outcomes of a vetting process for public employees who do not meet 
the minimum criteria for continued employment should depend on the rea-
sons for removal as well as the specific context. An employee with integrity 
deficits could be disqualified from a certain category of posts, from all posts in 
an institution, or from public service in general. The disqualification could be 
permanent or temporary, and reintegration could depend on the fulfillment 
of certain conditions, for example, the acknowledgement of or compensation 
for certain acts of misconduct. The employee could also be reassigned, put on 
probation, demoted, or barred from promotion. While employees who were 
involved in gross violations of human rights or serious crimes under inter-
national law should be banned from public employment, the determination 
of appropriate outcomes depends largely on the specific circumstances of the 
post-conflict context.
 If an employee is removed for lack of professional competence, the 
employee could apply for another position or reapply for the same position 
as soon as she or he has acquired the missing skills. If an employee is removed 
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only as a result of changes to the composition of personnel, the employee 
could immediately apply for another public post. While rewarding abusers 
should be avoided, care should also be taken to prevent, or at least alleviate, 
the detrimental effects removals might have on employees who are removed 
for reasons other than integrity deficits. The personnel reform process might, 
for example, foresee the provision of alternative employment, severance pay, 
reintegration assistance, or the provision of retraining.
d. dEVElOP ThE mEChANISm
Generally, regular discipline mechanisms are inadequate to conduct a vet-
ting process in a post-conflict context and a special, ad hoc commission has 
to be established (see above III.D). This commission should be independent 
to ensure an impartial and legitimate implementation of the process. Estab-
lishing an independent commission may not be an easy task in a country 
emerging from conflict. The members of the commission should be distin-
guished and broadly respected individuals who are not associated with a for-
mer warring faction. Broad consultations should precede the appointment of 
the members by a high and independent authority, such as the constitutional 
court, the head of state, or an international institution. The senior members 
should be appointed for the duration of the personnel reform process and 
should not be removable during this period.
 The ad hoc commission will need a well-staffed secretariat to prepare the 
necessary information and support the decision-making process. The staff 
of the secretariat should be multidisciplinary and include project managers, 
information system managers, lawyers, and technical experts. The commis-
sion and its secretariat should also be given adequate financial and material 
resources. Given the scarcity of resources in a post-conflict situation and the 
importance of an effective and fair vetting process, international support to 
establish and run an ad hoc commission will often be necessary.
 The ad hoc commission is likely to make unpopular decisions that could 
lead to risks for its members; arrangements need to be put in place to provide 
security for them.
 Domestic ownership, where possible, is preferable to internationalized 
processes, as it contributes to the legitimacy of the process, ensures the appli-
cation of local know-how, and provides a better basis for domestic buy-in and 
sustainability. Vetting will, however, inevitably meet resistance, in particular 
when representatives of former warring factions continue to wield authority 
in the post-conflict period. Strong international support, both political and 
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operational, will often be critical. The inclusion of international members 
may be considered to increase the independence and legitimacy of the ad hoc 
commission.
 In some instances, international leadership may be unavoidable. In an 
internationally-led process, every effort should be made to involve domestic 
actors as broadly as possible, ensure incorporation into domestic law, and 
make provision for a seamless changeover from the ad hoc vetting process to 
regular domestic recruitment and disciplinary procedures.
E. RESPECT INTERNATIONAl PROCEdURAl STANdARdS
Vetting processes that fail to respect international standards may undermine, 
rather than reinforce human rights and the rule of law and are unlikely to 
build civic trust. International standards require, in particular, that vetting 
processes are based on assessments of individual conduct, rather than on 
membership of a group or institution. Purges and other large-scale exclusions 
on the sole basis of group affiliation not only violate international standards 
but also tend to cast the net too wide and to exclude persons of integrity who 
bear no individual responsibility for past abuses. At the same time, group 
exclusions may also be too narrow and overlook individuals who commit-
ted abuses but were not members of the group. Such collective processes are 
unlikely to achieve the intended reform goals, may exclude employees whose 
expertise is needed in the post-conflict period, and may create a pool of dis-
contented persons that might undermine the transition.
 What specific rights apply in the vetting process itself depends on the type 
of process used. In a review process, minimum due process standards required 
in administrative proceedings should be respected:3 initiation of proceedings 
within a reasonable time and generally in public; notification of the parties 
under investigation of the proceedings and the case against them; an oppor-
tunity for the parties to prepare a defense, including access to relevant data; 
an opportunity for them to present arguments and evidence, and to respond 
to opposing arguments and evidence, before the vetting body; the opportu-
nity of being represented by counsel; notification of the parties of the decision 
and the reasons for the decision; and the right to appeal to a court or other 
independent body. An exception to this is that employees who were unlaw-
fully appointed, in violation of procedural or qualification requirements, can 
be removed without any need to establish other reasons for their removal.
 A balance of probabilities standard will generally be appropriate in a 
review process and the burden of proof falls generally on the vetting body. 
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Under exceptional circumstances, the burden may be reversed when the 
group or unit the employee belonged to during the conflict has a well-known 
history of human rights abuse. In such instances, the employee would have to 
prove noninvolvement in the abuse.
 The procedural status of a candidate in a reappointment process is dif-
ferent. Access to public employment as such is not a right, and a candidate 
who challenges the fact that she or he has not been selected does not enjoy 
the due process protections that are granted to an employee who is removed 
from public service. Reappointment processes are, therefore, procedurally 
less complex than review processes. A candidate for public employment has, 
however, a right to “access, on general terms of equality, to public service.”4 
Access to public service should, therefore, be based on criteria of equality, and 
the selection process should ensure equal application conditions and nondis-
criminatory procedures.
 Special international and constitutional protections safeguard the inde-
pendence of the judiciary including the separation of powers, guaranteed ten-
ure of judges, inability to be removed by executive order, prohibition of inter-
ference with the judicial process, and so forth. Particular care has to be taken 
to protect the independence of judges both in the process by which judges are 
vetted and in formulating the criteria according to which they are reviewed. 
In general, the vetting of judges should be carried out by their peers, through 
a regular or ad hoc judicial review commission.
 Appointments by executive order are reversible without due process con-
cerns. A political appointee who is removed by executive order has generally 
no right to a hearing or judicial review.
v. what other institutional reforms are necessary?
A comprehensive approach to institutional reform is critical to ensure its 
effectiveness and sustainability. More often than not, the shortcomings of a 
public institution in a post-conflict situation are multifaceted and represent 
complex and interrelated causes of malfunctioning and abuses. Generally, 
vetting and personnel reform are important but insufficient reform measures 
and need to be accompanied by broader institutional reforms to safeguard 
the results of the vetting process and to ensure the quality of public person-
nel in the future. These include, in particular, measures to remove political 
interference in and partisan control from public institutions, and to establish 
operational independence and public accountability. While a detailed discus-
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sion of these measures goes beyond the scope of these guidelines, key reform 
measures include the following:
• Terminate inappropriate interference by informal authorities such as 
warlords, ethnic groups, clans, or paramilitary groups;
• Initiate institutional culture change, including appropriate modifica-
tions in training methodology and content;
• Change symbols that are associated with abusive practices (e.g., uni-
forms, insignia, flags);
• Create a sense of identification of employees with their public institu-
tion. Allow, for example, employee participation in the choices defin-
ing the institution (values, motto, symbols, etc.), or offer extrainstitu-
tional incentives and services such as schooling and housing;
• Establish effective civilian oversight (constitutional, parliamentary, 
ministerial, public, community-level, ombudsperson);
• Provide effective redress for misconduct (internal disciplinary and 
public complaint procedures);
• Reform appointment procedures (merit based, ensure effective repre-
sentation of particular groups, ensure due process, create professional 
career path, limit appointment powers of the executive branch of 
government);
• Ensure the separation of powers, build in particular the independence 
of the judiciary and the operational independence of other public 
institutions (e.g., the police and the prosecutor’s offices); and
• Establish effective representation of public employees (professional 
associations).
vi. sources of additional information
There is limited information available on vetting. Within the UN system, the 
Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in particular its Civilian 
Police Division, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) have been involved in vetting processes. The International Center 
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) is acting as consultant on vetting to the UN in 
several countries (for contacts, see http://www.ictj.org). UN documents with 
useful general references to vetting include:
• The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Soci-
eties. Report of the Secretary-General, August 23, 2004, UN doc. 
S/2004/616.
• Diane Orentlicher, Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of 
Principles to Combat Impunity, and Updated Set of Principles for the Protec-
tion and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, 
February 8, 2005, UN doc. E/CN.4/2005/102.Add.1.
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notes
1 These guidelines were produced by the International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
with the financial support of the UNDP. A similar version of these guidelines has been 
published by the UNDP and is available at http://www.undp.org/bcpr/documents/jssr/
trans_justice/Vetting_Public_Employees_in_Post-Conflict_Settings.pdf. A similar ver-
sion has also been published by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) as Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States — Vetting: An Operational 
Framework (New York and Geneva: OHCHR, 2006).
2 For a full explanation of the CIF, see Annex 2 of the UNDP’s version of the guidelines.
3 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
4 Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
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CountRies eMeRGinG fRoM aRMed ConfliCt oR authoRitaRian Rule face difficult 
questions about what to do with public employees who perpetrated past human rights 
abuses and the institutional structures that allowed such abuses to happen. Justice as 
Prevention: Vetting Public Employees in Transitional Societies, edited by Alexander 
Mayer-Rieckh and Pablo de Greiff, examines the transitional reform known as “vetting” 
 — the process by which abusive or corrupt employees are excluded from public office. 
More than a means of punishing individuals, vetting represents an important transitional 
justice measure aimed at reforming institutions and preventing the recurrence of abuses. 
Justice as Prevention is the result of a multiyear project of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice that included human rights lawyers, experts on police and judicial 
reform, and scholars of transitional justice and reconciliation. It includes case studies of 
Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, the former German 
Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and South Africa, as well as chapters on 
cross-cutting themes such as due process, information management, and intersections 
with other institutional reforms. 
 “Justice as Prevention is a triple boon to the field of good governance. It establishes the 
importance of vetting as an integral part of transitional justice; it gives us a nuanced  
look at the complexity of the issues, which make vetting in practice so much more difficult 
than in policy; and, finally, it provides an invaluable, practical set of guidelines for those 
who take up this crucial work. Rarely does a single volume speak with such moral, 
historical, and practical authority all at once.”   
— ChRistoPheR stone, Guggenheim Professor of the Practice of Criminal Justice, 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
 “This penetrating and timely collection of studies contributes much to our understanding 
of the role vetting plays in pursuit of the rule of law in post-conflict settings. It skillfully 
articulates how vetting is at the heart of ensuring public confidence in police and  
other law enforcement agencies in transitional societies. Justice as Prevention is a  
great contribution to the growing discipline of post-conflict institutional reform.”  
— MaRK a. KRoeKeR, Police Adviser and Director of the Police Division, United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
alexandeR MayeR-RieCKh manages the ICTJ’s security system reform program. He  
was chief of the Human Rights Office of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
worked for the UN in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Timor Leste, and has 
published on post-conflict institutional reform and peacebuilding.
Pablo de GReiff is director of research at the ICTJ. Formerly associate professor of 
philosophy at SUNY Buffalo and Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at the Center for 
Human Values, Princeton University, he is the editor of seven books, most recently 
The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University Press, 2006).  
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